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Every Kinda People
Said the fight to make ends meet
Keeps a man upon his feet
Holding down his job
Trying to show he can’t be bought
It takes every kinda people
To make what life’s about 
Every kind of people
To make the world go ‘round
Someone’s looking for a lead
In his duty to a King or to a creed
Protecting what he feels is right
Fights against wrong with his life
There is no profit in deceit
Honest men know that
Revenge does not taste sweet
Whether yellow, black or white
Each and every man’s the same inside
It takes every kinda people
To make what life’s about 
It takes every kind of people
To make the world go ‘round
You know that love’s the only goal
That could bring a peace to any soul
Hey, and every man’s the same
He wants the sunshine in his name
It takes every kinda people
To make what life’s about 
It takes every kind of  people
To make the world go ‘round
Lyrics: Andy Fraser
Artist: Robert Palmer
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Introduction: Language and the Military
Language is fundamental to all social interaction. Even more so in the case of military 
operations in which efficient communication could mean the difference between life and 
death. History is rife with examples that demonstrate the importance of language for effective 
military cooperation. From ancient times to this very day multilingual armies have been part 
of war. Especially before the rise of modern nation-states polyglot armies were a widespread 
phenomenon. Empires, city-states and other political entities relied upon soldiers from 
various cultural and linguistic backgrounds to protect their interests and fight their enemies. 
The armed forces of France’s Ancien régime, for instance, consisted of, among others, Danish, 
Dutch, German, Hungarian, Italian, Irish, Polish, Swedish, and Swiss troops which all had 
their own customs and spoke their own language. Similarly, French recruits who originated 
from different parts of the country spoke dialects that often were unintelligible for those 
who were not familiar with these vernaculars. In this particular multilingual context military 
leaders not only continuously needed to find ways to communicate with their troops, they 
also needed to discuss the battle plan with commanders who were often foreigners as well. 
Consequently, the French army was always in search of ‘ad hoc strategies’ to overcome the 
language barrier (Tozzi, 2012, 12-16). 
With the emergence of national armies, soldiers became unified by their state’s official 
mother tongue(s). Multilingual states tried to prevent miscommunication by categorizing 
their troops on grounds of shared language. The language barrier, therefore, no longer 
hampered communication between commanders and their troops to the extent it did in the 
past. Yet, new challenges arose as armed forces of various countries increasingly started to 
work together in multinational alliances and coalitions. Now, the language gap between 
partners needed to be addressed. This was, for instance, experienced by the French-British 
(and later also American) alliance in the First World War (Heimburger, 2012). After the Second 
World War – which of course was won by another coalition – more permanent structures 
for multinational military cooperation were established. The UN and NATO became the 
most prominent organizations for humanitarian intervention and collective security. Today, 
many countries no longer are capable of conducting large operations on their own (Soeters 
& Manigart, 2008, 1-3). It is, therefore, of crucial importance to deal with language matters 
in international military cooperation. 
The internationalization of military operations also increased the amount of foreign 
missions. During such deployments, soldiers came to realize that it was unsustainable to 
‘ignore’ the languages of the local population (Kujamäki & Footitt, 2012, 120 -121). Throughout 
history armed forces had to deal with the peoples living in their area of operations. In case of 
linguistic differences, militaries, therefore, have relied on individuals whose skills enabled 
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stability in affected nations which typically is accomplished through military interventions 
by an international coalition. Current examples include UN missions in Mali and Congo 
and NATO missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For that reason, peace (support) and stability 
operations fulfill a predominant role in the spectrum of modern military operations. 
Precisely because such endeavors mostly seek to stabilize war-torn countries, it is crucial 
for soldiers to establish ties with local parties (Bollen & Rietjens, 2008, 1-2; Bollen & Soeters, 
2010, 174-176; Van der Meulen, Beeres, Soeters & Vogelaar, 2012, 11-12). As mentioned above, 
this confronts military organizations with a twofold challenge with regard to language 
management. First, the organization has to deal with language issues between the various 
national contingents of an international coalition. Secondly, the soldiers have to overcome 
the language barrier between themselves and local parties. This study therefore specifically 
focuses on peace (support) and stability as the most relevant forms of modern, international 
military operations. In the event of these operations, circumstances can be such that ‘talking 
is more important than shooting’ (Bos & Soeters, 2006, 261). Therefore, language today 
matters even more than in traditional warfare. 
Research design
The developments in military interventions during the past two decades have demonstrated 
that soldiers who deployed to foreign mission areas ‘(…) came up against the kinds of issues 
traditionally raised by scholars in modern languages, cultural studies and translation/
interpreting studies, questions relating to identity, agency, inter-cultural communication 
and transnationalism’ (Kelly, Footitt & Salama-Carr, 2019, 4). Given that lived reality, 
language became an irrefutable factor or even force in modern warfare. Whereas studies in 
language and conflict traditionally was the field of humanities, the linguistic facets of war in 
recent years have drawn the attention of a wide array of scholars from different disciplines. 
This growing body of interdisciplinary research combines insights from humanities and 
social sciences and thereby ‘provides a particularly helpful context for scholars to engage 
with issues of language and conflict as sites of inquiry (…) which will allow for synchronic 
and diachronic research on the role played by language and language mediators in situations 
of conflict and beyond’ (Kelly, Footitt & Salama-Carr, 2019, 6). Therefore, while this study 
predominantly adopts a sociological perspective to investigate how language matters 
influence the military organization and stakeholders in conflict-infested mission areas, it 
also incorporates insights that have been yielded by this interdisciplinary approach. 
Today’s military missions are highly internationalized organizational efforts that 
often take place in non-Western countries. Soldiers, therefore, need to collaborate with 
various national contingents of a coalition as well as local partners. As mentioned before, 
the language barrier affects both these forms of international military cooperation. For 
instance, even NATO with its highly standardized use of English has found that non-native 
them to mediate between soldiers and local parties (including the enemy). Here is where 
the interpreter entered the theatre of war. Whereas interpreters since of old have assisted 
armies, military organizations nowadays deploy these agents on an unprecedented scale. In 
Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, thousands of civilians were recruited to work as linguists 
for foreign forces (Fitchett, 2019, 194). As will be explained below, many of today’s missions 
are simply impossible without interpreters who not only act as ‘(..) language experts in the 
communication process between the foreign military and their compatriots’, but also ‘(…) as 
cultural, diplomatic and political mediators’ (Bos & Soeters, 2006, 266). The interpreters’s skills 
therefore are indispensable for ‘(…) working and talking with foreign military troops, police 
officers, government officials, and indigenous members of the population’ (Hajjar, 2017, 93). 
The importance of these agents, in fact, most probably will only increase even further in the 
future. Despite rapid developments in machine translation, human interpretation remains 
vital to grasp the nuance in sensitive situations of (violent) contention (Fitchett, 2019, 201-
202). It is more than likely that technology might provide ‘ever more accurate translations’ 
and deliver new tools to complement the military’s linguistic capabilities (Kelly, 2019a, 484). 
These innovations, however, will never replace the interpreter as an intermediate between 
parties. Like war itself, interpreting is and will remain a human and social activity. 
Language, undeniably, is crucial to the military. In addition to the need to overcome 
the language barrier within the own organization or international coalition, there is 
also the need to interact with local parties. Language management, therefore, should 
be an inherent part of governing the military organization. The formulation of language 
policy, however, is a time-consuming process which is further complicated by the fluidity 
of linguistic demands (Jones & Askew, 2014, 202-203). The need for language support, after 
all, heavily depends on the area of operations and consequently varies for each specific 
deployment. This explains why language policy does not primarily focus on operational 
practices, but rather concentrates on communication within national armies or between 
member states of international organizations (Kelly, 2019b, 92-94; Jones & Askew, 2014, 1-6). 
Since its establishment in 1949, NATO, for instance, has developed an extensive guidance 
to standardize English as its ‘language of interoperability’ in order to guarantee effective 
communication in various international headquarters. A similar formal policy with regard 
to operations, however, only emerged in 2011 when a first doctrine on Linguistic Support For 
Operations was promulgated (Jones & Askew, 2014, 201-203; NATO, 2011). 
NATO’s adoption of language policy for operational practice fits in a wider global trend 
that is brought forth by the nature of modern military operations. Traditionally, Western 
armies are trained and equipped to fight similarly organized militaries of opposing states 
(Kitzen, 2020, 2-3). In modern warfare, however, such direct conflicts between states are 
an exception. Even in this time of renewed global power competition, most fighting takes 
place against irregular armed groups that thrive in instable countries in which they seek to 
establish their authority. Moreover, such actors have become ever more capable of exerting 
influence on the regional or global level. Addressing this threat requires the enhancement of 
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Research Questions
Central Question: How do language issues affect military operations, and how in 
particular do soldiers and interpreters cooperate in mission areas to overcome 
such issues? 
Q1: How do language problems manifest themselves during military operations?
Q2: What are the implications of language (in)competence on communication 
between soldiers in multinational military organizations?
Q3: How does the language barrier between soldiers and local population 
influence the complexity of modern peace operations?
Q4: How do soldiers perceive the interpersonal dynamics of working with local 
interpreters as linguistic and cultural mediators in mission areas?
Q5: How can the role and position of interpreters in military contexts be described 
by use of interpreters’ working experiences in war-infested environments?
Q6: What are the dynamics of cooperation between soldiers and interpreters in 
























The six research questions generate independent but interrelated studies which in their 
entirety answer the central question. The structure of this dissertation, therefore, consists 
of an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion. The latter not only presents an overview 
of the main findings, it also discusses broader implications by respectively reflecting upon 
the study itself, giving suggestions for avenues for further research, and formulating 
recommendations. This introduction describes the research problem and explains the 
research design. The six chapters subsequently each address a specific object by applying a 
tailored method to answer the respective research question (see the Research Design table 
below). This study, therefore contains a variation of research objects and methods which 
provides a framework to deepen the understanding of the influence of the language barrier 
on international military cooperation. Now that the overall research design is clarified, it is 
important to briefly expound on the course of each chapter.  
The first chapter, Language Matters in the Military, adopts a macro/meso-sociological 
perspective in order to gain insight into the impact of language issues during military 
operations. The exploration, therefore, focuses on creating an overview of language-related 
problems and deficiencies in military cooperation and as such provides a further explanation 
of this dissertation’s research subject. For a thorough analysis of these difficulties the 
chapter relies upon the study of a wide range of organizational, sociological and historical 
literature. This enables the investigation of relevant experiences as well as the establishment 
speakers are not always able to meet the required level of the official military lingua franca 
which prevents them from collaborating with others and carrying out their duties properly 
(Jones & Askew, 2014, 35-36). Communication with local stakeholders, moreover, is even 
more complicated because this often requires knowledge of local vernaculars. A failure to 
effectively adapt to this reality seriously affects the military’s ability to engage and cooperate 
with the local population. To provide insight into the impact of these issues, this study first 
adopts a macro/meso-sociological approach to analyze respectively the manifestation of 
language problems in military operations, the implications of language (in)competence 
on multinational military cooperation, and the influence of the language barrier between 
soldiers and the local population on modern missions. 
Secondly, the study also applies a micro-sociological analysis to investigate the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters during the conduct of operations. This 
particular focus is a result of the nature of modern military operations as well as the 
complexity of this specific working relationship. These missions, after all, to a higher or lesser 
degree involve ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local population. Soldiers, therefore, 
depend on the socio-linguistic and cultural skills of the interpreter to get their message 
across. While interpreters are crucial to the success of the mission, they not always receive 
full recognition for their role and position (Bos & Soeters, 2006; Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 
201; Fitchett, 2019; Gallai, 2019). As a consequence, interpreters remain relative outsiders 
to the military organization. This paradox renders the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters one of the most complicated factors in the daily conduct of military operations 
that ‘(…) until recently has been a ‘missing dimension’ of the study of conflict’ (Kleinman, 
2012, 26). The micro-sociological investigation therefore seeks to understand how soldiers 
perceive the interpersonal dynamics of working with interpreters and how the interpreters 
themselves perceive their role and position in a conflict situation. Furthermore, this part of 
the study aims to comprehend the mechanisms of this cooperation and how the involved 
parties deal with the inherent intricacies. 
All together, these macro/meso-sociological and micro-sociological angles serve to 
enhance the research’s main goal to understand the influence of language matters on 
international military cooperation. In order to address these objectives, the framework of 
this study consists of a central question which in turn is specified into six research questions 
as depicted in the figure below.    
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of the role and position of interpreters in war zones. Together these aspects constitute a 
theoretical framework which enables a further investigation of similar experiences in the 
specific context of military operations.
The final chapter, Communicating Vessels? The Trade and Traits of Soldiers and Interpreters during 
Stability Operations in the Province of Uruzgan, aims to provide an insight into the dynamics of 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters in military operations and how individuals 
deal with the inherent intricacies of this relationship. By use of the previously introduced 
theoretical framework, a qualitative case study of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan province 
(during 2006-2008) is conducted through semi-structured interviews with Dutch soldiers 
as well as national and local interpreters. Some of these interviews took place during field 
research in which the researcher resided as a participant observer among the troops in 
Afghanistan. The findings from this micro-sociological in-depth analysis not only contribute 
to the understanding of the dynamics and intricacies of this interaction, they also describe 
how different individuals dealt with the challenges they encountered. This case study 
moreover also identifies possible paths of solution for more effective cooperation between 
soldiers and interpreters in future missions.  
Ultimately, the combined insights of these six chapters provide the answer to the central 
question of how language issues affect military operations, and how in particular soldiers 
and interpreters cooperate in mission areas to overcome such issues. As mentioned before, 
the conclusion of this dissertation discusses the wider implications of these findings 
and thereby it hopes to contribute to both the field’s body of knowledge and the military 
organization’s ability to effectively overcome the language barrier during operations.   
of a theoretical review of the military setting and organization and the role of language 
management in this specific context.      
The second chapter, Tough Talk: Clear and Cluttered Communication during Peace Operations, aims 
to understand the effect of language (in)competence on cooperation between international 
soldiers. For this purpose, a macro/meso-sociological analysis of organizational and 
sociological literature is complemented by participant observation during an exercise of 
staff officers of (1) GE-NL Corps. The resulting findings demonstrate how the language barrier, 
when not addressed appropriately, can separate and divide members of an international 
coalition. Even more important, the analysis also addresses how soldiers can anticipate 
language issues within military alliances. 
The third chapter, Language and Communication during Peace Support Operations in Timor-Leste, 
explores the impact of the language barrier on the complexity of modern operations. Again, 
a macro/meso-sociological perspective is applied to grasp the experiences of the involved 
international and local parties in these operations. For this purpose the example of the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East-Timor (UNTAET) is analyzed. This specific 
case not only offers an insight into the complexity of modern operations and the influence 
of language on organizational effectiveness, it also illustrates how such issues affect overall 
mission success. The case study makes use of the available body of literature on UNTAET as 
well as information from experts. 
The fourth chapter, Smooth Translation? Cooperation between Dutch Servicemen and Local 
Interpreters in Military Operations in Afghanistan, investigates the cooperation between soldiers 
and local interpreters from the perspective of the servicemen. This chapter marks the shift 
from a macro/meso-sociological towards a micro-sociological approach that concentrates 
on the dynamics of interaction between individuals. The study first explores historical and 
sociological literature on this matter. These findings have contributed to the formulation 
of several specific items with regard to soldiers’ experiences with local interpreters as part 
of a quantitative study conducted among Dutch soldiers deployed to the Afghan province 
of Uruzgan. This chapter not only provides an impression of the role of the interpreter as 
a language and cultural mediator within the military organization, it also elucidates the 
intricacies of interpersonal interaction that result from the in-between position of these 
agents.
The fifth chapter, A Small Sociology of Interpreters: the Role and Position of Interpreters in Conflict 
Situations, uses the perspective of the interpreters themselves to capture their working 
experiences in circumstances of violent contention. This exploration is conducted through 
an autoethnographic analysis of narratives from interpreters who operated in different 
conflict situations. Autoethnography is a qualitative research method which places the 
personal experiences (auto) of an individual within a social and cultural context (ethno) and 
as such offers reflective and critical interpretations (graphy) of everyday practices (Gregory, 
2000, 326; Chang, 2008, 41; Mischenko, 2005, 206; Panourgia, 2000, 552). The aspects derived 
from the application of this particular method of analysis provide an accurate description 
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Chapter 1
Language Matters in the Military
Andrea van Dijk & Joseph L. Soeters
Published in Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution: Sociological Perspectives, eds. Giuseppe Caforio,
Gerhard Kümmel and Bandana Purkayastha (2008, 303-325). Bingley: Emerald.
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is insufficient for facing the socio-linguistic challenges of an environment dominated 
by a multitude of vernaculars. In line with this premise, this article seeks to explore the 
environments of both multinational and military organizations which through their quality 
of international cooperation are forced to confront the language barrier. As such this article 
intends to contribute to the general development of a scientific perspective on the effect of 
language on international military communication.  
Through an illustration of historical military events, this article first describes the various 
ways in which language and the lack of linguistic proficiency can complicate the execution 
of instructions and commands as well as undermine peace negotiations. Secondly, it gives 
an explanation of the term language management by transposing the concept from the field 
of international management to the military context. Thirdly, this article will explore some 
of the specific environments in which the interventions of interpreters vis-à-vis military 
officers and the local population take place. Finally, the article will render a preview on the 
development of future research methods and instruments to investigate the influence of 
language management on today’s military peace operations.  But, first, we will begin with 
two illustrations of military history.  
2. Two Historical Military Cases
European military history has taught that commands at times tend to fall on deaf ears 
because soldiers do not master the language in which the instructions are communicated. 
Linguistic problems also arise when soldiers are unfamiliar with the vernaculars belonging 
to the expeditionary environment and for that reason fail to understand both the gravity 
of what has been said as well as the meaning and implications of the situation at hand. 
Consequences of such confusing linguistic situations can be illustrated by the language 
conflict within the Belgian Army during the turn and second half of the twentieth century, 
and the linguistic jungle of the colonial East-Indies, the war zone of the Dutch Colonial Army 
during the period 1815-1949.   
2.1 En Garde: A Flemish-French Military Linguistic Liaison under Fire
The origins of the Belgian language conflict can be situated around the year 1830, when 
the governmental bodies of the Belgian provinces separated themselves from the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and its regents not short thereafter decided to promulgate 
the introduction of a monolingual, Francophone army (De Vos & Coenen, 1988a, 90). The 
motivation for the promulgation was manifold. Besides a strong aversion against the Dutch 
language, the language of the former Kingdom, the rationale was also based on the far more 
ancient and common public principle to install one language for the military administration 
1. Introduction
Words imply action. Communication becomes of exigent importance in the international 
military field where the results of life-threatening peace-support operations depend on 
messages that must be understood ‘loud and clear’ before action can be undertaken (Crossey, 
2005, 35f ). Precisely because of its importance, communication can be described as the 
military’s aorta as it keeps the ‘heart’ of the military organization vital. And in line with this 
analogy, language can be categorized as the proverbial oxygen that makes communication 
possible. It is the key element with which all talk, whether small or big, trivial or profound, 
begins and ends. Yet, it is this natural commodity which is often overseen or neglected in 
situations where it is most needed. The words of Lydia Sicher, a psychiatrist and physician 
who volunteered for the Austrian army during World War I, reflect the tenor of this article 
when she stated that ‘As long as we can talk with people, as long as we can keep the guns 
quiet, one has a chance.1’
Especially in today’s peace support operations wherein talking is often more important 
than shooting, Sicher’s adage strikes a chord with the contemporary need to address the 
linguistic challenges that are inherent to military operations which often cover linguistically 
diverse national continents. A telling history in this regard is the compelling memoirs of 
former UN leader General Roméo Dallaire (2004) ‘Shake Hands with the Devil’. This autobiography 
offers not only a gruesome inside perspective on the Rwandan tragedy, it also is illustrative 
of how language incompetence can debilitate and undermine the communication between 
various military and governmental parties. As more often is the case, the ethnic conflict 
which at the time was infesting the Francophone country had a linguistic component to it 
(Laitin, 2000, 531-533). 
The Tutsi population in that country had many years before sought refuge in the 
neighboring Anglophone country of Uganda in 1962 after the Hutu’s had installed a Hutu-
dominated government. In 1991, when the first signs of the civil war were at hand, a constant 
stream of belligerent Tutsi men whom had organized themselves in the military movement 
of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, returned to their motherland ‘to restore’ their political 
power. Consequently, the political and military context of Dallaire’s peacekeeping operation 
was characterized by warring parties who each adhered to their own distinct language of 
French, English or vernacular. This linguistic limbo was compounded by Dallaire’s ‘ad 
hoc, multi-ethnic, and multilingual force’ of Belgian, French, Tunisian, Ghanaian and 
Bangladeshi contingents of which the latter did not command nor understood French, 
English or Kinyarwanda (Dallaire, 2004, 120-176). Being a bilingual himself and surrounded 
with multilingual coworkers, Dallaire, however, was able to circumvent the ‘language 
barrier’ many a time, but his report equally resonates his frustration in situations wherein a 
lack of linguistic proficiency threatened to thwart peace negotiations. 
The memoirs of Dallaire’s traumatic experiences in Rwanda is exemplary for the fact that 
a proficiency of the English language, the proclaimed international military lingua franca, 
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his extensive plea for a responsible sexual moral was shortened by a bilingual speaking 
officer into the less subtle ‘Stay clear of dirty lasses’ for the Flemish part of the troops.2 
That orders and the accompanying translations in other less carefree circumstances 
could lead to grave consequences can be gathered from testimonies of soldiers who served 
in the trenches of World War I. In this particular combat situation miscommunication due 
to a lack of linguistic skills resulted in the complete decimation of platoons, a tragedy of 
which the only unmistakable translation, the rise in the number of casualties, at long last 
reached the echelons of a dawdling government (Boijen, 1992, 67). The deferment of the 1913 
law which promised to address the grievances of the language struggle within the army had 
increased feelings of unease and frustration among the soldiers (De Vos & Coenen, 1988c, 
199). Tired of fighting a war that left them out in the cold and incited by the fervent criticism 
of clergymen and intellectuals who accused the government of using the language issue as 
a national trump card, radical sentiments gradually took hold of the Flemish troops (De Vos 
& Coenen, 1998c, 216). Preceded by years of administrative scheming and on the eve of yet 
another world war, the Flemish slogan ‘Na ons bloed, nu ons recht’ (‘First our blood, now our 
right’) was finally reflected in the hard-won and assailed law of 1938 which promulgated 
bilingual standards for the education of Belgian military officers (Boijen, 1992, 98, 287f ).    
2.2 Kromoblanda: The Multicolored and Multilingual Composition of the Dutch       
       Colonial Army
Another evocative historical example of the complexities of language within a military 
environment can be found in the colonial era of the Dutch Indies. As a true colonial power 
the Netherlands sought to exploit the conquered regions and expand its dominion over the 
native population. Just like its fellow colonial superpowers Great-Britain, Belgium, France, 
Spain and Portugal, The Netherlands proceeded according to the principles of imperialism. 
Unlike the other colonial powers, however, the Dutch colonial authorities paid little heed to 
the chapter on language and how to implement guidelines for a national language policy (De 
Swaan ,2001, 86f; Groeneboer, 1997, 9). 
Instead of constituting a national language from the very outset, as the other colonizers 
did, e.g., in central African countries and India, the Dutch colonial governmental 
bodies throughout the years got caught up in two opposite and alternate linguistic ideas 
(Groeneboer, 1997, 65f.). On the one hand, there was the school which advocated that one 
of the indigenous languages of the Archipelago the so called bahasa pasar or bahasa dagang, 
a popular and hybrid form of Malay, should become the lingua franca. The other linguistic 
movement, however, argued that no other language than the Dutch language could bring 
governmental solace and prosperity to the multifaceted colony (Maier, 1997, 18-45). Both 
‘parties’ could not find a compromise to overcome the linguistic impasse. Despite or perhaps 
and national army. The thought behind this monolingual policy consisted of the strong 
conviction that two or more languages would tear up and weaken the sovereignty of the 
country. The ancient rule, however, suited the political times rather perfectly. The French 
language after all was the language most spoken by the elite. Consequently, the adage was 
shared by a minority and not the majority of the population. It was the French speaking elite, 
the moneyed class who supported if not embraced this new rule. The rest of the people, that 
is the Flemish, just seemed to acquiesce in what they had known to be true for donkey’s 
years: laborers, whether a factory worker or a farm hand, communicated in their mother 
tongue while their superiors expressed themselves in French (De Vos & Coenen, 1988a, 91, 
145). 
Social stratification in other words not only categorized the Belgian society along the 
line of profession and descent, the higher rungs of the social ladder also demarcated an all 
telling ‘language barrier’ that explained people their social position by the utterance of just 
one word. Although the social structure of society thus clearly and conveniently organized 
society by the dividing line of linguistics, the language policy nevertheless stumbled upon 
an increasing resistance from the majority of the Flemish speaking population. The Zeitgeist 
had jolted the latter awake, all the more because Germany’s display of power in Europe 
portended the eve of an international war. With the organization of the national army and 
the monolingual language policy in effect, the Belgian administration seemed to be in 
control of the impending danger. At this stage, the national government, however, could 
not foresee that Germany was not their only enemy and that along with the escalation of 
World War I yet another conflict of a totally different kind was about to burst within the ranks 
of the national army itself. This happened when Flemish soldiers demanded the formation 
of separate, linguistic regiments, thereby shifting the scene of action towards the political 
arena of language dominance (De Vos & Coenen, 1988c, 198-202).    
Expecting an impending war, the Belgian government was pushed to form a strong army 
and started to recruit its men among the Flemish who soon formed more than half of the 
soldiers under the command of French speaking officers. And although the total number of 
Flemish soldiers in reality did not live up to the ‘eighty percent myth’, which believed to held 
true that eighty percent of the population of the Belgian army consisted of Flemish speaking 
soldiers, the Flemish nevertheless numerically formed the majority of the most dangerous 
military divisions (De Vos & Coenen, 1988b, 141-145). Their lack of educational and linguistic 
capacities destined the Flemish to end up fighting at the frontlines. This situation soon 
resulted in a disproportionate number of casualties among the Flemish infantrymen. Hidden 
behind a failing language policy and illiteracy and manifesting itself as an unrelenting and 
loyal ‘comrade’, the language barrier had thus conveniently lodged itself in the Belgian army. 
There, it could freely exploit the boundaries of language confusion and misunderstanding. 
When a French speaking colonel for instance discretely and rather carefully told his men to 
take personal hygiene and prudence in consideration when approaching girls of easy virtue, 
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guides and interpreters to accompany the soldiers on their patrol. But when the conflict 
between the partisans and the military erupted, the villagers turned out to be a highly 
unreliable source of information. Trapped between parties who did not shun the practice 
of violence, the local citizens often seized the moment by assisting those whom they feared 
most.5 The changing war climate moreover required the troops to develop a military strategy 
which would not only anticipate but also ward off the constant threat of guerrilla attacks. 
The Dutch contingents turned to irregular operations, a strategy which per definition called 
for the highly tested support of locals (Lanzing, 2005, 127-138; Anonymous, 1929, 43-51). The 
teamwork between the military and the locals was thus, to put it mildly, an ambivalent affair 
as distrust characterized their interdependency. 
To add fuel to the flames, the handbook for counter-insurgency, Voorschrift voor de Politiek-
Politionele Taak van het Leger (’Precepts for the Politico-Policing Task of the Army’), which 
described the regulations of the police tasks of the military in the Archipelago, warned future 
soldiers about the muffled and deceptive messages of the local population (De Moor, 2003, 
227). In comic strip the soldier learned, in both Dutch and Malay, that one could better take 
the subtitle, A Matter of Life and Death (Soal Hidoep Atau Mati), to heart if one wanted to return from 
the jungle alive and in one piece. In suggestive images the figures of the local interpreters and 
guides were portrayed as malicious and deceitful. The antidote for their serpentine behavior 
was disarmingly simple: familiarize yourself with the local vernaculars (Anonymous, 1947, 
5-12). Despite its simplification and prejudice, the VPTL handbook nevertheless conveyed a 
lesson, namely an investment in language training, which the (Dutch) military until today 
has not yet fully grasped.   
3. Language Management in the Military 
Both of the described cases, which of course are but two out of the broader gamut of European 
history, show that language is an ambivalent tool because an inadequate use of language can 
thwart the efficacy of the military organization, while language capability conversely can 
engender opportunity and progression. These consequences of language (in-)competence on 
organizational processes have predominantly been examined from the perspective of socio-
linguistic and organizational studies. The increasing process of globalization has forced 
these academic disciplines to focus more intensively on the intricate wheels of international 
management. While organization studies up until now have always invested in the aspects 
of cross-cultural communication, some authors have now come to acknowledge that 
linguistic capability is the carrier of international business communication and professional 
understanding (Adler, 2002, 74-77; Marschan-Piekkari, Welch & Welch, 1999, 422). Analyses 
of various case studies on communication dynamics in multinational corporations have 
gained an insight into the oftentimes strained relationship between parent and host 
national companies (Marschan-Piekkari et al., 1999, 425; Feely & Harzing, 2003, 38; Hoon, 
even precisely because of these failing language concepts, the Archipelago remained to be 
the heterogeneous and multilingual conglomerate it traditionally was.  
The consequences of this lingering language policy did not fail to have its effect on the 
contingents of the Dutch Colonial Army. Because the military service for the Indian colony 
was not mandatory, the Dutch Colonial Army depended on volunteers from other European 
countries and native men to meet the need of combatants (Teitler, 2006, 159-163).3 This 
enactment caused the members of the contingents to experience the fatal mechanism of the 
‘language barrier’ personally. Lanzing, relates the experiences of his grandfather who served 
as a commander in the Archipelago. A transcription of the journal which he kept during his 
deployment in the recruiting encampment of Malang 1907, recounts: “It was the intention 
to cram the freshmen in eight to twelve months for the field battalions, where their other 
military education would be taken care after. But their training was an uphill battle, recruits 
and instructors couldn’t understand each other. Literally. And as a matter of fact that was 
true for the whole of the army. The official policy was that two languages would be applied 
within the perimeters of the Dutch Colonial Army: Dutch and Malay. This was a rather 
unfortunate choice. The officers spoke Dutch, whereas the European non-commissioned 
officers spoke Dutch or German. Only very few (non-commissioned) European officers 
could express themselves in Malay, despite the fact that this was an official requirement. 
The other national languages - Sudanese, Javanese, Timorese, Madurese, to name but a few 
– were complete unknown to them. The native soldiers communicated with each other in 
their own vernacular. Even for them Malay was a foreign language and they weren’t forced or 
encouraged to learn Dutch. The Depot Battalions didn’t take the composition of the troops 
in consideration. It could happen that a new detachment of Timorese recruits arrived at the 
depot and that in the whole of the barracks not even a single staff member could speak their 
language. The instruction of the recruits then took place through exemplary behaviour and 
a literal demonstration of actions.” (Lanzing, 2005, 139f.)4 
As a consequence, all sorts of sociolects originated during the colonial period. Dutch 
soldiers (Blanda’s) developed their own ‘thug-language’ to distinguish themselves from the 
citizenry, and native soldiers (Kromo’s) created their own brand of Malay with a specific idiom 
and vocabulary, the so called barrack Malay. This Babylonian confusion of tongues was skirted 
by the makeshift of the horn player who translated and signalled the military commands 
by the sound of his instrument. The person of the horn player who perhaps can be best 
described as the precursor of the present-day interpreter was of eminent importance for the 
survival of the brigades and therefore held in high regard by his fellow comrades (Lanzing, 
2005, 141). But one can understand that despite the ingenuity of this mediation, music alone 
was not enough to overcome the language barrier. When it came down to establishing 
their administrative authority, the contingents above all relied on the communication and 
cooperation with local chiefs (Maier, 1997, 23). Reciprocity was a universal language all could 
understand; thus out of self-interest and in exchange for village protection, chiefs often not 
only informed the troops about the whereabouts of the rebellions but also assigned local 
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of the linguistic ineptitude of the Spanish medics leaves little to the imagination. People 
had to leave the relative safety of the base and had to drive through high-risk territories to 
reach the medical facilities. They in other words had to risk their lives in order to save a life, 
all because of language problems.  
The Spanish medics clearly experienced difficulties translating the medical argot of their 
native tongue into the English target language. In order to prevent awkward situations such 
as described above, specialists often call upon language assistants to translate the technical 
terminology for them. But even they at times are not guarded against the effects of the language 
barrier (Feely & Harzing, 2003, 6-8). A report of two medical examiners in this regard gives an 
account of the language problems and cultural barriers they themselves and their language 
assistants encountered in the assessment and treatment of enemy prisoners of war and 
foreign civilians during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Griffeth 
& Bally, 2006, 258-259). It appeared that although the language assistants were brought up in 
Arabic speaking households, and were acquainted with Arabic customs, they too sometimes 
were in need of words. The assistants not only experienced problems understanding the Iraqi 
language and traditions, they moreover had difficulties with translating the medical and 
mental health vocabulary. Irrespective of these linguistic obstacles, the medical providers 
nonetheless opted for a broad approach of situations in which medical questions and their 
responses needed to be translated. This meant that language assistants were given some 
latitude to pose questions on the basis of their own conceptual understanding. Needless to 
say, this experimental approach was sometimes more of a hazard than a help to the health 
of the patient. But since the real world, however, not always provides the best fit for patients, 
read Iraq-born and Iraq-practiced psychiatrists, health providers and interpreters have to 
“fight with what they brought”. And that, Griffeth and Bally argue, might as well, with some 
routine education of language assistants in medical terminology, be the reasonable and 
feasible change that would benefit the future assessment of non-English enemy prisoners of 
war or civilians (Griffeth & Bally, 2006, 581). All of the language problems encountered in the 
observations substantiate the findings on the negative effects of the language barrier on the 
information structure within international (military) organizations. 
Just like technical language, informal language can also complicate the process of 
understanding. Second language speakers who are for instance unfamiliar with the 
precise work of (war) slang might not recognize situations in which it is used (Dickson, 
1994, ix-xi; Andersson & Trudgill, 1990, 71-81). As a consequence, non-native speakers 
could unintentionally bring across a different message than which was originally phrased. 
Misunderstanding and miscommunication are therefore but an expression away when slang 
is literally (mis)interpreted.
Language can become even more of a problem when it comes to dialects and accents. 
In the past, the Dutch Colonial Army deliberately used Dutch dialects as ‘code language’ to 
ascertain that confidential information would not be overheard by interpreters and guides 
who could understand Dutch6. Today, however, the use of dialects unintentionally creates 
Sun & Kline Harrison, 1996, 80). Characteristic for these studies is their unanimity in which 
they pinpoint language as the culprit of organizational misunderstanding. The studies 
furthermore discuss the consequences and implications of (fixed) official languages for 
both first and second language speakers. They look closely into the specific phenomena that 
accompany the language barrier such as for instance language nodes, gate-keeping, autistic 
hostility, and parallel information networks. Various field studies conducted during peace 
support operations in 2006 and 2007 rendered opportunities to find out whether we could 
arrive at similar results for contemporary military organizations (see also Van Dijk, 2008).   
A report of a close observation of two commanding officers at Kabul International Airport 
by Resteigne and Soeters (2008) confirms the finding that the presence and proliferation 
of different languages within multinationals can confront its privies with problems that 
debilitate the managerial process. The field study illustrates the (im)practicality of linguistic 
(in)competence, and demonstrates the powerful position of language nodes within 
organizations (Feely & Harzing, 2003, 226). One of the observed officers was blessed with 
the ‘gift of the gap’. He commanded the French, English, German and Dutch language. 
His language proficiency enabled him to receive, influence and transmit information. His 
linguistic scope in other words ‘licensed’ him to become the (in)formal advisor of soldiers 
from various countries. The other officer, however, was less linguistically talented. During 
the observation of his daily routine it became apparent that he, in comparison with the 
‘gifted’ military commander, had not much contact with other personnel at the base. Instead 
of engaging in a proactive style which would keep him abreast, this particular officer awaited 
the moment for the information to reach him. The observation demonstrates that language 
incompetence restricts and perhaps even reduces the range of managerial power, whereas 
language proficiency on the other hand aggrandizes ones’ hold on communicational and 
managerial processes (Marschan-Piekkari et al., 1999, 430; Hoon et al., 1996, 86-89). Language 
nodes, like the ‘gifted’ commander, often cover strategic positions within organizations. 
They are described as ‘gate-keepers, for they can pass or block information between parties 
and as such support or subvert collaboration (Feely & Harzing, 2003, 46, 226). Their linguistic 
leverage thus almost implicitly heralds the onset of a parallel information network. 
Hence, it would be unwise to perceive the shadow structure as a convenient shortcut in the 
communication process for it might as well corrode the formal channels of communication 
and undermine the managerial positions of persons involved.   
Another field study of an international military operation at Kabul International Airport 
illustrates the processes of professional incapacitation and isolation as detrimental effects 
of the language barrier (Feely & Harzing, 2003, 6-8). It recounts of the situation in which 
Spanish medics did not sufficiently command the English language and whom therefore 
were unable to provide medical care during an emergency. It didn’t take very long for the 
news to go round the base. From there on, people sought medical support outside of the 
base at the German medical facilities at ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 
headquarters (Soeters, Resteigne, Moelker & Manigart, 2008). The effect and consequences 
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safe it (at least momentarily) from violent escalation. The fact that linguistic knowledge is an 
effective tool in the operational field, however, is not self-evident as can be gathered from 
the following illustration.
A Belgian commander reported of his experience in Kabul when an American company 
was assigned to his multinational battalion. It appeared that the Americans were not used 
to call upon the services of interpreters during searches and patrols. After a two-week 
training instruction, the American company confirmed that they knew how to team up with 
interpreters. When the company left the battalion after two months, it, however, turned out 
that they hardly had utilized their linguistic resources (Bos & Soeters, 2005, 364).8 Through 
their (in part failing) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a critical evaluation of their 
military doctrine, the US Department of Defense recently has learned that the traditional 
methods of warfighting are not suitable for “low-intensity counterinsurgency operations 
where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain” (McFate, 2005, 24). 
Language learning and cultural awareness have since become qualified as priority matters 
that need to be taken up in future policies of military effectiveness (Moskos, 2007, 3-13; 
McFate & Jackson, 2006, 14).  
4.1. Military Setting and Organization
In military missions language interpreters generally are subdivided into three categories, 
respectively embedded, local, and home-based interpreters. The latter forms the smallest 
category and consists of individuals who have enjoyed a higher (academic) education in the 
target language. The first two categories form the majority of the deployed interpreters. Most 
of the embedded interpreters are former asylum seekers who have lived in the region of the 
operation and who now under the circumstance of their new nationality and out of idealistic 
motives want to support and rebuild the country which they once had to leave as refugees. 
Locally engaged interpreters are, as the term suggests, locally hired individuals who pursue 
the position of interpreter predominantly out of financial considerations. 
Besides the categorization of interpreters the interpreting activity moreover is classified 
along the line of linguistic complexity. This means that the least skilled interpreters, the so 
called ‘dusties’, assist daily reconnaissance and social patrols, and that the more competent 
interpreters are assigned to mediate in technical situations and confidential negotiations 
(Bos & Soeters, 2006, 263f ). Irrespective of category or hierarchy, however, is the communal 
objective of all military interpreters to help peacekeepers to become informed about the 
linguistic and cultural aspects of the communicational process. 
Because of their ‘multipurpose’ as a language mediator, cultural advisor, and intelligence 
gatherer, and not in the least because of the fact that peacekeeping involves intervening 
between warring parties and/or rival parties in a region, high standards in the identification 
and selection of (non-professional) interpreters must be kept up to guarantee the security, 
a confusion of tongues in situations wherein international military organizations need 
to collaborate. An example of an international military operation in which the language 
barrier hampered the cooperation is the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In 
the framework of this particular mission Irish and Swedish troops needed to form a Quick 
Reaction Force (QRF). Despite the fact that the two troops were integrated into one unit and 
located on one compound, the cooperation between the Swedish and Irish soldiers was 
close to nil. One of the reasons for this low level of (communicational) interaction was the 
presence of a language problem between the troops. The Swedes, whom are renowned for 
their outstanding English verbal skills, experienced difficulties understanding their Irish 
colleagues. Used to their own high English standards and pronunciation, the Swedes often 
could not decipher the dialect and diction of the Irish troops.7 
Of course, dialects and accents are not restricted to the communication between 
international military contingents. They are of even greater importance to the communication 
with the local population. In order to prevent miscommunication between international 
military organizations and the local population, military officers in the operational field 
often work together with interpreters. Because of their knowledge of local vernaculars and 
cultural affinity, interpreters are able to close gaps, fill in blanks, support where needed, 
and save situations when necessary. While interpreters thus perform activities far beyond 
the scope of their linguistic task, they, however, are seldom judged on their merits. The 
following paragraph will look more closely into the ways and woes of the interpreter during 
peace support operations.
4. Interpreters: The Tightrope Walkers of War 
Military organizations operating in the context of peace and relief missions depend for 
their field negotiations on the assistance of interpreters. The use of local language in peace 
support operations is recommendable for several reasons. Knowledge of local vernacular 
contributes to the general security of the mission. One of the obvious examples of even the 
most basic command of the local language for instance is the ability to express that one is 
unarmed and that there is no need to shoot. Lessons learned from former peace support 
operations in Bosnia and Haiti moreover have demonstrated that language in the military is 
a matter of credibility for it is a gesture of good will and a sign of respect towards the reality 
of a country (Edwards, 2004). The manual of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti for 
instance describes that linguistic proficiency of military troops not only increases the quality 
of the mission but that language above all is the human right of each person “to express, 
communicate, blossom, develop, and be respected in ones own culture” (Edwards, 2004). 
Even the most rudimentary understanding of the local language and customs equips the 
peacekeeper with a social compass to evaluate the situation. If anything else, it will gain 
the peacekeeper some time and respect. Perhaps even enough to assuage the situation and 
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according to their own cultural references. They, on the other hand, are likely to coincide in 
circumstances wherein the interpreter is called upon to mediate between the two different 
worlds. The interpreter in other words holds a strong hand when it comes to conditions 
which require cultural knowledge and an inside perspective. 
Because of the lack of linguistic proficiency of the deployed contingents, and the 
gravity of the situation at hand, the assistance and support of interpreters could be of 
eminent importance to peace support operations. A vivid and disconcerting account of the 
contribution of interpreters to peacekeeping operations is Kayla Williams’ account of her 
experience as a soldier and interpreter for the American Army during her deployment in Iraq 
in 2003. The following text is part of a reflection described by her while being on patrol: 
“The past couple of days I’d heard horrible stories. About soldiers kicking in doors and drag-
ging down civilians onto the streets. About soldiers buying a sheep, just to beat it to death. 
About soldiers shooting people running away or sieving down cars because they didn’t stop in 
time when nearing, even when it had women and children in it. (…) We all knew that Iraqi wo-
men feared (American) soldiers, and because of that rather not came to a halt at a checkpoint. 
They were not used to associate with men, let alone American men. They panicked when see-
ing an American with a rifle. When an American sees a checkpoint with armed soldiers, she 
usually stops, doesn’t she? But in Iraq things are a bit more complicated. And from what I 
heard, things got out of hand. (…) They messed up. And meanwhile there were no signs in 
Arabic that warned civilians that they were nearing a checkpoint. There was no respect for the 
customs of these people, for their rhythm of life, for the tribulations they had to face. Hardly 
any attempt was made to communicate with the local population. Too many soldiers had an 
attitude of ‘just shoot them’ (Williams, 2005, 121f).”
One could easily recognize a critical voice in Williams’ pondering. She detests the heedless 
proceedings of her fellow American soldiers and thereby she indirectly touches upon the 
operational implications of the Powell-Weinberger doctrine which proclaims that “the 
use of force should always be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the 
enemy” (McFate, 2005, 27). This conventional military thinking of large-scale wars and major 
combat operations, however, is an anachronism in a time wherein the nature of conflicts 
is defined by low-intensity counterinsurgency operations whose protagonists are difficult 
to discern from local civilians. Peacekeepers, e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan, have to fight a 
complex war against an enemy whose organizational structure is not military but tribal, and 
whose weaponry consists not of tanks or fighter jets but of improvised explosive devices 
(McFate, 2005, 24). Contemporary warfare, that is unconventional warfare, thus calls for 
a new military doctrine wherein not “overwhelming force,” but cultural understanding 
and linguistic knowledge should form the cornerstones of military management (McFate, 
2005, 37; Moskos, 2007, 3-5). The intervention of interpreters could particularly be useful 
in this refined military approach because they can reconnoitre the local human terrain by 
expertise and ethics of the mission (Moskos, 2007, 7; Bos & Soeters, 2006, 265; Edwards, 
2004). An incident which happened during a preparatory training for the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), illustrates the importance of training and 
teamwork between military officers and interpreters: 
 
“Shortly before our UNTAC-3 deployment in Cambodia, and after the screening of the inter-
preters in Amsterdam, I was sent to an American military base in Germany for cultural and 
communicational training. My interpreter and I were asked to participate in a real-life situa-
tion that was put on for us. Everything went according plans. I was communicating with the 
local mayor through the mediation of my interpreter when suddenly out of nowhere eight to 
nine armed Cambodians appeared through the thick of the grass. Besieged by the enemy, I 
was ordered to give up my weapon. Right at the very moment when I was about to tell my 
interpreter that such was out of the question, my interpreter collapsed to the ground. He was 
having a nervous break-down, not a single word came out of his mouth. It so happened that 
my interpreter, before he fled Cambodia, had experienced the exact same situation that was 
put on for us. On stage, he relived the tragic and traumatic situation in which his uncle was 
killed.”9
Interpreting remains a human ‘resource’ with unknown and unforeseen depths. Irrespective 
of this element of ‘surprise’, however, there are of course some general directives and 
key features to assess the quality of an interpreter. What makes a good interpreter? Two 
independent investigations of users’ experiences of interpreters (Edwards, Temple & 
Alexander, 2005; Bos & Soeters, 2005) demonstrate that language matching and proficiency is 
but one half of the interpreter’s quality indicator. The other half consists of the interpreter’s 
attitude and character. Besides knowledge of systems and procedures, character and a 
proactive stance were highly appreciated as qualities that credit the professionalism of the 
interpreter. Both investigations moreover render an insight into the users’ need of the 
interpreter. People call upon the services of the interpreters for more than just a passing on 
of words, they want their interpreter to proceed as their manager and advisor in situations 
wherein they themselves are unfamiliar and unfit (Edwards et al., 2005, 85; Bos & Soeters, 
2005, 361). As has been said before, it is precisely this advisory role of the interpreter which 
proves to be of importance to soldiers in the operational field. Interpreters are experts 
in understanding the mores of the local culture and in this capacity they are often more 
perceptive of signals than soldiers. Being the middleman of two linguistically and culturally 
different worlds, interpreters are capable of ‘fine-tuning’ the low context approach of Western 
contingents to the need of the high context culture of (most of the) operational areas (Bos & 
Soeters, 2005, 360f.). Whereas in Western countries straightforwardness and openness are 
received as the prerequisites for efficient communication, non-Western countries on the 
other hand often prefer a more subtle and indirect communicational approach. Needless 
to say, these two cultures are bound to collide when military contingents decide to operate 
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or standards, that control the situation in which they are called upon to operate”, yet their 
commonness to both worlds often prevents their unconditional acceptance to either one 
of the worlds (Karakayali, 2006, 319f ). Hence, the Druze interpreter, embodies the ancient 
‘us versus them dilemma’: While his status as non-Arab Arab compels him to be loyal to the 
military service, his lingering Arabness at the same moment makes him susceptible to the 
suspicion of others (Hajjar, 2000, 319; Karakayali, 2006, 313). 
The Druze military interpreters are not the only interpreters who are being looked at with 
Argus’ eyes. It seems that distrust is part of the interpreter’s professional (or)deal (Moskos, 
2007, 7). The not so distant (military) history after all has learned that some interpreters 
knowingly pass on confidential and sensitive information to opposing parties. Recently, 
the Dutch government was startled when they found out that a Turkish interpreter had 
leaked crucial police-information to Turkey. The crime committed by the interpreter not 
only damaged the police investigations into an international drug cartel, it moreover caused 
serious harm to the collaboration between the Dutch and Turkish judicial authorities (NRC 
Handelsblad, March 3, 2007). A salient detail in this case consists of the fact that the very 
same interpreter already had been banished from the ranks of the national intelligence 
service for passing confidential information to the Hofstad group, an alleged terrorist 
organization. In context of the military field, the American cases of senior airman Ahmad 
al Halabi and former intelligence specialist Ahmad Mehalba are exemplary for the distrust 
held against interpreters (Pipes, 2004). Because of their ethnic descent and their Arabic 
linguistic skills, Halabi and Mehalba were recruited to serve as interpreters at the American 
detention and interrogation center at Guantanano Bay. Both men, however, were arrested on 
the accusation of taking part in a spy ring at the Naval Base in Cuba. In 2003, they were, after 
a highly criticized trial, convicted for the lesser counts of lying to the government agents and 
removing classified documents from the detention facility. 
The above-mentioned cases were two out of in total four trials on similar accusations. 
All of the trials received major media coverage which in turn brought the ill fate of the 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay to light. Significant in this regard is that various statements of 
former Gitmo detainees singled out the language barrier as one of the major problems which 
compounded the inhumane treatment of prisoners. The story of two Afghan brothers who 
were arrested and flown into the detention facility in Cuba after having written a political 
satire on Clinton recounts: 
“As Badr and Dost fought their freedom, they had enormous advantages over Guantanamo’s 
500-plus other captives. The brothers are university-educated, and Badr who holds a mas-
ter’s degree in English literature, was one of few prisoners able to speak fluently to the inter-
rogators in their own language. (…) The brothers escaped the worst abuse, partly because of 
Badr’s fluent English. At times, prisoners ‘who didn’t speak English got kicked by the MP’s be-
cause they didn’t understand what the soldiers wanted,’ he said. And both men said that while 
many prisoners clammed up under questioning, they were talkative and able to demonstrate 
means of their linguistic and cultural profundity. In this capacity, interpreters could prevent 
grave misunderstandings from happening. As an intermediate, they are able to regulate 
international and intercultural communicational processes by carefully translating the 
information from the source language into the target language and vice versa. The interpreter 
could therefore very well be described as the linguistic and cultural bridge between two 
linguistically divergent parties. Translation in this regard is something different than a 
direct decoding of linguistically interchangeable signs as the term ‘conduit’ might wrongly 
imply. Although translation is about ‘fine tuning’, the interpreter is anything but a “language 
machine” (Bos & Soeters, 2006, 64). Interpreting involves a comprehension of the thought 
expressed in one language and the use of the resources of another language to explain the 
message of the foreign language. The craft of interpretation consists of “changing the words 
into meaning, and then change meaning back into words of a different language” (Edwards, 
2004). Prerequisite in these circumstances, of course, is that the interpreter commands 
a solid and sound understanding of the subject matter of the military operation and/or 
negotiation.
4.2. Secrets and Suspicion
The fact that interpretation implies a profound knowledge of both the cultural context and 
extra-linguistic aspects of communication (Edwards, 2004), can be explicated by the very 
unique position of Druze military interpreters in the Israeli legal courts (Hajjar, 2000, 302). 
The Druze community forms an extraordinary niche in the border zones of the Hebrew-Arab 
conflict. The Israeli state policies distinguish the Druze from other Palestinian Arabs. As a 
separate category of non-Arab Arabs, the Druze are part of a select group of non-Jews who 
are subjected to mandatory conscription (Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 2007, 127, 135). Because of 
their bilingualism and lingering Arabness, the Druze are selected as an exclusive and efficient 
cultural tool within the national military organization (Hajjar, 2000, 314-319). And as such, 
the Druze have come to fulfil the role of military court-interpreter. Or as an army spokesman 
said: “‘Some Jews do know the Arabic language, but translating involves more than just 
translating the words. It involves really understanding the people you are translating for.” 
(quoted in Hajjar, 2000, 305). 
As bilingual non-Arab Arabs, Druze military interpreters need to steer a middle course 
between the legal and military dimensions of the courtroom. Whereas their language 
mediation legitimizes the legal system on the one hand, their military identity on the other 
hand paradoxically causes them to regard themselves as soldiers whom are facing ‘the enemy’ 
in the context of a courtroom (Hajjar, 2000, 317). The Druze interpreter in other words needs 
to walk a tight rope. His cultural identity condemns him to be both an insider and outsider 
to the Israeli and Palestinian worlds. The Druze interpreter is thus the stranger who is both 
distant and near. As goes for interpreters in general, the Druze are familiar with “the beliefs, 
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of the mission. It would therefore be interesting when future research would look more 
closely into the effectiveness of language on peacekeeping operations. Surveys, field studies, 
before-and-after-designs with comparison groups who either have or have not participated 
in a language program, long-term evaluation of linguistic interventions by interpreters, 
and a cross-national comparison of communication strategies of military operations are 
but a couple of the research methods that could uncover the linguistic potential of this yet 
uncultivated military domain. 
Notes
1  This quotation is taken from the Quotations Page on www.quotationspage.com.
2  This anecdote was told by Richard Boijen, author of De Taalwetgeving in het Belgische Leger (1830-1940)’during an interview at 
the Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and Military History in Bruxelles in November, 2006. 
3  The flux of foreigners joining the troops, a hodgepodge of nationalities and classes, gave the Dutch troops more the 
appearance of a Foreign Legion than of a Dutch Colonial Army. And despite the shortage in men, the acquisition of natives 
was not always welcomed as a relief. Military commanders sometimes were hesitant to trust native soldiers out of fear for 
insurgencies and conspiracies that would bring down the colonial regime (De Moor, 2003, 206).
4  This quote was translated from Dutch to English by Andrea van Dijk.
5  McFate and Jackson (2006, 13, 16) in this regard write that in any (contemporary) struggle for political power, neither the 
insurgents or counterinsurgents have an explicit or immediate advantage in the battle, for the local population will support 
those whom make it in their interest to obey.
6  A crude example of war slang used by soldiers of the Dutch Colonial Army in the Dutch Indies concerning captives is the 
Dutch expression ‘Ik laat hem effe pissen’ (‘I’m letting him take a leak’). The expression might have let detainees believe that 
they were offered some privacy to relieve themselves, while in fact the saying was a euphemism for liquidating captives 
in times when the number of detainees was draining and slowing down the military expedition. This example was told by 
Stef Scagliola, researcher of the Dutch Institute for Veterans.
7  This observation was part of a field study in Liberia which was conducted by Erik Hedlund, Louise Weibull and Joseph 
Soeters in November 2006 (see Hedlund, Weibull & Soeters, 2008). 
8  The fact that US troops in Iraq had an average of one interpreter to 75-150 soldiers as against one to 15-20 servicemen in 
Bosnia for the Dutch illustrates the difference in operational styles with regard to the employment of interpreters (Bos & 
Soeters, 2006: 268).
9  This quote was taken from an interview with Ltcol. Dick Bosch and translated from Dutch to English by Andrea van Dijk.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for the help given by Richard Boijen (†), Dick Bosch, Petra Groen, 
Wim Klinkert, Charles Moskos (†), Stef Scagiola, and Ruben Verbist.
cooperation. (…) Another problem was that ‘Many of the interpreters were not good,’ said 
Badr. He recalled an elderly man, arrested by U.S. forces for shooting his rifle at a helicopter, 
who explained that he had been trapping hawks and fired in anger at one that flew away. But 
the interpreter mistook the Persian word ‘booz’ (hawk) for ‘baz’ (goat). ‘The interrogator be-
came very angry,’ Badr said. ‘He thought the old man was making a fool of him by claiming to 
be shooting at goats flying in the air’ (Clore, 2005).” 
Once more, this example shows that language competence and efficient interpreting 
are imperative for a complete understanding of a situation. Language incompetence 
and misinterpretation can conversely trigger a whole array of misunderstanding and 
miscommunication. At the end of the line, it is the interpreter, the tightrope walker who 
often can make the difference between the two. As a cultural bridge and as a facilitator of the 
co-working language of the mission the interpreter undeniably contributes to the security 
and success of a peacekeeping operation. Military personnel should therefore acquire a 
more sophisticated conception of the role of the interpreter. A re-conceptualization of the 
position and profession of the interpreter within peacekeeping operations, in combination 
with language and cultural awareness training would benefit the military organization as a 
whole.  
5. Conclusions and Avenues for Future Research 
The language barrier is not a recent phenomenon. Language problems within the military 
have surfaced in different disguises throughout time. Whether as a linguistic conflict 
that rattled on in both the Belgian military trenches as well as in the political chambers, 
a Babylonian confusion among the mixed contingents of the Dutch Colonial Army in the 
deep of the jungle, or an offside position of military commanders during contemporary 
peace support operations in Afghanistan: language matters in the military. With the change 
of traditional military warfare to peace support operation tasks, the object, aim, ways 
and means of the military organization have changed correspondingly. In their effort to 
reconstruct society through a minimal use of force and cooperation with armed forces and 
civilians from all over the world, the military has gradually transformed into (what in theory 
should be) a ‘soft’ powered and diplomatic ‘multinational’. As a consequence of this shift 
in perspective, military officers have come to think of themselves as manager of violence, 
soldier-diplomat, and soldier-communicator (Bleumink, Moelker & Vogelaar, 2003, 142-153). 
International scientific research of the Netherlands Defence Academy, however, has brought 
to light that the managerial position of this new ‘flexible officer’ was not exempt of problems. 
The outcome of this data-analysis moreover confirmed the premise of this article in as much 
that in the exploration of problems and deficiencies during peace support operations, all 
respondents ranked language as one of the leading factors complicating the proceedings 
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carrier of international communication and professional understanding (Adler, 2002, 73-
102; Marschan-Piekkari, Welch & Welch, 1999, 422). Studies on communication dynamics in 
multinational corporations have gained an insight into the oftentimes strained relationship 
between parent and host national companies (Marschan-Piekkari et al., 1999, 425; Feely & 
Harzing, 2003, 38; Hoon, Sun & Kline Harrison, 1996, 80; Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari & Santti 2005, 
596). Characteristic for these studies is their unanimity in which they pinpoint language, 
and more precisely the language barrier, as the culprit of organizational misunderstanding. 
Whereas the studies of Feely and Harzing, and Hoon et al. emphasize the corrosive effect 
of the language barrier on both native and non-native speakers, the studies of Marschan-
Piekkari et al., and Vaara et al. on the other hand focus more on power circuits that arise in 
the wake of corporate language policies. 
In order to get a better understanding of language problems that impede efficient 
communication, it is necessary to discuss some of the findings of the abovementioned 
authors. Their longitudinal case studies have demonstrated that language problems of native 
speakers mainly consist of miscommunication, attribution and code-switching. The first two 
phenomena are somewhat intertwined as both allude to the alleged linguistic fluency of the 
non-native speaker. Miscommunication often arises in situations wherein native speakers 
wrongly assume that non-native speakers command full linguistic proficiency of the official 
business language. Needless to say inaccurate attributions create the perfect breeding ground 
for miscommunication between native and non-native speakers. The biased expectation 
of the native speaker, however, is bound to be contradicted by the restrictions of reality. 
And once the linguistic incompetence of the non-native speaker has been discovered, the 
‘disenchantment’ of the native speaker cannot but disrupt the communication as feelings of 
distrust and dislike affect the business relation. 
Moreover, it is very plausible that these negative experiences could grow into individual 
and even institutionalized prejudices against non-native speakers. Robertson and Kulik 
in this regard have described the prevalence of stereotype threat in (multinational) 
organizations. The psychological concept of stereotype threat arises when members of 
a particular identity group fear that they will be seen and judged according to a negative 
stereotype about their group. Their anxiety is heightened in situations where they have to 
perform a task on which members of their group have said to have done poorly. Stereotyped 
threatened participants often lack the confidence that they will perform well and therefore 
the stereotype (threat) often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (Robertson & Kulik, 2007, 
24-29). Although Robertson and Kulik have described the effect of stereotype threat on 
minority groups within the context of the American society such as African-Americans, 
the elderly and overweight people, they emphatically state that’ (…) members of any group 
could experience stereotype threat when their identity group is negatively compared with 
another group’ (Robertson & Kulik, 2007, 27). The phenomena of stereotype threat could 
therefore easily be applied to the condition and context of non-native speakers within 
multinational organizations because a lack of linguistic proficiency is very often put on a 
1. Introduction
With the change of traditional warfare into peace operations, language has become an 
essential tool in the coordination and management of operational tasks in multinational 
military cooperation. The importance of English as the military lingua franca in this 
regard has increased proportionately to the expansion of the number of nationalities that 
participate in military missions (Crossey, 2005). In order to prevent a linguistic confusion in 
the theatre of operations, the English language policy has often been installed to ‘command 
and control’ the internal communication structures of the military organization. Depending 
on the degree of linguistic proficiency, language, however, has proved to be an ambivalent 
tool for it can both empower as well as disempower the voice and job performance of the 
military personnel. 
The importance and implications of language (in-)competence moreover does not 
restrict itself to the perimeters of the military organization, they are also applicable to the 
environments in which peace operations take place. The experience of military officers 
and academics has taught that the military lingua franca will not suffice as an accepted and 
efficient means of communication in non-Western environments. In order to optimise the 
interaction and exchange of information between peacekeepers and the local population, 
the military organization should enact the channels of cross-cultural communication in the 
expeditionary environment by implementing a (basic) knowledge of the local vernaculars 
and interpreter interventions into its corporate language policy. 
Although both subjects are equally important, this chapter will only elaborate on 
the influence of language on the communication structures of multinational military 
cooperation. Through a theoretical account of the origin and development of language 
management within multinational companies, and participatory observation during an 
international military exercise in Germany, this chapter seeks to investigate and analyse the 
implications of language (in-)competence on military communication in a multinational 
context. 
2. Language management in multinational companies
Although scholars in international management have largely contributed to an 
understanding of cross-communication processes by analyzing the various cultures and 
nationalities within multinational corporations, they for a long time ‘managed’ to overlook 
the one aspect of communication that holds the fabric of international organizations 
together. Communication cannot exist without language, and yet it was this very aspect of 
human interaction that was structurally forgotten and neglected in cross-communication 
research (Feely & Harzing, 2003). Over the last five years organizational scholars, however, 
have come to acknowledge that language, and more specifically the language barrier, is the 
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non-native speakers hope to save their face. The context and implications of face-saving 
strategies will be further explicated through a discussion of experiences of non-native (non-)
commissioned officers who participated in an international military exercise in paragraph 
four of this chapter. 
All the above-mentioned detrimental effects of the language barrier are undoubtedly the 
results of the partiality of the language selection between two different linguistic parties. 
The choice of the official language is in almost all of the situations determined by two tacit 
but fixed norms: the vitality of the language and the mutual linguistic skills of the parties 
involved. Reasonably or not, English, to this day, is still respected as the most important 
language. It has even been stated that the English language becomes of greater importance 
when the number of nationalities in a company increases (De Swaan, 2001). Again, the case 
study of Vaara et al. (2005) on the power circuits in multinational organizations seems to 
be of value in substantiating this hypothesis. As soon as English was introduced as the new 
legitimate official corporate language, the tide seemed to turn for the Finnish employees. 
The Finns experienced the new language policy as a relief and did not waist any time to enact 
their ‘new rights (…) by showing the Swedes their place.’(Vaara et al., 2005, 615). Whereas the 
English language re-established the equality for the Finns, the Swedish on the other hand 
were considerably less enthusiastic about the consequences of the new language policy: 
 
“I am a little bit afraid that we are losing some competent people who will become silent, who 
are not as good (as others) in this language… A lot of culture creation, cooperation and con-
sensus, it is precisely participation in these joint meetings. And if one only sits there and does 
not understand every nuance or value… (Vaara et al., 2005, 615).” 
The quotation is not only illustrative of the advance of English as the primary corporate 
language for most multinationals, a process which is described as linguistic imperialism; it 
also indicates that English is not yet common ground for everyone (Méndez García & Pérez 
Cañado, 2005, 89). In a meeting between English and non-English speakers for instance, this 
rule of thumb obviously downplays the non-English speaking party. Language then installs 
a distortion in the power/authority balance. Whereas language becomes a means of power 
for the English-speaking parties, it often becomes a shackle for those who do not sufficiently 
command the English language. A lack of linguistic competence can at worst literally lead 
to ‘excommunication’; for silence is often the last resort for those who, to their own great 
annoyance, are unable to voice their opinion. Hoon et al. (1996, 87) have described the 
detrimental by-products of the language selection process as a sense of peripherality and 
autistic hostility which respectively mean a distancing from the communication network, 
and an avoidance of communication. 
The following section seeks to transpose the findings of the multinational organization to 
the context of the international military organization. It sketches situations and observations 
in which language determines the outcome of international military communication. 
par with professional ineptitude. This misconception can often assume a life of its own and 
discredit non-native speakers to a degree that they start to believe that the stereotype indeed 
reflects a truth about the quality of their job performance. As a result of this negative (self ) 
perception, the stereotype threat seizes its opportunity. It disrupts the performance of non-
native speakers and negatively affects their professional credibility. 
Two quotes taken from a case study of Vaara et al. (2005) on the merger of a Finnish and 
Swedish bank, illustrate the (subjective) interdependence between language competence, 
self perception, and power when one language has been chosen to be the corporate language 
(in this case, Swedish): 
 
“In the beginning it was, of course, a terrible shock… It was really horrible. It felt like…half of 
our professional competence had been taken away when we had to use a language that was 
not our native tongue. You felt like an idiot…The main thing was to get over the feeling of 
inferiority (Vaara et al., 2005, 609)”. 
“In Finland, we lost many potential future key figures because they realized that they would 
never be able to compete with their Swedish rivals in the organization (Vaara et al., 2005: 
615).” 
Other circumstances that give rise to misunderstanding and misconception consist of 
situations where delegations of non-native speakers discuss matters in their own language 
during negotiations. Another quote from the above mentioned case study illustrate this: 
 
“With Finnish as your native tongue…you are, in a debate or negotiation situation, in a weaker 
position… Whether or not this is the case, it feels like it when the other person speaks his/her 
native tongue… But, turning it the other way around, we have this secret language (i.e. Fin-
nish) in which we can speak pretty freely to each other – in the middle of the negotiation. The 
majority of the Swedes don’t understand one single bit of it (Vaara et al., 2005: 609).”
This switching of codes during times of negotiation and decision making, however, is often 
(unjustly) perceived as a manifestation of ‘conspiring behaviour’ which on its turn triggers a 
whole new gamut of sentiments of exclusion and hostility. 
The case study of Hoon et al. (1996) on United States firms in South Korea zooms in on 
the problems and grievances affecting non-native speakers. Non-native speakers lose their 
rhetorical skills when they have to communicate in a language which is different from their 
own. Even if non-native speakers command the official lingua franca, they are still at a loss 
when the situation calls for other more decisive and interpersonal skills. Closely interrelated 
to the loss of rhetorical skills is the concept of face (Hoon et al., 1996, 81). The fear of making a 
fool out of oneself and/or being regarded as “dense”, may ‘force’ non-native speakers to keep 
up appearances. By keeping a low profile and pretending to be in control of the situation, 
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The abovementioned examples demonstrate that language proficiency or a lack thereof, 
either ease or block the wheels of internal and external communication. Through a discussion 
of a field study which was conducted during an international military exercise in Germany, 
the final section of this chapter attempts to discover ways in which language (in-)competence 
influences the job performance of key players within international military organizations. 
4. Exercise Kindred Sword: a closer look at the implications of multinational military 
cooperation and communication
Exercise Kindred Sword took place in Lehnin, Germany between May 14 and May 25 2007. This 
Command Post Exercise was part of three closely linked Maritime, Land and Air Component 
training exercises whose aim was to test the combat readiness of the participating units. It 
was designed to train the command and control elements of the staff of the headquarters 
of the German-Netherlands multinational corps, (1) GE-NL Corps, in the context of its role 
as a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Response Force.1 In their effort to sustain 
stability and peace in times of need, the multinational NRF components depend upon 
extensive and detailed cooperation within and between the units. It goes without saying 
that communication in this matter makes or breaks the operational effectiveness of both 
military exercices and real expeditionary missions. A field study at the (1) GE-NL Corps 
headquarters offered an exceptional opportunity to observe and analyse how language 
proficiency influenced the planning, co-ordination and team work skills of the military 
representatives of the participating nations.2 
At the beginning of the field study it became apparent that language appealed to the 
imagination. The subject triggered people to speak about their own experience. Officers 
from various ranks and cells showed interest and offered their opinion on international 
and inter-organizational communication processes. Significant about the majority of these 
accounts was that although language was always introduced and labelled by the interviewees 
as a bothersome but bridgeable inconvenience, their experience ultimately tended to tell a 
more discriminating story. It was as if the recollections of these non-native speakers were 
intended to make public what the military mind and hence organization was not yet willing to 
accept or display. That is, that language, and more specifically a lack of linguistic proficiency, 
touches not only the heart but also the sore spots of military cooperation. It was therefore no 
coïncidence that a Dutch officer, who was part of the CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) cell 
during the exercise in Lehnin, therefore mentioned that the heraldic motto of the (1) GE-NL 
Corps ‘Communitate Valemus’ (‘Together We are Strong’) not always met its noble standard. He 
remembered a situation at the end of his deployment in Kabul 2002 which according to him 
was illustrative of the communication problems of Kindred Sword.  
3. Language and Communication in multinational military cooperation
Because military operations over time evolved into global affairs, the characteristics and 
hence problems of military organizations started to resemble those of multinationals 
(Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008). A participant observation of two commanding officers at Kabul 
International Airport in this regard confirms the finding that the presence and proliferation 
of different languages in a multinational operation confronts its members with problems 
that affect the managerial process (Resteigne & Soeters, 2008). The field study exemplifies 
the (im)practicality of linguistic (in)competence, and demonstrates the powerful position 
of language nodes within the organization (Feely & Harzing, 2003). One of the observed 
officers was a multilingual who spoke French, English, German, and Dutch fluently. His 
language proficiency enabled him to receive, influence and transmit information. Whereas 
the linguistic skills of this particular officer allowed him to become the (in)formal advisor 
of soldiers from various countries, the other, less linguistically talented, officer experienced 
great difficulties with the language barrier. His linguistic shortcomings prevented him from 
taking a proactive stance in communication processes and ultimately condemned him to 
passively wait for information to reach him (Resteigne & Soeters, 2008). In contrast to those 
who are greatly inconvenienced and impaired by the language barrier, language nodes, like 
the talented commander, thus often occupy powerful positions within organizations (Vaara 
et al., 2007). They are described as ‘gate-keepers’, because they can pass or block information 
between parties. As such language nodes can establish a parallel information network within 
the organization which either supports or subverts collaboration (Feely & Harzing, 2003, 46). 
Another field study at Kabul International Airport (Soeters, Resteigne, Moelker & 
Manigart, 2008) illustrates the process of professional incapacitation and isolation as 
detrimental effects of the language barrier (Feely & Harzing, 2003). It relates a situation in 
which Spanish medics did not sufficiently command the English language and whom were 
therefore unable to provide medical care during an emergency. As a consequence of the poor 
linguistic skills of the Spanish medics, people had to drive through high risk territory in 
order to receive medical support at the German medical facilities at ISAF headquarters. The 
Spanish medics clearly had trouble translating the medical argot from their mother tongue 
into English. In order to prevent similar situations, (medical) staff personnel often rely on the 
service of interpreters (Bos & Soeters, 2006, 261-268). But even they at times are not immune 
to the effects of the language barrier. Two medical examiners, for instance, have written a 
report about language problems and cultural barriers they and their interpreters encountered 
in the assessment and treatment of enemy prisoners of war, hired local workers, and foreign 
civilians during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Griffeth & Bally, 
2006, 258-259). It appeared that although the interpreters were brought up in Arabic speaking 
households and were acquainted with Arabic customs, they too sometimes encountered 
difficulties. The interpreters not only had problems understanding the Iraqi language and 
traditions, they also had difficulties translating the medical and mental health vocabulary. 
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variety of phenomena that accompanied the language barrier, the interviewees mentioned 
the loss of face as one of the most feared and poignant effects of linguistic incompetence 
(see also Hoon et al., 1996; Jones, 2005). Significant in this regard was the fact that whether 
or not people were speaking out of personal experience or had learned from observing the 
struggle of other non-native-English speakers, each identically linked the loss of face to the 
public domain and more specifically to meetings and conferences. The below-mentioned 
quotes come from interviews with respectively a Norwegian officer and a Spanish officer 
who participated in exercise Kindred Sword. 
 
“Non-native-language speakers are not so much as pushed out of the decision making pro-
cess by the fluency of native speaking participants, it’s more likely that they themselves feel 
so uncomfortable and awkward talking in the target language that they unwillingly refrain 
themselves from the communication process. (…) At the end of a meeting for instance, the 
chairman always asks if everyone agrees with what has been said. Well, this confronts non-
native speakers with a problem. If they do not agree, they have to argue why they think oth-
erwise – and this is not an option for those who feel uncomfortable speaking in a second lan-
guage. But then again, if you agree with the rest while in fact you do not exactly understand 
what you have agreed, you might run the risk of having to answer questions before your su-
periors about matters you do not know of. It’s a double trap. What you see is that people keep 
a low profile in the hope that other’s don’t address them and don’t ask them any questions.” 
“It’s hard to express yourself in a new language. It’s difficult to learn a new vocabulary, let 
alone the technical jargon of a particular mission such as during this exercise. (…) I feel ridicu-
lous always needing the help of others. (…) When the telephone rings, I try to be at the other 
side of the office so that someone else answers the call. I am afraid that when I do pick up the 
phone, the person at the other end of the line commands even less English or that he speaks 
in abbreviations and technical argot. I would be at a loss, the conversation would be a disaster. 
In the beginning it was the same with attending meetings. I didn’t feel comfortable with my 
language skills and therefore didn’t dare to speak out in the presence of high ranked officers. 
My lack of language proficiency even kept me from joining informal meetings. Therefore I so-
metimes felt that I was missing out on information. But over time, when I became more fami-
liar with my colleagues, I gained more confidence and learned to express myself more often.” 
The quotes illustrate that, in situations wherein participants considered their language 
skills to be insufficient, non-native-English speakers rather preferred to remain silent as 
an attempt to uphold a positive image of role fulfilment (see also Jones, 2005, 74). Silence 
in communication, however, does not always has to be the product of inarticulacy and 
hence a face-saving strategy. The silence of non-native-English speakers might in certain 
situations as well be perceived as contextually and culturally defined behaviour (Tatar, 2005, 
285). In cultures where silence is related to careful thinking and planning, it can function 
“When our troops changed guards with 1GNC battalion we noticed that some of the soldiers 
had changed the caption of their insignias. The official slogan read ‘Communitate Valemus’ 
but they had altered it into ‘Communicate Problemus’. Hilarious as it was, the joke also un-
nerved me. It gave me food for thought. It made me think about the motives for their self-
mockery or even self-criticism.” 
The anecdote refers specifically to the language barrier that hampered the cooperation in 
the (1) GE-NL Corps. Although English was the military lingua franca, the English language 
proficiency of German soldiers was often so inadequate that Dutch soldiers, in order to 
communicate more easily, switched to the German language. According to another Dutch 
military commander working for the ‘red force’ during the exercise, Dutch soldiers did exactly 
what most of Dutch citizens naturally tend to do when they meet people who neither speak 
Dutch nor English: they tried to address their German colleagues in their own language. 
Similar linguistic strategies of situational code-switching between actors from different 
countries in a bilateral (business) cooperation have also been described in a case study of 
a Dutch parent company that runs a holiday centre in Germany (Loos, 2007, 37, 44, 50, 54). 
In anticipation of a prospective rise in German tourists, this particular Dutch organization 
implemented a German language policy for their (Dutch) personnel. Both situations prove 
that the readiness to address people in their own language does not solely arise from a 
demonstration of sympathy or a gesture of courtesy. The choice of language rather rests on 
the presence of common objectives and the willpower ‘(…) to make things work’ (Loos, 2007, 
46, 51; Moelker, Soeters & Vom Hagen, 2007). Efficacy and the corresponding interdependence 
of key players, apparently form an incentive to overcome cultural and linguistic differences 
by adapting a language strategy that serves shared interests. Applied to the (1) GE-NL Corps, 
this hypothesis signifies that Dutch soldiers, because of a lack of English proficiency of their 
German colleagues, needed to ‘shift gears’ in order to optimise the cooperation between 
Dutch and German units. Temporarily abandoning English in favour of German as the 
unofficial military lingua within the (1) GE-NE Corps, enabled Dutch and Germans to pursue 
their tasks and attain their goals as a true corps befits.  
In the course of time the initial bilateral cooperation of 1(GE-NL) Corps, however, has 
been expanded and transformed into a worldwide affair that encompasses over more 
than twenty NATO member states. It goes without saying that the importance of language 
proficiency increased proportionately with the amount of participating countries. English 
could therefore no longer be passed over as the ruling military lingua franca (De Swaan, 
2001). In multinational teams as the NRF it simply is no longer possible to get round the 
language barrier by ‘switching codes’. In order to fully partake in the organization, members 
need to acquire a certain level of English proficiency (Crossey, 2005). It is then that the 
language barrier starts to take effect and gets tough on non-native-English speakers. 
Although the interviews and conversations with Dutch, German, French, Spanish, Italian, 
Greek, Polish, Norwegian, Finnish, and English (non-)commissioned officers displayed a 
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alleviate the consequences of the language barrier. The fact of the matter, nevertheless, is 
that a cautious approach in this regard will only clutter the channels of clear communication. 
The language barrier, and not the military organization, as was so carefully intended, will 
benefit from prudence. Creating a taboo about language problems, after all, will only uphold 
and not tear down the pillars of miscommunication. 
In conclusion, the interviews and the observations tend to reflect a rather ambivalent and 
even discordant image of the military stance on the influence of language on communication 
processes and cooperation. Language proficiency of the military lingua franca officially 
is considered an expected quality of the (1) GE-NL Corps staff personnel. According to the 
data gathered during the field study, this expectation, however, was not yet fully realized 
and could therefore, if not anticipated properly, contribute to an unfounded carelessness 
towards language policies. Negligence could cause the detrimental effects of the language 
barrier to be overlooked and trivialized. In order to effectuate an efficient communication 
between headquarters and the theatre of operations, the military therefore needs to be 




When all people share the same tongue, language can easily be described as an unrivalled 
unifier. The opposite, as this chapter hopes to have demonstrated, unfortunately is also true. 
Language is an unequalled divider as well. It is, par excellence, a factor which can separate 
and divide relations within and between members of multinational organizations when 
its ‘barrier’ is not timely detected and dismantled. In order to make language a potential 
military resource for effective communication and cooperation, staff personnel should first 
and foremost become aware of the detrimental effects of linguistic problems. Instead of 
treating linguistic proficiency as a matter of course, and downplaying the problems of the 
less linguistic proficient (non-)commissioned officers within the organization, the military 
should take up the responsibility to manage language matters properly. Communication after 
all consists of language, and the latter can only fortify the former when the interdependence 




1  The information described in this section was based on the following web page: www.gnn.gov.uk/imagelibrary/
downloadMedia.asp?MediaDetailsID=201621.htm 
2  In the period of 12th of May – 17th of May a total of approximately 14  face-to-face interviews were carried out 
with international participants of the multinational military exercise Kindred Sword. The field study could not 
have been possible without the support of lieutenant-colonel Van Rijssen and lieutenant-colonel Sampanis. 
as a reaction to excessive talk and meaningless contributions of others during meetings. 
Moreover, silence can also be the product of modesty and respect for authority.  In this 
particular instance people remain silent unless they are directly addressed (Tatar, 2005, 288-
291). 
The observations and interviews during Kindred Sword demonstrated that, whereas 
language incompetence restricts and perhaps even reduces one’s voice in the decision-
making process, language proficiency conversely increases one’s hold on communication 
and information channels (Vaara et al. 2005; Marschan-Piekkari et al., 1999, 430; Hoon et 
al., 1996, 86-89). The assumption that native-English speakers in this regard would have 
a head start on their colleagues is, however, only partially true for the advantage of their 
fluency paradoxically also happens to be their flaw. Non-native-English speakers repeatedly 
referred to their British colleagues as examples of an inarticulate and incomprehensible use 
of language (see also King, 2008). A German non-commissioned officer was even strongly 
convinced that the British deliberately tried to manipulate the communication process by 
using complex words. 
 
“They tend to outplay the others by their use of English. Language than no longer is used as a 
tool but as a weapon. The power play doesn’t include the Americans. They are more open and 
outgoing, more social.” 
Less hostile but as critical was the experience of a French officer. He told about the difficulty 
he experienced understanding his British colleague: 
 
“Speaking the official military language, the British are often harder to understand than non-
native English speakers. You could understand single words, but at the end of the sentence I 
am always clueless about what he was talking about. (…) I would rather prefer to command a 
German/Dutch type of English than British English.”  
According to the French officer, the language barrier could be categorized into problems of 
hearing and understanding. While non-native-English speakers might cause problems related 
to hearing because of their bad pronunciation and accent, native speakers on the other hand 
could create problems of understanding due to the specific use of their grammar, syntax, 
sense of humour and – remarkably enough – sometimes their accent too (see also King, 
2008; Hedlund, Weibull & Soeters, 2008). Remarkable in this regard was the fact that these 
conceptions, perceptions, and theories about native and non-native-English speakers were 
not communicated and therefore not known to the involved parties. Instead of addressing 
and giving voice to these language related sentiments and sensitivities, there was a strong 
(and implicit) tendency of the military staff personnel ‘to beat about the bush’ or hush the 
language matter whenever the subject came up for discussion (Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008). 
This evasive behaviour could perhaps best be interpreted as a sensible and tacit strategy to 
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2. Understanding the Socio-political and Linguistic Landscape of Timor-Leste
“In December 1999, the departure of the last vestiges of the Indonesian military was met with 
cheers and jeers at the Dili port. But the elation was short-lived: On every front, in every dis-
trict, the country was in a state of havoc. The establishment of security was just the first step 
towards not only recovering what was lost, but also forming the new nation that the people 
had overwhelmingly voted for. With little food or water, an absence of law and order, and wi-
despread destruction, that dream must have seemed a long way off (Lee & Valerio, 2002, 56).”
On the 20th of May 2002, after three years of UN intervention and on the day that nationhood 
was declared, the UN handed over its administration to José Alexandre Gusmão, a former 
guerrilla leader and the first chosen president of Timor-Leste. Although both UNTAET as 
well as the International Force in East-Timor, INTERFRET, the mission prior to UNTAET, 
competently fulfilled their objectives, the label ‘successful’ was not acknowledged by a 
considerable amount of the East-Timorese population. The criticism concerned the fact that 
the involved military and non-governmental parties lacked sufficient cultural knowledge 
and trained linguists to support the population (Ballard, 2007). In order to grasp the depth 
and truth of this complaint, and before raising some of the positions and experiences of 
several insiders, one needs to know more about the linguistic, socio-political, and (post-)
colonial landscape of Timor-Leste. 
The island of Timor encompasses two language families: Austronesian and non-
Austronesian. The indigenous vernaculars in the country can be reduced to either one of these 
families. Today, Timor-Leste alone knows sixteen indigenous vernaculars and three foreign 
languages namely, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, and Mandarin (Van Engelenhoven, 2006). 
These numbers, however, are but a fraction of the local languages that have existed before 
the reign of colonial powers in Timor-Leste. When Portugal, which incorporated Timor-
Leste in the 18th and 19th century, introduced Portuguese as the high variant of the lingua 
franca, the ritual speeches of the local vernaculars were shut out of the colonial society 
and pushed into the margins of the ethno-linguistic groups. When Indonesia subsequently 
annexed Timor-Leste in 1976, the Indonesian government on its turn tried to remove the 
Portuguese language from society by imposing their state philosophy, the five principles of 
the Pancasila, onto the East-Timorese population. The Pancasila originally was promulgated 
by President Sukarno in 1945 to unify the archipelago and to help solve the conflict between 
Muslims, Christians, and nationalists. The first of the five state principles concerns the belief 
in the all-oneness of God. This monotheistic pillar of the Republic of Indonesia therefore 
favored Roman-Catholicism at the cost of traditional beliefs (Van Engelenhoven, 2006). The 
percentage of people who converted themselves to Catholicism had almost tripled from a 
third of the population to about 80% or 90% after the Indonesian invasion.1 The Pancasila 
moreover declared Bahasa Indonesia, the symbol of an Indonesian unitary identity, as the 
sole language of administration and instruction. The Indonesian government, however, 
1. Introduction
Because of the continuing globalization and the complexity of the cultural environment and 
political nature of military operations, the term peacekeeping does not refer to monolithic 
military processes. It rather forms the umbrella description of ad hoc strategies that 
transcend the mandate of ‘keeping and maintaining’ peace in conflict ridden territories. 
This article focuses on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East-Timor, 
UNTAET (1999-2002), the multidimensional peace support operation which intended to 
provide security to the territory of Timor-Leste through the installment of an interim UN 
administration. The UNTAET mission has been said to be the only peace support operation to 
have successfully accomplished the transition of a UN administrative body to democratically 
elected leaders (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004). That the latter, however, after 6 turbulent 
years of democracy still proves to be a hard won achievement is demonstrated by the recent 
uprising of rebel soldiers and the assaults of both president José Ramos-Horta and prime 
minister Xanana Gusmão of Timor-Leste in February 2008. The attacks, which are described 
by Gusmão as ‘a failed coup attempt against the state’, seem to be the remaining cinders 
of a military and political incident that took place in 2006 (Johnston, 2008). The men that 
attempted to assassinate the two-highest politicians of Timor-Leste are believed to be the 
remnants of a military police unit from the western districts of the country that in January 
2006, under the direction of the Australian-trained mayor Alfredo Reinado, had signed a 
petition in which they alleged that they were being discriminated against in promotions 
and conditions within the army. Although the president of the republic acknowledged the 
allegations of ‘the petitioners’ the army nevertheless discharged 595 western soldiers in 
March of that year. Instead of addressing the grievances and keeping the conflict indoors, the 
dispute slipped out of the hands of the commission and onto the streets triggering a whole 
array of violent actions in its wake. Riots broke out, people got killed and more than one 
hundred thousand people were forced to leave their homes of which today still 30.000 live 
in refugee camps just outside of the capitol city of Dili (Trinidade & Castro, 2007; Johnston, 
2008). 
Although it has been said that the shooting of the political leaders in February 2008 
has not been the result of a scheme, and that Reinado, who was killed during the attack 
himself, favored conversation over conflict, one might ponder the question what has 
caused the rebel military leader to claim that ‘Gusmão was to blame for the crises in the 
country and  that he should own up to it’ (Johnston, 2008). Instead of trying to captivate the 
elusive motivations for an alleged coupe d’etat of a renegade soldier and his sympathizers, 
this article seeks to reflect on the inner demons of a country that almost ten years after the 
withdrawal of Indonesia still struggles to fulfill the promise of independence by describing 
the perspectives and experiences of representatives of the citizenry, the military, and non-
governmental institutions. 
62 Talk Up Front   Chapter 3 63
“Sometimes it wasn’t the language you were translating but the cultural behavior. I often nee-
ded to step in to ask UN forces not to do some things because those actions would have been 
perceived as very offensive by the locals.”2
Because the UN troops failed to integrate adequate cultural and linguistic knowledge in their 
strategic approach, they unwittingly, and often unconsciously, dissociated themselves from 
the population. As a consequence of the fact that the troops could not communicate with the 
locals in a language that the latter could understand, the Australian contingents for instance 
were not as positively perceived by the East Timorese population as the international 
community hitherto thinks. Instead of being perceived as peacekeepers, they were often 
looked at by the local population as though they were the enemy. The Australians had thus 
taken over the negative image and role of the Indonesians.3 The Australian contribution has 
even been called a ‘fiasco’ by some of the East Timorese on account of the fact that they 
failed to understand that the distinction between the eastern and western part of Timor-
Leste, respectively the low context cultures of the Firaku and the Kaladi, called for different 
linguistic and thus cultural approaches. One of the explanations of the origins of this popular 
distinction between the easterners and westerners have been said to stem from Portuguese 
colonial times. The generalization describes the Firaku as talkative and stubborn, and the 
Kaladi as taciturn and slow. The source of the conflict of the rivalry between the rival ethno-
linguistic groups may possible be set after the Second World War when both groups began 
trading in a local market in Dili. Over time, this commercial rivalry has degenerated into a 
default cultural division which structurally affects and evokes struggles between the groups. 
An example of how this cultural divide is absorbed (and even politically instrumentalised) 
into a mutually excluding mindset of both westerners and easterners can be found in the 
actions of youth gangs close after the military incident in 2006:
 
“Streets in Dili were not safe for either Lorosa’e (eastern) or Loromonu (western) people. Il-
legal check points were set up by youth gangs from both sides, looking for people who came 
from the ‘other’ region. Because it was difficult to identify which person is from which region, 
the youth gangs used tetum (…) to determine where people came from (Trinidade, Castro, 
2007, 11).”
Language was thus used as an identity marker, it enabled the gangs to differentiate between 
the people and to single out those who belonged to the ‘other’ group. The gap between 
the groups has also been widened by the perceived role of the different groups during the 
resistance struggle against Indonesia. The Firaku claimed to have won the war through their 
belligerence in the east. They accuse(d) the Kaladi for their permissiveness towards the pro-
Indonesian militias. Although the Kaladi have rejected these allegations, the competing 
claims over the relative sacrifice and suffering still fan the contrast between the two groups. 
As long as the East-Timorese feel the need to rekindle these stereotype and derogatory 
failed to understand that Portuguese, because of its catholic heritage, was deeply rooted 
in the East-Timorese society. The language policy therefore backfired on the Indonesian 
government as Portuguese became the primary language of the underground resistance (Van 
Engelenhoven, 2006; Mydans, 2007). Tetum, on the other hand became the aboveground 
language of resistance as Father Martinho da Costa Lopes, a strong defender of human rights 
and supporter of self-determination and justice, promoted Tetum, instead of Portuguese or 
Bahasa Indonesia, as the alternative language of liturgy. When the Indonesian government 
finally withdrew from the island in 2002, Bahasa Indonesia nevertheless had almost erased 
all of the ritual registers and oral traditions of the local languages (Van Engelenhoven, 2006). 
Up and until independence was declared in 2002, the East-Timorese were characterized 
by their protest against the Indonesian occupier. With the establishment of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste this binding agent, however, lost its necessity. In search of a new 
national identity mark, the East-Timorese returned among other things to their linguistic 
roots by proclaiming language as their national token. The indigenous languages were 
acknowledged as national languages, whereas Tetum and Portuguese, the former rebel 
languages, were selected as the official linguae francae in the administration of the 
newly found republic. Because the vocabulary of Tetum, however, was deemed too thin 
Portuguese was appointed as the de facto official language in the courts, the schools, and 
the government. The language policy thus in retroact welcomed back the language barrier to 
the gamut of difficult challenges that confront East-Timor today for Portuguese had always 
been considered a dying language after Indonesia had incorporated East-Timor in 1975. Yet, 
over half a decade later this very language has marginalized Tetum and Indonesian, the most 
widely spoken languages of the country (Mydans, 2007). In order to have a voice in either 
one of the public realms, the East-Timorese are therefore forced to pick up their Portuguese 
language skills, a tongue that for a long time seemed to be reserved for the older generation 
in the country 
Unfortunately, it was precisely this linguistic and (post-)colonial landscape that formed 
the neglected décor of the UN peace support operations in Timor-Leste. It turned out that 
most part of the UN forces was ill prepared for the complex linguistic and cultural dimensions 
of their operational environment (Jones, 2005). The following two quotes of two interpreters 
who joined the UN peace support operations in Timor-Leste in respectively 1999-2000 and 
2006-2007, illustrate that the military personnel was not trained to engage in cross-cultural 
communication encounters:
 
“There was no institute to acquire an understanding of the languages and cultures of Timor-
Leste. It was your own, individual responsibility. (…) Even basic things such as cultural poli-
teness were not imparted during the UN mission. There was lots of offence given that was 
avoidable.”
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‘At one night I heard machine gun shots. At first I thought the sound came from a movie that 
probably was playing in one of the other rooms of the building. The following morning, ho-
wever, I learned that the repetitive sounds indeed had come from machine guns. A local by-
stander explained to me that there had been a riot and that Malayan soldiers had opened fire 
from out of their jeeps. Their bullets grazed the heads of the civilians. People were face down 
instantly. Next thing, the Malay soldiers jumped out of their vehicles, unarmed the rioters, 
collected their weapons and drove off as soon as the job was done. The balance was restored 
and the streets were calm again. The bystander nodded approvingly and said ‘That’s how it 
should be done’.4    
Van Engelenhoven later came to understand that these and other manifestations of 
(controlled) violence without respect of persons brought about the peace and order that the 
Australian forces failed to procure. Objectionable and incomprehensible as this might seem 
from a Western point of view, violence in some cultures, and more specifically in smaller 
communities, can indeed under certain circumstances function as a meaningful social 
and cultural act (Jones, 2005, 82-83). Unlike the Australian effort to prove the contrary, Van 
Engelenhoven learned through his encounters with the local population that they rather did 
not want to find out who were guilty of committing crimes during the upheavals over the 
course of time because people were sometimes forced to alternately belong to conflicting 
forces in order to save their lives. Moreover, a single family often contained members of 
opposing political stands. An example of such a perilous family situation can be illustrated 
by the experience of Mohammed Carlos Soares:
 
“In September 1999, Baucau´s Muslim community had to flee the militias whilst also fighting 
off possible accusations that they were in fact collaborating with the enemy. Muslims like 
Nur Slam and Mohammed Carlos Soares remember the panic and the chaos, and the sounds 
of gunshots ringing out across town as they fled. Carlos was in the clandestine movement 
and wanted to remain in Baucau. But Indonesian troops soon found him and threatened to 
harm his family unless they left for West Timor. At the refugee camps at the border, Carlos 
found himself in a precarious situation. His brother-in-law was a mid-level commander for 
for the Indonesian army in Baucau. That meant that the soldiers in West/Timor paid more at-
tention to Carlos and his family. The troops became enraged when they found out about his 
involvement in the resistance movement. Fearing for his safety, Carlos secretly visited UNHCR 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Kupang, hoping to find a way to return 
to east Timor. He was able to secure passage for both himself and his sister. “I had to arrange 
this without my brother-in-law knowing,” says Carlos. “I was afraid he would found out and 
interfere”(Lee & Valerio, 2002, 56).” 
images of each other, the divide will fast become an insurmountable obstacle on the road to 
recovery for East-Timor. 
Because the Australians did not sufficiently realize the precarious nature of this feud, they 
inadvertently failed to understand that different linguistic and cultural regions demanded for 
interpreters who specifically belonged to the involved ethno-linguistic group. An interpreter 
of Firaku descent for example would not match very well with the culture of western regions. 
One of the interviewees even claimed that UN troops would probably not receive any 
information if the request for assistance was mediated by the ‘wrong’ kind of interpreter. 
This example illustrates that the service of interpreters comprehends more than just a 
passing of words. Interpreters often proceed as advisors in situations in which people, and in 
this regard more specifically peacekeepers, find themselves unfamiliar and unfit (Edwards, 
Temple & Alexander, 2005; Bos & Soeters, 2005; Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008). It is precisely the 
advisory role of the interpreter which proves to be of importance to peacekeepers in the 
operational field. Local interpreters are experts in understanding the customs and values 
of the (regional) culture and in this capacity they are often more perceptive of signals than 
peacekeepers. Being the middleman of two (or more) linguistically and culturally different 
worlds, interpreters are able of ‘fine-tuning’ the low context approach of Western contingents 
to the need of the high context culture of (most of the) operational areas (Bos & Soeters, 
2006). Whereas in Western countries straightforwardness and openness are received as 
prerequisites for efficient communication, non-Western-countries on the other hand often 
prefer a more subtle and indirect communicational approach (Hall & Hall, 1990, 3-9). It needs 
no say, that these two cultures are bound to collide when military contingents decide to 
operate according to their own cultural references. They, on the other hand, however, are 
likely to coincide in circumstances wherein an apposite interpreter is called upon to mediate 
between the two different worlds. On grounds of their linguistic and cultural knowledge, the 
interpreter thus holds a strong hand when it comes to softening the military ‘tough talk’ into 
more appropriate means of communication. 
3. Reconciliation in East-Timor: Plight or Right?
Even the well-intended attempts of the Australians to enforce reconciliation upon the East 
Timorese were received with mixed emotions by some of the local population. The latter 
feared that the (con)quest for truth of the Australian troops and the UN initiative that soon 
followed thereafter to install truth and reconciliation commissions would not purify but 
pollute the tacit and tentative interpersonal relations that existed between people. Opening 
up recent wounds would tear up the whole of the country while leaving them in peace might 
have kept the country together. A personal experience of linguist Aone van Engelenhoven in 
this matter recounts of the following: 
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of the meetings, it moreover painstakingly uncovered not the inability, but the sheer 
unwillingness of the international participants to adjust themselves to their cultural and 
linguistic environment. The advisor in question explained the striking development in the 
Western attendance as follows: 
 
“What the internationals tend to forget or don’t know is that Tetum is both a language as well 
as a culture. It’s an oral tradition. It is of great importance to East-Timorese people that eve-
rybody gets the opportunity to have their say and speak their mind. It’s what their culture is 
about. A lot of the internationals are not familiar with the cultural background of the Timorese 
population. They get fed up with the long negotiations. They want action.”5
The tangle of misunderstandings between the local East-Timorese and Western value and 
belief systems that has unintentionally been brought forth as the byproduct of the effort of 
all the (international) involved parties has thus not so much as consoled but corroborated 
the problem of a country that is in search of itself. 
4. Conclusion
Although the UNTAET has facilitated the transition of East-Timor, the government has 
nevertheless not been able to fortify the initial steps on the road to recovery and peace. 
Although the past and present situation in East-Timor does not permit pinpointing a culprit 
for the stagnation of the peace-building process, it seems rather fair to state that a lack of 
cultural and linguistic understanding has prevented the international peacekeepers from 
playing a decisive role in the consolidating phase of the newly founded nation. Despite good 
intentions, the attempts of the UN, the NGOs, and the government to resolve the internal 
conflict have all failed to address the core of the problem. Problems that are rooted deep in 
the core of the East-Timorese society should therefore perhaps best be kept out of the hands 
of sympathetic but foreign parties and restored to the people who know the hearts and 
minds of their communities the best. The road to recovery is a quest for self-understanding 
which should belong to the authority and the identity of the East-Timorese themselves and 
it should therefore be addressed by the customs of their society so that they can build up 
confidence and through that rebuild the nation.
Western attempts to interfere in this matter were therefore considered pointless as the 
complexity of the society of Timor-Leste would not allow for mediation of outside, read 
Western valued, parties. Although the committee of the in 2003 established Commission 
for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) acknowledged the above mentioned anxiety 
towards for instance the public hearings of both eyewitnesses and perpetrators of massacres 
in the period of … , they nevertheless were convinced that East-Timor should as many nations 
before them ‘(…) come to the consensus that in order to leave the evils of the past behind 
and move forward and in order to heal the wounds inflicted in the past, it is necessary to 
open them and cleanse them. Only then will the wounds heal naturally and only in this way 
can we avoid the dangers of stinking, festering wounds under a cloth of fear.’ (Timor-Leste 
Massacres, National Public Hearing). Despite the fact that both of the described accounts 
advocate and represent different approaches on how sentiment and resentment with the 
East-Timorese society should be dealt with, an implication of Van Engelenhoven’s findings 
would nevertheless be that Western military organizations, the United Nations (UN), and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) could be even more effective if they, rather than 
molding the operational environment to their own liking, acquire an inside perspective on 
the local perception of the environment by adapting strategies that are more true to the 
complex reality of their operations. An example of such a strategy in this regard was aptly 
applied in a situation in which the distribution of humanitarian aid for the local population 
needed to be organized during a period within the UNTAET. In this particular context, a co-
worker of Austcare, Australia’s second largest non-governmental organization, who served 
as an advisor of the East Timorese government was assigned to organize high meetings 
between representatives of respectively the government, the military, UN forces, NGOs, and 
the local population. While all of the other parties commanded (at least a certain degree 
of ) Tetum, the UN forces on the other hand were (literally) not prepared to communicate 
in the local language. Out of convention, and/or perhaps convenience, English therefore 
subsequently became the official language of the meetings. This ad hoc language policy, 
however, ‘overruled’ the local people and caused them to regrettably abandon the meetings. 
The East-Timorese people who wanted to attend the meetings after all did not command 
enough English to properly represent themselves and the administration moreover did not 
provide for an interpreter who could translate for them. The injustice of the situation soon 
contributed to the employment of interpreters and although their presence considerably 
improved the position of the local population during the meetings, the ‘solution’ was only 
a small adjustment in relation to the whole of the transformation the governmental advisor 
ultimately managed to realize. Instead of ‘all English meetings’, the advisor prioritized 
Tetum as the official language for the high meetings. From that moment on a remarkable 
development occurred in the attendance of the ‘international’ participants. By the time 
the transformation was completed and the meetings were held in Tetum and translated 
in English, the attendance of the international participants dropped spectacularly. This 
reversed process not only clearly outlined the transition and corresponding attendance 
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Notes
1  The percentages of the East Timorese population professing to be Catholics are derived from a radio interview with 
Rowena Lennox . http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport/stories/2000/169312.htm
2  Both quotes are taken from two separate interviews with Australian respondents who functioned respectively as an NGO 
co-worker and government advisor. The telephone interviews were held in June, 2007.   
3  The negative image of Australians was confirmed by a greater part of the interviewees. The antipathy, however, becomes 
specifically clear in the following fragment of a letter written by Dr. Geoffrey Hull, director of the National Institute of 
Linguistics in Dili, Timor Leste. In reaction to several (linguistic) misconceptions about Timor-Leste conveyed in a public 
online letter written by yet another Australian author, Dr Hull replied: ‘(…) Is it any wonder that the Timorese judge quoted by Mr 
Deakin quipped that “the only people we dislike more than Australians are Indonesians”? I’d say we’re fast becoming the favorites for 
first place.’ The last mentioned remark of Dr. Hull refers to the tenacity with which so many Australians seem to embrace 
their ignorance about the socio-historical and linguistic landscape of Timor-Leste.  http://www.asianlang.mq.edu.au/
INL?onlineopinion.html
4  This quote is a fragment of an interview held with Aone van Engelenhoven at the Leiden University Centre for Linguistics 
on the 22nd of May, 2007.
5  Interview with Australian respondent who functioned as government advisor (see also note 2).
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between soldiers and interpreters.  In this article we study how servicemen perceive their 
cooperation with interpreters. What are their experiences regarding their cooperation 
with interpreters in the mission environment? And more specifically, what factors define 
the smoothness or the strains in the interaction with interpreters? These two key questions 
will be discussed in relation to the experience of representatives of a battle group (BG) and 
a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) of the Netherlands armed forces that have been 
deployed to Uruzgan, one of the troubled provinces in southern Afghanistan. 
We rely on survey-data collected among military people, who had just returned from 
their mission as well as interviews conducted with soldiers and officers in the area of 
operations and back home in the Netherlands. Elsewhere we have reported research on the 
experiences of local interpreters themselves; these are other projects though, implying that 
these data cannot be connected to the data reported in this article (Bos & Soeters, 2006; 
Hoedemakers & Soeters, 2009). First, we will put the issue of language matters in the military 
in a historical perspective. Then we continue with the presentation and analysis of the data. 
We conclude with a reflection of limitations, future research and possible recommendations 
for improving military practice in the missions overseas.  Given the fact that the issue of 
language matters in the military is still under-researched2, we think this article provides a 
much-needed contribution to our knowledge of military operations far away from home.  
2. Historical examples of the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters
Although linguistic capability today cannot be left out of the core of warfare, its importance, 
however, has long been forgotten in military procedures. While military history is full 
of examples which illustrate the influence of language within the theatre of war and the 
sometimes fatal consequences of linguistic incompetence and miscommunication, the 
military organization has only recently (re)valued the lessons that could be learned from 
the past. Two different yet comparable examples of the language barrier within military 
history representative for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan to date are the 
Dutch Colonial Army in the Indonesian Archipelago and the Kit Carson Scouts in Vietnam. 
The multinational, multilingual composition of these contingents induced serious 
communication problems, and sometimes this occurred in a fatal way. 
Dutch Colonial Army
In the case of the Dutch Colonial Army soldiers, not only had difficulties understanding their 
Western and indigenous comrades, their lack of linguistic skills also made it impossible to 
interact with the population (Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008, 307-310). In order to circumvent the 
hindrance of the language barrier the army called upon the support of local leaders who, 
1. Introduction 
In ‘The Punishment of Virtue’, activist and journalist Sarah Chayes displays a critical view of the 
developments inside southern Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban (Chayes, 2002). 
Chayes touches upon a matter that is of infinite importance to the success of military opera-
tions in Afghanistan:
“But to my mind, the very worst breach of U.S. security lay with the interpretation and trans-
lation services the troops relied upon for all their interactions with the Afghans around them. 
I can remember only one soldier who spoke Pasthu. Local interpreters were required for the 
army’s every move. And those interpreters were provided, again, by Razziq Shirzai [a local 
powerbroker]. (…) Whether by inclination or - as was often the case - by force, with physical 
abuse driving home the facts, the interpreters were Razziq’s men, under his orders. The result 
was a severely distorted picture of the situation in the Afghan south and nearly unintelligible 
interactions between Americans and Afghans. The information U.S. forces were receiving was 
frequently inaccurate or deliberately misrepresented. The messages U.S. officers were trying 
to communicate to locals were either not getting through at all, or were, time and again, twis-
ted to suit the Shirzais’ ends (Chayes, 2002, 56).” 
This article explores the significance of Chayes’ grim picture of a corrupt ‘language agency’ 
namely the importance of linguistic skills within military operations. Chayes’ discovery 
that the army’s language skills did not meet the demands of the mission environment is 
not limited to the U.S. military only. On the contrary, it is the fate of almost every allied 
soldier deployed to Afghanistan and overseas operations in general. Research on language 
matters in the military has confirmed that the task to win the ‘hearts and minds’ is severely 
obstructed by the fact that soldiers do not sufficiently command the language and cultural 
customs of the local population. In order to gain a firm foothold in the mission area, military 
organizations therefore often need to rely on the cultural and linguistic expertise of local 
interpreters (Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008; Pouligny, 2006; Rubinstein, 2003; Rubinstein 2008). 
The recruitment of local interpreters, however, is a delicate matter for more reasons than 
Chayes describes in her book. Malpractice among language agencies is only one of the factors 
why soldiers reflect upon the merits but also on the ‘costs’ of the service of interpreters 
(Bogers, Van Dijk & Heeren-Bogers, 2010). The balance between the pros and cons of working 
with local translators trouble the military, because dependence on the knowledge of 
interpreters may, as the citation has illustrated, imply vulnerabilities that threaten the safety 
and success of the operation (Bos & Soeters, 2006, 261-269). After all, the local interpreters’ 
role is boundary-spanning, connecting the international military organization to the local 
communities but at the same time bringing in dangers that threaten the interpreters as 
well as others in those communities.1 Particularly in a dangerous and turbulent mission 
area as Southern Afghanistan such reflections on vulnerability could strain the relationship 
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1957, 22). An important lesson of the past, in short, has thus demonstrated that dependence 
on interpreters in the mission environment could be eased but not excised by language 
training.
Vietnam War: the Kit Carson scout program
Two decades after the decline of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, American soldiers 
experienced similar cultural and linguistic problems during the Vietnam War. Whereas the 
Dutch Colonial Army at the time sought to govern regions by incorporating the power and 
party of local leaders, the American army reconnoitred the mission area by using former 
Vietcong soldiers in combat operations in South Vietnam’s battlefields (Tovy, 2006). The scout 
program was founded by chance in 1966 when Vietcong fighters turned themselves over to 
a unit of the U.S. marines. When the Vietcong shortly thereafter spread rumours among the 
local population about the brutal torture and murder of one of their missing colleagues, the 
commander of the Marines decided to refute the rumour by sending the ‘murdered’ deserter 
and two other former Vietcong combatants to nearby villages to inform the people about 
the good treatment they had received by the Americans (Tovy, 2006, 78). Their mission was 
an instant success and led to a significant rise in the number of Vietcong deserters. After a 
local trial-run program in which the deserters were used as rank-and-file soldiers, an official 
program for the employment of former Vietcong as scouts was established in the entire 
operational area.    
The program for the deserters, Hoi Chanh in Vietnamese, was named after the legendary 
hero Christopher (‘Kit’) Carson whose quasi-pacification missions along the American 
frontier in the nineteenth century reflected the situation in Vietnam (Tovy, 2006, 82). As the 
ideal American patriot Carson knew how to handle both the velvet and iron glove by learning 
not only the language and cultural customs of the Indians but also by striking against their 
sources of income and infiltrating their meeting places. It was precisely in the realm of these 
two tactical spheres that the role and position of the scouts within the American units in 
Vietnam was envisioned. After a strict selection procedure, a basic training on American 
warfare and weaponry and recurring loyalty tests (some scouts deserted back to the Vietcong 
and others turned out to be spies), the scouts were attached to their new units in which they 
received additional training to improve their English language skills. The extra training was 
necessary because the language barrier between the scouts and the American soldiers proved 
to be one of the few serious problems that appeared throughout the implementation of the 
program. Reports state that soldiers complained about the extraordinarily poor language 
skills of the scouts ‘(...) which kept them from carrying out even the most minimal essentials 
of communication between themselves and the commanders of the units’ (Tovy, 2006, 89). 
The gravity of the language barrier cannot be underestimated, for the primary assignment 
of the scout was to lead army units on patrol and to prevent them from falling into ambushes. 
in return for personal privileges and village protection, assigned trackers and interpreters 
to the troops. A military officer writes the following about the use of interpreters in the 
supplement of the precepts for the policing task of the army in 1929 (our translation): 
 
“A disadvantage of the gathering of intelligence is the, often inevitable, use of interpreters. 
Because of our repeated relocation and actions in completely different regions, it was not 
possible to always command the vernacular and at the beginning of the operation linguistic 
knowledge of course is nil. Nevertheless, it is very useful to learn some words in advance. 
Then one already has some control over the interpreter, the latter will less likely dare to tam-
per and every now and then one can detect that he does not translate a question correctly. Of 
course, it is difficult for underdeveloped people to understand the intention of our sentence, 
they are not accustomed to translation, so that the question sometimes is completely distor-
ted (Anonymous, 1929, 139).”
It was precisely because of the unfamiliarity with the area of operations and the local 
languages that soldiers were potentially vulnerable to subversive actions of local people. 
Reports therefore repeatedly insisted on a close watch of the movements of both the 
interpreter and scout, for their loyalty, as experience had learned, was not always a foregone 
conclusion. The supplement consequently conveyed numerous examples of local co-workers 
who tried to manipulate information during patrols and interrogations in order to serve 
their own interest or that of the opponent. A lack of awareness of the real intentions behind 
the apparent goodwill of the interpreter and scout could thus contribute to the downfall of 
the unit. Another officer in this regard reports the following (our translation):
 
“In 1903 various patrols in Blang Pidië, mainly in the area of south Lho Pawoh, were led by a 
scout, a young Teukoe, whom later proved to belong to the opposition party. Presumably he 
was tasked to observe the customs of the patrol and its commander and to lure them into an 
ambush when possible. The trustee, a so called ‘sure shed’ whom only performed interpreter 
services, must have known that the scout was untrustworthy. Two years later, a lieutenant pa-
trol commander recognised his former scout as a mobster who was put down by a repeating 
rifle (Anonymous, 1929, 119).”
Following these experiences, the official Dutch handbook of counterinsurgency for the 
military in the Archipelago therefore prescribed their troops to learn the basic grammar of the 
local vernaculars in order to overcome the potential deceit by locals (De Moor, 2003). Despite 
its practical value, the advice, however, was not always feasible for some of the vernaculars 
in the Archipelago were almost impossible to master. Christian Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch 
Islam expert and chief advisor for indigenous affairs to the Dutch colonial administration, 
for instance deemed it necessary to develop a linguistic manual for military officers in order 
to come to grips with the otherwise impracticable Achenese language (Goebée & Adriaanse, 
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restricted in its options to resolve the problems caused by the language barrier (Resteigne & 
Soeters, 2009, 323-324; Van Dijk, 2008). 
Whereas language training of personnel ideally is the most efficient instrument to 
streamline communication in regular multinational corporations, the reality of the 
international military organization, however, does not allow the development and 
implementation of language training programmes for all of today’s military operations.3 
Instead of depending on linguistic personnel that has been trained within the setting of the 
organization, the expeditionary unit is forced to recruit local language experts that have 
been brought forth by the mission environment itself. Embedded and local interpreters thus 
form an important, if not the most vital link in the communication between the military and 
the local population (Hoedemakers & Soeters, 2009). It, however, is precisely this situation 
that defines the precarious relationship between the soldier and interpreter because their 
interdependency paradoxically affects the communication they seek to establish. It is widely 
recognised that a common culture and language enhance trust as they help coordinate shared 
expectations. Whereas most situations provide some clues for a person to coordinate mutual 
expectations, the detection of such markers is more difficult when the interacting parties 
belong to different linguistic, social, religious or ethnic groups (Brouckaert & Dhaene, 2004). 
Differences in background, such as between the soldier and interpreter, in other words can 
significantly impede the level of smoothness occurring in the process of communication. 
In order to understand the soldiers’ experiences with intercultural communication in 
international missions abroad, the following paragraphs will look more closely into the 
perceptions of soldiers regarding their cooperation with interpreters. We focus on the 
experienced strains or smoothness (problems or lack thereof ) in their interaction with the 
interpreters as well as on demographics and variables pertaining to cultural skills that can 
possibly explain the perceived aspects of working with local translators. 
   
3. General description of the study’s set-up 
In 2008 a survey was conducted among servicemen of the Dutch armed forces who belonged 
to the Battle Group Task Force Uruzgan 4 (BG TFU4) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
4 (PRT4) who had been deployed to Uruzgan in respectively July 2007-January 2008 and 
September 2007-March 2008. The respondents of the Battle Group were approached when 
they returned to the barracks after deployment. Following the request of their commander, 
all servicemen available at that time participated in the study; this is roughly half of the 
total workforce of the Battle Group. The 52 members of the PRT were requested to fill out 
the questionnaire via an email message that was sent to their home addresses; 50% of them 
(26) responded. The total sample consisted of 278 members of the BG TFU4 and 26 members 
of the PRT4 (N=304). These differences in size of the subsamples are in line with the size of 
workforce of the BG and the PRT. 
This was a task, which the scout could only fulfil when he was able to use his ties with the 
population to the advantage of his unit. The position of the scout in other words strongly 
depended on his ability to translate and transfer the gathered intelligence information to his 
commander. Despite the language barrier and the possibility of hidden agendas among the 
recruited scouts, the project was unique in a sense that it granted the Vietnamese scout the 
same benefits as the American soldier. The Kit Carson Scout program moreover was the only 
project that was generally endorsed by the Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development 
Support (CORDS) and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) during the Vietnam 
War (Tovy, 2006, 90).
 
Language management in the military
When comparing the two historical examples, the function of scouts in military operations 
of the past does not seem to differ much from the tasks of interpreters and translators in 
the military today. Leaving moral-political considerations, semantics and operational 
differences aside, both scouts as well as today’s interpreters are recruited by the military for the 
operational value of their environmental, cultural and linguistic knowledge. The rhetorical 
question: ‘Is he [the scout] just an extra rifle or is he a second set of eyes and ears for the unit leaders?’ 
which at the time was raised during a US army conference on the use of scouts therefore 
seems to be relevant when applied to the use of today’s interpreters (Tovy, 2006, 87). Before 
exploring how soldiers indeed perceive their interaction with interpreters, the historical 
examples demonstrate that linguistic capability, whether commanded by soldiers or their 
local co-workers, engenders powerful advantages for those who command the languages 
of both the military organization and the mission environment. As such, the experience of 
the Dutch Colonial Army and the Kit Carson Scouts readdresses the language barrier within 
the contemporary military by pointing out that if demands for linguistic personnel cannot 
be met within the organization itself, the latter should not shy away from the risks of local 
recruitment but rather trust on the cultural and linguistic benefit these ścouts´ bring to the 
fore (Kilcullen, 2009).  
In accordance with current research conducted by management scholars on the often 
strained relationship between parent and host-national companies, the military has come to 
acknowledge that language is the carrier of international communication and professional 
understanding (Van Dijk, 2008). Featuring strong resemblance to multinational corporations, 
the military organization moreover has increasingly experienced the conclusions of 
management studies which emphasize the corrosive effect of the language barrier on both 
native and non-native speakers and the power circuits that consequently arise in the wake 
of ‘asymmetric’ communicational processes (Feely & Harzing, 2003; Adler, 2002; Marschan-
Piekkari, Welch & Welch, 1999; Hoon, Sun & Kline Harrison, 1996; Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari & 
Santti 2005). Despite the similarities with multinationals, the military, however, is strongly 
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with Opposing Military Forces (OMF). The members of the provincial reconstruction team, 
on the other hand, sought to establish reconstruction operations through contact with 
local and regional governments and NGOs. They were involved in encouraging and enabling 
the development of social and policing instances, the inventory of local needs, and the 
recruitment of local contractors in the implementation of local projects. The PRT’s job – 
at least to a degree – resembles the activities of aid and reconstruction workers (Rietjens, 
2008). Because of the observed differences in background and mission assignments the data 
of the BG TFU4 and PRT4 have been analysed separately.  
Given the under-researched nature of this topic, we had to formulate our own items 
with respect to the interaction between the servicemen and the local interpreters. We 
formulated statements about the cooperation with interpreters involving the importance 
of these contacts for the execution of the soldier’s assignment (1= strongly disagree; 5= 
strongly agree), the soldier’s impression about the interpreter’s service (1= very negative; 5= 
very positive), and possible problems related to the interaction with interpreters (frequency, 
seriousness, and personal involvement in problems). We also added 15 items to register the 
soldiers’ evaluation of their interaction with the interpreters. In addition, we asked the 
respondents to fill out a list of cross-cultural competencies. We used 62 items from the so 
called FORCE-IT questionnaire, measuring cross-cultural competence grouped into scales 
tapping seven dimensions of cultural competence, i.e. flexibility, openness, respect, cultural 
empathy (sensitivity), emotional stability, and social initiative, respect and trust.5 Each dimension 
consisted of eight or ten items. 
Although the survey included items, which addressed the cooperation with embedded 
interpreters (Dutch citizens of Afghan descent) and local interpreters separately, members 
of the BG, apart from a few high ranked officers, did not use the service of embedded 
interpreters. The analysis therefore restricts itself to the cooperation with local interpreters. 
During the time of the study, the Dutch hired roughly 80 (embedded and local) interpreters 
for their activities in the Uruzgan province, which is about 1 for every 20-25 servicemen. Most 
of them were local translators, young adults (aged 21-23) mastering the English language 
and originating from urban regions such as Jalalabad, Kabul and Kandahar. The Dutch 
military has a general rule to have each and every patrol or action outside the compound 
being accompanied by at least one interpreter.  Of course, translators are always present in 
conversations, meetings and negotiations of members of the PRT with representatives of the 
local population and authorities. 
The intention of the following is to provide an indication – based on the survey data – of 
how soldiers and (non-commissioned) officers of two different units, in the same military 
operation within a relatively same time period, experienced their cooperation with local 
interpreters. In addition, we have conducted a large number of in-depth interviews among 
Dutch military personnel as to their experiences with interpreters. Passages from these in-
depth interviews with members of the BG and the PRT have been used in the text in order to 
illustrate and complement the quantitative findings of the survey-study.6 
67% of the members of the BG TFU4 (187 out of 278) and all of the members of the PRT4 (26) 
did have (frequent) contact with the local population through interpreters. Since this study 
seeks to investigate the factors affecting the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters 
the following paragraphs will only be based on the data of the respondents that have called 
upon the assistance of interpreters (total numbers hence are 187 + 26 = 213). In table 1 the 
demographics of this sample are displayed.
Table 1: Characteristics of respondents who have worked with interpreters
  




25,1 years 36,6 years 26,4 years
Enlisted Men/NCO/CO 75,1% / 16,4% / 8,5% 3,8% / 61,5% / 34,6% 66% / 22,2% / 11,8%
Educational level:
Low/Middle/High
25,8% / 54,5% / 19,7% 0% / 52,2% / 47,8% 22,9% / 54,2% / 22,9%
Previous Deployment 
Experience 
61,4% 71,4% 62,4% 
Of the total number of 213 respondents roughly two third were soldiers and one third were 
(non-commissioned) officers. A predominant part of the respondents were male: only 2 
members of the BG TFU4 and 2 members of the PRT4 were female. The average age of the 
respondents in the Battle Group was 25 years and almost 37 years in the PRT. More than 62% 
of the respondents had fulfilled at least one foreign assignment before they were deployed to 
Afghanistan. In terms of education 23% had a low level, 54% a middle level and 23% a higher 
degree of education.4 Members of the BG were on average younger, had a lower rank – they 
were predominantly soldiers whereas the members of the PRT were predominantly NCOs 
and officers -, and they had a lower educational level than the members of the PRT4; this is 
all in accordance with the actual differences in composition of Battle Groups and PRTs in 
Afghanistan. 
The tasks of the units were very distinct of one another. The infantry units of the 
battle group were tasked to conduct reconnaissance operations throughout the Afghan 
Development Zone, escort their colleagues from the PRT, and protect the local population 
and military troops. Hence, they were tasked to conduct classical, core-military jobs, the more 
so as they were – irregularly but not infrequently - engaged in violent, hostile interaction 
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(troublesome aspects). These results underline the impression we inferred from the previous 
findings namely that the soldiers in general value the contribution of the local interpreters 
in a professional and positive way. Despite this general impression of professionalism and 
general satisfaction, there are also problems in the interaction with the local interpreters; 
these, however, are less prominent than the professional use and general satisfaction with 
the interpreters.
Regarding the relation between these 3 ‘evaluation’-scales and the nature of the soldiers’ 
experience in working with local interpreters (negative/positive), stepwise regression 
confirmed that there indeed is a correlation between the soldier’s experience with local 
interpreters on the one hand and the general satisfaction about the cooperation with the interpreter 
and troublesome aspects in working with the interpreter on the other (R2=0,20; df 1.67; p<.01). The 
beta weights for the predictors are respectively 0.36 and -0.28. The last correlation indicates - 
not surprisingly - that those servicemen who have reported troublesome aspects in working 
with the interpreter are less positive in their general experiencing of those contacts. Only 
the scale evaluating the professional use of the service of the interpreter did not produce a significant 
contribution in this analysis. 
We see the same pattern emerging when we put these three variables in a series of 
three stepwise regression models explaining the soldiers’ experience in working with local 
interpreters. We inserted respectively 1) age and education only, then 2) age, education and 
the four cross-cultural competencies that had shown satisfactory degrees of reliability (i.e. 
openness [alpha = 0.79], respect [alpha = 0.68]; cultural empathy (sensitiveness) [alpha = 
0.80] and social initiative [alpha = 0.79]7, and 3) age and education, the four cross-cultural 
competencies and the three ‘evaluation’-scales. There were no problems of multicollinearity, 
since the intercorrelations ranged from zero to .51, and were, hence, not very high. Table 2 
shows the results of these analyses. 
The analyses show that among the respondents from the Battle Group age nor educational 
level play a significant role in explaining the soldiers’ experience with the local interpreters. 
We tend to think this is partly a result of the compressed composition of this sample: the 
majority is young and has a relatively low educational level; hence, the methodological 
problem of “restriction of range” comes to the fore, generally reducing the size of correlations 
(Sands, Alf & Abrahams, 1978, 747-750). We will turn to this later, when we will be studying the 
older and more educated PRT-respondents. Contrary to age and education, some of the cross-
cultural competencies, however, do play a role in this analysis on the data from the Battle 
Group-respondents. It shows that the cross-cultural competence of ‘openness’ is important 
in experiencing the contact with local interpreters (model 2) as are the general satisfaction of 
working with local interpreters and – in a negative sense – troublesome aspects of working 
with them (model 3). We already saw the latter two effects in the previous analysis.
  
4. Findings
4.1 Experiences of BG TFU4 in working with local interpreters. 
Although cooperation with interpreters was not prominently present (positive or negative) 
in the respondents’ spontaneous reactions about mission experiences, the wide majority 
of the 187 members of BG TFU4 found contact with local interpreters somewhat to very 
important (85%) and (very) positive (68%). 77% of the respondents indicated that they almost 
never experienced problems with local translators. Of the 23 % of the respondents who did 
encounter problems in their interaction with local interpreters, 44% rated these problems 
as (somewhat) serious. In other words, about 10% of the respondents of the Battle Group 
indicated that they had experienced somewhat serious problems with the local translators. A 
first stepwise regression analysis (using reported problems in terms of frequency, character 
and the involvement of soldiers as predictors) indicated that variance in the experience in 
contact with local interpreters (positive/negative) was partly, but significantly explained by 
the problems that the respondents had experienced (R2 = 0.09; df 1.180; p<.01). Of course, this 
is not a very surprising result. 
As mentioned before, respondents were asked to evaluate their relation with the 
interpreters on 15 items. A principal component factor analysis revealed a structure in the 
number of items that could be related to the soldier’s experience with local interpreters. On 
grounds of the structure that was discovered (explaining 53,6% of the variance), three factors 
could be specified: 
* professional use of the service of the interpreter (based on the following 5 items: my relation 
with the interpreter was part of my job; was strictly focused on a literal translation of the 
spoken message; was focused on the explanation of local customs and traditions; was 
necessary for my professional performance; was strictly professional of nature)
* general satisfaction about the cooperation with the interpreter (based on the following 6 items: 
my relationship with the interpreter was satisfactory because I could understand him well; 
was good because I was convinced that he reproduced the information correctly; was valuable 
because he explained how the received and translated information should be understood; 
was pleasant because of his personality; was optimal because I trusted him completely; was 
cordial of nature), and 
* troublesome aspects in working with the interpreter (based on the following 4 items: my relation 
with the local interpreter was uncomfortable because he was an outsider to the military unit; 
was troublesome because of cultural differences; was risky because he was threatened by 
outside parties; was difficult because I suspected him of a hidden agenda). 
A reliability analysis on the above-mentioned scales resulted respectively in Cronbach’s alphas 
of 0.84, 0.71 and 0.64, which indicate acceptable degrees of reliability. The mean scores and 
standard deviations of the three scales - with a theoretical range of 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree) 
- are respectively: 3.4/ 0.72 (professional use), 3.1/ 0.59 (general satisfaction) and 2.7/ 0.56 
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“Look, interpreters have their whims and fancies but so do we… so that doesn’t surprise me 
anymore. But if you treat them like dirt or as something dangerous, interpreters will lose their 
surplus value. (…) So, you’ll need to steer a middle course and that’s the hardest thing to do for 
young adults. If you have no experience of life and no experience in general to handle these 
situations and you are confronted with such a guy [interpreter] of whom you have heard all 
kinds of wild stories than that’s really hard to handle. People need time to get accustomed 
to that. Think about 3 to 4 weeks before people learn to do that. The most important reason 
is that people in their twenties haven’t seen so much of the world yet. They see these long 
bearded men and women dressed in burkha’s for the first time in their lives and then imagine 
an interpreter who’s telling you about these things and what you’re doing wrong. And when 
you’re in your twenties and not so very self confident and get to deal with this on top of the 
excitement of being deployed to Afghanistan than it’s really difficult to remain civil to the 
interpreter. They really have to learn that. Interpreters most often receive the short end of the 
soldier’s patience. Do that once to an interpreter and next time he will have less trust in you. 
It’s an interaction and before you’ll know it you’re in for it, because that’s how problems bet-
ween people arise. (…) From a cultural point of view you have absolutely nothing in common 
with interpreters so that’s what you need to work on, but at the same time that’s not what you 
came for as a twenty year old. You need to get your vehicles ready, instruct your men. There’s 
just so much you need to do, but when you have experienced that once already you know that 
you will have a little chat with the interpreter ten minutes before you’ll go on patrol and that 
things will work out fine (Anonymous BG company commander, 2008).”
When applied to members of the in-group, the competence of openness thus can be perceived 
as a form of social and cultural empathy, which enables soldiers to mentor comrades in their 
understanding of the local interpreter.  
4.2 PRT4 experiences in working with (local) interpreters
Similar analyses of the data of the Battle Group were applied to the 26 members of the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team who participated in the research. All PRT-respondents had 
contact with local interpreters during their deployment, most of them (more than 84%) on 
a weekly or daily basis. Although the respondents generally judged their experiences with 
interpreters as positive, problems with local interpreters did occur according to slightly 
more than half of the PRT4 members (54%). The problems mostly concerned incidents, 
but according to 3 respondents (10%) problems happened more often. The nature of the 
(incidental) problems with local interpreters was serious and involved the soldier personally 
according to more than half of the PRT members.  We have no specific information about the 
nature of the incidents referred to in these data, but based on other studies we can attribute 
these incidents to problems of trust (“does this guy really say everything?” “is his translation 








AGE .09 .08 .14
EDUCATION .04 .06 -.14
OPPENNESS --- .29* .24+
RESPECT --- .04 .06
CULTURAL EMPATHY --- -.07 -.15
SOCIAL INITIATIVE --- -.20 -.14
PROFESSIONAL USE --- --- .08
GENERAL SATISFACTION --- --- .28*




+ 0.05 <p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p <0.01
 Hence, the only cross-cultural competence that is significantly connected to the soldier’s 
experience in working with interpreters appears to be the competence of ‘openness’; this 
competence describes a person’s open-mindedness towards out-group members and his or 
her susceptibility to cultural norms and values of others. There is one more cross-cultural 
competence that shows a remarkable even though not significant result in this analysis. The 
competence ‘social initiative’ shows negative betas with the experience of the contact with 
the interpreters (model 2 and 3).  This result would imply that those servicemen, who show a 
certain aptitude to approach others and other situations in a lively way and to take initiative, 
experience their contact with local interpreters as more negative. This is a bit surprising. 
We tend to interpret this as an indication of a certain competition between the translators 
and those soldiers who are good at taking social initiatives, a competition between the two 
parties, we have seen before in other studies (Hoedemakers & Soeters, 2009).
The quantitative analysis would lead us to disregard the factors age and education, which 
would be unjustified because of the “restriction of range” problem we mentioned before. 
Indeed, in our qualitative study a diffuse image emerges, in which soldiers try to reflect in 
a more ‘comprehensive approach’ by connecting and complementing factors such as age, 
educational level and experience, in order to understand the soldiers’ outlook on local 
interpreters. As such, the implementation of openness, as the following quote of a company 
commander illustrates, seems to be relevant when applied to members of the in-group as 
well.
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Are there any other factors influencing the PRT soldiers’ experience with interpreters? Of 
the obvious factors age, education, and previous deployment experience only education 
correlated almost significantly (r=.44; df 1.20; p<.06). This suggests that particularly the 
higher educated members of the PRT have experienced the contact with local interpreters as 
more pleasant. A possible explanation for the significance of the factor education in contact 
with local interpreters may be the fact that individuals with a higher level of education tend 
to be more cross-culturally competent (Matsumoto, LeRoux, Robles & Campos, 2007). In this 
line of thought higher educated PRT members are, for instance, probably more susceptible 
to the cultural values of hierarchy and respect for the elderly within the Afghan society. 
Openness towards these cultural values may consequently result in a more pleasant working 
relationship between the parties (Torikai, 2009, 1-3). Consistent with this idea is the finding 
that especially the intercultural competencies of respect and cultural empathy correlate 
significantly with the experience PRT members have had with local interpreters (respective 
correlations are r=.68 and .49; df1.25; p<.05).       
  
 
4.3 Comparing results between members of BG TFU4 and PRT4
The experience with local interpreters is significantly more positive for members of the PRT 
(mean 4.3) than BG soldiers (mean 3.7) who have cooperated with interpreters (t= 3.90; df 206; 
p<.001). Whereas possible explanations as age, education and rank between the members of 
the PRT and the BG seem obvious, none of the mentioned variables within the BG, however, 
seem to be directly linked with the soldier’s experience with local interpreters. Plausible 
explanations for the differences between the PRT and BG sample consist respectively of  (1) a 
different working environment and relationship with local interpreters, including perhaps 
also differences in the skills of the interpreters allocated to either the BG or the PRT; (2) the 
readiness to invest in a trusting relationship with local interpreters; (3) an increased level of 
intercultural competence among PRT members and (4) a more adequate preparation prior to 
working with interpreters during the military mission.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
Examples of operational experiences of soldiers who have been deployed to culturally and 
linguistic countries other than their own, have learned that a description of the interpreter 
as an invisible and neutral non-person is untenable. On the contrary, for contemporary 
counterinsurgency it is of key importance that the interpreter is a present and resourceful 
translator of the linguistic and cultural needs of both the military organization and the local 
population. The service of the interpreter, therefore, embodies the linguistic and cultural 
capabilities of the soldier as well as his or her communicational intentions. As such the 
correct?”), rivalry (“who is in charge here?”) and/or task ambiguity (“is the interpreter 
a translation machine or a language mediator?”) (Hoedemakers & Soeters, 2009; Bos & 
Soeters, 2006). 
Through a simple correlation analysis, it was possible to determine that the soldiers’ 
experience with local interpreters was correlated with the occurrence of problems during 
their interaction. Frequency, seriousness, as well as the soldier’s involvement in problems 
correlated negatively with a positive experience of contact with local interpreters. Especially 
the gravity of problems was of importance: the more serious the nature of problems, the 
less positive the experience of contact with local interpreters was (r=-.47; df 1.19; p<.05). 
It moreover appears that personal involvement in problems was more prominent when 
soldiers had more frequent contact with local interpreters (r=.55; df 1.18; p<.05).  
The PRT-respondents endorsed the hypothesis that a satisfactory cooperation as well as 
a professional attitude towards local interpreters is of importance for the establishment of a 
trusting relationship. General satisfaction about the cooperation in particular appeared to 
be somewhat connected with the PRT experience of contact with interpreters. Although this 
connection was – given the small sample size - not significant (r=.32; df 1.23; NS), interviews 
with PRT members in general tend to confirm the hypothesis that trust between soldiers 
and local interpreters often is positively influenced and reinforced by the satisfaction and 
professionalism experienced by both parties. A PRT commander in this regard told that:
 
“If you know people longer like Tassal, then you can discuss that we have a shura with repre-
sentatives of the region. (...) He knows with what kind of intent we want to go there and that’s 
what you see in the way he acts as an interpreter. But I didn’t do that with other interpreters. 
These young guys who arrived at the very last. Well, you’re not going to brief them intensively 
about what you’re planning to do, you just keep them a bit in the dark. You need to have built a 
trusting relationship with an interpreter before you can involve him in your assignment and he 
must also be capable to live up to the task. There were a couple of interpreters, well they just 
didn’t get the picture of what we were doing there. And they didn’t even master their English 
properly. I don’t think it’s wise to take a risk at that point. So, yes building a trusting relati-
onship depends for a part on the quality of the interpreter. The guys who just barely make it, 
you’ll just keep your distance to them in comparison to those who are intellectually on a high 
level, who are driven, interested in your mission, and who command the English language. 
And if you have a satisfactory relationship with your interpreter you’ll naturally have contact 
outside of the mission assignment as well. You’ll drink a cup of coffee together and discuss 
things. Cause those men are very surprised about the ways of our society. (...) A world opens 
for them. We also watched DVD’s on a notebook for instance. Tassal really enjoyed that. We 
did that sometimes with the other interpreters and then you instantly saw the divide. Some of 
them then just pulled out and others showed interest and wanted to know something about 
you as well (Anonymous PRT mission team commander, 2008).”    
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Notes
1  For a more theoretical approach about the boundaries of organizations, including the boundary-setting and boundary-
spanning mechanisms, see Scott (1992), especially chapter 8. To get an idea of the pressure and dangers local interpreters 
are exposed to, see Soeters and Johnson (2012). 
2  For instance, in a recently published, highly interesting sociological portrait of the American soldiers in Iraq, we cannot 
find the words “language” or “interpreters” in the index; there is an occasional reference to cross-cultural interaction 
and the use of translators (Ender, 2009). In Rubinstein’s work on peacekeeping we cannot find the words “language”, 
“interpreters”, or “translators” in the index either (Rubinstein, 2008). In the volumes of Armed Forces and Society, there 
is regularly mention of communication issues in multinational missions, but seldom one can find reference made to 
translators and interpreters in communication processes with the host nation people. 
3  The U.S Department of Defense has created innovative venues to increase the linguistic proficiency of the workforce 
by bringing personnel into the organization who already possess language skills and regional expertise. The heritage-
recruiting plans are revolutionary for the Department has developed comprehensive outreach programs with colleges, 
universities, and professional and heritage associations to recruit (civilian) key language-skilled individuals. One of the 
successes that these recruitment programs have brought forth is the 2006 (09L) Interpreter/Translator program in which 
individuals from heritage Arabic, Dari, and Pastho communities served in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
4  Completed highest education: Low=none to Lower Vocational Education; Middle=Lower General Education and 
Intermediate Vocational Education; High=Higher Vocational Education up to University.
5  The FORCE IT62 questionnaire is a combination of the Multicultural Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) and two sub-
scales pertaining to respect and trust developed by Richard de Ridder. The MPQ is described in (Van der Zee & and Van 
Oudenhoven, 2000; Van der Zee & Van Oudenhoven, 2001).
6  Andrea van Dijk has conducted 70 interviews with Dutch servicemen, national, and local interpreters both in the 
Netherlands (after returning from deployment in Afghanistan) and in Uruzgan in Southern Afghanistan, the area of 
operations itself. Her main focus in these interviews is on the development of trust between both parties. 
7  We had to delete the cross-cultural competencies “flexibility”, “emotional stability” and “trust” because the alphas of 
those scales were less than .60.
person and position of the interpreter strongly depend on the extent to which the interpreter 
is able to meet the serviceman’s expectations. 
In this study we have attempted to create some awareness of the importance 
of language issues in military operations overseas, particularly with respect to 
the interpersonal dynamics between international servicemen and host nation 
interpreters. We found that this is an under-researched area in military studies. 
Our study is a first quantitative attempt in this regard, with data limited to the 
experiences of the servicemen only. This necessitates future research that will 
include the perceptions of both the servicemen and translators at the same time. Only 
in such a research design, the real interpersonal dynamics between the two parties 
will be clarified. New studies would also need to address the vulnerable role of the 
interpreters, being in-between two opposing factions in the area of operations. Because 
of this precarious position, their fate after the international military mission has 
ended, but also the recruitment, security and staffing conditions during the missions 
should be taken into consideration, by both researchers and HR policy makers of the 
armed forces participating in the missions.  Hence, there is still a lot to be done with 
respect to this particular aspect of military operations.  
Our study – limited as it may be – has demonstrated that the soldiers’ experiences in 
working with local interpreters are determined among other things by the nature of the work 
(core-military tasks versus reconstruction tasks) and the cross-cultural competencies of the 
military person. Military organizations – as well as their leadership – should, therefore, be 
aware of the desired cooperation between servicemen and interpreters across the various 
components of the military organization and pay attention to the inherent precarious 
dynamics between the two parties. Military organizations should also pay attention to 
the level of required cultural competencies of its individual members. They should take 
appropriate measures to achieve the required degree of cross-cultural sensitivity among 
their personnel, through selection if possible and specific pre-mission training for all. 
Cultural empathy of the soldier defines the smoothness of the cooperation with the 
interpreter. Respect for the latter is indispensable for the military to gain access into the 
foreign, unfamiliar (Afghan) society. The soldiers’ ability to feel comfortable about the 
translation process on the one hand, and the general conduct of the interpreters as well as 
support of their position on the other hand, could be the initial step in the process of local 
cooperation. Ultimately, the quality of the relation between the international military and 
the host nation population might very well define the course of success for the whole of the 
military campaign (Rietjens, Bollen, Khalil & Wahidi, 2009). After all, words - if well chosen 
- can silence guns.   
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A later period in history learns that interpreters were crucial for the purpose of territorial 
expansion (Mairs, 2011, 78-79). Although interpreters yet again were seldomly mentioned 
in official documents, there nevertheless are some evocative examples that illustrate the 
versatility of the interpreter. During the discovery of America in the 16th century, the Spanish 
conquistador Hernán Cortès for instance was well aware of ‘(…) the importance of having 
adequate interpreters to assist them in communicating with the radically different peoples 
they encountered’ (Bowen, 1995, 255). The interpreters who accompanied Cortès’ exploration 
of the New World undeniably occupied a powerful position by serving as his ‘tongue and 
ears’ (Bowen, 1995, 262). This can be illustrated by the following quote:
 
“It immediately seemed to Cortès that Aguilar might become the interpreter whom he nee-
ded. Aguilar spoke Chontal Maya. His Spanish was rusty, as might expected, after eight years 
in the wilderness, and he never completely recovered it. But he was nevertheless immensely 
useful. Aguilar’s stories about human sacrifice among the Mayas must have cast a shadow 
over many conquistadors’ enthusiasm, as well as strengthening their sense of Christian mis-
sion (Hugh, 1993, 164).”
Apart from the fact that the knowledge of the interpreters was used to ‘enable’ the 
conquistador’s imperialistic and Christian conviction to conquer and proselytize the Maya 
people, this historical example also seems to confirm that the interpreters’ eyes and ears 
indeed were a powerful means that enhanced the efficacy of the people they served. Another 
example from this rather infamous era of history concerns the unenviable reputation of 
Cortes’ female interpreter and mistress Doña Marina who is best known as ‘La Malinche’. 
Malinche’s career is illustrative for the vulnerabilities that interpreters face who don’t belong 
to the formal military and bureaucratic hierarchies (Mairs, 2011, 79). This Nahuatl woman 
spoke various vernaculars because of the years she had spent in slavery among several 
indigenous Mexican people. She was baptized by her Spanish captors and learned their 
language. As a result of her proficiency she was employed as an intermediary between the 
conquistadores and the indigenous people (Mairs, 2011, 78-79). This was both a difficult and 
ambiguous position because as an interpreter she did not only had to pass on unwelcome 
and blatantly disrespectful messages that conflicted with local mores, she acted on her own 
initiative as Cortes’ spy and informer as well. Especially when it concerned the enemies of her 
own people, she wasn’t afraid to play it high or dirty. This stance contributed to her persisting 
reputation of a betrayer of the Mexican natives. Up until this day, the terms ‘malinchismo’ 
and ‘malinchista’ respectively mean ‘foresaking one’s own in order to embrace the new and 
foreign’ and ‘someone who has transgressed the boundaries of perceived group interest 
and values’ (Mairs, 2011, 79). The ambivalence of La Malinche becomes even more significant 
when one realizes that this ‘willing whore of the Spanish’ in fact is the very ancestress of the 
Mestizo, a name still proudly carried by the majority of today’s Mexicans, as she gave birth to 
Cortes’ eldest son who thereby became the first of its people.  
1. Introduction
“I was the tongue and ears of the military, but I received no recognition, commitment or 
whatsoever (Anonymous ISAF-6 interpreter, 2007).”
This statement, taken from an in-depth interview with an embedded interpreter who was 
deployed in Afghanistan, captures the central theme of this chapter: the tension between 
the formal position of both national and local interpreters within the military organization 
and the actual role they perform during military operations. In no uncertain terms the quote 
indicates that there is an apparent discrepancy between the interpreters’ self-attribution 
and the manner in which his qualities are appreciated by the representatives of the military 
organization. The interpreter characterized himself as ‘the tongue and ears’ of the soldiers 
thereby implying that the interpreter is more than just a translator of words (Bos & Soeters, 
2006; Baker, 2010). In a figurative yet accurate sense the quote seems to suggest that the 
interpreter catches and conveys contextual notions and insights that otherwise would have 
remained unobserved by a military which, in the eyes of the interpreter, is not equipped to 
detect such sensitivities. 
The metaphor which the interpreter used to describe the significance of his cultural and 
linguistic potential and the subsequent complaint about the lack of acknowledgement he 
thereof received, are not confined to the experience of this particular individual alone. The 
autoethnographic narratives that will be explored throughout this chapter will demonstrate 
that this perception is commonly shared by interpreters who have worked in situations of 
violent contention. Historical evidence, moreover, also demonstrates that the problem of 
the ‘invisibility’ of the interpreter is pervasive throughout history (Delisle & Woodsworth, 
1995; Mairs, 2011, 66, 80). Greek and Latin historical sources, for example, rarely mention 
the role and performance of interpreters because their linguistic knowledge was seldomly 
regarded as a professional accomplishment (Mairs, 2011, 66). Those interpreters who actually 
were mentioned in historical sources often performed roles that went beyond language 
mediation such as the role of messenger, guide, broker, diplomatic envoy or military adjutant 
(Peretz, 2006, 451). Besides language capability, these roles also required local and cultural 
knowledge and even negotiating and managerial skills. Instead of inspiring admiration, 
their behavior was often described as suspicious and treacherous (Mairs, 2011, 71-72). This 
portrayal of ancient interpreters was rather ironic since only highly trusted individuals were 
selected to act as interpreters in order to ensure confidentiality and cooperation between 
political factions (Mairs, 2011, 78; Peretz, 2006, 461-462). The trust that was placed in these 
intermediaries therefore was not completely free of ambivalence itself because it also made 
interpreters easy targets who could get attacked from all sides (Mairs, 2011, 67). Death, injury, 
capture, or being put up for ransom were some of the dangers that ancient interpreters could 
face as a result of their difficult position, and their implication in webs of conspiracy and 
missions into foreign territory (Mairs, 2011, 68, 75-76).
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was brought up in a bilingual environment by parents of different nationalities. A bilingual 
upbringing granted persons the opportunity to turn their linguistic capacity into economic 
advantage (Roland, 1999, 9). And if one did not make a profit out of one’s linguistic talent 
himself, the powerful but often linguistic inept elite within ancient societies exactly knew 
how to do so by selecting and training young (wo)men for the job of interpreter (Roland, 
1999, 11).     
Circumstances such as the abovementioned, in which linguistic competence was a matter 
of upbringing or training, made out only a part of the other and often less pleasant conditions 
that determined the fate of individuals who were forced to become interpreters. Imagine 
for example enslaved people whom were ordered by their master to act as an interpreter 
and had to translate their own vernacular, or natives (like Doña Marina) whom after being 
taken captive were charged to learn the language of their captors so that they in time could 
serve as their interpreters (Roland, 1999, 11; Bowen, 1995, 259; Mairs, 2011, 78-79). Whenever 
coercion was the decisive determinant in the appointment of an interpreter, the servitude 
of the latter towards their ‘master’ was seldom one of unconditional loyalty. This category of 
interpreters was often only servile as long as their interests, or that of their people, were not 
subordinated to or sabotaged by the interests of their master. The kidnapping of two Indians 
in the 16th century by Francisco Cordoba illustrates the literally fleeting character of their 
imposed servitude. After they were baptized, trained, and given Spanish names, the captives 
were taken back to Cuba where one of them died. The remaining interpreter was assigned to 
the next expedition of Cortès but he made a run for it as soon as he saw an opportunity to 
escape:
 
“Leaving the Spanish clothes he had been given by his captors hanging in a palm grove, Mel-
chior ran off with the people of Tabasco and advised them to attack the Spaniards (Bowen, 
1995, 258-259).”
Forcing persons to act as an interpreter clearly was not without risk. The brutality of the 
kidnapping and the conceit with which the docility of the interpreters was mistaken 
for loyalty could, as the above-mentioned example illustrates, backfire against the 
conquistador’s intention to use the interpreters’ knowledge for his expansionism. Instead 
of relying on force, other more sophisticated strategies were required to meet the need for 
interpreters. New recruits for the job were found in either small groups of people that were 
already integrated into the native culture of the expeditionary environment or individuals 
who were tactically placed there for that specific purpose. Bowen in this regard mentions the 
existence of Norman interpreters, called truchements, in the early 16th century in Brazil, and 
French resident interpreters in New France which is now known as Canada in the early 17th 
century. Being not only familiar with the language of the indigenous people but also with 
their customs and their way of thinking, the recruits of both groups functioned as cultural 
intermediaries who, unlike the colonizers, could win the sympathy and confidence of the 
Just like the explorers of the past depended on the linguistic and cultural expertise of 
their interpreters when they encountered the unknown along their journey, the deployed 
soldiers of today often need the support of interpreters in order to establish contact with 
local people in foreign territories. Therefore, it is all the more striking to discern that it is 
precisely the role and position of the interpreter within the military organization which, 
according to the quoted interpreter himself, seems to be perceived as being of a secondary 
order. 
This chapter seeks to examine the ‘tongue and ears’ experience through the written 
accounts of several authors who had once operated as interpreters themselves. But before 
taking up this narrative analysis, it is interesting to learn whether this grim assessment of the 
interpreter is a common outlook within the general history of the service of interpreters. 
 
 
2. A short history of interpreting
In answering the above-mentioned question, we must once more address the phenomenon 
of invisibility in the history of interpreters. Although the role and the position of 
the interpreter has been a constant subject of social research within translation and 
interpretation studies, there are, as noticed before, not many written accounts about the 
life and works of interpreters who have operated in the past (Roland, 1999, 7-8). This is quite 
extraordinary once one is aware that we could not have had any access to or knowledge of 
our history without the intervention of interpreters. There are two main reasons that sum 
up why interpreters have been largely ignored in the recording of history. First, there is the 
fact that influential people of the past seldom thought it worthwhile to record the name 
and intervention of an interpreter. Secondly, it is understandable that historians in the 
composition of their books acquit themselves of the duty to ‘(…) include every intriguing 
tidbit they may uncover’ (Roland, 1999, 8). In addition, there is also the given of the primacy 
of the written text over the spoken word and the social status of the ancient interpreters, 
who were often ethnic and cultural hybrids, women, slaves or members of a lower caste, that 
could explain why interpreters throughout history have been overlooked (Bowen, 1995, 246). 
Forgotten and neglected as the interpreters of the past might have been, they nevertheless 
have contributed considerably to our understanding of international affairs and diplomatic 
history. After all, without the mediation of interpreters there could have been no such thing 
as contact between linguistically diverse nationalities through time or across geographical 
boundaries.  
Since of old, interpreters have escorted individuals and organized formations on their 
missions and enabled them to establish contact with the inhabitants of these faraway 
regions. Who were these individuals who performed the job of interpreter and how were 
they recruited? In the past the question of becoming an interpreter was more a case of chance 
than of choice.  The most fortunate circumstance to become an interpreter was when one 
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Unfortunately, as was stated earlier, there are not many written accounts about the 
experiences of individuals who were thrown into the job of interpreter. A rarely examined 
and scarce source which taps into this niche and which might be of value for the subject of 
this research study, however, can be found in the self-narratives of the ‘hands-on’ experts 
themselves. Through a close reading of different yet comparable narrative accounts, 
the following paragraph will look more closely into the experience and observations of 
military interpreters during their involvement in various military operations throughout 
contemporary history.
3. Once Upon a Time: The Interpreter’s Narrative as a Source for Social Research 
In case of the theatre of war, four historical accounts of interpreters could provide 
information about the experiences of military linguists who were bestowed ‘(…) the 
intimacy that language allows with the peoples of cultures’ (Bowen, 1995, 272). These 
narratives involve two prisoners of war in Japanese internment camps during World War II 
in respectively Burma (Lumière, 1981; Lumière, 1966) and Java (Rookmaker, 1987); a French 
civilian who assisted the American army during the Liberation of France at the end of World 
War II (Guilloux, 2003; Kaplan, 2005); and a Dutch student in Arabic who volunteered for the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (Mulder, 2010).1 All of the narratives are 
set against the background of international military missions but each story tells in its own 
particular voice the different and often difficult circumstances under which these men had 
to carry out the task of interpreter. 
But before we go deeper into the stories of these interpreters, it might first be helpful to 
know a little bit more about the meaning of stories and storytelling in general. Stories have 
been told since the beginning of time to explain not only the origination of creation and 
the history of mankind but also to understand the fabric of society that people are a part of 
(Chang, 2008). The meaning of stories and the importance of storytelling in history becomes 
even more clear when we look at the origins of the words ‘story’ and ‘history’. Both words 
stem from the same etymological root which includes the Greek terms histos, histanai, and 
eidenai which respectively mean ‘web’, ‘to stand’, and ‘to know well’. Storytelling therefore 
can be perceived as an art that shapes, organizes and interprets experience and as such ‘(…) 
stories enact and construct the world as it is lived and understood by the storyteller’ (Kostera, 
2002; Ewick & Sibey, 2003; Baker, 2006). 
The interest in the narrative approach in field research has increased significantly over the 
past decades. The popularity of contemporary self-narratives within the realm of humanities 
and social sciences in this regard ‘(…) rides on the back of postmodernism that values the 
voices of common people, defying the conventional authoritative elitism of autobiography’ 
(Chang, 2008, 32). The attraction and asset of studying these ‘ordinary’ self-narratives lies 
in the assumption that autobiographical texts can evoke self-reflection and self-analysis. 
locals. Because of their longtime presence within the indigenous community, the truchements 
and resident interpreters were perfectly suited to intermediate between the settlers and the 
local population serving at once as guides, explorers, diplomats, liaison officers, and traders 
(Bowen, 1995, 257, 259). But again, the colonizers experienced that the interpreters could 
not be coerced into cooperation. The French missionary Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon 
in Brazil for instance learned that his effort to impose strict moral standards upon the 
interpreters resulted in the rebellion and desertion of the trailblazers. It turned out to be 
a costly miscalculation, for the missionary could not establish any authority or make any 
headway without the intervention of the interpreters. Without their support, the missionary 
lost his influence over the local population and this eventually led Villegagnon to abandon 
the evangelization and quicken his return to Europe (Bowen, 1995, 257). 
The examples taken from the early history of interpreting show that the service of 
interpreters was seldom restricted to a strict verbal or written translation of words (Mairs, 
2011, 71; Peretz, 2006, 452). The task of the interpreter often encompassed a tactful and 
tentative inquiry of the candor of the conversation partner as well as the sounding out 
of proper occasions to initiate topics of discussion. The interpreter, in other words, had 
a powerful and important hand in the proceeding of affairs. It is precisely this advantage 
of the interpreter in negotiations which paradoxically casts a shadow over the integrity of 
his actions (Mairs, 2011, 80). The suspicion that military principals in this regard can have 
towards the moral integrity and hence loyalty of their interpreter will be taken up in more 
detail further on in this chapter. For now, it perhaps suffices to say that, although every 
talent can be misused for evil business, ‘(…) it is quite possible for a linguist, particularly in 
wartime, to grossly abuse his powers, or, at least, to abet an unworthy cause’ (Roland, 1999, 
172).       
By entering upon the question about the moral obligation of the interpreter during 
wartime, we run into another peculiarity within the history of interpreting which is that 
there is even less recorded about military interpreters. The reference books that are 
consulted for this particular paragraph only sparsely mention the role and position of the 
interpreter within the army. The descriptions of the recruitment and variety of tasks of 
military interpreters within these books, however, render significant similarities with the 
circumstances of the rather diplomatic interpreters in the ancient time. Just like the ‘tongue 
and ears’ of the conquistadors were employed to support the reconnaissance of new frontiers, 
military interpreters, within their specific contextual environment and mission assignment, 
were needed to ‘(…) making and keeping allies, determining the enemy’s position and 
plans, overseeing conquered territories and negotiating with the enemy (...) and last but 
not least [they] were required for communication within the same, but multilingual army’ 
(Bowen, 1995, 263). Similarly to the experience of ancient interpreters, becoming a military 
interpreter often also was a matter of chance. Soldiers who happened to know the language 
needed for communication, or (foreign) civilians who were recruited for that purpose, were, 
without much training, placed in the position of interpreter (Bowen, 1995, 252, 263).
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who apply autoethnography therefore must identify the perspective through which the 
study is ‘observed’ by delineating the choice or rather ‘voice’ of their source. None of the 
consulted authors in this chapter, however, knowingly adopted the specific research 
method. The narrator himself is the examined research subject and their stories are used to 
analyze and interpret the conditions and circumstances under which they had to carry out 
the role of interpreter. Although all of the interpreters therefore do not consciously apply 
autoethnography, their accounts can be used as such since their written testimonies are a 
form of self-narrative in which the author situates his personal experience within a social, 
historical and cultural context (Boje & Tyler, 2009, 177; Bryman, 2016, 590).
Now that we have clarified the idea of the author as auto-ethnographer as the very lens 
through which the historical self-narratives of the interpreters are explored, we can delve 
more deeply into their accounts in the attempt to deduce ‘variables’ from their experience 
that transcend the individual personal narratives. These findings in turn might contribute 
to our general understanding of the position and role of the interpreter in contemporary 
military environments as well.   
4. (Re)Constructing Meaning out of Memories
In my search for books on interpreters I probably stumbled upon what Edith Grossman has 
called a new great wall (Grossman, 2010, 89). It appears that the Anglophone publishing 
industry has a great resistance to translated material. Only a striking 2 to 3 percent of books 
published each year in the United States and Britain are translations. The most important 
consequence of this literary arbitrariness is the construction of some kind of iron curtain 
which threatens one of the central ideas of a democracy namely ‘(…) the free exchange of 
literary ideas, insights, and intuitions – a basic reciprocity of thought facilitated by the 
translation of works from other cultures’ (Grossman, 2010, 90). The practical implication of 
the unavailability and inaccessibility of the writing of a predominant part of the world is 
that the already limited stock of available titles on this particular research subject is even 
further restricted by the reluctance of major publishing houses to translate the voices of 
non-Western authors. The absence of that particular source of information in this study, 
however, only partially explains the ‘dearth’ among books about military interpreters. The 
fact that the researcher herself is only proficient in two languages did not help either as it 
further limited the scope of the literary search to Dutch and English publications. This lack 
of language skills, once more and this time in a rather awkward way, brought home the 
importance of linguistic proficiency. 
Just like becoming an interpreter, finding books on the very subject therefore turned out 
to be a matter of chance as well. Stacked away on dusty bookshelves in bookshops overseas 
or between endless piles of books on the national book fair, the discovered copies felt like 
a rare find. All in all, the literary search for books on military interpreters finally resulted 
Readers are invited to engage in a hermeneutic understanding of the author’s writings in 
which the readers’ empathy is deepened through the activity in which they ‘(…) compare and 
contrast themselves with others in the cultural texts they read and study, in turn discovering 
new dimensions of their own lives’ (Chang, 2008, 33-34). In studying the self-culture of 
others, the reader thus discovers himself. 
Although self-narratives cover a wide variety of writings which all uses the personal 
experience to focus on the self through memory-search, self-revelation, and self-reflection 
as is the case in for example autobiographies, memoirs, journals, diaries, letters and 
personal essays, this paragraph seeks to explore the experience of interpreters through 
autoethnography, a form of self-narrative that ‘(…) places the self within a social context’ 
and which is applied within social sciences and in qualitative research in particular (Gregory, 
2000, 326; Chang, 2008, 41). Autoethnography shares the storytelling perspective of other 
genres of self-narratives but distinguishes itself from its ‘kin’ through the implementation 
of cultural analysis and interpretation. This means that autoethnography as a research 
method interprets the micropractices of everyday life and critically questions power 
structures and privileged points of view (Mischenko, 2005, 206; Panourgia, 2000, 552). 
Although advocates in favor of autoethnography confidently align the practice with other 
critical research methods within social studies, the autoethnographic approach, however, is 
often criticized for lacking academic rigor and methodological validity (Chang, 2008, 54). As 
if these critiques are not enough to pull down the authority of autoethnography all together, 
the research method has also been accused of being vain, narcissistic, and self-indulgent 
(Mischenko, 2005).  Notwithstanding the fact that autoethnography indeed places 
subjectivity to the fore, this doesn’t imply that it cannot meet academic standards. On the 
contrary, the voice of self-narratives within the autoethnographic practice has been said to 
take ‘(…) a stance against the silent authorship ways to create so-called ‘objectivity’ by ‘(…) 
offering a model of ‘polyphonic, interactive work, which calls on readers to see potential 
problems for themselves’ (Boje & Tyler, 2009, 177; Gregory, 2000, 329). It is precisely this 
transformative strength of autoethnographic analysis and interpretation which enables 
readers to understand the influence that factors such as nationality, religion, gender, 
education, ethnicity, socioeconomic class and geography can have on their sense of self and 
that of others (Chang, 2008, 52-53). As such, ‘(…) autoethnographic vignettes enhance the 
representational and reflexivity richness of qualitative research’ (Boje & Tyler, 2009, 177).  
Having touched upon the pros and cons of the research method, there’s yet another final 
obstacle which needs to be tackled before we can apply the autoethnographic approach 
to the selected narratives. Just as self-narratives cover a wide range of genres, there also 
exists a complex variety in autoethnography. These presentations differ from each other 
to the extent in which the personal dialogues balance out the triad of the self (auto), the 
culture (ethno) and the research process (graphy). In the application of autoethnography 
the term ‘self’ moreover has been used differently over time, referring to either the 
ethnographer himself, his informants or his own people (Chang, 2008, 46-48). Researchers 
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“Endless hardships, hunger and fear, the insults and suffering of the Japanese slave camps are 
but the fuel to the inner force driving and guiding the interpreter. His is the mind that makes 
for the participant, rather than the spectator. (…) This man, another prisoner, sharing the vic-
tims’ risk and the hatred the guards held for all prisoners, was brutalized and beaten like other 
prisoners. Over all he was ill-treated more frequently than others because he stood between 
the captor and some unfortunate fellow prisoner where and when he could. He stood there 
because he had selected to stand there from the days of early captivity, to stand up, to stand 
between, disregarding the risks, knowing there was no reward. (…) His energy and excessive 
imagination, and his lack of patience, sometimes were difficult to comprehend. Yet inside him 
beat a heart, eager for understanding and for recognition (Lumière, 1981, 11-12; Lumière, 1966, 
xiii, 256).” 
“I was a volunteer, I didn’t have any military experience. I had to familiarize myself with three 
cultures: that of the Dutch army, the Arab rural society in the south of Lebanon and, more im-
portantly, that of a country reigned by anarchy. (…) We did more than just translating. Because 
of the nature of our job we got a good insight into the thinking of the local Lebanese popula-
tion. We had to mediate in all sorts of possible incidents. Also because of our Intel function we 
gained insight into the immense complexity and intricacy of the problems. In many ways we 
were the eyes and ears of the battalion (Mulder, 2010, 19).”
“My role as interpreter made me feel important, of course, but equally embarrassed, worried, 
and distressed (Kaplan, 2005, prologue).”
Each of the above-mentioned accounts include a validation of what the essence of being a 
military interpreter is about. The descriptions convey a sphere of power and powerlessness 
and depict the role and position of the interpreter as both important and influential as well 
as unacknowledged and misunderstood. As such these narratives can also be perceived as 
accounts of flesh-witnesses of war who do not base the authority of their knowledge on the 
observation of facts but rather on a sensible observation of experiences they have undergone 
themselves. Sensibility in this regard refers to both the attentiveness of the narrators to 
sensations, feelings and emotions as well as the willingness to be influenced and changed by 
experience (Harari, 2009, 217-218; Kleinreesink, 2014, 68-69).  
          The first quote portrays the interpreter as a ‘humanitarian’ in service of the community 
who, in the context of the Japanese prison camps, becomes the voice of the oppressed (Bahadir, 
2010, 125). The second quote in this regard illustrates that the mediation of the interpreter 
between the camp staff and prisoners didn’t leave the authors unscathed. By taking up the 
role of interpreter, the authors inherently became participant observers (or more strongly 
put flesh-witnesses) of a repressive system whose representatives were, not only in their 
understanding but also in their instructions, judgment and treatment of the internments, 
dependent of the service and perhaps even more the servitude of the interpreter. It goes 
in a modest yield of six titles that were considered suitable for autoethnographic analysis 
(Lumière, 1981; Lumière, 1966; Rookmaker, 1987; Guilloux, 2003; Kaplan, 2005; Mulder, 2010). 
In this regard it is noteworthy to learn that all of the authors either titled their stories after 
the role they had performed or made a reference to their occupation in the subtitle of their 
books. The similarity between the titles of the individual authors, conveys something about 
the apparent significance of this experience in their lives. In that regard it is interesting to 
investigate how the role of interpreter, in its context and course of events, has affected the 
author’s sense of self and others during that specific period in time.
Although the authors have already organized their experience into structured narratives, 
this paragraph has rearranged the autoethnographic material in corresponding segments in 
order to deduce meaning out of the interpreters’ experience. A close reading and coding of 
the narratives has yielded five aspects within the data, respectively: allocation, motivation, 
position, intervention, and perception of the interpreter. Together, these aspects form 
the conceptual framework which also includes theories on strategic interaction, self-
presentation and core social motives. These theoretical insights subsequently have been 
applied to the analysis, interpretation, and framing of the autoethnographic data (Chang, 
2008, 131). Although the paucity of interpreter narratives might be seen as a limitation of 
this study, the correspondence between the autoethnographic samples provided enough 
substantiality to justify the development of the framework and the generalization of the role 
and position of the interpreter in environments influenced by (the threat of ) violence such 
as described by the narrators. 
4.1 Finding Truths in True Stories
Books in which interpreters describe their experiences in conflict situations are a rare find 
on itself. Reading these stories, however, made this even more rewarding as the narratives 
concurred with the preliminary findings of this research. The premise of this study was 
poignantly expressed in the words of the authors who once had operated as military 
interpreter themselves:
 
“It was a difficult job to protect the interments against their [the Japanese commander and his 
staff] unfairness. In order to succeed in this, it was of the utmost importance that the camp 
commanders – precisely because of their weak position - were informed (…) about the capa-
cities of the adversary, the ways of the Japanese, their motives, and if possible their plans.  A 
special task in this matter was performed by the interpreters among the POWs [Prisoner of 
War], whom, because of their involvement in all of the encounters with the Japanese, had 
the experience, not only with the language, but with the psychology of the guards as well, 
to give advice about which approach could best be applied towards the enemy authorities 
(Rookmaker, 1987, 7).”
104 Talk Up Front  Chapter 5 105
In case of Guilloux, a French civilian who assisted the American army in Brittany during the 
liberation, dearth and chance were the conditions that best describe the circumstances that 
contributed to his job appointment. Whereas the Liberation Army in Germany could rely on 
the language potential of American soldiers of German descent, the troops experienced great 
difficulty in finding interpreters in France. Instead of working with ‘national interpreters’, 
the American Army now had to rely on French civilians who knew enough English to help 
them communicate with the local population. The fact that the Army’s rate of pay for the 
position was very low didn’t help either because it made the job unattractive for soldiers 
with advanced training. In hindsight the Army Military Justice officials had to conclude 
that this situation had affected the investigations and the trials during the war deplorably 
(Kaplan, 2005, 23-24). Fortunately, however, the Army’s VIII Corps found a perfect candidate 
for the job in the person of a French writer cum translator who at that time was working as 
an interpreter for the town mayor:
 
“No one in the car was talking, not the two lieutenants in the back, nor the driver I was sitting 
next to. It must have been around three in the afternoon. We had just left the city hall, where 
the lieutenants had come looking for me. As soon as he entered my office, the older one asked 
me if I was really the mayor’s interpreter. When I answered yes, the lieutenants introduced 
themselves. (…) “OK. According to Bill, it seems you don’t have much to do at the city hall?” 
That was true.  In fact, I had nothing to do. “In that case, you could do us a big favor.” They 
were about to go on a case and they needed an interpreter. How about it? The jeep was out in 
front. (…) I said yes, of course. Why not? (…) The jeep was there, just outside the door, with a 
driver at the wheel. We got in. The lieutenants sat in the back and I sat next to the driver. “OK, 
Joe,” said Lieutenant Stone. Joe shifted right into gear and no one said another word (Guilloux, 
2003, 1-2).”
Also taking place during World War II but set against a completely different background 
are the narratives of two authors whom were held prisoner of war in Japanese internment 
camps. One of the authors, Rookmaker, who was interned in Java describes the call which 
determined his assignment as a camp interpreter as follows:
 
“When a Japanese non-commissioned officer entered our battery to take over the weaponry, 
it soon became clear that he could not make himself intelligible so that our captain verified 
whether there was someone among the troops who could speak Japanese. Since no one took 
the call, I reported myself with the announcement that I took Japanese classes seven years 
before, but that I didn’t had the time as a civil servant to continue the study. My knowledge of 
the language therefore was very poor but since there was no one else who could take up the 
job of the interpreter, I was willing to give it a try.  At least I could count in Japanese and I had 
a dictionary (Rookmaker, 1987, 10).”
without saying that this perilous condition, in which the interpreters were wedged between 
the stranglehold of the Japanese and the scrutiny of the internments, required an almost 
schizophrenic approach of situations in which they needed to intervene. The interpreters for 
instance were tasked to communicate the camp regulations, but in doing so, they, in their 
own interest and that of their fellow prisoners, also tried to pacify the oppressor. Precisely 
because of their coaxing, the interpreters, had to make sure that the other interments did 
not attribute any malice to them. Their ‘partiality’, after all, could all too easily be mistaken 
for something it was not. Suspected by the other interments of collaborating with the 
enemy, the attempted manipulation in fact often was the interpreter’s only means to serve 
the survival of the prisoners. The quotes therefore demonstrate that by representing the 
voiceless, and attempting to reconcile the (conflicting) interests of the involved parties, the 
authors stepped into a realm in which the boundaries between interpreting and advocacy 
had faded (Bahadir, 2010, 125).     
The first three quotes moreover provide insight into the fact that the interpreters, under 
the guise of their assignment, alternately acted as either a language broker, communication 
facilitator or cultural go-between (Bahadir, 2010, 125). As such one could say that the term of 
interpreter is used as a general denominator which encompasses various (sub-)roles that each 
in turn demand different, albeit sometimes unacknowledged, socio-linguistic and cultural 
competencies of the interpreter. The fourth and final quote in this regard formulates the 
interpreters’ contradictory frame of mind during the execution of these transcending roles 
and interventions. By mentioning the simultaneous occurrence of feelings of importance 
and awkwardness, the author suggests that the outer (objective) translation of ‘the eyes and 
ears’ resonates in an inner (subjective) interpretation of what has been seen and heard. It 
is precisely this reflexivity of the interpreter that enables us to further analyze the aspects 
that have been identified in the autoethnographic material (Chang, 2008, 45). The number 
of quotes that for that purpose are taken up in the following paragraphs might come across 
as somewhat abundant, but they are considered complementary representations that 
contribute to the understanding of the interpreter’s condition.
4.2 Allocation: The Accidental Interpreter 
In most situations it is reasonable to argue that the pathway to a career is not left to chance 
but rather carefully planned and well prepared for. This type of ambition, defined as ‘the 
desire to be successful or powerful in whatever position one wishes to achieve’, however, 
was not part of the modus operandi of the authors. (Anonymous, 2006, 42). On the contrary, 
chance and not choice, as the following three quotes will demonstrate, still seemed to be the 
determinant factor in most cases of the assignment of interpreters. The first aspect therefore 
is called ‘allocation’ and this describes the often arbitrary circumstances under which the 
position of interpreter was allotted to the authors.   
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of the Japanese language, his most important instrument, could cease the weapons of the 
opponent.  
Stripped of all humanity but with one trump card in hand, these authors turned 
their language capacity into a tool of survival that in its ambiguity served the interest of 
themselves, their allies as well as their adversaries. The narrative accounts of communal 
relief caused by the intervention of the interpreter therefore seems to contradict the notion 
that ‘(…) people held in detention camps, refugee camps, in custody, and in prisons cannot 
truly improve their status or become empowered by way of interpreting’ (Bahadir, 2010, 129). 
According to Şebnem Bahadir interpreters can only carry out their role of interpreter, and 
hence create opportunity for empowerment, in the social dramas in which they participate 
if they can ensure the trust of both parties. Whereas the interpreter’s trustworthiness and 
his ability to foster trust undeniably are crucial factors that influence the communication 
relationship, they are not exclusive preconditions for the empowerment of the individual 
or group. In anticipation of the aspects that will be discussed further on in this chapter, 
the stories of the authors seem to provide evidence that the interpreter in some situations 
can support the empowerment of the community through his service and more remarkably 
through the subversive acts that are concealed by ways of his interpretation. Although these 
(im)moral practices might not coincide with Bahadir’s conception of the interpreters’ ethical 
deliberation, these interventions nevertheless paradoxically contribute to what Bahadir 
claims as the highest principle of the interpreters’ position namely enabling, establishing, 
supporting, and even preserving communication (Bahadir, 2010, 129). Therefore, the 
narratives of the authors learn that the linguistic capacity of the interpreter, sometimes 
symbolized in the shape of an armband or other vignette, was a powerful and potential tool 
that added to the visibility of their exceptional position. Yet, before further discussing this 
matter it is first important to look into the way the aspect of motivation determined the role 
and position of the interpreter.
4.3 Motivation
Although evolutionary social psychologists state that survival should be listed as the 
sole original motive that results from the interplay of person and situation, Fiske offers a 
framework of five unifying themes that enhance people’s survival in social groups. These 
core motives consist respectively of belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing 
self and trusting others (Fiske, 2004, 14-25). The first and most important motive that runs 
through all the other core motives is belonging and this concept has been described as the 
idea that people need strong, stable relationships with other people to constitute a sense 
of subjective well-being. Moreover, these ongoing, secure social bonds, help individuals to 
survive.      
 
Another author, Lumière, who in a relatively similar context was imprisoned in Siam Burma, 
shares a similar experience as he writes about the abruptness of the ‘decision’ and the 
subsequent ‘obviousness’ of his job appointment:
 
“A Jap officer had joined the sergeant (…) he approached a small group of prisoners who had 
just disembarked and, stick raised threateningly, shouted, “Kura! Hayaku!” One of the priso-
ners confronted the Jap lieutenant and, bowing slightly from the waist, asked “Nan mei hodo 
iru no ka?” Surprise registered on the Jap’s face. He lowered his stick, looked the prisoner over 
and, sucking his teeth, said, “Ah so ka? Nihongo wo hanasu ka? Korekara igo kimi wa tsūyaku wo yare! 
Chotto mate. Ju mei hodo iru.” The prisoner answered, “Wakarimashita,” bowed again, and went 
over to the nearest Dutch officer to explain that ten men were wanted for a work party at 
once. (…) In a few moments a bow-legged dignitary returned with a white painted armband, 
on which some red hieroglyphics had been painted. He took it over to the Japanese speaking 
prisoner and tied it on his left arm. Ten men were lined up and waiting, and without any be-
ating or shouting, they were taken away for the next job. A feeling of relief swept over the 
prisoners. This was the first time anyone had been put to work without the terrifying shouting 
and the rain of blows. The white armband appeared to be the first link between captors and 
captives. (…) On catching sight of his armband, various Japs who needed a working party cal-
led to him, shouting “Tsūyaku, tsūyaku kochi koi.” Erik knew they meant him. What the word 
tsūyaku meant he did not know until several days later; after he had reached Tavoy he learned 
its meaning: I-n-t-e-r-p-r-e-t-e-r. (…) And so on this day, this night, Erik Leeuwenburg, civilian, 
turned private second class in the N.E.I. army, became “the tsūyaku”. Until the previous day he 
had carried only his personal load - the load every prisoner carried, the burden of hunger and 
hardship, disease and fear, the nearness of death. Now he must carry the burden of the entire 
group with him. Whatever their rank, nationality, their number, he, with his absurdly small 
vocabulary of Japanese words, had become their spokesman. Each day, each hour, he learned 
more words. With a beating for every mistake, he learned fast (Lumière, 1966, 2-4, 6-7).” 
In case of the two POWs, the examples clearly demonstrate how a lack of linguistic proficiency 
on the side of the Japanese guards and even the smallest of language competence on the 
part of the prisoner, created opportunities for empowerment. In both instances the authors 
responded almost on impulse to the demand by literally bridging the language gap between 
the parties. By stepping forward, the authors seized the opportunity to take up not just a job 
but to fill in a ‘vacancy’ that addressed the needs of all of the involved. The examples, and 
more in particular the quote of Lumière, moreover illustrate that their intervention caused 
an immediate change in atmosphere. Imagine for instance the terror that the sight of the 
raised stick, the only language in which the Japanese could make themselves be understood, 
caused among the prisoners and then imagine the sweeping hand of the guard coming to a 
halt by a single sentence spoken by one of the prisoners. Through that performative act, the 
author transformed himself from a prisoner into an interpreter whose modest knowledge 
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This seemingly trivial conversation illustrates that the interpreters’ observation of the 
predominantly colored prisoners differs from the officer’s opinion about the inmates. The 
question not only brings to light that the interpreter was unfamiliar with the presence of the 
penitentiary within the camp, but that he was unaware of the assumption that underlied the 
social representation of the imprisoned black servicemen as well. Rather than ascribing the 
unusual remark to the naivety of the interpreter, the anomaly refers to his curious yet critical 
outlook on what the military officers had come to understand as a commonly accepted 
phenomenon. Whereas shared meaning facilitates easy understanding and coordination 
with other group members, this particular quote paradoxically illustrates that the interpreter, 
in his very effort to make sense of his environment, unintentionally emphasized that he, 
instead of being a member of the group, continued to be an observant outsider. In this regard, 
the interpreter perfectly fits the role of ‘the stranger’ who Simmel characterizes as someone 
who’s not quite part of the community and who therefore is able to observe it from a distance 
and with some independence (Soeters, 2018, 60). By questioning the unquestionable, and 
in this case also stating the unmentionable, the interpreter (consciously or not) indicated 
that he possessed over a special quality that enabled him to sense and both address ‘(…) the 
incoherence and inconsistency of the in-group’s behavior, interaction and culture’ (Soeters, 
2018, 60).     
A motive related to understanding is the third core motive of control that encourages 
people to feel competent and effective in dealing with their social environment and 
themselves (Fiske, 2004, 20). Personal control is described as the contingency between 
behavior and outcomes. When people experience a correlation between what they do in 
a group and what happens to them, that sense of control subsequently will contribute to 
their psychological, social and physical survival. In an environment such as for example an 
internment camp that lacks predictability and belonging, the interpreter, however, needs to 
find other ways of gaining control over himself and others.   
 
“There were some whose faces were not bruised, whose bones were not broken; there were 
some whose lives were not lost because between them and a murderous captor, at the time 
of extreme peril there stood a man. (…) He stood there because he had selected to stand there 
from the days of early captivity, to stand up, to stand between, disregarding the risks, kno-
wing there was no reward (Lumière, 1966, 255-256).”
This fragment illustrates that even though the interpreter stayed in captivity, he still chose to 
exert some level of control through his mediation. Under stressful conditions and at his own 
expense, the interpreter used his ties in the hope to influence the outcome of interactions 
in his social environment. Although not in full control of his environment, the interpreter 
in this manner at least held some sort of leverage that gave him enough courage to try and 
manipulate the captor. Knowing that these dangerous actions would jeopardize his own 
chances of survival, the interpreters’ selfless and bold attempt to protect his fellow prisoners 
Taking the previous aspects of the autoethnographic analysis into consideration, 
we immediately stumble upon a remarkable phenomenon when applying the motive of 
belonging to the person of the interpreter. All of the discussed quotes in some way illustrate 
the rather isolated position of the interpreter in relation to other people and groups. The 
interpreter can be depicted as the man in the middle who is ostracized but who nevertheless 
through his position and service paradoxically contributes to what belonging essentially 
seems to motivate namely the formation and consolidation of close relationships, support 
and groups. This contradiction raises the question why the interpreter, given his difficult 
and lone position, even bothered to make the effort of adapting at all. In order to answer 
this query, it is important to keep in mind that the in-between position of the interpreter 
determines his role to such an extent that his human condition can be discerned as 
substantially different from other individuals who function within social groups. The 
interpreter, after all, did not belong to any group in particular. Therefore, it is interesting to 
learn how this ‘sense of unbelonging’ affects the relevance and implementation of the other 
core motives of understanding, controlling, self-enhancing and trusting others. In other 
words, how did the interpreter interpret and apply the other four core social motives without 
belonging to a certain group?   
The core motive of understanding encourages people to understand their environment 
in order to predict and make sense of (un)predicted events. In the process of understanding 
their world, people usually share their ideas with others in an attempt to reach agreement. 
These socially shared meanings are called social representations or group meaning and refer 
to the fact that shared understanding emerges when groups gather and discuss already-
shared information with each other (Fiske, 2004, 18). Group meaning thus enables people 
to function in groups and contributes to their survival as group members. The following 
fragment illustrates that the absence of a shared understanding between parties can cause 
for an awkward situation that is revealing in more than one way. 
 
“What’s this, Joe? The prison?” “Sure, it’s the prison. You can tell from the barbed wire and the 
MP’s.” Behind the barbed wire a few prisoners were playing ball. They were all wearing shoes 
without laces. None of them was wearing a jacket. Almost all were colored. “Say, Joe, is this 
a special prison for colored men?” “No. It’s the prison.” (…) He turned around and pointed at 
the two lieutenants, who were coming to meet me. “Hello!” “Hello!” “By the way,” Lieutenant 
Stone said as he shook my hand, “my name is Robert. Call me Bob – everyone does.” (…) “And 
what’s your name?” “Louis” “OK, Louis.” All very cordial, light-hearted, good-natured. “And 
this is where you have your prison for colored men?” My question startled Lieutenant Stone 
– I mean Bob. “Oh, Louis! What are you thinking!” This prison was for everyone. If there were 
mostly blacks there, it was because they deserved it (Guilloux, 2003 41-42).”
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from the news like you would turn off a television if the screen went static. (…) When I, finally 
managed to enter Lebanon in April 1980, in a Dutch military uniform with a blue beret would 
you believe, I was somewhat aware of the state of affairs in the neighboring countries. (…) In 
that chaos, in which even the Lebanese did not comprehend themselves, let alone others, a 
Dutch battalion needed to operate and that had prepared itself for a totally different situa-
tion: an apocalyptic war against the Warsaw pact. (…) The reality was that we very rarely and 
with the explicit permission of the UN headquarters in New York were allowed to use mortars. 
That permission virtually never happened. The battalion, therefore, was forced to solve pro-
blems by talking. Interpreters could then be of importance (Mulder, 2010, 51-52).”
While adventure, curiosity, and seizing one’s opportunity in this quote might perhaps be the 
key words that best describe the author’s motivation to become an interpreter, these initial 
motives soon gave way to core social motives when the complexity of the situation and 
mission became clear. After all, it was precisely in environments characterized by violence 
that the role and position of the interpreter was of vital importance as the abovementioned 
quote suggests and as other fragments in this chapter have demonstrated. When placed 
in these demanding and oftentimes dangerous situations in which interpreters needed 
to intervene, motivation eventually determined how interpreters assumed their role and 
position. Therefore, it is now important to delve into these aspects, starting with the latter.
4.4 Position: The Man in the Middle
The interpreter’s role has been described by a variety of terms that convey certain 
characteristics of his position. Descriptions such as for example tongue and ears, language 
broker, go-between, facilitator therefore not only seem to illuminate something about his 
qualities but also about his expected behavior. The ‘interpersonal self or social self’ of the 
interpreter in this regard can be described as a set of expectations about how he should behave 
according to his socially defined position (Fiske, 2004, 171). As such, one could subsequently 
say that the action of the interpreter was bound by both his individual interpretation of 
his role as well as ‘the rules’ that governed how he as an occupant of such a particular role 
was expected to behave towards occupants of another role (Krackhardt, 1999, 186-187). An 
analysis of various quotes will demonstrate that these expectations about the role of the 
interpreter were not always as transparent as these ‘rules’ perhaps might presume because 
his actions were often determined by the rather arbitrary circumstances of the moment and 
the specific needs of the parties that called upon his service.   
One key feature of the interpreter, however, which is common to all characterizations 
of the interpreter and strongly related to his cultural and linguistic competence, is that his 
presence transforms the communication dyad between interlocutors into a triad. Through 
his intervention, the interpreter becomes an intermediary expert who has ‘(…) the potential 
could also be labeled as heroic because he displayed exceptional courage in the face of danger 
(Blomberg, Hess & Raviv, 2009, 509-510; Wansink, Payne & Van Ittersum, 2008, 547-549). 
Contrary to what the fragment says about the absence of a reward for his altruistic behavior, 
there might be some merit in his actions in the long term after all. Precisely because of his 
risk-taking interventions and the willingness to sacrifice himself, the interpreter was able to 
create an alternative and pragmatic sense of belonging and as such his heroism could also be 
understood as a strategy that helped him survive as a ‘sort of’ member of the group. 
The resourcefulness of the interpreter to tie the interests of his fellow prisoners to his 
own means of survival must be seen in light of the core motive of self-enhancement. In his 
effort to protect the group, the interpreter eventually generated an opportunity to (im)prove 
himself as a member by wholeheartedly performing the role of caretaker ‘within’ the group 
(Fiske, 2004, 22-23). The motive of self-enhancement can also be illustrated by the following 
quote in which the interpreter takes pride in fulfilling the hope of making himself useful for 
others.
 
“Carrying out our imposed task distracted the monotony of camp life but it also caused for a 
lot of distress. Although there was seldom something cheerful to translate, we nevertheless 
enjoyed ourselves with each other’s funny experiences. In the meantime, during the many 
years of internment, the position gave me the satisfaction to stay active in the hope of doing 
useful work. Moreover, I have learned a lot from it (Rookmaker, 1987, 8).”
The fifth and final core motive of trust, which is here understood as a state of favorable 
expectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions, cannot be found explicitly 
in the narratives of the authors (Möllering, 2001, 404). This is perhaps not very surprising 
as this study concentrates on places dominated by a constant threat of violence. In such 
environments, in which the idea of the social world as a benevolent place is suspended, 
people are more inclined to distrust others (Fiske, 2004, 24). The autoethnographic analysis 
in this regard has demonstrated that in such situations (inaccurate) perceptions of others 
more often than not have caused the interpreter to become the target of suspicion. Not 
succumbing to the belief of people that he would take advantage of them if he got the chance, 
the interpreter remained focused on a trusting orientation to facilitate and constitute 
communication with others (Fiske, 2004, 23).
Apart from these core social motives there are of course other theories that help explain 
the motivation to take up the role of the interpreter. The following fragment in this regard 
illustrates that there are less profound and much more pragmatic motives for becoming an 
interpreter.
 
“Before my deployment with UNIFIL I hardly knew more about Lebanon than that it was three 
times as small as the Netherlands. Attempts to visit the country during my study, failed twice 
due to the security situation. Reports about the civil war were so chaotic that I cut myself off 
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would ask Bob to ask the interpreter to raise his right hand and swear to translate according to 
the truth… “Do you swear…” “I do…” Raising my right hand. Neither then nor before had they 
asked me who I was. The oath I took could have been administered to anyone. The oath of an 
official interpreter (Kaplan, 2005, 63, 79).” 
The quote hints at the contrast between the moral understanding of the author who in 
his role of interpreter felt himself to be either an accomplice or a spectator, and the total 
indifference with which his position was regarded in the courtroom (Kaplan, 2005, 79). Being 
reduced to an indispensable but anonymous language conduit in the court proceedings, the 
author was struck by the notion that he, apart from his linguistic service, was as insignificant 
as the accused African-American soldiers whose fate was sealed with the deafening clap of a 
hammer. As indiscriminate and impersonal as the oath of the official interpreter according 
to the author might have been, the ethical burden of his task, as the story seems to imply, 
however, most certainly was not.   
In comparison to the rather subordinate position of Guilloux, the narratives of the POWs 
seem to display a different perspective on the position of the interpreter. The first quote 
explains the position of the interpreter among the internments from a rather unexpected 
point of view:
 
“In informal conversations with guards who were friendly to us, every now and then Ten-
no Heika was mentioned. (…) A Japanese soldier once tried to explain to me how important 
exactly the position of camp-interpreters was. He told me that the names of all the brave Nip-
pon soldiers as well as those of their interments, were registered in several books which were 
available to the emperor. The list, however, contains so many names that no ordinary sol-
dier should make himself the illusion that the attention of the emperor would ever befall on 
him. The interpreters in the camp, on the other hand, despite the fact that they belong to the 
enemy troops, find themselves in a totally different position. Their names are written down 
in a tiny booklet, their number after all being very small, so that the emperor, if he should leaf 
through it, undoubtedly would say: “Look, here I have mister X and there’s mister Y!” That is 
how prominent the ‘tsūyaku’ are among the POWs and their guards (Rookmaker, 1987, 29).”
Regardless of the fact whether the small notebook of the Emperor existed or not, the soldiers’ 
use of superlatives gives the impression that the interpreter occupied a privileged position. 
Knowing that in the Japanese culture the Emperor was held in the highest possible esteem, 
one would easily think that the sheer thought of the Emperor’s interest in the interpreter 
would influence the appreciation of his position by his military subordinates (Rookmaker, 
1987, 24, 28). Nothing of the sort, however, as both authors recount in their books of the 
numerous hardships they had to endure at the hands of the camp commanders and guards: 
to consolidate or weaken, or at any rate to influence and shape, the social form of the triad’ 
(Bahadir, 2010, 127). Especially in areas of military conflict in which parties have different 
interests, values, beliefs and strategies, this standing in-between can be considered a 
general and possible powerful trait of the interpreter (Bahadir, 2010, 127). On the subject of 
the transformative powers of the interpreter, the question, however, remains what actually 
determines the range and influence of his position. Rather than being advantageous, Georg 
Simmel in this respect argued that the bridging role in triadic structures could be quite 
constraining when the ties between parties are strong.  A ‘Simmelian tie’ represents a social 
system in which two people are not only reciprocally and strongly tied to each other but to at 
least one third party they have in common as well (Krackhardt, 1999, 186). Once a third party 
is added to the dyad, a triad or clique is formed in which rules are developed to which each 
member must subject in order to stay a part of the group. The difference between a dyadic and 
triadic structure, therefore, is fundamental because the presence of a third party gives each 
party less autonomy, less power, and less independence in relation to the other members 
of the triad. Simmelian ties in other words consolidate bonds between members in return for 
compliance to group norms. In case of the interpreter, the constraints of the Simmelian ties 
are even felt more strongly because he is embedded in cliques and therefore his behavior is 
restricted even further because he has to comply with the norms of different and oftentimes 
opposing groups. The narratives of the authors in this regard narrate different perspectives 
on the position of the interpreter within triads and between groups. Compare for example 
the story of the Frenchman working for the military justice in the U.S. Army during the 
Liberation with the accounts of the POWs who were deployed in the Japanese internment 
camps.   
Guilloux’s personal experiences as an interpreter for the Judge Advocate Office of the 
VIII Corps, describe his conversations with the American soldiers and the differences in 
worldview that came to light during these talks (Kaplan, 2005, 23, 145). Guiding his superiors 
on their daily visits to civilian witnesses and being present at the subsequent trials of the 
accused, the author soon noticed that racial prejudice permeated the administration of 
justice. To his concern the verdict of the African-American soldiers, which covered almost 
all of the cases in which the author needed to interpret, ended almost without exception in 
capital punishment. With great sense of subtlety, the author’s memoirs paint a picture of the 
inner moral conflict of an interpreter who witnesses the injustices of the racially segregated 
laws of the Jim Crow system (Kaplan, 2005, 145).2 Contemplating about his position in the 
American judicial system, the author recounts: 
 
“I’d see another one of them opening the window to check the weather, and the first words 
I’d hear would be that the day was going to be as beautiful as the one before; (…) and yet 
there was that rope, and at the end of that rope a child of the shadows, his body gone limp. 
And tomorrow, another one. And soon there would be yet another trial; Lieutenant Colonel 
Marquez would raise his head but still look as though he were checking his fingernails, and he 
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“The worst of the Japanese and Korean guards took utter delight in trying to make me lose 
my self-control. Other prisoners in trouble might guess the gist of the harsh words that were 
coming their way. In my case, the captors delighted in going to any lengths to tell me their 
thoughts on white people: the British, the Australians, the Americans, and Dutch, and me as 
well - ad nauseam. I always had to steel myself, which sometimes became almost impossible. 
At the slightest sign of my disagreement or impatience, the guards (…) would become more 
infuriated, and frequently lend weight to their arguments by the use of a rifle butt or bamboo 
stick (Lumière, 1981, 146; Lumière, 1966 124-125).”
The ill-treatment of the POWs in general and that of the interpreter in particular can be 
explained through reference of the military ethics of the Bushido tradition which demanded 
absolute sacrifice and deemed surrender an unbearable dishonor (MacKenzie, 1994, 512). 
Conform their ‘surrender is shameful’ ideology, the Japanese captors perceived their 
prisoners not as fellow human beings but as hostile and despicable foes who could not 
be tolerated and therefore deserved to be treated badly (MacKenzie, 1994, 519). In light of 
this belief system, the precarious nature of the interpreters’ position becomes even more 
clear. Being the spokesmen of the allied forces, the interpreter practically represented the 
embodiment of surrender and hence all that the Japanese soldiers held in contempt. It was 
after all the interpreters’ imperative to relieve the burden of the prisoners by seeking ways to 
communicate and cooperate with the Japanese, but in this perilous endeavor the interpreter 
also often became the object of the ridicule and brutality of the camp staff (Lumière, 1981, 12). 
Not succumbing to the terror of their captors, but fighting for the community’s needs, the 
interpreters dared to defy the camp staff and camp regulations by exploring and exceeding 
the limits of their position.
Although very distinct from each other, the experiences of the court interpreter and 
camp interpreters demonstrate that the interpreters’ position most often was defined by the 
context and group in which the authors operated. Whereas the court interpreter was expected 
to adhere to a strict translation of the communicational process that left no liberty for the 
author, the performance of the camp interpreters, on the other hand, involved mediation 
which particularly required editing from the authors (Bowen, 1995, 248). A remarkable 
observation with regard to the contrast between the strictly defined and liberty taking 
interventions of these interpreters moreover is that, despite their Simmelian ties, each of the 
authors to a certain degree were perceived as non-participants during their assignment. This 
attribution, however, occurred in different domains of their actions as the next paragraph 
among other things will explain. 
“Erik learned early that he was to expect no privileges, that he had no more rights than any 
other POW. At one time the brigadier wished to take up some urgent issue with Colonel Na-
gatomo. A Korean guard, Aoki (…), refused to transmit the brigadier’s request. (…) The inter-
preter felt the Korean had no right to refuse transmittal of the brigadier’s request. He told 
the guard so. That was his mistake. (…) The little Korean (…) within a split second turned into 
a screaming demon. By claiming that he did not have the right to stop POWs from seeing Na-
gatomo, the prisoner had made the guard lose face. Aoki let go a stream of invective, jumped 
up from his desk and hit the offending POW as hard as he could. (…) Many weeks later the 
interpreters’ body still showed bruises and welts. (…) Thus, he learned relatively early that, to 
avoid losing his head, he had to avoid making an Oriental lose face. In a Jap’s mind, doubting 
a guards’ authority was tantamount to insulting the Emperor. To this, the only answer was: 
death! Aoki’s beating taught Erik two things: never to over-rate his own value or importance, 
and never to under-rate a guard’s power (Lumière, 1966, 124).”
“A few of the POWs with whom the Japs dealt daily, such as the Brigadier, Colonel Ander-
son, his Adjutant, Major Campbell, and the interpreter, and POW officers in charge of jun-
gle camps, were often treated differently from other prisoners. To the Japs these few were 
identities rather than numbers. But it did not assure these outstanding few the different tre-
atment would be better; in fact in many cases they were treated worse! (…) Erik received nu-
merous beatings and twice, barely in time, was rescued from being bayoneted to death. To 
lose prisoners of war was a matter of total indifference to many Jap. In the minds of many it 
was probably a good thing. To lose one of the few through whom they conducted the POW 
administration was inconvenient. To lose, of these, one who spoke Japanese would not do at 
all. Though realizing, that he was walking an endless tightrope, Erik tried to make the most of 
his unique position to obtain all he could for III Branch of POWs and, needless to say, for his 
own survival. There was, of course, a limit beyond which he could not go. Sometimes he took 
a liberty, exceeding it (Lumière, 1966, 161-162).”
Under these grim and inhumane circumstances, the POWs were made to work to their 
maximum capacity. The latter being the only criteria that convinced the Japanese that the 
prisoners and therefore the interpreters were more valuable to their war effort alive than 
dead (MacKenzie, 1994, 519). In this respect the ‘prominent’ position of the interpreter 
indeed might have protected the authors somewhat from the assaults of their captors, but 
the broader hermeneutical horizon of the narratives tends to suggest that it was precisely 
the qualities of the interpreter which made him ‘stand out’ against the rest of the prisoners 
and that this ‘outstanding’ position, in both senses of the word, subsequently caused him 
to become more vulnerable to the whims and terror of the guards. Whereas the messenger’s 
person of old was deemed sacred and inviolable, the narratives of the authors learn that 
instances of mistreatment in case of the camp interpreter were more rule than exception 
(Roland, 1999, 12):
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were able to restore the public image of the Japanese commanders and Korean guards. Of 
more importance to the camp interpreters, however, was the fact that their intervention 
sustained the safety of their fellow prisoners. Keeping up the appearances of the opponent, 
in other words meant that the camp interpreters were able to prevent their captors from 
reverting to other and more violent means to maintain the power (im)balance.  
When we continue the interpreters’ ‘game’ analogy to analyze the nature of their 
participation in the communication process, and define the interpreters according to 
Goffman’s game theoretical approach as players who are authorized to act on behalf of the 
parties’ interest, the narratives learn that the authors were players of a most extraordinary 
sort. Apart from the player, Goffman’s game perspective on interpersonal dealings discerns 
two other types of stakeholders namely a party and a coalition (Goffman, 1969, 86). In case 
of the narratives of the POWs, the party can be understood as the community of internments 
that has a unitary interest to promote, and the coalition as the conjunction of opposing 
parties which temporarily and in regard of a specific aim have joined forces to serve a single 
interest.     
The previous quotes illustrate that the camp interpreter was attributed the position of 
spokesman for the party of prisoners and that the authors in that capacity served the self-
preservation of the group. The following example, however, demonstrates that the camp 
interpreters were also forced to form a coalition with their captors.  This second dyad 
illustrates the double ‘loyalty’ imposed on the interpreter as both parties expect him to 
serve their interests. The triad of Simmelian ties, therefore, consists of demanding and 
even opposing ties that keep the interpreter in a stranglehold (Krackhardt, 1999, 189-191). 
In those constraining circumstances the so-called single interest consequently was of a 
rather dubious nature because the author could not refuse his cooperation to the other party 
without risking capital punishment:  
 
“There was fear and a measure of shock in Erik’s eyes and heart when he left the gate of Ta-
markan camp, handcuffed, on the back of a Japanese Military police truck. Not a word had 
been said as to why he had been arrested by the Kempetai, the most dreaded organization 
in Jap-held Asia. (…) True, he had stolen from the Japs often; innumerable times he had lied 
or had distorted a prisoner’s story to save an individual or an entire camp from ill-treatment. 
But he was positive he had not been discovered in this activity. In the Oriental mind, however, 
anything might be turned into an offence. (…) Erik approached and tried to fathom the enemy 
face to find what the dark, slant-eyed features of the Jap were hiding. His curiosity was satis-
fied in the most unbelievable manner. Nagoya warned, “Ima no hanashi wa dare nimo zettai 
ni hanasu na!”- What will be discussed here must never be told to anyone. He continued to say 
that he would kill his prisoner if the order was disobeyed. The Kempei officer picked up several 
sheets of paper and read in rapid Japanese, using many words unfamiliar to Erik, an accusa-
tion of misbehavior by Nagatomo. It soon became clear that this was courtroom material. The 
Japs apparently meant to deal with Nagatomo before the Allies would have a chance of trying 
4.5 Intervention: The Interpreter in Disguise
Being the man in the middle, the interpreter most often had to use all possible means to bridge 
the linguistic and cultural gap between interlocutors. Especially in critical circumstances as 
conflict situations in which interpreters needed to intervene between parties with different 
frames of reference, the authors had to perform a tightrope act that would please or at 
least appease the others. Therefore, standing between ‘others of similarity’, and ‘others of 
difference’, respectively those who came from the same or a different group as the author, 
the interpreters had to calculate, anticipate, and advocate the interests of the parties involved 
(Chang, 2008, 26-27). How delicate an affair this exactly was, illustrates the following quote:
“In order to prevent sensitive incidents from happening it was wise to keep to the rules of the 
game. This meant that troublesome or even impossible assignments could not with so much 
words be refused by a POW and that an interpreter instead needed to intervene. The interpre-
ter then quickly had to choose the proper moment to approach the principal to explain to him 
the existing problems and if possible to carefully suggest alternative options. As long as the 
Japanese did not suffer any loss of face in these circumstances, acceptable solutions could be 
reached for both parties (Rookmaker, 1987, 33).”
 Standing not between others of difference but rather others of opposition, the go-
between position of the camp interpreters was even more precarious because they had to 
communicate behavior, customs, and beliefs that often were irreconcilable and threatening 
to their own existence and that of the other internments. Keeping to the rules of the game 
in other words meant that the camp interpreters had to use their multicultural knowledge 
in order to respond to the contextual and symbolic cues of their environment and that they 
moreover needed to shift cultural frames whenever the situation required doing so (Hong, 
Morris, Chiu & Benet-Martinez, 2000, 710). In that regard, the authors can be understood as 
(a-)typical bicultural individuals who, under the most crudest of circumstances, had acquired 
and internalized specific knowledge of two cultures to the extent that these skills guided 
their perception and behavior (Verkuyten & Pouliasi, 2006, 313). Unlike typical biculturals, 
who derive their identity from a membership of two cultures and who switch frames to 
facilitate a sense of alignment and belonging, the authors did not identify themselves with 
the opponent. On the contrary, the camp interpreters switched frames to anticipate mutual 
cultural sensitivities and navigate between the conflicting parties. The quote in this respect 
illustrates that alongside their linguistic intervention, the camp interpreters’ actions were 
also oriented towards the preservation and negotiation of the guards’ face in the interaction 
with prisoners.  The concept of face has been described by Erving Goffman as the 
presentation and preservation of a respectable front or line to others when managing 
different relationships (Merkin, 2005, 215; Hoedemakers & Soeters, 2009). By circumventing 
face threatening situations for the guards through ad hoc mediation, the camp interpreters 
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role and assignment enabled him to enter the back regions of the camp and gain information 
about the hidden practices of its inhabitants.  
It was precisely the interpreter’s knowledge of such incriminating information which 
caused representatives of both parties, the captors as well as the captives, to attribute to 
him the role of keeper of secrets. In case of the opponent, the camp interpreter of course 
had to put up a façade of loyalty and trustworthiness so that his opponent would believe 
that their secrets were safe with him (Goffman, 1969, 37). This act of professed sincerity in 
reality, however, often was the interpreter’s intervention or rather ploy to meet the need for 
information of his fellow prisoners. The interpreter’s masquerade therefore was a form of 
resistance which involved a manipulation of social roles in order to influence transactions to 
a more desirable outcome (Ewick & Sibey, 2003, 1350-1351). 
Whereas the prospect of severe punishment in the aforementioned example forced the 
camp interpreter to become the informant of the Japanese commander, the general storyline 
of both of the narratives learns that a strong belief in justice convinced the authors to 
become the informer of the internments as well (Goffman, 1959, 144-145). It was this powerful 
combination of insight in the scope of their competencies and interventions and their deep-
seated sense of duty towards the other interments that ultimately encouraged the authors 
to overcome their deeply rooted fear for the guards. While this double play brought down 
accusations of espionage and treachery on the camp interpreters during their captivity, their 
inside knowledge ironically designated them as valuable contributors and official witnesses 
of war crime investigations as soon as the camps were liberated (Rookmaker, 1987, 119-130). 
As such the stories of the authors explicate that the camp interpreter performed discrepant 
roles across time and space, in which each intervention required another challenging 
performance.                                             
In contrast to the previous fragment in which the camp interpreter was pinpointed, 
marked and used for his inside knowledge, the following example demonstrates a sheer lack 
of acknowledgement on part of the American military forces for the often decisive nature of 
the interpreter’s intervention during the interrogation of civilians. 
 
“I need that bullet!” Lieutenant Stone said again, with even more passion. (…) I let them look 
for the bullet and went out into the courtyard. A few neighboring farm people were out there, 
surrounding Joe, who had climbed out of the jeep and was offering them cigarettes. When 
he saw me, Joe came over to me, and the people followed him. One of them asked me if they 
had arrested the guy. I told them they had. They wanted to know who the officers were and 
what they were doing. “Investigating. Right now they’re looking for the bullet.” Joe knew it 
was about a murder, but who was the murderer? “A black man, Joe.” “Dirty bastard!” “And the 
officers, who are they, Joe?” “Military justice. Lieutenant Stone is the prosecutor. Lieutenant 
Bradford’s the defense lawyer.” I explained all that to the villagers. “And who are you?”one of 
them asked me. “I’m an interpreter.” “They’re not bad guys, the two lieutenants, not bad guys 
at all,” Joe said… A young man came up to me, looking embarrassed. He took an old wallet 
him as a war criminal later. It took quite a while before Erik realized that (…) the Emperor’s 
henchmen were not prepared to discipline Nagatomo for his base behavior, for the inhuman 
treatment III Branch prisoners had suffered. The accusation now being read was based on 
Nagatomo’s ill-treatment of fellow officers and Japanese lower ranks, of fraternizing with the 
enemy, of insulting his Imperial Majesty by speaking the enemy’s language; in short, it was 
obvious that somebody was out to get Nagatomo hung at any cost. Before Nagoya finished 
his long list of accusations, Erik remembered Naito’s hatred of Nagatomo. From there on the 
picture became much clearer. Whilst Nagoya continued reading, the P.O.W. wondered what 
he had to do with all this. When the Kempei captain finished, he explained that he wanted a 
detailed statement concerning every occasion on which the interpreter had dealt with Naga-
tomo and the brigadier or other P.O.W. officers, at which he had been present. (…) It was clear 
in Erik’s mind that no judgment against Nagatomo could ever even the score for the crimes the 
Jap colonel had committed against the prisoners of III Branch. But he had dealt with twisted 
Oriental minds sufficiently to realize that an accusation such as Nagoya now demanded would 
be his own death sentence, if this was a trap set for him by Nagatomo. Nagoya left no choice. 
(…) For three days the interrogation continued. (…) During these days Erik worried a lot. The 
Japanese were perverse enough to obtain all this material against Nagatomo to complete 
their own case and then dump a P.O.W.’s body down a sump hole to eliminate an enemy who 
had been given an insight into the Japanese army and Military Police methods against their 
own senior officers (Lumière, 1966, 143, 147-149).”
The above described situation illustrates that the author not only acted as both party and 
player, but that he served as a pawn and informant for the Japanese commander as well. 
In that circumstance and capacity, the interpreter, remarkably was not perceived as a 
participant but as a mere cog in the machinery of the commander. As can be read, the author 
quickly realized that his opponent wanted to drain him of all usable information that would 
discredit the other, absent party. Knowing that his inside knowledge had led to this perilous 
predicament, the camp interpreter subsequently had to accept that he could only propitiate 
his tormenter if he once again relied on the knowledge that got him into trouble in the first 
place. In the process of this diabolical ‘double take’, the camp interpreter in other words 
out of self-interest needed to reveal information that he theretofore had hidden in order 
to anticipate the moves of the Japanese commander and control and counteract a situation 
which otherwise, as the author wrote himself, undoubtedly would have been the end of him 
(Goffman, 1969, 36).
Apart from the fact that the interpreter’s knowledge was necessary to disclose information 
that could incriminate the adversary of the Japanese commander, the quote reveals another 
aspect that is explanatory for the role, position and interventions of the camp interpreter. 
When we follow the actions of the Japanese commander, it becomes clear that the linguistic 
skills of the author were decisive in targeting the camp interpreter as a useful informant. 
Like no other person, the camp interpreter had access to different territories of the camp. His 
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same as we: maintaining order in the area. I am in the company of a Dutch major and captain. 
In theory I act as an interpreter in circumstances like these, but in reality  I am given free rein to 
achieve the goal by talking. I am allowed to talk about the teacher of religion whom dismissed 
me from class because of a pro-Palestinian standpoint, or about the Dutch resistance against 
the Germans during World War II. For some reason the latter often works out well and that’s 
why I take up the topic again. It’s a bit painful, though, when colleagues ask me for a transla-
tion of this drivel. A New Zealand officer, who is also present, thinks it’s all not very soldierly. 
‘Is this the right approach?’ he growls. I tell the guerilla that this matter is so important that 
only a solution of the highest order is possible and that we therefore must contact their supe-
riors immediately. ‘Please, don’t,’ they beg startled. It appears that they have acted on their 
own. ‘Rather have tea with us,’ they ask invitingly and lift the blockade. The New Zealander is 
dumbfounded. ‘So, that seems to work as well’ he mumbles, while taking a sip of his tea, and 
he calls me ‘peacemaker’. I feel like a magician who has made rain (Mulder, 2010, 128-129).”
Whereas the previous fragment described a situation in which the interpreter was regarded 
by his superiors as a negligible and almost invisible agent, this quote recounts of a situation 
in which the military interpreter not only functioned as a player who proactively sought to 
defend the interests of the party he was trying to represent, but in doing so also was given 
a carte blanche to intervene according to his own insight. The interpreter in this example, 
therefore, acted not so much as a middleman between parties but rather as a spokesman 
of one party in front of another. This distinction in attribution is significant for how the 
interpreter was perceived by the military as well as the guerrillas. Knowing that reputations 
and lives were at stake, the interpreter needed to deliver a ‘message’ that would convince 
both parties of his presumed authority. In order to pull this off, the interpreter was given the 
liberty to translate his role to the needs of the moment. This freedom of interpretation more 
or less implied that the interpreter was licensed to embellish his performance with some 
fabrication and bluff.   
Far from being respected as immoral and unethical, lying and active misrepresentation 
such as described above, have been commonly applied in military operations as strategic 
devices to advance one’s position in competitive and conflicting interactions (Crawford, 
2003, 133-134). The question whether the interpreter lied to the guerillas by making false 
statements or that he misled them through more subtle forms of deception as framing or 
(mis)presenting information, in this particular example is perhaps of less significance than 
the fact that the interpreter deceived the guerillas to protect his fellow men. In that sense, 
the interpreter not so much lied as well as used his resourcefulness and communication 
skills on behalf of the collective good. It is probably because of these situational factors and 
pro-social purposes that the interpreters’ untruthfulness or rather small talk and innuendo 
eventually received the approval and moral justification of his colleague (Genyue, Evans, 
Wang & Lee, 2008, 495).  
with a brass clasp out of his pocket and took the bullet out of it. “Here’s the bullet. I wanted to 
keep it as a souvenir, but I don’t want any trouble…” I took the bullet and went back into the 
house. I gave the bullet to Lieutenant Stone. He cried out, “I’ve found the bullet!” Holding the 
bullet between his thumb and index finger he held it up to look at it and show it off. He put the 
bullet into his pocket and said, “Excellent!” (Guilloux, 2003,7-8).”
The military interpreter in this fragment, the protagonist of the narratives ‘Ok, Joe’ and ‘The 
Interpreter’, comes across as a vague figure in the periphery of interaction who gradually 
gains more contour and weight when he is being addressed by the villagers.  As if shedding 
his invisible cloak when mentioning his function to the young man, the interpreter suddenly 
comes into full view. In that very instance, when having stepped out of the anonymity of 
the background and into the centre of visibility, the interpreter promptly is seen by the 
young man as the only appropriate person among the military men who could be entrusted 
the evidence material. In ancient time, interpreters were sometimes used as a distancing 
device by those in power (Mairs, 2011, 71). Although the young man in the example hardly 
could be described as a powerful person, his discovery and possession of the bullet would 
definitively have made him a figure of interest. Not wanting to become the subject of the 
special attention of the American officers, the young man employed the interpreter as a go-
between who could ensure the necessary (formal) distance that was needed to keep him out 
of sight and thereby out of the investigation. 
The disappearing act of the interpreter which happens next, however, is as remarkable 
if not even more astonishing as the materialization of his persona the moment before. 
The magic of the interpreter seems to have evaporated as soon as he hands over the bullet 
to the lieutenant who, under much self-acclaim, slips the evidence into his pocket. The 
conceitedness of this gesture is revealing for the manner in which the lieutenant apparently 
dismissed the interpreter; the person whose very presence and intervention contributed to 
the finding of the evidence in the first place. While being designated as the mediator and 
confidant by the villager, the interpreter evidently was regarded by the military not as a 
player but as a pawn, or even a non-person.  
The lack of social recognition for the military interpreter in the communication process 
as described above, can be understood as a misjudgment of the information control (em)
powered by the interpreter (Goffman, 1963, 86-87). The following fragment from yet another 
narrative, ‘Pratend Voorwaarts’, exemplifies that it is precisely the acknowledgement of this 
key role of the military interpreter that can foster solutions in contentious situations:
 
“I meet these guerillas right before my return to the Netherlands and shortly before their 
death. They have posted themselves on a main road in an attire of twentieth century knights, 
with Russian Kalashnikovs and RPG [Rocket Propelled Grenade]-grenades. They’re waiting for 
a person with whom they have to settle an old score. The man forms a threat for UNIFIL as 
well, they say. And we could not object to their actions, they argue, because they are doing the 
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demonstrates that the latter didn’t receive the respect and loyalty that usually characterizes 
members of the ingroup. Instead, the interpreter was perceived with animosity and almost 
literally placed outside of the group of internments (Tajfel, 1982). While being part of the 
category of prisoners, the camp interpreter apparently did not seem to belong to the ‘in-
group’ of allied prisoners. Moreover, the fragment explains that the interpreter was accused 
of bonding with the Japanese which practically caused him to be seen as the very enemy 
himself.   
The accusations of collaboration against the camp interpreter can be understood more 
clearly when the bottom-up organization of camp life is taken into consideration. Cor 
Lammers in this regard defines organizations as top-down constructed relations to achieve 
specific purposes that, much to the distress of the founders, often generate various (counter)
active bottom-up initiatives (Lammers, 2005, 177). In case of the Japanese prison camps, 
these informal organizations served among other things as a consolidation and amelioration 
of the top-down organization; a mitigation of the camp policy; a mediation between the 
staff and prisoners, and an opportunity for association (Lammers, 2005, 182-184). In theory, 
the camp interpreter would fit the profile of the bottom-up organization rather perfectly. 
The interpreter, after all, proved his dexterity in all of the above-mentioned functions. The 
autoethnographic narratives, however, point out that reality nevertheless was much more 
ambiguous.   
Despite the fact that the interpreter, in accordance with the quid pro quo stance between 
the top-down and bottom-up organization, fulfilled the interests of both parties, the 
interpreter was not perceived as a member or loyal representative of either of these groups. 
Crudely stated, one could say that the interpreter was drummed up to show his tricks on 
behalf of the various organizations and that he was considered ‘tainted goods’ as soon as the 
job was done. The following fragment illustrates that the suspicion that was attached to the 
camp interpreter is an almost inescapable and inherent feature of his in between position.
 
“The Japanese soldiers were always on guard for enemy espionage. Posters hung in clear view 
in their offices with the Japanese characters Bō Chō on it which meant ‘Prevent Espionage!’ 
In several occasions we, the interpreters, were therefore confronted with – an in our opinion 
unreasonable – suspicion of our guards which we nevertheless had to take in consideration 
in order to prevent misunderstandings or worse from happening. The Nippon soldiers were 
so indoctrinated with the necessity of secrecy of everything that had to do with the force that 
even the execution of normal administrative actions became immensely complicated (Rook-
maker, 1987, 104-105).”
In forced relations such as internment camps, where prisoners are subjugated to the rule 
of their captors, cooperation must always be seen in light of potential subversiveness. The 
Japanese soldiers, therefore, always took the possibility of espionage into account, and 
even more so when it concerned the person of the interpreter who, because of his skills 
There is, of course, a serious downside to the use of strategic ambiguity. Whereas the 
military interpreter in this particular situation told falsehoods to serve a communal 
objective, concealment and misrepresentation usually hold the risk of threatening the 
integrity of the individual and the reputation of the organization (Aquino & Becker, 2005, 
662). Goffman in this regard notes that persons who are caught telling a lie do not only lose 
their face during the interaction but that they also have their face destroyed because people 
believe that if a person has lied once, he can never be fully trusted again in other occasions 
(Goffman, 1959, 62). Although this negative corollary effect does not apply to this particular 
fragment, (well-intended) misrepresentations (by the interpreter) and false impressions (of 
the interpreter) might affect the relationship between the military and the interpreter since 
‘(…) a discreditable disclosure in one area of an individual’s activity will throw doubt on the 
many areas of activity in which he may have nothing to conceal (Goffman, 1959, 64-65).
The intricacies inherent in the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters and the 
consequences these have for the reputation of both the involved parties and organization 
have already been discussed profoundly. To complete this chapter’s analysis the following 
section will deal with the final aspect that determines the role and position of the interpreter.
4.6 Perception: The Interpreter of Maladies 
So far, the autoethnographic analysis of the narratives has brought forth an image of the 
interpreter as a person characterized by duality. Whether the interpreter acted out of free 
will or by force, was revered or reviled, or was placed center stage or at the background, fact 
is that the interpreter needed to reconcile these dualities within himself. The person of the 
interpreter in other words incorporated extremes or rather personality traits at either end of 
the continuum that reflected the momentary needs of the perceiver. The following quote in 
this regard illustrate that these situational perceptions in turn determined the image of the 
interpreter. 
 
“While quite unwilling to give him any floor space amongst their number, while in fact accu-
sing him of “fraternizing” with the enemy, the N.E.I. Aerodrome Camp Command was never-
theless quite happy to order the interpreter to protect them and all the other prisoners from 
the enemy whenever possible (Lumière, 1966, 9).”
Based on the description of the authors, one could roughly divide the population of the 
Japanese internment camp into two categories of respectively the camp staff and prisoners. 
These categories subsequently formed separate (sub)groups in which members identified 
with each other. The prisoners for example did not only have their social status in common, 
they also shared similar experiences, beliefs and loyalties. Remarkably enough, however, this 
relatedness or sense of belonging did not include the person of the interpreter. The fragment 
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context. What immediately became apparent in the analysis was that all of the authors 
manifested a certain degree of versatility in their role of interpreter. Although the context of 
their actions differed, the authors each commanded a set of similar linguistic and cultural 
skills that they applied for different purposes and parties. 
In order to infer meaning from their experience, the narratives have been closely read 
and categorized into corresponding segments. This encoding resulted in five aspects, 
respectively allocation, motivation, position, intervention, and perception. Through a 
selection of quotes taken from the narratives, the aspects have subsequently been analyzed, 
interpreted and framed with a variety of relevant social theories. The significance of these 
selected fragments for the role and position of the interpreter within the military field is 
manifold.       
First, the accounts gave insight into the arbitrary yet transformative nature of the job 
appointment. While almost being thrust into the position of interpreter, the authors 
soon experienced the transforming powers of their service. The linguistic capacity of 
the interpreter enabled and consolidated not only the communication, it also created 
opportunities to address the needs of the involved parties. As such the allocation of the 
interpreter contributed to the empowerment of both the individual as well as the group. 
Second, the narratives of the authors recount their motives for becoming an interpreter. 
Although the assignment of the interpreter was more a matter of chance than of deliberate 
intention, his interpretation of the circumstances motivated him to devote his cultural and 
linguistic capacities to improve his own condition as well of that of others.   
Third, the narratives of the authors have demonstrated that the interpreters were literally 
positioned between (representatives of ) groups. Being the third party, or the go-between, 
the interpreter was tied to different cliques and thus subjugated to oftentimes conflicting 
group norms and interests. Despite the physical, psychological and moral burden of these 
constraining circumstances, the interpreter nevertheless sought ways to explore or rather 
exploit the potential of their position by not only preserving the lifelines of communication 
but that of life itself as well.   
Fourth, the narratives illustrated that the interpreter needed to steer a clear course 
in order to neutralize cultural sensitivities of groups. Whereas the interpreter seldomly 
received credit for his services and sometimes was even reduced to a mere pawn, he was 
undeniably an important player in the field because all of the involved parties depended on 
his interventions. These actions, after all, gave access to undisclosed territories, persons, 
and information. Knowing the potential of his role, the interpreter used his multicultural 
knowledge to influence the outcome of interactions even if this meant through subtle forms 
of manipulation and misrepresentation.  
Finally, the experiences of the authors demonstrated that the in-between position and 
sometimes ambiguous interventions caused inaccurate perceptions of the person of the 
interpreter. Due to the duality of his position and role, the loyalty of the interpreter was 
always perceived with suspicion. As a consequence, the interpreter most often remained an 
and inside information, stayed close to fire. Therefore, it was not just the prisoners but also 
the representatives of the formal camp organization who perceived the interpreter with 
suspicion. As such, the interpreter remained an ‘outsider with inside information’ to whom 
both organizations, top-down and bottom-up, either turned to or turned away from as 
suited their convenience.   
The abovementioned quotes demonstrated that all parties, despite their conflicting 
nature, shared a similar (prejudiced) perception of the interpreter. The following quote, 
however, shows that the interpreter himself also obtained a unique observation of people 
and circumstances as well.
 
“What I have heard and read about kidnappings I try to put in practice. With each of the many 
passing guards, mostly boys about seventeen years old, I’ll have a chat so that no one feels 
offended. (…) Because I am busy, I am able to control the fear. I’d rather not think of circum-
stances in which all communication is impossible. I can talk as much as I want, but the others 
also have to participate in the conversation in order to prevent annoyance. In this stage (…) the 
machinegun marksman, however, cannot bring himself to say a thing.  The militia boys anger 
themselves about his behavior. ‘He’s mad at us,’ they say aggrieved to me. Sounds need to 
come out of his mouth and that’s why I prompt him something. ‘In Alkmaar is een kaasmarkt,’ 
he repeats after me and in the translation I let him pronounce his appreciation of the hospita-
lity and excellent treatment (Mulder, 2010, 249).” 
In this hostage situation the interpreter demonstrates his ability to accord the thoughts 
and actions of all of the involved parties. Although the interpreter was regarded a pawn 
in the interaction between those parties, he was clearly an independent actor capable 
of understanding and anticipating the perceptions of others.  The interpreter used this 
knowledge to good effect as his intervention mitigated the tension between the parties. 
This illustrates the interpreter’s skill to act as an ‘edgewalker’ who uses his knowledge to 
bring about a dialogue that turns others of difference into others of similarity (Chang, 2008, 
29). Stepping up to the plate, the military interpreter in this particular example therefore 
expanded his boundaries and engaged in others to neutralize an otherwise explosive 
atmosphere.      
5. Conclusion
This chapter has tried to explore the ‘eyes and ears’ experience of the interpreters through 
an autoethnographic analysis of the narratives written by authors who have once operated 
as interpreters in war-infested environments. These testimonies served as a form of 
self-narrative in which the authors acted as researchers who reflected on their ‘working 
conditions’ by situating their personal experience within a social, historical and cultural 
126 Talk Up Front  Chapter 5 127
References
Anonymous (2006). Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary. Glasgow: 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
Anonymous ISAF-6 interpreter (2007, October 23). Personal interview.
Aquino, K., & Becker, T.E. (2005). ‘Lying in negotiations: how individual and situational 
factors influence the use of neutralization strategies’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 
26, 661-679.
Bahadir, Ş. (2010). ‘The Task of the Interpreter in the Struggle of the Other for 
Empowerment. Mythical Utopia or Sine Qua Non of professionalism?’, Translation 
and Interpreting Studies, 5 (1), 124-139.  
Baker, C. (2010). ‘‘It’s Not Their Job to Soldier’: Distinguishing Civilian and Military in 
Soldiers’ and Interpreters’ Accounts of Peacekeeping in 1990s Bosnia-Herzegovina’. 
Journal of War and Culture Studies, 3 (1): 137-150.
Baker, M. (2006). Translation and Conflict. A Narrative Account. Oxon: Routledge.
Blomberg, S.B., Hess, G.D., & Raviv, Y. (2009). ‘Where have all the heroes gone? A 
rational-choice perspective on heroism’, Public Choice, 141, 509-522.
Boje, D., & Tyler, J.A. (2009). ‘Story and Narrative Noticing: Workaholism 
Autoethnographies’, Journal of Business Ethics, 84 (S2), 173-194.
Bos, G., & Soeters, J. (2006). ‘Interpreters at Work: Experiences from Dutch and Belgian Peace 
Operations’, International Peacekeeping, 13 (2), 261-268.
Bowen, M. (1995). ‘Interpreters and the Making of History’. In: Delisle, J. & 
Woodsworth, J., (eds.), Translators through History (244-273). Philadelphia: John Ben-
jamins North America.
Chang, H. (2008). Autoethnography as Method. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.
Crawford, V. P. (2003). ‘Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational 
Misrepresentation of Intentions’, The American Economic Review 93 (1), 133-149.
Delisle, J., & and Woodsworth, J., eds. (1995). Translators through History. Philadelphia: John Ben-
jamins North America.
Ewick, P. & Silbey, S. (2003). ‘Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal 
Authority’, American Journal of Sociology ,108 (6), 1328-1372.
Fiske, S. T. (2004). Social Beings: Core Motives in Social Psychology. Hoboken: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Genyue,  F.,  Evans, A.D., Wang, L., & Lee, K. (2008). ‘Lying in the name of the collective 
good: a developmental study’, Developmental Science, 11 (4), 495-503.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Double Day & 
Company.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma. Notions of the Management of Spoiled Identity. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall.
Goffman, E. (1969). Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
outsider to all of the parties. Notwithstanding the accusations of the others, the interpreter 
used his own outlook to engage in others and bridge differences.
The theoretical framework has demonstrated that the interpreters have been employed in 
ways that went beyond mere language mediation, and that contextual factors as environment 
and task assignment determined the actual position and role of the interpreter (Fiske, 2004, 
171). Whereas the interpreter most often had to walk a fine line in order to serve the interests 
of the opposing groups, it is remarkable and even regrettable to conclude that the grim 
assessment of the ancient interpreter is confirmed in the autoethnographic narratives of 
the authors as well. This finding calls for a thorough investigation of the tongue and ears 
experience of interpreters in contemporary military missions. The following chapter will 
therefore examine the civil-military cooperation between Dutch soldiers and embedded and 
local interpreters in Afghanistan’s war-torn Uruzgan province.
Notes
1  A total of six books have been explored to analyze four narratives. The difference in numbers is a result of the fact that 
the researcher used a Dutch and an English version of the book of Cornel Lumière. With regard tot he narrative of Louis 
Guilloux, two books books were used. Respectively, OK Joe by Louis Guilloux himself and The Interpreter by Alice Kaplan who 
recovers the history of the racial segration of the Jim Crow system during the American liberation of France through eye-
witness accounts of Guilloux.
2  The American segregation politics of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century became historically known as 
the Jim Crow system. The term is derived from a song by comedian Thomas Dartmouth Rice (1806-1860) in 1832 and was 
used in an old American show. With his face polished black, white man Rice sung the words: “Turn about and wheel about. 
And do jis so. And ebery time I wheel about. I jump Jim Crow.” The lyrics belonged to a song Rice had once learned from an elderly 
African-American in 1828. In his artist interpretation, the song, however, had become a mockery of African-Americans and 
an exploitation of their culture (Horton & Horton, 2001, 246; Leeflang, 2003, 50-53).
128 Talk Up Front  Chapter 5 129
Mulder, E. (2010). Pratend Voorwaarts: Een Nederlandse Militaire Tolk in de Chaos van 
Libanon. Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema.  
Panourgia, N. (2000). ‘Review of Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the Self and the Social, 
by Deborah E. Reed-Danahay’, American Ethnologist, 27 (2), 551-553. 
Peretz, D. (2006). ‘The Roman Interpreter and His Diplomatic and Military Roles’, 
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 55:6, 451-470.
Roland, R.A. (1999). Interpreters as Diplomats: A Diplomatic History of the Role of 
Interpreters in World Politics. Ottawa: University of Ottowa Press.
Rookmaker, J. (1987). Tolk achter Prikkeldraad: Meirei Wa Meirei Da: Bevel is Bevel. 
Franeker: Uitgeverij T. Wever.
Soeters, J. (2018). Sociology and Military Studies, Current and Classic Foundations. 
Abingdon: Routledge.
Tajfel, H. (1982). ‘Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations’, Annual Review of 
Psychology, 33, 1-39.
Verkuyten, M., & Pouliasi, K. (2006). ‘Biculturalism and Group Identity: The Mediating 
Role of Identification in Cultural Frame Switching’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 
37 (3), 312-326.
Wansink, B., Payne, C.R., & Van Ittersum, K. (2008). ‘Profiling the heroic leader: empirical 
lessons from combat-decorated veterans of World War II’, The Leadership Quarterly, 19 
(5), 547-555.
Gregory, B. (2000). ‘Review of  Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the Self and the Social, by 
Deborah E. Reed-Danahay’, The Journal of American Folklore, 113 (449), 328-330.
Grossman, E. (2010). ‘A New Great Wall. Why the Crisis in Translation Matters’, Foreign 
Policy May/June.
Guilloux, L. (2003). OK, Joe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Harari, Y.N. (2009). ‘Scholars. Eyewitnesses, and Flesh-Witnesses of War: A Tense 
Relationship’. Partial Answers 7 (2), 213-228.
Hoedemaekers, I., & Soeters, J. (2009). ‘Afghan conversations. Interaction rituals and 
language mediation during peace missions. Experiences from Afghanistan’. In: 
Caforio, G. (ed.), Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles Moskos (329-352). 
Bingley: Emerald. 
Horton, J., & Horton, L.E. (2001). Hard Road to freedom: The Story of African America. 
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Hong, Y., Morris, M.W., Chiu, C., & Benet-Martínez, V. (2000). ‘Multicultural Minds: A 
Dynamic Constructivist Approach to Culture and Cognition’, American Psychologist, 55 
(7), 709-720. 
Hugh, T. (1993). The Conquest of Mexico. London: Random House.
Kaplan, A. (2005). The Interpreter. New York: Free Press.
Kleinreesink, L.H.E. (2014). On Military Memoirs: Soldier-authors, Publishers, Plots and 
Motives. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University. 
Kostera, M. (2002). ‘Review of Storytelling in Organizations: Facts, Fictions, and 
Fantasies, by Yiannis Gabriel’, Human Relations, 55 (6), 728-734.
Krackhardt, D. (1999). ‘The Ties that Torture: Simmelian Tie Analysis in Organizations’, 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 16, 183-210.
Lammers, C.J. (2005). Vreemde Overheersing. Bezetten en bezetting in sociologisch 
perspectief. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Leeflang, T. (2003). Black Hollywood. Soesterberg: Aspekt.    
Lumière, C. (1966). Kura!  Brisbane: Jacaranda Press.
Lumière, C. (1981). De Tolk: Krijgsgevangene aan de River Kwai. Baarn: Hollandia BV. MacKenzie, 
S.P. (1994). ‘The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II’, The Journal 
of Modern History, 66 (3), 487-520.
Mairs, R. (2011), ‘”Translator, Traditor”: The Interpreter as Traitor in Classical 
Tradition’, Greece & Rome, Second Series, 58:1, 64-81.
Merkin, R.S. (2005), ‘Uncertainty Avoidance and Facework: A test of the Hofstede Model’, 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30, 213-228.
Mischenko, J. (2005). ‘Exhausting Management Work: Conflicting Identities’, Journal of 
Health Organization and Management, 19 (3), 204-218. 
Möllering, G. (2001). ‘The Nature of Trust: From George Simmel to a theory of 
expectation, Interpretation and Suspension’, Sociology, 35 (2), 403-420.  
Chapter 6
 Chapter 6 131
Chapter 6
 
Communicating Vessels? The Trade and Traits of Soldiers and
Interpreters during Stability Operations in the Province of Uruzgan
Andrea van Dijk
132 Talk Up Front  Chapter 6 133
‘Lucky’, proved to be true, calm at the base was restored soon after. The incident, neverthe-
less, left an imprint on the military attitude towards local partners, which became clear when 
we once again joined the safety briefing at the end of our visit. This time, however, the base 
commander concluded his speech by warning the new units that they should carefully ap-
proach the local partners and that they should always be treated with reserve and suspicion.” 
The observation demonstrates that the incorporation of local partners into the military 
organization also confronts the military with a certain kind of ambivalence.  Whereas 
the expertise and input of local partners can be considered pragmatic tools for attaining 
operational effect, dependence on local competence could also imply vulnerability for 
the military organization (Rietjens, 2008, 196-197). It is precisely the organization’s lack 
of linguistic, cultural, and environmental knowledge of the mission area which makes it 
particularly difficult for the military to fully comprehend and control operations. The 
uncertainty of these circumstances could create feelings of insecurity towards the intentions 
of their ‘foreign’ co-workers. Particularly in a dangerous and turbulent mission environment 
like the province of Uruzgan, such feelings of vulnerability might ultimately constrain the 
relationship between the military and the local partners.
In unfamiliar and uncertain conflict zones, military leadership can make a difference 
between life and death. Military leaders therefore are trained to lead their units in dangerous 
situations. This type of leadership is called ‘in extremis leadership’ which means ‘giving 
purpose, motivation, and direction to people when there is imminent physical danger, 
and where followers believe that leader behaviour will influence their physical well-being 
or survival’ (Vogelaar & Dalenberg, 2012, 97).  Subordinates therefore need to trust their 
leaders’ competence in making the right decisions as well as their commitment not to expose 
them to unnecessary danger (Vogelaar & Dalenberg, 2012, 97). When trust in competence 
and loyalty are considered fundamental attributes of the on-scene commander, one could 
ponder whether this also should be true for local partners who perform key roles during 
military missions. Perhaps even more so for the person of the interpreter who often acts 
as a lifeline in the complicated operational environment that characterizes contemporary 
military interventions (Kummings, 2010, 8-9). 
In order to investigate the dynamics between soldiers and interpreters, this chapter 
aims to interpret their cooperation through an explorative analysis of interviews that have 
been conducted among soldiers and national and local interpreters who have cooperated 
during ISAF. National interpreters are recruited among the Afghan-Dutch community 
and are embedded in the Dutch armed forces. Local interpreters on the other hand are 
contracted (via a placement agency) in the mission area itself. Following the framework of 
the five aspects that have been discussed in chapter 5, the analysis will moreover focus on 
the different strategies soldiers and interpreters have applied in dealing with the intricacies 
produced by their interdependent relationship.  
1. Introduction
This chapter continues along the path of the five aspects that have been derived from the 
narratives of interpreters in high risk environments. The auto-ethnographic experiences of 
these narrators produced a framework to describe how respectively allocation, motivation, 
position, intervention, and perception defined and influenced the interpreter’s behavior 
as well as that of the relevant stakeholders. Now, we fast-forward to a more contemporary 
context by applying these aspects to a case study which analyzes the cooperation between 
soldiers and interpreters during stability operations, more specifically Task Force Uruzgan 
(TFU 2006-2010), the Dutch contribution to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in the Afghan province of Uruzgan. 
Modern military missions such as ISAF (2001-2014) have become highly organized 
enterprises that encompass the cooperation of numerous countries. These missions, 
however, do not only involve the contribution of coalition partners. The operational 
efficiency of the intervening forces also often depends on the services of local partners. 
Camp Holland, the main military base of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, for instance not only 
accommodated Dutch, American, Australian, British and German soldiers, it also encamped 
the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Security Guards, local interpreters, and several other 
local units who took care of the facilities that were present on the base. These local partners 
constituted an essential part of the organization without which a military mission such as 
ISAF could not have sustained.
Soldiers who are deployed to foreign mission areas, typically have to interact with 
unfamiliar social groups in order to achieve their mission goals. Their understanding of 
the environment often is the result of socio-cultural information which is gathered and 
processed during encounters with the local population and more specifically through 
the collaboration with local coworkers (Harris, 1994, 310-312). The impressions, ideas and 
attitudes of soldiers towards local partners, and vice versa, however, change according to 
positive or negative experiences in the cooperation. These shifting opinions about local 
partners and the accompanying alteration in the soldier’s perception for instance can be 
illustrated by a personal observation that was made during field research (2008) at the above-
mentioned military base:
 
“Shortly after our arrival at the camp we were invited by the base commander to attend a 
safety briefing. He informed us about the regulations of the camp and urged us to take no-
tice of the different alarm signals that sounded whenever the camp was endangered. The 
commander concluded his talk by impressing on our minds that we should respect the local 
workers on the base and that they should not be distrusted beforehand. The very next day, 
however, the camp was closed off and thoroughly searched after the alarm signaled that an 
intruder had tried to enter the base. Rumors about a former local interpreter on the warpath 
immediately swept the camp. Although the rumors about the intruder, who was referred to as 
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their military counterparts.        
     The participant observation took place from the 17th of January to the 1st of February, 2008. 
The researcher visited Camp Holland in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with servicemen (M), national interpreters (NI) and local interpreters (LI). The 
interviews with the interpreters were conducted with a co-interviewer who was involved in 
a separate study on cultural awareness. The topic lists (see Appendix V) addressed, among 
other things, the nature of the task assignment, type of cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters, perceived problems in the cooperation, the performance and perception of 
the partner, (confidentiality of ) information transfer and safety restrictions with regard 
to the cooperation. Other subjects that were discussed related to a more general inquiry 
into the respondents’ memory of significant moments, individuals and circumstances that 
characterized the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters.   
A total of 70 respondents have been interviewed individually and face to face over the 
period of January 2008 to December 2008 (see Appendices I, II, and III for an overview of 
the interviews conducted). During the field research at the central military base Camp 
Holland in Tarin Kowt, a number of 33 interviews were conducted among respectively 17 
soldiers, 8 national interpreters and 8 local interpreters. It should be mentioned that all of 
these interpreters had a Pashtun background which coincided with Uruzgan as a Pashtun-
dominated province. The collected data furthermore was complemented with a number of 
37 interviews that were conducted in the Netherlands with soldiers who had been deployed 
as members of either the Battle Group, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), or other 
units during different periods of TFU rotations (see Table I). 
In qualitative research there often is quite some variation in the amount of time that 
interviews take (Bryman, 2016, 480). The interviews with the local interpreters at Tarin Kowt 
for example lasted approximately half an hour while the interviews with the soldiers in the 
Netherlands could take up to almost two hours.  It would be wrong to assume, however, that 
shorter interviews are inferior to longer ones. When respondents agree to be interviewed, 
they are usually cooperative meaning that even short interviews can be of significance 
(Bryman, 2016, 480). The duration of the interviews, whether conducted in Afghanistan or 
in the Netherlands, mainly depended on the available time of the respondents involved. 
Two days prior before our leave, we had been granted permission by the quartermaster to 
meet with the local interpreters of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT). This 
last-minute authorization was the result of the sensitive circumstances that accompanied 
the Lucky incident. The initial plan of course was to conduct more interviews among the 
local interpreters since this would strengthen the integrity of the conclusions generated 
from the research (Bryman, 2016, 41, 697). Despite its small number, this specific group of 
local interpreters, however, produced relevant and unique data which only could have been 
gathered on scene. This data, moreover, proved valuable when compared to information 
provided by other types of respondents and sources. Eventually, we were granted exactly one 
half day during the interpreters’ working hours to conduct the interviews which meant that 
2. Methodology
2.1 Research Strategy
A case study was applied to describe the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters in 
the mission environment. Although heavily criticized and stereotyped as a research strategy 
that lacks precision, objectivity and rigor, the case study nevertheless is a widely practiced 
method within social science research and renowned for its contribution to our knowledge 
of individuals, groups, organizations and social and political phenomena (Yin, 2018). In order 
to disqualify the stereotypes that surround this research strategy, Yin has given a definition 
of a case study that encompasses two features. First, he describes the case study as ‘(...) an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (“the case”) within its real-
world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not 
be clearly evident’. Second, Yin continues by explaining that the case study inquiry copes with 
the ‘(...) distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data 
points, and as one result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide design, data collection, and analysis, and as another result relies on multiple sources 
of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion’ (Yin, 2018).
The investigative nature of the implicit research questions within the study, such as for 
example ‘Why do soldiers (dis)trust their interpreter?’ and ‘How do interpreters intervene in complex 
situations?’, justified the implementation of a case study. These types of ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions, after all, covered conditions and phenomena that could only be examined within 
the contemporary context of the events itself (Yin, 2018). The five aspects that have been 
distinguished in the previous chapter and which are perceived to be elementary in the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters, moreover required the implementation of 
triangulation by tapping into various sources of evidence such as participant observation, 
documents and interviews (Yin, 2018). The case study comprised an all-encompassing 
research method that allowed the investigator to capture the characteristics of cooperation 
in high-risk environments as experienced by soldiers and interpreters who formed the 
primary unit of analysis of the case study (Yin, 2018). 
2.2 Data Collection
Whereas a combination of multiple data collection techniques such as participant 
observation and a literary study has been applied, this case study concentrates mainly 
on the narratives that were gathered through the conduct of interviews. Narratives are 
understood as the story people live by which help them to understand the world (Ruiz 
Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017, 187). More specifically this narrative approach enables us to 
comprehend the role of interpreters through how they are narrated by themselves as well as 
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set of interviews conducted with soldiers who had returned from their deployment. This 
resulted in a very heterogeneous group of respondents that covered almost the complete 
continuum of the 2006-2008 period of the mission. The replicating strategy of the multiple-
case sampling in this regard strengthened the findings because they proved to hold true 
in comparable settings (TFU rotations) and thereby added confidence to the notion that 
the insights found could be considered generic for the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters during the TFU mission in the above-mentioned particular period of time 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, 29-30). Moreover, it is important to notify the probability that the 
respondents have cooperated with the very same national interpreters that have participated 
in the field research. This overlap in deployment and hence cooperation is not inconceivable 
in view of the fact that national interpreters usually are contracted by the Defence Interpreters 
Service for the entire duration of the mission and as such are assigned to military bases for 
extensive periods of time. In fact, the researcher has conducted interviews with respondents 
in which such overlap was confirmed.
The unforeseen situation of the trespasser at the central military base at Tarin Kowt caused 
for a diversion of the original script of the field research. Although used as an informative 
anecdote to illustrate the sensitive nature of the cooperation between soldiers and local 
partners, the ‘Lucky incident’ which was described in the introduction of this chapter had a 
major impact on the course of the field study. Since the attempted attack involved a former 
local interpreter, the TFU staff had, out of safety precautions and investigative reasons, 
prohibited all contact with the group of local interpreters. Given that the primary source 
of information was closed off indeterminately, other venues of research within the military 
base needed to be explored to overcome the (methodological) impairment at hand.
Making the most of the situation, an alternative source of information was found 
in soldiers who had worked with local interpreters and who, after a short and informal 
introduction of the research subject, were keen to participate in the study. Completely in 
accordance with the nature of qualitative research in which adaptability to circumstances 
is pivotal, the change of perspective fortunately proved to be an unexpected opportunity 
that delivered an insightful and valuable contribution to the original intent of the field 
research (Yin, 2018). By including the perspective of the soldiers, the scope of the case study 
was not only broadened but also deepened by the fact that experiences in the cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters could now be compared between the various groups of 
respondents. 
In contrast to the relatively easy approachability and readiness of the soldiers, a certain 
amount of persuasion and persistence was needed to convince the national interpreters to 
partake in the study. A semi-official meeting was organized with the assistance of the staff’s 
personnel officer (G1) in order to coax the national interpreters into partaking in the research 
by informing them about the objective of the study and the outline of the interview. With the 
incident with the intruder still fresh in mind, however, there were some interpreters who 
were reluctant to participate while others had been given clear orders from their military 
we had to maintain a tight schedule in order to let all of the voluntary candidates participate. 
The duration of these interviews ranged from 00.26 hours to 00.46 hours with an average 
time of 00.30 hours. We had considerably more time at our disposal with the national 
interpreters. Most of them reserved time for us during their leisure hours which enabled 
us to delve more deeply into certain issues that were addressed. These interviews ranged 
from 01.13 hours to 02.23 hours with an average time of 01.27 hours. The interviews with the 
soldiers were conducted by the researcher alone. Similar to the interpreters, I was granted 
permission to interview the soldiers at Camp Holland by either their superiors or the G1. 
These interviews also took place during their working hours and ranged from 00.24 hours to 
01.45 hours with an average time of 00.53 hours. The extra number of additional interviews 
that were conducted with soldiers predominantly took place at the various barracks at 
which their unit was based. Not hampered by ongoing operations in the mission area, these 
interviews were the lengthiest of all ranging from 01.13 hours to 02.43 hours with an average 
time of 01.49 hours.
Table 1 Overview of Interviews










*This sub group consists of personnel from various military units including ISTAR, OMLT, TFU support and Regional Command South.
The respondents, respectively servicemen, national interpreters and local interpreters, 
were predominantly approached through an informal network, followed by snowball 
sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 28). This meant that after the interview was completed, 
respondents were asked if they knew other individuals who met the requirements of the 
research population and who were willing to participate in the study. These potential 
candidates were either national interpreters or soldiers who had relied on their assistance 
during TFU rotations.    
Although the interviews that were conducted during the field research in 2008 form the 
core of the data collection of this study, reasons of internal validity and reliability caused the 
researcher to broaden the horizon of the study and to complement the results with another 
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were developed in such a way that they encouraged respondents to freely reflect upon their 
experiences (Bryman, 2016, 589).    
   By narrating their experiences, soldiers and interpreters enabled themselves to give 
meaning and value to the oftentimes complex situations they experienced during their 
cooperation in the mission environment. Precisely because narratives are sense-making 
structures in which the respondent not only tells about an experience but also creates a 
self through that very performance and hence in Goffman’s terms renders a presentation of 
the self of how one wants (his role) to be perceived, it is of importance that the researcher 
preserves the story as told by the respondent so that their ways of constructing meaning 
are respected and narrative analysis can take place as an interpretive tool that examines ‘(…) 
phenomena, issues, and people’s lives holistically’ (Goffman, 1959, 17-20; Daiute & Lightfoot, 
2004, xi; Kohler Riessman, 1993, 4, 11, 20). With that precaution in mind, the researcher has 
taken great care to use the original wording of the respondent whenever their account of 
events was quoted. 
Furthermore, the idea of “ideological dilemma” as developed by Billig is used to look at 
the narratives in the interviews. At the core of this idea is the contention that the “common 
sense” consists of contrary themes, revealing contrary ideological values (Stanley & Billig, 
2004, 160-161). These values can be brought into argumentative conflict with each other. 
The theme of trust and distrust for example, which appears to be central to the analysis 
of the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters, is considered to constitute such an 
ideological dilemma. There are values that support the necessity of trust, just as there are 
values that support the opposite. The analysis will explicate how various respondents dealt 
with such ideological dilemmas. Important in this respect is the idea that a single narrative 
cannot transform every thinkable ambiguity and uncertainty into tightly organized 
certainties. Every form of representation therefore is potentially controversial because the 
researcher’s attempt to capture the whole truth in their narration of the stories of others, 
essentially remains the creation of the researcher himself. Narratives, in other words, are 
seen as principally imperfect and selective ways of making sense of a dynamically complex 
environment (Kohler Riessman, 1993, 15-16).
Essential in the analysis of the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters was a 
twofold selective coding of the interview material which enabled the researcher to interpret 
the interaction between the soldiers and interpreters as expressed in the narratives of the 
respondents. First, the coding process was performed by a constant movement between the 
data and the five aspects of respectively allocation, position, intervention, perception and 
motivation that have been discussed in the previous chapter. This initial coding resulted in 
the development of five separate but complimentary meta-narratives which each were based 
upon the singular experiences or stories of the respondents. In this regard, it is important 
to reiterate that the meta-narratives are interpretations and reconstructions made by the 
researcher of how the respondents dealt with the interdependent relationship within the 
mission environment. The meta-narratives are therefore just as much the making of the 
superiors not to get involved at all. This type of gatekeeping is a common limitation of 
research in conflict environments which often results in limited access to the research object 
(Müller-Wille, 2014, 41-42). The national interpreters who eventually did participate in the 
study, were very cautious with regard to their privacy and safety and therefore sometimes 
withheld information about their personal details and regional descent. 
After fervent lobbying up unto the final days of the visit to the central base, the G1 as 
described before finally gave permission to interview a group of local interpreters who were 
assigned to the OMLT.  The staff’s approval allowed for the necessary access to a group of 
respondents which could only be observed and interviewed in the mission environment 
itself. Again, a meeting with the interpreters was arranged. Instead of informing the 
potential candidates in a neutral setting such as a meeting room, the assembly this time 
took place in the personal residence of the interpreters themselves.  Seated on the ground 
in the center of a dimly lit tent and with a cup of some freshly poured chai in hand, the 
interpreters were informed about the purpose of the study and the topic list. Of course, 
this all took place according to the custom of the Pashtunwali, the traditional lifestyle and 
ethical code in Pashtun regions, which meant that the atmosphere was one of generosity and 
hospitality (Rzehak, 2011, 15). After a considerable amount of small talk and an exchange of 
polite gestures had taken place, the interpreters were invited to participate in the study to 
which they enthusiastically responded.   
The interpreter database per camp was estimated by various military respondents at 
approximately 71 interpreters (consisting of both national and local interpreters) for Camp 
Holland in Tarin Kowt, and 13 local interpreters for the smaller Dutch base, Camp Hadrian, 
in Deh Rawod. These, however, were theoretical figures. In practice the number of active 
interpreters was often a fraction of the officially contracted interpreters. Circumstances 
of dismissal, leave, and even disappearance of (predominantly local) interpreters pressed 
heavily upon the already scant interpreter database. The participating local interpreters were 
(with some exception) mostly young urban adults between the age of 21 years and 23 years. 
Most of these local interpreters, often referred to as ‘city boys’ by the Dutch soldiers, came 
from urban regions such as Jalalabad, Kabul, and Kandahar. 
     
2.3 Data analysis
The interview material has been analyzed using principles of narrative analysis. This approach 
takes stories, understood here as first-person accounts of the respondents’ experience, as 
the object of investigation itself in order to explore how respondents ‘(…) impose order on 
the flow of experience to make sense of events and actions in their lives’ (Kohler Riessman, 
1993, 2). Especially in case of qualitative interviews like those conducted in this particular 
study, the answers given by respondents can be viewed as stories because the questions 
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zones. Even more so, because of its focus on the understudied issue of the cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters during military operations in Afghanistan (Ruiz Rosendo 
& Barea Muñoz, 2017,184). 
In order to judge the quality of the research, several tactics with regard to data collection 
and data analysis have been taken into consideration to contribute to the reliability and 
validity of the case study. Construct validity has been established during the phase of 
data collection by applying source triangulation (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 266-267). By 
conducting interviews with respondents, the researcher was able to unearth facts, opinions 
and insights about events that took place within the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters. Through direct observation of relevant behaviors and contextual conditions on 
‘site’ during for instance negotiations, meetings, and leisure time, the researcher moreover 
was able to provide new dimensions for understanding both the context and phenomenon 
of the cooperative relationship. The gathering of administrative documents in the form 
of operational protocols, evaluation reports, recommendation letters and newspaper 
clippings related to the subject matter furthermore provided specific details which granted 
the researcher the opportunity to corroborate information from other sources of evidence. 
Finally, by asking respondents about the physical artifacts they had collected during their 
deployment such as for example photographs, gifts, and memorabilia, the researcher was 
able to develop a more precise understanding of the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters beyond that which could be observed during the limited time of the visit to the 
central base alone. Together, these sources of evidence contributed to the construct validity 
of the case study by providing multiple measures of the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters during military operations. In addition, requirements for internal validity have 
been met during the phase of data analysis by developing a framework that was based on five 
aspects that were developed during prior autoethnographic research and which contributed 
to the organization of the analysis of the case study.    
To increase the reliability of the information, two principles have been applied respectively 
the development of a case study database and the maintenance of a chain of evidence. 
With the exception of one respondent who refused to be taped, all of the interviews have 
been recorded with the permission of the respondents. These audio-recordings have been 
carefully stored and are accessible for examination. The interviews with the interpreters have 
been transcribed but due to the very time-consuming nature of this task, it was considered 
acceptable to forego the transcription of the remaining interviews since detailed notes 
were kept of each interview. The notes and audio-recordings provided the researcher ample 
opportunity to conduct a careful analysis of the data. A formal database of the interview 
material has been developed, so that an overview of the evidence can be reviewed directly 
(see Appendices I, II, and III). 
Furthermore, full field notes regarding interviews, events, people and conversations have 
been written down in order to contribute to the conceptualization of observations (Bryman, 
2016, 444). This information was chronologically organized in three separate notebooks in 
researcher as they are “narrated” by the interviewees, meaning that they ultimately are a way 
of “imperfect sensemaking” by the researcher of the sensemaking of respondents (Kohler 
Riessman, 1993, 23).  
Second, the coding process consisted of a (re)construction of the more detailed character 
of the meta-narratives by finding examples and evidence for each of the five aspects. Quotes 
representing a selection of these examples and evidence are used to illustrate the meta-
narrative of each aspect (see Appendix IV). With regard to the concept of representativeness, 
the researcher has tried to construct a sample that reflects the population accurately so that 
it can be viewed as a microcosm of the population (Bryman, 2016, 695).  More specifically, 
the researcher has used a purposive sample by strategically selecting participants that were 
relevant to the research questions that were posed (Bryman, 2016, 408). Quotes representing 
this microcosm of the population therefore have also been chosen with due care. In practice, 
this meant that in case of the interpreters every respondent has been quoted at least once in 
this study. The group of interviewed soldiers, however, was too big for every respondent to be 
quoted. The researcher therefore has tried to the best of her knowledge and ability to create a 
balanced representation by selecting quotes that either reflected a more general experience 
shared by other respondents or a particular experience, observation or finding of a soldier 
that shed a different and or interesting light on matters described. Moreover, the researcher 
attempted to do justice to the contribution of the participants by representing the results as 
truthfully and authentically as possible. In relation to the quotes this meant for example that 
the quotes of the local interpreters were presented as phrased by the respondents without 
editing their English language. While this perhaps makes these quotes more difficult to 
read, it also gives an impression of their language proficiency as experienced by soldiers who 
cooperated with them during the mission.
2.4 Quality of Research
The Dutch contribution to the military operation of ISAF started in 2006 and ended in 
2010. Given that descriptive studies are vulnerable to become outdated with the passing 
of time, one could wonder whether this research on the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters during the TFU mission is still relevant today. A decade later, it is safe to say 
that this is most certainly the case. After all, Western armed forces are still heavily engaged 
in interventions in fragile states in which they need to interact with the local population. 
Moreover, for some of these armies such operations are the main focus of their deployments. 
The Dutch military, in this regard, offers a case in point because its soldiers are still active in 
Afghanistan and countries like Iraq and Mali. The lessons of the TFU experience, however, 
have not yet fully been learned (Kitzen, 2019, 52-53). This critical observation can also be 
applied to the (mutual) experiences of soldiers and interpreters. This case study therefore 
provides a valuable contribution to the understanding of the role of the interpreter in conflict 
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and minds of their interpreters first. When that condition is taken for granted or overlooked, 
trying to get a foothold in the region will become a mission impossible. For Western soldiers 
intervening in non-Western mission areas, it is therefore important not only to notice, 
discuss and mitigate the effects of such opinions and sentiments present among interpreters 
in order to improve and (re)direct the cooperation but also to help prevent such biases from 
developing by contributing to a constructive work environment in which all members of the 
organization receive recognition for their contribution to (the goals of ) the organization.
Another form of researcher effect occurs when the researcher threatens ongoing 
institutional relationships. In reaction to their insecurity about who the researcher is and 
what might be done with the collected data, respondents could adopt an on-stage role or 
special persona as a presentation of the self to the outsider (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 265). 
This bias seemed to be the case when the local interpreters were asked about the possible 
prevalence of social and work-related problems within the camp. With the exception of 
one respondent, all of the local interpreters expressed that there were no hardships and 
that they were very content with their job and the way things were going within the camp. 
The unanimity in responses, however, indicated that the respondents in this matter gave 
socially desirable answers because the interviews were conducted shortly after the incident 
with the former local interpreter had taken place. The occurrence of this very incident and 
the raid of their tents shortly thereafter already unmistakably hinted at the presence of 
tension within the TFU contingent of local interpreters. This impression was later confirmed 
during interviews with non-commissioned officers who told that competition among 
the interpreters and feelings of animosity towards the military supervisor were recurring 
events. The respondents most probably assumed the on-stage role of satisfied employees to 
prevent the researcher from exposing sensitivities such as for instance rivalries, weaknesses, 
compromises and contradictions to the outside world (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 265). 
Precisely because the researcher could have been interested in this type of information, the 
respondents might have felt it necessary to put on a masquerade in order to protect their 
interests.  Although this kind of bias undoubtedly influenced the reliability of the data, 
the respondents’ tendency to provide ‘correct’ answers also encouraged the researcher to 
carefully investigate the reasons that could underlie such reticence through other sources 
of evidence (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 265). In this particular case, this meant that sensitive 
subjects such as for instance allegations of mistreatment mentioned by respondents were 
addressed and verified in interviews conducted with other types of respondents.
 
2.5 Research Ethics
Social researchers cannot permit themselves to focus solely on the quality of the knowledge 
they produce. They must also be aware of the ethical issues that are involved in doing 
social research in order to be able to make informed decisions about the implications 
such a way that both the researcher and outside parties can retrieve the raw material at any 
other time. With regard to the chain of evidence, the researcher has also strived to create 
transparency about the evidentiary process by explicating the circumstances under which 
the evidence was collected. 
Although contributing to the quality of the research, these measures, however, cannot 
guarantee airtight evidence because qualitative research inherently involves some degree of 
subjectivity in both the respondents’ experiences and opinions as well as the researcher’s 
(theoretical) interpretation of these (re)presentations. A situation in which such a 
predisposition or even bias surfaced can be illustrated by the following ‘clash of civilizations’ 
which happened during a jointly conducted interview with a local interpreter:
 
“A disturbing silence falls when Saber is asked if he has heard about the Dutch hearts and 
minds approach. After some moments, the co-interviewer reformulates the question by as-
king how Dutch soldiers could win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  Again, Saber 
remains silent but ultimately he responds by stating that the Dutch, as well as the Americans, 
Canadians and all the other coalition forces that have come to Afghanistan, cannot win the 
hearts and minds of the local people. He can’t, however, tell us why they cannot do so.  When 
trying to verify whether he doesn’t know the reason or doesn’t want to share his opinion on 
this matter, the winter’s cold within the tent suddenly threatens to turn into an icy chill.  ‘It’s 
a secret only I know and that’s why I don’t want to tell you.’ Saber says defiantly.  Changing 
tactics, the co-interviewer introduces a new topic only to address the hearts and minds issue 
moments later. ‘When the Dutch soldiers respect the local people’, the co-interviewer sug-
gests, ‘they are winning the hearts and minds in a small way.’ Saber responds wearily that 
such an attempt would amount to almost nothing because the Afghan people are Muslim and 
would therefore still perceive the ‘guys as kafirs’.”
Researchers within the field can be regarded as ‘outsiders’ who inadvertently could create 
social behavior in respondents that would not have occurred otherwise. In this particular 
case, the researcher for instance could be perceived by the respondent as a civilian and not a 
soldier, a Westerner and not an Afghani, a female and not a male. Aspects of status, ethnicity, 
religion and gender that each in itself, let alone all together, could influence the ‘chemistry’ 
with the respondent as is evident in the above-mentioned incident. This artificial effect of 
the researcher-respondent relationship could, when not detected in an early stage, lead to 
biased observations and inferences (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 265). Despite its potential 
negative influence, the researcher-respondent effect could, however, also refer to other 
issues that need to be addressed or more thoroughly investigated. The strong reaction of the 
respondent towards the insistent inquiry of the hearts and minds approach for instance could 
also be interpreted as a dislike of Western values. In that light, the incident also contained a 
significant paradox which makes clear that the military, in their effort to win the hearts and 
minds of the local population, has still a long way to go if they cannot understand the hearts 
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true in case of the interpreters, who due to the nature of their work, already were prone 
to become the victim of violence. People were invited to participate voluntarily in the 
research and those respondents who actually did participate did so by giving their verbal 
consent. Prior to the start of each interview, the researcher assured that respondents were 
free to stop the interview at any given time and without any explanation. Furthermore, the 
researcher took measures to uphold the confidentiality and anonymity of participants by not 
mentioning their names or using fictitious names and by omitting or slightly altering details 
in the analysis to prevent identification (Bryman, 2016, 132-133; Miles & Huberman, 292-293). 
Having discussed the methodological and ethical approach of this study, we can now 
proceed with the analysis of the first aspect of allocation.
3. Allocation 
In the previous chapter the term allocation was used to describe the oftentimes unexpected 
and unconventional ways in which the job of interpreter was assigned to individuals. A 
similar pattern of allocation can also be discerned in the way most respondents of this study 
either became an interpreter or had to cooperate with one. The element of unexpectedness 
or rather unforeseen circumstances never being far away. Before delving further into this 
aspect, however, it is helpful to first explain something more about the historical background 
of Afghanistan to put some of the findings of this study in context and perspective.
For more than three decades and up until 2013 Afghanistan was the largest refugee-
producing country in the world (Anonymous, 2013). During this period of time millions of 
Afghan people were forced to leave their homeland due to a history of ongoing war, violence 
and socio-political insecurity (Tober, 2007, 133). Currently, Afghans are the second largest 
refugee population after Syrian refugees. Most of the Afghan refugees have migrated to Iran 
and Pakistan but a considerate amount has also fled to Western countries. The term ‘refugee’ 
is defined by the United Nations international law as a person who is outside the country 
of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of a 
‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group, or political opinion’ (UNHCR, 2010, 14). The definition makes 
clear that refugees are driven by a fear that forces them ‘to take tremendous risks to escape 
the discomfort of localized existence’ (Bauman, 1998, 2). While refugees in that regard each 
have their own authentic and personal (his)story, the immense exile of Afghan refugees 
nevertheless can be understood as both the collective story of a displaced people as well as 
the testimony of a shattered country.   
The forced migration of the Afghan people was caused by several historical 
conditions which took place in four different periods of time that started from the late 
1970’s and continued into the new millennium (Schmeidl, 2002, 10; Smith, 2009, 60). 
The first group of refugees left Afghanistan following the intervention of the Soviet 
of the rightness or wrongness of their actions (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 288; Bryman, 
2016, 123). Although some of the ethical issues already have been implicitly mentioned, 
it is nevertheless important to describe how the principles of honesty, scrupulousness, 
transparency, independence and responsibility have been accounted for in this particular 
study (Committee for the Revision of the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity, 
2018, 13-14).       
With regard to the first principle of honesty, the researcher has always been open to 
the respondents about the true nature of the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 292; Bryman, 
2016, 133). It was clear to all stakeholders and participants that the researcher’s interest 
involved the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters during military operations. The 
researcher always made her presence and intentions clear whenever she observed meetings 
and or conversations. Furthermore, the researcher made sure to inform respondents about 
the explorative and descriptive nature of the case study as well as the scope of the topic list. 
In order to illustrate the complexity of the theoretical framework, the researcher moreover 
tried to give voice to alternative or even contradictive opinions in the hope to achieve an 
honest and balanced report of the investigated aspects.
When it comes to the second principle of scrupulousness, the researcher has taken the 
utmost care to design, undertake and report the research according to the standards for 
good research practices. This means among other things that the researcher has conducted 
research with scholarly and societal relevance, has justified the research method of a case 
study and has taken the latest scholarly insights about the subject matter into account 
(Committee for the Revision of the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity, 2018, 
13, 16). 
The third principle of transparency has been covered by the researcher through a clear 
description of how the data was gathered (purposive sampling, semi-structured interviews), 
documented (audio-archives, transcripts and handwritten notebooks) and processed 
(matrices, database and analysis).  These sources of information are, with due regard for 
the privacy and confidentiality of the respondents, accessible for peer-examination. The 
researcher has also tried to elucidate the qualitative research process by referring to the 
applied theoretical framework and by explaining how results were achieved and analyzed 
through a stepwise coding process. 
With regard to the fourth principle of independence, the researcher has made sure that 
the choice of research method and data analysis was not determined by non-scientific or 
non-scholarly interests and preferences (Committee for the Revision of the Netherlands 
Code of Conduct for Research Integrity, 2018, 17). For that purpose, the researcher regularly 
consulted with her supervisors and peers in order to see to it that the research was conducted 
honestly and accurately. 
The final principle of responsibility was taken to heart because the researcher was very 
aware of the sensitivity of the military operations and the harm that could be done to the 
participants when the gathered information was not treated carefully. This was all the more 
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granted refugee status in the host country (Van Houte & Davids, 2014, 78). Despite their 
level of education, this group of Afghan refugees nevertheless often had to wait for years in 
immigration reception centres before they finally received clarity about their official refugee 
status as an asylum seeker. This period of uncertainty and the experience of identity confusion 
determined the integration process of the Afghan refugees in general (Rostami-Povey, 2007, 
246) and the background of the respondents among the group of national interpreters that 
have been interviewed for this research in particular. Conditions that undoubtedly, as this 
study will demonstrate, influenced their choice to become an interpreter. In a more or less 
similar situation, this also applies to the local interpreters who experienced the uncertainty 
of living in a conflict zone. These harsh conditions affected their livelihood which stimulated 
them to explore other and less familiar pathways to employment.  
3.1 Employment: A Matter of Survival and Sustenance
Whereas various value systems today are competing with each other in Afghanistan, the 
values, norms, customs and habits of the ideal of the Pashtunwali, still presents an attractive 
guiding principle for the honourable behaviour of both individuals and social groups in 
everyday life as well as in exceptional situations (Rzehak, 2011, 1, 21). Individual honour, 
pride that comes from self-reliance, and the fulfilment of family obligations are some of 
the shared cultural values which are part of the ‘Pashtun way of life’ (Hatch Dupree, 2002, 
978). Employment in that respect is considered to be an important virtue within Afghan 
culture and most Afghan refugees, more specific those of Pashtun descent, therefore strive 
to continue their profession in their host country. Despite their ambition such job prospects, 
however, were not always attainable for the Afghan refugees because the degrees and skills 
acquired in their home country often did not meet the standards and needs of the Western 
labour market. In most cases their credentials, therefore, were not recognized as formal 
degrees by employers (Hessels, 2004, 50; Drever & Hoffmeister, 2008, 432). Research on 
the employment experience of refugees in the Netherlands, in this instance, showed that 
the time spent in reception centres furthermore impeded the refugees’ opportunities of 
employment as this prevented them from gaining human capital such as post-migration 
education, work experience and language proficiency. Skills that could improve the chances 
of economic integration (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010, 398). 
Like most of the Afghan immigrants that belonged to the middle class, the respondents of 
this study therefore faced the loss of status as they often remained unemployed or occupied 
lower status positions (Rostami-Povey, 2007, 251). Disappointed but not defeated by these 
grim perspectives, the respondents sought other and more unexpected venues to pursue a 
career as the following quote of NI 1 illustrates:
Army in 1979 to support the new secular regime that was installed after the Saur Revolution 
the year before. When Middle Eastern countries, the United States and China in reaction 
began to arm and support the Afghan resistance (mujahedin) in the early 1980’s the flow of 
refugees increased into an unprecedented stream of nearly four million Afghan migrants. 
The second group of refugees left Afghanistan when the Soviet soldiers had withdrawn from 
the country. The Afghan war, however, wasn’t over as from the early 1990’s on various rival 
resistance factions engaged in a devastating power struggle that caused the internal security 
of the country to deteriorate further. The third group of refugees fled the country in 1996 
when the Taliban gained control over the majority of Afghanistan. The civil war dragged on 
as resistance factions joined together in the United Front to fight the Taliban rule. The war 
intensified when UN sanctions failed to undermine the Taliban regime. Instead of breaking 
the Taliban rule, the UN peace efforts contributed to a continuation of the war and a further 
radicalisation of the Taliban. The fourth group of refugees left Afghanistan in 2001 after the 
9/11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent US led invasion to eliminate the al-
Qaida terrorist network. Although their number fluctuated over the years due to a recovering 
but still instable political climate, the stream of Afghan refugees hasn’t ceased ever since 
(Jennissen, 2012; Hessels, 2004). Their amount, on the contrary, seems to have increased 
after the end of the ISAF campaign in 2014 which triggered a renewed surge of violence.
The constant flow of Afghan refugees denotes both the security dilemma of the country 
as well as the enormous number of Afghans who had to reconstruct their identity in host 
nations. The millions of people who fled war torn Afghanistan, after all, not only left behind 
their home, family and belongings in search of safety and a better life, the trauma of uprooting 
themselves also compelled the Afghan refugees to rebuild their lives in other and often 
more developed countries different from their homeland. The resettlement and adjustment 
process of refugees, therefore often is affected by the memories of the (traumatic) events 
that caused their migration as well as the social, cultural, political, religious, economic and 
linguistic challenges they faced in the new society (Smith, 2009, 61). In between worlds, 
the Afghan migrants therefore often have found themselves in a continuous and complex 
struggle to maintain their cultural identity on the one hand and the integration to the 
host country on the other hand (Tober, 2007, 134; Hessels, 2004, 51). As will be illustrated 
throughout this chapter, this particular struggle in a sense also manifested itself in the work 
of the interpreter because respondents had to ‘navigate’ between parties that belonged to 
different cultural backgrounds. 
Most of the national interpreters who were involved in this study were part of the third 
stream of refugees which fled Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. They also belonged 
to the biggest group of Afghans that have migrated to the Netherlands in the mid-1990’s 
(Hessels, 2004, 51). It was the so-called Afghan elite that was able to leave the country at 
an early stage of the conflict and it was because of their high profile that they were often 
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1973, 1371). Precisely because these weak ties move in different circles, they are able to bridge 
different networks, sectors and labour markets (Matthews, Pendakur & Young, 2009, 325). 
Granovetter has called this phenomenon the ‘strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter, 2005, 34).
In light of this research, the data has demonstrated that social structures indeed positively 
contributed to the employment of the respondents. While the initial steps of the acquisition 
of interpreters were established through more formal and impersonal means, the Ministry 
of Defense also has been apt to exploit social structures as a source of recruitment to address 
the immediate need for national interpreters as the following quote by respondent NI 4 
illustrates. 
 
“At some point I read something about interpreters in a brochure of FAVON and around the 
same time a friend showed me an advert in a newspaper. The Ministry of Defense was looking 
for national interpreters. I made a phone call and was invited for an interview.”
Another example of the importance of, in this case, local networks is given by respondent NI 
8 who travelled to Afghanistan and by chance got recruited by Dutch troops.
 
“In 2005 I made a road trip from the Netherlands to Kabul. I come from the north of Baghlan 
and at the time there were Dutch soldiers in the area. There were a couple of schools, one 
school for girls and two for boys, that needed support.  I asked the principals if they wanted 
me to interpret for them. I told them that I could make arrangements and that the rest was up 
to them. I made appointments with the soldiers and I brought the people, a female teacher 
and the other two principals, to the PRT house in Pol-e-Khomri. That´s how I met with the 
military organization. I had some brief conversations with the soldiers and they asked me to 
come and work for them. I spoke with major D. and he told me how and where I could apply.” 
Respondent NI 8 was connected to both the Dutch soldiers as well as the Afghan school 
principals. These connections gave him the opportunity to act as a broker and trade on gaps in 
social structures (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 141). He positioned himself as an intermediary between 
the two disconnected stakeholders and used his ties to broker the flow of information 
between these different parties (Obstfeld, 2005, 102-103). By bridging the structural hole 
between the Afghan principals and Dutch military, the respondent not only contributed 
to the establishment of interethnic contacts and hence an exchange of resources, these 
crosscutting ties in turn also enabled him to widen his own network and benefit from the 
resources this generated (Lancee, 2010, 207).  His mediation, after all, resulted in a position 
as a national interpreter for the Dutch troops. 
Social networks not only proved to be pivotal for respondents among the national 
interpreters, local interpreters also used the resources of their social capital to increase their 
chances of deployment. All of the respondents, apart from LI 4 who coincidentally met an 
interpreter in Kandahar who referred him to the International Management Services (IMS), 
“I had some experience with interpreting. I acted as an interpreter at the immigration recep-
tion center and every now and then I accompanied people who needed to see a doctor. My 
friends told me that the Ministry of Defense was looking for interpreters. I was unemployed 
so I decided to apply for the job. I called and was invited for an interview. They took some 
tests and I was screened.” 
In search for a living another respondent NI 6 relates in an almost similar voice the following: 
 
“In the past I worked voluntarily as an interpreter at an immigration reception centre and 
for a law firm. It was at a meeting of the Federation of Afghan Refugee Organizations in the 
Netherlands (FAVON), however, that an acquaintance, who worked as an interpreter for the 
Ministry of Justice himself, told me that the Ministry of Defense was looking for interpreters. I 
applied because I was unemployed and in need of a job. Before I was taken on by the military 
organization, I was thoroughly screened. That procedure took about three to four months. It 
was understandable and logical that these precautions needed to take place. After all, it’s a 
precarious job.” 
The resemblance between these quotes is significant. Both respondents, as did some of the 
other respondents, volunteered as interpreters in reception centers. The similarities in their 
stories become even more substantial when we look at how the respondents found their job 
as an interpreter. Except for one respondent who used a more formal means of application by 
responding to an advert in a newspaper, all of the respondents among the group of national 
interpreters acquired their jobs through their social network. Each of them was informed 
through resources in their network about the possibility to become an interpreter for the 
Dutch Military of Defense. The employment of the respondents, therefore, was a direct 
consequence of the information passed on by friends, family, acquaintances, or contacts 
within Afghan community groups. 
The job seeking process of the respondents confirms that social capital (the mutual 
relations, interactions and networks that emerge among human groups) has a strong 
impact on economic outcome (Matthews, Pendakur & Young, 2009, 306). Sociologist Mark 
Granovetter has established that social structures and more specifically personal networks 
(social ties) are very important in job-finding. The strength of a social tie is characterized 
by a combination of the amount of time, intimacy and reciprocal services shared between 
persons (Granovetter, 1973, 1361). The stronger the ties between the members, the more 
likely the sharing and exchange of resources among insiders. A bonding social network, 
more in particular, is characterized by strong ties, solidarity and primary contacts between 
the members of the network (Kanas, Chiswick & Van der Lippe, 2012, 681). While close ties 
thus might be more motivated in helping with job information, Granovetter on the other 
hand also states that weak ties (infrequent connections) have access to different and new 
information which makes them better sources when it comes to finding a job (Granovetter, 
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Before concluding this subparagraph, we have yet to touch upon another resemblance 
between the interpreters. Both national and local interpreters experienced economic 
difficulty. That condition drew them to an unfamiliar profession which allowed them to earn 
a living and to support their families (Fitchett, 2012, 177). The difference in the circumstances 
of the local interpreters, however, is that their path to employment took place in a war-torn 
country which complicated the situation of local interpreters considerably. Motives for the 
interpreters’ employment and the consequences these implicated, will be addressed later on 
in this chapter. 
3.2 Interpreters: Scarce Resources, Tricky Business    
Although the initial steps on the labour market were enabled through the support of their 
social network, the actual recruitment of the local interpreters by the Dutch army was 
organized by an agency called IMS. All of the respondents in this respect claimed to have 
followed the same route towards their new position, respectively a (mediated) visit to KAF, 
an interview at IMS, a job interview and screening conducted by the Dutch military and 
subsequent deployment to Tarin Kowt. Once at the camp, the local interpreters were allocated 
to certain units by the quartermaster, the military official in charge of the task assignment 
of the interpreters. The fact that the Dutch troops depended on IMS for the recruitment of 
linguists implied that the local interpreters were operating amidst the military organization 
while not being employed by them. This discrepancy caused the responsibility for the local 
interpreters to shift and become blurred (Fitchett, 2012, 178).  Control over the policy and 
practice of IMS concerning the operational activity and well-being of interpreters was 
difficult to exercise as respondent M 17 rather vividly explains: 
 
“That agency was a nail in my coffin. I couldn’t do business with them. (…) My interpreters told 
me in confidence that they only paid out half of their days off and that they were forced to 
work for other coalition partners while they were on leave. (…) The agency duped my people 
at the shop floor and did not once meet my requirements during my period of deployment. As 
a consequence, some of the local interpreters did not return to the base after their leave. (…) 
The Dutch military organization always felt obliged to keep their part of the agreement even 
though the other party didn’t stick to theirs.”
The example illustrates that the cooperation between the military and its local interpreters 
can be obstructed by the very agency that conducts the selection and hiring of linguistic 
personnel in the mission area and that partnerships established by contractual planning 
do not necessarily guarantee a satisfactory, stable and fair cooperation between the 
organizations (Bogers, Van Dijk en Heeren-Bogers, 2010, 168). Scarce resources of interpreters 
being the reality, however, the military organization had to deal with the vagrancies of the 
have found their job through the support of family and friends. Respondent LI 1 in this 
respect explains:
 
“Well, there was my friend in Kandahar Airport. He was working with me in this organization 
and after that he was working for the Canadians. He called me and said ‘If you want to work 
there’s a name of a company in Kandahar Airport’. IMS is the interpreter’s company. When I go 
there, he arranged an interview for me. I was passed in that interview. The second interview 
was in Kandahar Airport also and there was also a screening. So, I was passed in the screening 
and they already send me here to Tarin Kowt.”
Respondent LI 8 subsequently demonstrates exactly how strong the ties of these bonding 
networks can be: 
 
“Respondent LI 2, you already had an interview with him, he’s my cousin. He was an interpre-
ter in KAF with the Dutch army. So, he asked me, I was jobless at the time, ‘If you want to have 
a job especially as an interpreter, if you want to work, you can come with me’. So, he took me 
to KAF and I had an interview with the Dutch army, with a Dutch officer. So, fortunately I go on 
interview and I pass and I get this job.”
At first it seems rather striking to notice that among the relatively small group of eight 
respondents of the Operating Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), a total of four persons 
found their job through their friends.  Two other respondents, moreover, relied on the 
resources of their family to obtain their position. This observation of social brokering, 
however, can easily be understood from the perspective of the structure of Afghan society in 
which kin-based solidarity groups (qawms) (re)distribute resources (Kitzen, 2016a, 344). This 
cultural phenomenon therefore is a local rendition of the theory of bonding social capital 
as described in the exploration of the job seeking experience of the national interpreters. 
The qawm, perhaps the strongest amongst ties within Afghan culture, as such proves to be 
the ‘core bonding social capital’ that even allows members in the periphery to count on the 
leverage of the shared values of trust and solidarity (Monsutti, 2004, 225). This is illustrated 
by the following quote of respondent LI 5:
 
“My classmate who was with the American SF called me, he informed me: ‘If you wanted to 
find a job for you to support your family, in Kandahar is a company its name is IMS’. After I 
come here I got an interview for the Dutch soldiers, they gave an interview and after I inter-
viewed in 11 September I get the job.” 
The quotes demonstrate that the respondents, in line with Granovetter’s theory, used both 
their strong and weak ties as resources for finding a new job. 
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more professional enterprise which was incorporated by IMS and transformed into a clever 
business model over time. The downside of this development, however, was as mentioned 
before the dependency of the supply of local interpreters by this monopolistic powerholder.
As soon as IMS had allocated the local interpreters to the task force, they came as 
mentioned earlier under the supervision of the quartermasters in Tarin Kowt or Deh Rawod. 
The quartermasters assigned the interpreters to specific units and tasks. Whereas almost 
all of the respondents among the soldiers indicated that they had preferences for certain 
local interpreters, the quartermaster did not always take such requests into consideration. 
Sometimes these refusals were a consequence of a lack of flexibility in the person of the 
quartermaster but most often it was caused by the scarcity of the local interpreters. Some of 
the interviewed soldiers, however, were not prepared to let go of their preferences so easily. 
They found ways to circumvent the policy of the distribution of resources in order to claim 
the interpreter who had proven his worth in the cooperation and who as such matched their 
interests best. Respondent M 29 says in this instance:
  
“I have my preferences. They’re based on the English language proficiency of the local inter-
preter and the number of instructions he needs to do his job. You don’t want an interpreter 
who speaks poorly and is incomprehensible. You need to get hold of information fast. That’s 
why it’s important to work with the same interpreter. In that way, you know what his (in)capa-
bilities are and he knows how you like things to be done. If we have a competent interpreter, 
we don’t wait and see but pull him out of his tent directly by ourselves. That works the most 
efficient for us.” 
The quote illustrates that soldiers in this study valued the individual competence of the local 
interpreter most and that whenever they were in the position or had the chance to choose (or 
claim) an interpreter of preference, this was based on the language proficiency, knowledge 
and personality of the interpreters. These employable skills can be described as human 
capital that determined the standing of the interpreters in the eyes of the troops (De Vroome 
& Van Tubergen, 2010, 377). Some local interpreters were aware of this mechanism and tried 
to increase their market value by improving their English language proficiency in their spare 
time by reading English books and watching movies.
The reputation of competent interpreters did not remain unnoticed by the military 
organization and often resulted in a transfer to different units with more complicated 
tasks but also better working conditions. Such a ‘promotion’ for example could consist of 
a transfer from the BG or OMLT to the PRT which obviously diminished the risks of the job 
considerably. Interpreters, in other words were assigned different assignments according to 
their level of language skills. This process of allocation seems to be a recurring phenomenon 
within the Dutch military. In the Bosnian conflict for instance social patrols were reserved 
for interpreters with the least developed skills while the more advanced and experienced 
interpreters assisted liaison officers, civil military cooperation officers and the commanding 
IMS nonetheless. Some quartermasters understandably were able to cope with that more 
easily than others. Dependence on a recruitment agency with such monopoly did not 
exist at the beginning of the Dutch Mission. During the Deployment Task Force (DTF) and 
first rotation of the TFU, the Dutch military on the one hand called upon the assistance of 
interpreters working for the U.S. and Canadian coalition forces and on the other explored 
opportunities to enrol local persons who could fulfil the role of interpreter. These individuals 
were recruited amongst the population or were drawn from local staff that was already 
working on the camp for example as security guards. The necessity to make ends meet in 
order to address the need for interpreters, is illustrated respectively by respondents M 1 and 
M 12 who worked for the DTF and the first rotation:
 
“During the pre-planning of the DTF we did not have our own interpreters. When we wanted 
to get in touch with local officials, we, out of sheer necessity, had to use the interpreters of our 
American and Canadian coalition partners. Without them communication simply was impos-
sible because we did not possess sufficient language skills. They were of great assistance to 
us and were excellent advisors as well. They introduced us to local contractors and companies 
who could provide for the rental of building machines, the use of the concrete mixing plant, 
the purchase of market products and the hiring of workmen. They even helped us out with the 
recruitment of local interpreters.”
“There were situations in which our interpreters were so low in number that we had to call 
upon the Afghan Security Guard (ASG). A couple of them could speak a bit of English. So, we 
sometimes took them with us out of necessity. You really can’t do anything without an inter-
preter. Well, except maybe when you are writing reports on the compound but as soon as you 
leave the gate interpreters are crucial. Most often civilians will try to approach you and then 
it’s a real pity when you have to give them no for an answer because you cannot understand 
them. The interpreter was also important during the HOTO. Not only because I had to take 
my successor across the area of operations to show him important features of the terrain but 
more importantly because I had to handover the acquired contacts. The first, you could per-
haps try and do without an interpreter because that’s focused on getting to know the area but 
when you want to introduce your successor to key players, the importance of the interpreter 
is undebatable.”
The experiences described by the officers correspond with the image of the DTF and first 
TFU rotation as a pioneering phase in which the Dutch soldiers not only had to adapt to the 
operational environment but also to the specific tasks as well as the scale of the mission. 
With approximately 1200 to 1400 troops, the Dutch mission was of an unprecedented size 
and by far the biggest deployment of the modern Dutch military (Kitzen, 2016b, 218).  Along 
with the success of addressing these challenges, came the organization of the recruitment 
and deployment of interpreters. From a provisional activity, it gradually evolved into a 
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To conclude this paragraph, one could state that the aspect of allocation is centered 
on scarcity. It involves both a lack of suitable jobs (for Afghan migrants and local Afghans) 
in which the importance of bonding social capital eventually provided in the need for 
employment as well as a lack of linguistic resources in which human capital proved to be 
the determinant factor for interpreters in making headway within the military organization. 
While the profession of interpreting in this study was in most cases a matter of chance, the job 
itself was one of purpose and necessity as the second aspect of motivation will demonstrate. 
4. Motivation: When the Going Gets Rough, the Tough Get Going
After World War II three landmark studies by respectively Marshall, Stouffer, and Shils & 
Janowitz have explained that not moral reason but small-group psychology determines 
combat motivation. (Wessely, 2006, 275) Instead of the traditional motives as patriotism, 
religion, and ideology, they introduced the primary group as a key factor for motivation. 
‘Soldiers fight because they have been trained to fight and failure to do so endangers not 
only their own lives but also the people immediately around them with whom they have 
formed powerful bonds’ (Wessely, 2006, 275-76). These doctrines continue to be relevant 
for Western professional militaries because in a non-ideological age military organization 
simply can’t recruit, train and sustain a professional army on ideology alone. A recent study 
among the U.S. army in this light has shown that soldiers have plenty of reasons to join. 
Their choice to enlist is influenced by institutional factors such as for example family and 
duty and occupational factors such as professional development and job stability of which 
the latter also incorporates a rather simple motive namely money (Helmus, Zimmerman and 
Posard et al, 2018, 26-27). Yet, the study also shows that after some time in active service, 
soldiers report that ‘peer bonds and camaraderie represent the best elements of their unit 
life’ (Helmus, Zimmerman and Posard et al, 2018, 120).
A survey among Dutch soldiers during the Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR) confirms 
the abovementioned findings that soldiers have various motives for participating in a 
mission. During the mission itself, however, combat readiness was determined as the most 
predominant motive (Van den Berg, Soeters and Dechesne, 2006, 315). It is precisely this 
preparedness to face crisis or engage in combat with the primary group, that characterized 
the deployment experience of the respondents of this particular study. The soldiers in this 
regard discovered that their readiness to operate in the murky operational environment of 
Uruzgan, was compromised by the fact that they didn’t command the language and cultural 
customs of the local population. In order to explore the mission area and interact with the 
local population, the soldiers had to depend upon the linguistic and cultural intervention of 
national and local interpreters (Bogers, Van Dijk and Heeren-Bogers, 2010, 166). This explains 
the rather instrumental approach of soldiers towards the cooperation with interpreters as 
reflected in the quote of respondent M 10: 
officers (Bos & Soeters, 2006, 263-264; Ruiz Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017, 186). Apart from 
safety, the interpreters experienced other positive effects as a result of their specific human 
capital. This also included their status within the informal hierarchy of their peers which will 
be further addressed in this chapter when the position of interpreters within the military 
organization is discussed. Whereas the upward move was an all-round improvement of 
the interpreters’ condition, the soldiers who had cooperated with these capable local 
interpreters, however, experienced their departure as a loss for the unit. They reluctantly 
accepted this ‘brain drain’ as a fait accompli since all of the local interpreters started at the 
bottom of the ladder. Respondent M 41 said the following about this matter:
 
“The rookies start at the combat units and the consequence of that is that it takes ages before 
instructions are understood. The ANA unit doesn’t do what they’re told to do because of the 
bad translation of the interpreter. This can cost lives. There was a situation in an open field in 
which I told my men to ‘deploy’ so that they didn’t form an easy target. Both the interpreter 
as well as the Afghan commander didn’t know what that instruction meant. I couldn’t even 
explain it to them with the use of hand gestures. The unit walked in a straight line through 
the field. It was very dangerous. (…) Another time I was angry with the interpreter because 
he didn’t translate what I asked him to. The interpreter, however, didn’t get that I was mad at 
him and started to yell, like I had just done, to the ANA soldiers. I had to stop him and explain 
to him that my frustration was directed at him and not the soldiers. (…) All the good interpre-
ters eventually move on to the staff and the PRT. It should be the other way around. Rookies 
should start with the staff and should be transferred to the BG when they’re experienced. In 
that way, you don’t have to waste your time on the interpreter but instead you can invest your 
energy in the competence, or rather the incompetence, of the Afghan commander.”
Ideally, the local interpreters employed by the military ‘possess sufficient cross-cultural 
competence and language skills to facilitate effective communication and relationship 
building’ between the soldiers and the Afghan counterparts (Hajjar, 2017, 94). Reality, however, 
demonstrates that newly hired interpreters were hardly equipped to cooperate efficiently 
with soldiers. Most interpreters were recruited because they knew the local language and the 
language of the foreign army and not because they had professional experience or received 
a formal training as interpreters in these languages. Assumably, interpreters therefore 
often might not have acquired the necessary skills to interpret adequately in conflict zones 
beforehand (Ruiz Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017, 183). In that light, the quotes of respondents 
M29 and M41 not only demonstrate the vital need for competent interpreters who are able 
to assist the military in their effort to control operations, they also illustrate that the gap 
between demand and supply of ‘competent interpreters’ creates a grey area in which soldiers 
find inventive and sometimes even controversial ways to ‘allocate’ the (proven) linguistic 
resources to themselves.
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“I know that ISAF is doing a lot for the population, for the Afghani people which is obviously 
me as well. So, I want to support ISAF as much as I can to help them rebuild my country. To 
make my population stand back on their feet. They are giving the security, support, every-
thing and I want to join my part in the responsibility for it.” 
The quotes of the respondents refer to the process of reciprocity, a form of prosocial behavior 
that obligates persons to repay gifts, favors, and services that have been performed for them 
(Goldstein, Griskevicius and Cialdini, 2011, 441-442). Reciprocity, therefore, can be discerned 
as the other pivotal principle that legitimizes the respondents’ decision to (co)operate along 
soldiers in hazardous areas. For over a century, reciprocity has been described by sociologists 
as a defining feature of social exchange and social life. Simmel in this respect has stated 
that social balance and social cohesion cannot exist without ‘the reciprocity of service 
and return service’ (Molm, 2010, 119). The norm of reciprocity, therefore, can be described 
as the evolutionary basis for cooperation in society in general and as a central catalyst for 
organizational cooperation in particular.
The critical factors that determine the extent to which people feel personally obligated 
to reciprocate are the relationship between the benefactor and the beneficiary and the belief 
of the latter in how much they have benefitted from the favor (Goldstein, Griskevicius and 
Cialdini, 2011, 442). In this case, almost all of the interviewed national interpreters wanted to 
do something in return for the Netherlands. Theoretically understood, this could be out of a 
sense of indebtedness that was created by the benefits (for example asylum and citizenship) 
that had been received in the past and that had directly contributed to their welfare (for 
example safety and housing) (Goldstein, Griskevicius and Cialdini, 2011, 442). By joining the 
mission, the respondents could reciprocate the host country through fulfilling the need for 
linguistic personnel as experienced by the MoD. The implication of this unique and perfect 
return service of the respondents is that they changed roles from beneficiary to benefactor. 
As interpreters, they now possessed resources desired by the military and that change of 
position (and power) in fact inherently created an obligation for others to reciprocate. This 
process is illustrated by the experience of respondent M 11: 
 
“There was a desperate shortage of competent interpreters and the PRT really relied on them. 
(…) I had two interpreters who worked in shifts for me. Each had their own specific qualities 
but I needed both of them otherwise I would have completely worn them out. It’s such a 
demanding job for which they hardly receive the acknowledgement they deserve but I highly 
appreciated them. (…) I remember a situation at night in which combat took place. We had to 
ask the governor to send assistance and it was the interpreter who tried to build bridges bet-
ween me and his people. That was admirable. These interpreters have left everything behind 
and are now prepared to return to the country they have fled. I am not making saints of them, 
they have their ‘businesses on the side’, but these people have fire in them. Their attitude is 
one of ‘Get up and go!’.”
 
“Interpreters are an essential part of your operation. We also considered it an ‘abort criterion’ 
if you didn’t have an interpreter. I mean, if you don’t have an interpreter with you, you’re 
practically blind in the area. You could of course say: ‘We are going to an area where we don’t 
necessarily have to talk, so we don’t need an interpreter’ but if you happen to run into a situa-
tion on the way in which you simply have to make contact with the local people and you don’t 
have one, well then you’re blind. You will not only be unable to get information from the local 
people but you won’t be able to get your own message across to them either. Especially when 
your new to an area that’s of vital importance.”  
The quote, which is illustrative for the approach of a majority of the respondents, 
demonstrates that the soldiers had predominantly rational motives to cooperate with 
interpreters. They simply needed their assistance in order to work as an effective unit and to 
achieve their goals in the operational environment. This exploration and explanation of the 
soldier’s motives for enlistment and deployment, also raises the question what motivates 
interpreters to work in the frontline of conflict. Contrary to the soldiers who have been 
thoroughly trained, the interpreters in war zones are rarely professionals (Fitchett, 2012, 
177). What made them decide to take up this dangerous task and work for the military? One 
factor has already been addressed in the paragraph of allocation and consists of the need 
for employment. This occupational and more specifically economic motive is a factor that 
the national as well as local interpreters, according to the insights of the aforementioned 
survey, seem to have in common with the soldiers. The interviews, however, show that the 
interpreters have another motive that is equally (or even more) important for their decision 
to join the military as the following respondents NI 5 and NI 7 indicate:
 
“Before I became an interpreter, I had jobs that did not suit my education. I was looking for 
something that fitted my profile and my experience as a former Russian army officer. I also 
wanted to do something good for the Netherlands as well as Afghanistan. I want to build a 
bridge between the countries. And not unimportantly, the job pays well.”
“I wanted to become an interpreter because I wanted to do something for my native country. 
I wanted to help but I also wanted to do something in return for the Netherlands because I am 
a Dutchman now.”
The motives shared by the national interpreters don’t differ much from the answers given by 
the local interpreters, as respondents LI 4 and LI 3 illustrate:
 
“ISAF wants to rebuild this country for us and I want to satisfy this country. I am working with 
them jointly to rebuild this country and I want to get money too.”
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“It’s a dangerous job. In Kandahar Airport the guy already said to me in interview: ‘Maybe you 
will lose your body member, maybe you die.’ I said: ‘No problem.’ That’s what he already told 
the first time to me. He wanted me to disturb, he said: ‘We have this kind of job. And this is 
your choice. If you want yes you can join with us but if you don’t…’ But also I had a mission in 
Deh Rawod (DR), really bad there, because I lost my two friends in Dutch Army, also he already 
gave to me a watch. That’s what he gave to me before we went into a qalah and absolute he 
said: ‘LI 1 [first name], I want to give something to you.’ I said yes. He gave it to me on the night 
I lost him. When he died he said: ‘You are true to me, take this watch.’ I said: ‘I don’t have a 
watch.’ He said: ‘Maybe you can now know what time it is.’, and in the evening I lost him. I 
already miss them, so I don’t want to see any more of this kind happen.”
Although such (deeply) shared commitment and trust evidently stimulates the motivation 
for cooperation, data has also shown that the norm of reciprocity wasn’t always followed by 
the military. Favors, in this matter could also be taken for granted by beneficiaries. Social 
arrangements that make great demands on one’s individual time, loyalty and energy are 
known in sociology as greedy institutions (Soeters, 2018, 160). The social position of priests, 
soldiers and housewives are often mentioned as the classic examples of such institutions but 
the person of the interpreter might very well become a new epitome of this concept. Despite 
the importance of their presence for the mission, the anticipated return of their service 
often remained absent as the experiences of respectively respondents NI 2 and NI 7 illustrate:
 
“I have been on several missions and sometimes they asked me if I could stay longer because 
I was familiar with the situation. I told them that I had run out of proper clothes and that the 
food had been bad. Sometimes there’s pork and I am not allowed to eat that. How many days 
on end do I have to eat the same thing? During their deployment a lot of interpreters don’t 
exactly know what to do. They don’t have enough material because they simply just don’t 
know. Like the time when I needed a cover for my sleeping bag. I have mine only since the 
last two months. I have slept in soaking wet sleeping bags just because I didn’t have the right 
material. I wasn’t prepared. That usually is the case with interpreters because they simply 
don’t know. We’ve got most of the things but not everything. It usually takes a while before 
our gear is complete. I am waiting for safety glasses for about half a year now and I still haven’t 
got them even though I do IED searches.”
 “My boss said that I had a tough job but he doesn’t write that in his assessment. When I was 
ill, the doctor advised me to stay in bed for four days. My boss told me that the guys had to go 
on patrol and that they didn’t have an interpreter. I said: ‘Okay, going on patrol is important, 
so I’ll work’. I didn’t give any comment of course; our people are outside and that is what mat-
ters. I don’t know what the reason for the assessment is. I am not angry about it but the letter 
has disappointed me. I have done something positive over there, you know.”
The respondent’s return for the service of the national interpreter consisted of appreciation 
and admiration. Competence (understood as acknowledgement) is, together with relatedness 
and autonomy, one of the basic psychological needs that is necessary for optimal human 
development and integrity (Ryan & Deci, 2000, 68). Satisfaction of those needs, for example 
in the form of recognition received for one’s effort to help achieve organizational goals, as 
is the case in the abovementioned quote, therefore contributes to the enhancement of the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and hence self-determination of people (Gagné & Deci, 
2005, 337). The effect and influence of reciprocity on the individual and organizational level 
is furthermore illustrated by the experience and vision of respondent M 40:
 
“I already respected interpreters because they risk a lot for their profession. My local interpre-
ter Harry continued to do his job under all circumstances. We’ve been knee-deep in shit. Harry 
was on duty during the TIC in which my unit was involved and which had cost the lives of both 
Dutch soldiers and ANA soldiers. That was a dramatic event. Harry then more or less stood 
up as a leader to guide my men in how they should approach the ANA staff. He told them 
how they should pay their condolences and what was expected of them. He did that in an 
outstanding way. (… ) Harry trusts me because we look after him. We have to take good care 
of the interpreters. Make sure that their gear is in order, those sorts of things. We just need to 
pamper them a bit more. Only when you provide in the needs of the interpreter, you’ll be able 
to ask something in return. Information is motivation. See, cooperation improves when you 
acknowledge and respect people. The ANA soldiers and interpreters will then put more trust 
in you and that’s fundamental. That’s why I gave Harry my weapon at the time. He was the last 
in line and otherwise had to enter the house without cover.” 
Organizational cooperation runs smooth when the norm of reciprocity is carefully kept in 
balance. It brings people together through affective regard, bonds of trust, and solidarity 
(Molm, 2010, 123; Fiske, 2004, 23-24). The latter also explains why some soldiers were 
willing to give a weapon (sometimes even their own) to their interpreter. Whereas national 
interpreters were militarized and therefore authorized to carry a gun, local interpreters 
were not allowed to bear arms. Feelings of unity and harmony experienced in the mutually 
beneficial partnership, however, made some respondents ignore the rules and decide for 
themselves what was in the best interest for the interpreter and the unit. This experienced 
kinship between soldiers and the local interpreters is reminiscent of the key factor of 
small group psychology that motivates soldiers to join the army and demonstrates that 
the ‘buddy system’ that usually is generated during basic military training and boot camp 
could overcome cultural boundaries and include ‘others’ like the interpreter as well (Qirko, 
2013, 140-142). The development of bonds of trust and hence the feeling of being part of the 
smallest unit of action, seemed to be expedited and consolidated by the extreme duress and 
danger of the circumstances of the mission. Respondent LI 1 in this regard recalled of the 
following experience: 
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want to support the Dutch government. That’s my goal. What others might think of that is 
irrelevant.”
This respondent defied the accusations and threats that go hand in hand with his choice of 
profession on grounds of moral conviction and social identification (Skitka & Morgan, 2014, 
96; Fowler & Kam, 2007, 813). He took up the role of the interpreter as if it were a civic duty. 
A stance through which he could realize an act of counterpressure against the hegemony of 
the opponent (Soeters & Johnson, 2012, 182). He justifies his actions and his work on grounds 
of his Muslim identity, his core belief about right and wrong and his desire to improve the 
welfare and safety of the Afghans. The respondents’ motivation to work as an interpreter 
might therefore also be considered a calling in which he serves ‘a higher principle that 
entails discipline, sacrifice, but most of all a striving toward achievement that is linked to 
the individual’s sense of self’ (Hatch, 1989, 349-350). This process of adhering to oneself or 
rather to that which is greater than oneself alone, can be related to the core social motives 
of respectively understanding, controlling and self enhancing (Fiske, 2004, 14-23). People 
strive to understand their environment in order to anticipate uncertainty and to make sense 
of events that are perceived to be important. Preferably, people develop meanings that are 
shared with others. The interpreter’s moral beliefs, faith and ideological conviction in that 
regard are all part of social representations or group meaning that enable the respondent 
to make sense of the world (Fiske, 2004, 17-18). The motive of control subsequently entails a 
contingency between behavior and outcome and encourages people ‘to feel competent and 
effective at dealing with their social environment and themselves (Fiske, 2004, 20). Even in 
the face of violence, the respondent demonstrated a sense of confidence about his role and 
what that should amount to. This in turn is also closely linked with the motive of enhancing 
self as people like to feel good about themselves (Fiske, 2004, 22). The respondent had set 
several goals for himself that enabled him to (humbly) improve himself by putting the fate of 
others first (Fiske, 2004, 23). These core social motives, moreover, can also be associated with 
the Pathan identity of the respondent and more specifically with the value of what Pashtuns 
call ghairat which usually is translated as ‘bravery’ but which is more completely understood 
as ‘zeal’ expressed in the pursuit of one’s own objectives. ‘A man who possesses ghairat is a 
man who determines his own destiny, who follows his own compass despite the attempts 
of others to limit and circumscribe his activities’ (Edwards, 1986, 315). In taking up the job 
of interpreter, the respondent as it were demonstrated an act of self-definition according 
to Pashtun custom by exerting a degree of independence and maintaining his personal 
autonomy of action (Edwards, 1986, 315).  
Interestingly enough, both the respondent as well as the opponent used the same 
religious motive to justify the actions in which they engaged. The interpreter to validate his 
task and the Taliban to eradicate it. The latter, in that regard, not merely only issued the 
destruction of their task but also the person assigned with it. Pictures of brutally slaughtered 
interpreters and threatening messages in which ‘traitors’ are warned for their violent ending, 
Reciprocity as a way to solicit cooperation, thus proved to be more the product of traits and 
insights of the individual soldier than that it was part of the institutional procedures of the 
military organization at the time of this study. 
Having touched upon the direct relation between benefactor and beneficiary, some of 
the quotes also demonstrate a more indirect form of reciprocity. By assisting the military, 
the interpreters could also benefit the Afghan people through the interventions of the 
Dutch troops. Why, one could wonder, would they support the Afghan people when they 
don’t receive personal benefits from their actions? The answer is that although people ‘(…) 
generally want to improve their own personal welfare, they also tend to be motivated to 
enhance the welfare of individuals, groups and issues that are tied to their identity, beliefs, 
or values. This motivation can be so strong that it inspires people to sacrifice their own 
resources to provide aid to those valued individuals, groups, and issues’ (Goldstein et al, 
2011, 443; Simpson & Willer, 2008, 38). This holds even more true for interpreters, who 
benefit others often at the cost of themselves even if this means endangering their lives. The 
core social motive of belonging, which has been discussed in the previous chapter, in other 
words seems of particular relevance here as people’s need to belong motivates them to help 
others (Fiske, 2004, 17). Whereas showing support often involves the concrete act of sharing 
information, such help is not self-evident in fragile states like Afghanistan where good 
governance is absent and violent attacks against citizens are common (Soeters & Johnson, 
2012, 168). Apart from the fact that not everyone has access to information, one also needs 
to take into consideration that not everyone will be brave enough to use it. People’s fear of 
giving and using information on and against “evil others” out of genuine dread of becoming 
the next victim is called ‘informerphobia’ (Soeters & Johnson, 2012, 169). Especially in situations 
where the lives of local people are constantly threatened by parties who are not afraid to 
use violence, most people will think twice about becoming an informer (Soeters & Johnson, 
2012, 169). After all, people are violence-averse and will therefore not be cold-headed enough 
to act strategically when their lives are in danger (Soeters & Johnson, 201, 176). Given the 
omnipresence of the fear factor in this matter, it is therefore even more commendable that 
(local) people are willing to become an interpreter as this role might very well be seen as the 
epitome of the informer itself. At least the enemy does. Committed to the stabilization of 
the country, the interpreter can count on being viciously attacked as they are perceived as 
traitors and spies in service of ISAF.
While financial income, reciprocity and belonging seem to define the most prevalent 
reasons for becoming an interpreter, there are two other motives that draw attention in this 
study. The first is mentioned by respondent NI 2:
 
“In their eyes soldiers are the enemy and therefore I am an enemy as well. The fact that I am 
an interpreter makes matters even worse. They’ll see me as a traitor. But I am a Muslim and 
I don’t care what people think of me. The only thing that matters is how I feel about myself. 
I know what I do is right. I am here for the reconstruction and safety of this country. I also 
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deployment soldiers were mainly motivated by the necessity to fulfill their tasks effectively, 
which resulted in a rather instrumental approach towards the cooperation with interpreters. 
Second, both national and local interpreters indicated that reciprocity was a pivotal incentive 
to join the mission. This, among other things, materialized in the desire to benefit both the 
Dutch military and the local population. How these expectations of soldiers and interpreters 
influenced their actual sense of work and consequently cooperation will be analyzed in next 
section that addresses the third aspect of position. 
5. Position: How to Find One’s Place and Make It Work for All?
While the respondents had their personal and sometimes corresponding and/or differing 
motives to join the mission, they all had one trait in common. With the exception of the odd 
former Afghan army officer, they all had to take a big leap into the unknown. Soldiers had 
to put their years of training and education to the test in a completely foreign territory and 
the interpreters had to provide translation and interpreting services in war zones with barely 
any experience in that capacity. Whereas the national interpreters in that regard were open 
about their professional background in for example engineering, agriculture, law, medical 
science or business administration, most of the local interpreters remained somewhat 
vague about their former occupation and education. This lack of ‘compatibility’ is hardly 
surprising, however, because in the context of armed conflicts language brokering always has 
been, despite any attempts of the army to professionalize language services, an unregulated 
occupation mainly pursued by untrained interpreters (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2019, 473). 
The ad hoc recruitment of interpreter provisions, and more specifically the recruitment of 
locally hired interpreters, in that regard seems to be the most common approach to hire 
contract interpreters and this certainly applies to the Dutch Army (Gallai, 2019, 208; 44BG, 
2007, 1; BTD, 2009, 9).    
Military organizations have structured their interpreters into various categorizations 
which circumvent the formal regulations as prescribed by the International Association of 
Conference Interpreters (AIIC). By describing the interpreters as linguists, they could include 
tasks as for instance reconnaissance and intelligence into the profile that otherwise would 
not have fit the conventional rules and agreements on interpreting (Gallai, 2018, 209). The 
US Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24, which acted as a blueprint for international 
operations in Afghanistan, for instance extensively deals with the linguistic aspect of 
missions in which the military finds itself deployed among the local population. The FM 3-24 
has such a prestige that it was also applied by NATO countries like The Netherlands (Kitzen, 
2016a, 144). In case of linguistic resources, the manual states that linguists employed by 
the armed forces need to possess cross-cultural competence and efficient language skills 
to enable effective communication and cooperation between soldiers and locals (Hajjar, 
2017, 94).  In order to manage the military interpreters, the FM 3-24 has classified them into 
the so-called ‘nightletters’, proved that the opponent was merciless in their condemnation 
of interpreters. Despite the risk involved, respondent NI 2, however, used his faith and 
his sense of self-esteem as resources to deal with the threat and to motivate his support 
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Sorrentino & Yamaguchi, 2008, 451). This kind of 
self-determination to the benefit of others, can be seen in a more egoistic manner in the 
motivation of respondent LI 7:
 
“I work for ISAF to earn some money and to help Afghan people. (…) I also like missions be-
cause I want to see fighting. I also want to fight and for that case I need to have a gun and go 
on mission. I like to fight the enemy, not everyone. That’s the reason why I love to fight. I do 
not have a problem with the Taliban but it’s just my duty. It’s my job. I don’t feel that I am a 
terp, I feel I am a soldier in the mission. For this case, I am fighting for my own country and not 
for the work. Before coming here, I said ‘I will make money.’ but when I came here I saw the 
ANA guys who have a salary about 150 dollars. I can also fight for 600 dollars by interpreting. 
So, I am fighting. I am not only the terp, I also feel I am a soldier.” 
While this respondent showed all of the aforementioned motives to become an interpreter, 
his approach displays a kind of opportunism that could cast doubt upon his integrity. By 
becoming an interpreter, the respondent was not only able to gain the most value out of 
a job, the job itself also enabled him to act upon his desire to fight like a soldier. Instead 
of avoiding violence, this respondent dealt with danger by seeking it out. As such the 
interpreter displayed an emotional energy that usually is the predicate of the ‘violent few’ 
who not only actively but competently engage in violence in order to dominate and defeat 
the enemy (Collins, 2008, 376, 380-81). Police forces and the armed forces are examples 
of social scenes in which the violent few seem to flourish. Although this respondent was 
attracted to the use of military force and not afraid of combat-like confrontation, he most 
certainly was not a trained soldier. Therefore, it remains questionable whether such ‘warrior-
interpreters’, are suitable partners for the military organization. A problem, however, that 
didn’t seem to bother this particular respondent because he just saw an opportunity not only 
to enter but also to capitalize on the interactional field of fighting.  In highly fragmented 
societies and war-torn societies like Afghanistan, such forms of opportunism moreover are 
often considered a necessary ‘strategy of survival’ that seeks to address people’s basic needs 
(Migdal, 1988, 27).  Although opportunism, especially in contrast to the other factors, might 
not be considered as valuable a motive, it is a valid motivation for respondents to join the 
mission nonetheless.       
To sum up this analysis of motivation as an aspect of the cooperation between 
interpreters and soldiers, it can be concluded that respondents from all categories displayed 
a variety of motives for joining the military and deploying to the mission area. While this 
result concurs with other studies in the field of military recruitment and motivation, 
there are two particularly protruding findings that draw attention. First, during the actual 
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This quote demonstrates that the professional categorization of linguists predominately 
is a theoretical attempt to define the tasks and position of the interpreter in the military 
organization. In this ideal image the interpreter is ‘someone who can accurately and quickly 
translate nuanced meaning, be thoroughly versed in both countries’ history, literature, 
culture, and politics, as well as in the technical subjects under discussion, and yet not allow 
his personality to shade the interpretation’ (Metrinko, 2009, 36). The perfect interpreter, 
however, doesn’t exist in reality and the position, therefore, is most often occupied by a 
person who is, as mentioned earlier, culturally and linguistically affiliated with the country 
but who is not trained to do so professionally (Baker, 2010, 216; Fitchett, 2012, 177). 
Similarly, there’s a paragon for the ‘universal soldier’ whose skills should be as diverse 
and complete as the tools of a ‘Swiss Army knife’ in order to perform in the full spectrum of 
combat and noncombat operations (Hajjar, 2017, 98). These competencies consist, besides the 
more conventional ‘warrior’ skills, of peacekeeper-diplomat tools, cultural self-awareness, 
agency and the creation of new tools on the job, skills to cross the civilian-military sphere, 
teaching tools, soft and harder leader skills (Hajjar, 2017, 98-102).  The Swiss Army knife in 
this light almost seems to be like a magic box of tricks that soldiers can open up to effectively 
work with interpreters as well as to engage the local population. This study, however, seeks 
to demonstrate that there’s hardly a soldier who would fit the metaphor of the knife perfectly 
and that the cooperation with interpreters, therefore, is not a case of handling a toolkit but 
more a matter of a tentative personal and mutual exploration of each other’s role and part in 
achieving the goals of the mission.  This interdependency comes to the fore in the (in)formal 
position of the interpreter in the military organization and the peer group, and the relation 
with the local population, or as respondent M 26 formulates: 
 
“They say: ‘You’ll never be able to trust an interpreter completely, yet you have to be able to 
work with him.’ In practice this means that you have to be attentive of how the interpreter 
handles information and how you handle that information and the interpreter yourself’. So, 
you have to circulate the interpreters frequently in order to know how they perform and what 
kind of work relations result from that.”
Respondent NI 5 describes how this exploration even made him question his professional 
identity as an interpreter and the implications this had for his position inside as well as 
outside the military organization:
 
“It’s not easy being an interpreter. I often struggle with the question ‘Who am I?’. The answer 
can be explained in so many different and sometimes contradictory ways. I am an interpreter 
for ISAF but I am a soldier as well. In theory that seems to be incompatible or even inconceiva-
ble but everything that happens over here is military and as an interpreter you’ll have to fight 
alongside your men. It’s not that you have other options though because in the eyes of the 
population you’re a traitor. Being an interpreter therefore means being in a lonely place. You’ll 
three categories that are also representative for the situation of the Dutch Armed Forces. The 
Dutch armed forces in this regard distinguish two categories of interpreters, respectively 
local and national interpreters (Bureau Tolkdiensten Defensie, 2009). The former concurs 
with US category I, while the latter overlaps with both US categories II and III:
 
 “Category I linguists usually are hired locally and require vetting. They do not have a secu-
rity clearance. They are the most abundant resource pool; however, their skill level is limited. 
Category I linguists should be used for basic interpretation for activities such as patrols, base 
entrance coverage, open-source intelligence collection, and civil-military operations. Com-
manders should plan for 30 to 40 linguists from category I for an infantry battalion. Brigade 
headquarters should maintain roughly 15 category I linguists for surge operations.
Category II linguists are U.S. citizens with a secret clearance. Often, they possess good 
oral and written communication skills. They should be managed carefully due to limited 
availability. Category II linguists interpret for battalion and higher-level commanders or 
tactical human intelligence teams. Brigade commanders should plan for 10 to 15 linguists 
from category II. That breaks down to one linguist for the brigade commander, one for each 
infantry battalion commander, and approximately 10 linguists for the supporting military 
intelligence company. Of those 10, three translate for each tactical human intelligence team 
or operations management team, and two translate for each signals intelligence collection 
platform.
 
Category III linguists are U.S. citizens with a top secret clearance. They are a scarce commodity 
and often retained at division and higher levels of command. They have excellent oral and 
written communications skills (U.S. Army, 2006, C-1).”
This categorization of interpreters gives a clear description of the interpreters’ security 
clearance and skills, and as such hints at the way soldiers can cooperate with different 
kinds of linguists.  Most of the interviewed soldiers, however, initially used interpreters in 
a predominantly instrumental manner (as mentioned in the previous paragraph) without 
taking the categorizations of different levels into consideration. This is reflected by the 
experience of respondent NI 8: 
 
“At the time of my appointment the position of interpreter also comprised the role of advisor. 
The position was categorized into level one, two and three. Level one [corresponding to cate-
gory III from FM 3-24] is allowed to work with the staff and has authority to give advice. Just 
like our job profile actually. So, the part of giving advice is included in the position from the 
start but since most of the men only see you as an interpreter in the beginning, you’ll hardly be 
asked for advice or anything other. This can change over time, however, once you are longer 
deployed.” 
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to achieve the high levels of coordination and cooperation necessary to ensure survival and 
success’ (Halevy, Chou & Galinsky, 2011, 33-34). Weber, moreover, has defined hierarchy as a 
‘vertical formal integration of official positions within one explicit organizational structure 
whereby each position or office is under the control and supervision of a higher one’. As a 
result, official roles and positions of individuals are clearly defined and demarcated from 
each other while social relationships are institutionalized and legitimized exclusively as 
hierarchical relations (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011, 1517-1518). In the military organization this 
is visible in for instance the delineation of military ranking, the classification of interpreters, 
and the defined patterns of interaction (Weiss, 1986, 213).
Military hierarchy is a form, or even the archetypal example itself, of a closed bureaucratic 
organization in which ‘all positions are placed along official lines of top-down command- 
and-control [and in which] formal authority is closely correlated with the ranking and prestige 
of positions and independent from the actual holder of the position’ (Diefenbach & Sillince, 
2011, 1518). In this type of organization, the hierarchical differentiation is attributed to ‘the 
quality of the social positions individuals occupy’ (Gould, 2002, 1144). As a consequence of 
this organizational framework, rewards are linked to specific positions regardless of the 
individual human capital of the occupants. On the individual level of work-identity, this is 
experienced as an injustice by interpreters (44BG, 2007, 2). Respondent NI 6 in this respect 
narrates as follows:
 
“I have received the rank of captain. It’s very important to me. It’s a status symbol. You receive 
more acknowledgement when you wear a rank and this concerns the younger interpreters in 
particular.  I don’t wear a rank myself, however, the position of captain is beneath my age. I 
don’t care about the rank but I do think that the working conditions and the ranks for inter-
preters need some reform because they’re outdated. The job is very demanding in terms of 
workload, risks and responsibilities but nowadays almost everyone is captain irrespectively 
of their experience, age, background, or education. I think that a bonus payment therefore 
should be applied to improve the position of interpreters within the military organization. 
Some sort of arrangement that differentiates between the quality and age of interpreters. 
It’s no secret that we would like to receive a higher salary because we all know that it’s a 
dangerous job and besides that there are mayor differences in rewards as well as wages be-
tween interpreters working for Defense and those working for foreign affairs and other NATO 
countries.”
The quote makes it obvious that the respondent was ambivalent about his own rank of 
captain. On the one hand, he appreciated his rank as a status symbol that confirmed his 
position within the organization. On the other hand, however, he stated that his rank 
was of no importance and value to him because others were also given the same rank 
irrespective of their qualities and traits. While the position of the national interpreters was 
formally demarcated by their rank, not all of them experienced the military’s hierarchical 
constantly have to fight an inner battle because you must consider the implications that each 
of your actions may have for your own standing.” 
In both quotes the respondents, albeit from different perspectives, touch upon essential 
issues that are closely linked to the position of the interpreter thereby demonstrating 
that identity can be considered an important factor behind work-related behavior. 
Subsequently, work identity can be defined as ‘the collection of meanings attached to the 
self by the individual and others in a work domain. These meanings can be based on unique 
individual characteristics, group membership, or social roles’ (Miscenko & Day, 2016, 216-
217). Furthermore, identity can be understood as a cognitive schema that stores information 
and meaning to a particular role. Identity, therefore, creates a framework through which 
people make sense of their experiences. Consequently, the following paragraph, therefore, 
explores how soldiers and interpreters attempt to identify themselves with their working 
environment.
5.1 Work Identity:  I interpret therefore I am?
Work identity can be understood by three different levels of inclusiveness, respectively 
the individual, interpersonal and collective. ‘Work identity at the individual level focuses 
on the unique traits and characteristics that differentiates someone from others in a work 
domain. Interpersonal work identity is derived from relationships with significant others, 
such as one’s boss or peers in the workgroup. Finally, collective work identity is based on 
self-perceived organizational and social category membership’ (Miscenko & Day, 2016, 
217). Translated to the position of the interpreter in the military organization, this would 
imply that the individual work identity for example relates to the linguistic and cultural 
competencies and personality (human capital) of the interpreter. Second, the interpersonal 
level can be understood not only as the relation between the interpreter and soldier but with 
the local interlocutor as well. This emphasizes the triadic nature of the relationship which 
has been previously described as a ‘Simmelian Tie’ and which will be further addressed in the 
following paragraphs. Third, the collective level concerns the group to which the interpreter 
finds himself belonging to. This can be a rather ambiguous affair since interpreters might 
identify themselves (simultaneously) with various specific groups such as the military, the 
national and/or local interpreters, and the local population.
These three levels of work identity provide a structure through which the position 
of the interpreter in the military organization can be further explored throughout this 
chapter. Before we delve more deeply into the individual level of work identity, however, it is 
important to address the concept of hierarchical differentiation first. The interpreter, after 
all, is positioned in a military organization which is known for its hierarchical structure. 
Hierarchy can be defined as a fundamental form of social organization which ‘allows groups 
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the interpersonal level) as well as their individual performance should be the differentiating 
benchmark for the financial compensation of their occupation.
While respondents expressed their preference for a more individualist framework 
of hierarchical differentiation in terms of safety, risk and financial gratification, it is 
nevertheless unlikely that such a transformative approach would gain support. The top-down 
command-and-control structure of the military organization, after all, is designed to serve 
the needs and goals of the organization and not the aspirations of its members. Yet, it should 
be noted that whereas the market framework of hierarchical differentiation conflicted with 
the bureaucratic nature of the military, the MoD nevertheless had to follow this economic 
principle in order to compete with other coalition forces for the recruitment of local 
interpreters. This market process became manifest in the different wages the interpreters 
received from their employers. Respondents among the local interpreters compared their 
‘meager’ pay of 600 dollars for example to the ‘huge’ salary of 1000 dollars that others in 
the same position earned working for the U.S. troops. Despite the importance and weight 
of other motives, this discrepancy in financial rewards inevitably influenced the willingness 
(and hence the quality) of interpreters joining the Dutch troops. Soldiers, who were already 
weary of the fact that good interpreters sooner or later would be taken away by other units 
within the organization, also learned the effect that a potential pay rise could have a on their 
men. Some soldiers in this instance discovered that their interpreters, after a sudden leave, 
were incorporated by the Americans. Linguistic resources, in other words, were a precious 
good that only lasted as long as the competition would allow it to do. 
5.2 Cooperation: One for All and All for One?
Position is not the only aspect that is rigidly structured within the bureaucratic organization, 
social relations as mentioned earlier are hierarchically organized as well. Individuals are 
placed in unequal relations via an abstract order and are submitted to person-independent 
rules (Dieffenbach & Sillince, 2011, 1518). In the military organization, this order becomes 
clear on the interpersonal level of work identity. Identity, after all, is defined by the 
different social roles that an individual takes up and ‘(…) because each role and therefore 
each identity is associated with certain social expectations, these roles provide structure 
as well as meaning to human behavior’ (Miscenko & Day, 2015, 216).  Identity, and more in 
particular work identity, therefore functions as a framework to interpret experiences. When 
individuals assume a new role, they must interact with others to negotiate meaning to this 
role (Miscenko & Day, 2015, 222).  
In case of the position of the interpreters within the military organization, this sense-
making process proved to be challenging for both the interpreters who had to adjust to their 
new work role within the military as well as the soldiers who had to relate the task of the 
interpreter to their own ones. The involved parties, in other words, had to learn how to use 
differentiation as ‘fair’ because it failed to sufficiently acknowledge (and thus appropriately 
reward) their individual competencies. Some of the local interpreters, whom are not given 
a rank at all, also expressed their dissatisfaction about this very same matter as respondent 
LI 3 illustrates: 
 
“In our job, you know, once we go for our contracts, they don’t look at our education, they 
don’t look at our experience, they don’t look at anything. As long as you can speak a few 
sentences of English you’re hired and you’re getting the same amount of salary that a fully 
educated and experienced man gets. So, it shouldn’t be like this, you know. The guys who are 
new, they get jobs local to their family, close to their houses, close to his village but the guy 
who has worked like for two years, three years they’re still working far away, miles away from 
their families from their homes. So, it should not be like this. The easiest jobs or the close 
jobs, should be for the ones who are experienced or who have worked like two, three years. 
They should get the best jobs, not someone who comes now and tomorrow he’s got the best 
job with more salary and less hours and he’s more safe. (…) So, I am not happy because I don’t 
feel like I am being treated fair. Not because he’s my cousin, or my uncle so he should have the 
best job. No, someone who has got more education, experience he should have the best job.”
Instead of attributing value to one’s social position, both respondents opted for another 
kind of framework of hierarchical differentiation in which rewards are granted to some 
(and thus not all) people on grounds of the type and quality of contribution they make to 
the organization. This individualist or market framework suggests that ‘valuable outcomes’ 
are unequal because people vary in qualities.  In line with the logic of this framework, 
an organization should therefore ‘confer more authority (and compensation) upon 
some members than upon others because the former have devoted more energy to the 
organization’s goals, invested more in developing valuable skills, revealed unusual talents, 
or have shown a flair for ‘leading’ rather than ‘following’ (Gould, 2002, 1144). Rewards, in 
this framework, moreover are not seen only as a compensation for such contributions but 
also as incentives that elicit them.
The definition of what the ‘best jobs’ are, however, is not unequivocal and depends of 
course on the particular point of view and personal interests of the parties concerned. 
According to some soldiers who have worked with local interpreters, the best jobs (at the 
PRT) are allocated to those who have proven themselves to be capable and of value for the 
mission. Other soldiers, however, refute the promotion of competent local interpreters to 
higher positions since they are, as seen from the soldier’s perspective, of more value in the 
field where the presence of a competent interpreter can make the difference between life 
and death. Local interpreters, in turn, will suggest that the more dangerous jobs should be 
occupied by the less qualified individuals and that competent interpreters should be working 
during staff meetings in the relative safety of the camp. Most national interpreters, finally, 
are of the opinion that not so much their position (while being of significant importance on 
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of protection in exchange for loyalty’ (Hofstede, 1991, 64). How important this need of 
belonging and safety for interpreters exactly is, is illustrated by respondent NI 4:
 
“Although I am well prepared before I go somewhere, I nevertheless think that I am treated 
differently than the other soldiers. Last year I was at a bazar in Chora. The district governor 
and the commander came up to me. They knew I was an interpreter. At both sides were armed 
men. I thought that I would team up with a Dutch soldier and that he would take care of me. 
Nothing of the sort, however, happened. They just abandoned me. The first week we didn’t 
even know who these other men were. They also argued with the district governor which I 
thought was very odd. The commander accused the governor of being a thief. I received a map 
from someone and I acted as a mediator. They just left me there. The soldiers probably must 
have thought by themselves: ‘He’s an Afghan, so he’ll know what to do.’ But I didn’t have a 
weapon while the other guys were armed. It was strange. The second time when something 
similar happened was at the bazar in TK. They told me that we were going to have a talk with 
governor Munib so I wanted to get my helmet and vest out of the Bushmaster but the vehicle 
just drove away with my gear in it. The next day we received a visit from Foreign Affairs. I had 
to accompany them to interpret at the bazar. I asked where the Bushmaster was because I 
needed my helmet and vest. They said that it had already left. I was forced to work all day at 
the bazar without having the protection of my helmet and vest. They just don’t pay attention. 
Most of the times we are told that the soldiers will take care of us, but I have seen for myself 
that they don’t look after their interpreter. I find that strange. (…) I don’t want to say that they 
refuse to take care of me but they simply can’t look after me. All people have to fend for them-
selves because there simply is no time to do otherwise.” 
It is often expected that new organizational members will adopt the dominant cultural-
value system and learn appropriate behavior (Bloor & Dawson, 1994, 278). The experience of 
respondent NI 4, however, makes clear that the interpreter was not properly initiated in the 
knowledge of the military culture. Another example which illustrates the lack of guidance 
into the mores of the military organization was given by respondent NI 7:
 
“I didn’t have any expectations about my deployment. You don’t receive that much of in-
formation. They say that it can be dangerous but they don’t actually tell you that. Like when 
you go out on patrol for a lot of days. They said that I didn’t have to sleep outside and that 
we would only be on patrol for one day. They didn’t inform me properly. When I arrived here, 
nobody knew that I was coming. Not the G1, not the other interpreters, nobody. At night I 
wandered around. I didn’t know where to go. I didn’t have any codes. I talked to the G1 and 
he said that the person who was in charge of my assignment was away. At that moment there 
was someone from electronic warfare (EW) present and he said: ‘We could use him.’ I didn’t 
exactly know what EW meant but I told him that I wanted to work but that I didn’t want to 
go outside without any experience. I wanted to acclimatize a little first. The ISTAR comman-
the ‘software’ of their surrounding social system (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). The 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters, therefore, was shaped by the (conflicting) 
demands of the military organizational culture and the Dutch and Afghan culture. 
Sometimes this led to situations in which the position of the interpreter was misconceived, 
misattributed or even mistreated. Respondent M 36 relates the following about the personal 
insights he learned as a soldier during his cooperation with interpreters: 
 
“I used to think that interpreters would always be at your service but reality proved to be quite 
different. Especially, in case of the national interpreters. The rank of captain is strictly a pay 
grade but the interpreters nevertheless act like they really are a military officer. That caused 
for some confrontations between the rookies and the ‘captains’. I had a clash once myself 
with an interpreter. I told him: ‘You make tons of money. I’m your superior and now you’re 
just going to do as you’re told!’ The interpreter went ballistic after that. He said that they were 
mainly here out of ideological motives. So, I’ve learned to tread carefully and that there are 
limits to what you can say to interpreters. Etiquette is very important to Afghans but their 
manners just aren’t my style. An interpreter must realize that he’s a specialist, you know. They 
have to be aware of the rights and duties that come with a rank but unfortunately, they don’t 
always get that.”  
The situation between the soldier and the interpreter was characterized by a large power 
distance in which superiors and subordinates are considered to be existentially unequal. 
The hierarchical system of the military organization organizes power in as few hands as 
possible which consequently means that ‘subordinates are expected to be told what to do’ 
(Hofstede, 1991, 35). Adding insult to injury, the soldier also reproached the interpreter for 
the high payment he received thereby implicitly questioning the reciprocal intentions of the 
interpreter. An accusation which in military history was made against interpreters before 
when Croatian translators, working for the European Community Monitoring Mission, 
were denied their acts of volunteerism and patriotism by the Croatian minister of education 
because they were payed for their work (Stahuljak, 1999, p. 46). More than a decade on, the 
idea that interpreters only work for the money still seemed to strike a chord with some 
members of the military organization. Respondent M 36, in this light therefore, by default 
acted according to assumptions and norms of the military organization and these initially 
caused him to be unaware of the impact his behavior had on the interpreter and the different 
ideas they both could have about the construction of their cooperation. While the soldier 
viewed the relationship primarily as a business transaction from an individualistic societal 
perspective, the interpreter on the other hand most probably understood the relationship 
in moral and social terms from a collectivist societal perspective. In collectivist societies 
the workplace itself might become an in-group and this explains the heated reaction of the 
interpreter towards the perceived inadequate behavior of the soldier. From his point of view 
the military organization should resemble ‘a family relationship with mutual obligations 
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of the in-group, is attributed certain traits by the military that makes him the designated 
person to connect and interact with the local population and to understand and decipher 
the (code) language of the opponent. Here, the interpreter in other words is presumed 
to be endowed with the Swiss or perhaps more appropriately the Afghan Army knife 
which should enable him to anticipate and control the mission area. In this respect, and 
as exemplified by the respondent, the interpreter is almost seen and used as a one man 
forward operating base who, without the assistance of others, singlehandedly must probe 
and reconnoiter the environment in order to achieve the mission goals. This approach, 
however, is a misconception that doesn’t do justice to the actual experience and needs of the 
interpreter. It doesn’t take the preconditions as for instance military knowledge, trust, safety 
and a sense of belonging into account which lay the foundation for the interpreter to be 
able to effectively contribute to the goals of the unit. Conditions that matter of fact requires 
teamwork. The interpreter can only fully perform his task assignment when the members 
of the unit guarantee and acknowledge his position. In the following quote, however, the 
opposite is the case. The interpreter in this instance cannot carry out his assignment because 
the military officer holds a different opinion about the interpreters’ task and position. 
Respondents NI 2 narrates as follows:
 
“When we are on a mission, the soldiers often address me politely and that’s much appreci-
ated by me. I tell them ‘Guys, we’re all colleagues. It’s okay to call me on a first-name basis.’ 
They like that. They know exactly what I do and what to expect of me and if I need something 
they’re helpful and understanding. Of course, this has to come from both sides. Once I was 
with a marine corps captain, I was the interpreter of the chief of staff at the time. I have always 
tried to be civil and open towards the guys and the soldiers. The chief of staff had given me 
the assignment to ask the secretary of the provincial governor at what time we had to depart 
the following morning. It was outside the gate. There was a captain on guard and he asked me 
about my plans. I explained my task and he escorted me as my guard. I asked the secretary in 
English what the time of our depart was, so that the captain could understand it as well. The 
secretary told me that it was at eight but he laughed while saying this. I said ‘You’re laughing 
so that means that we’ll probably depart at nine and not eight. I would like to hear a clear 
answer.’ The captain suddenly got mad at me and said ‘Who are you to ask any questions? You 
are nothing but an interpreter. I am the one who’s asking the questions, not you’. This all hap-
pened in the presence of the secretary and because I didn’t find it appropriate to argue in front 
of him I said to the guy ‘Alright, I’ll have a word with you later.’ After the conversation I said 
to him ‘First, I am not your interpreter. Second, I have an assignment given to me by the chief 
and third, you are not my conversation partner. So, why did you treat me like you just did?’ The 
captain could only talk nonsense so I got angry with him. I told him ‘You’re one of the weirdest 
officers we have here at the camp. This is the last conversation I am having with you because I 
will never ever work with you again.’ The discussion went on all night. The chief of staff finally 
told me that I was right and that the guy was wrong. The captain, however, insisted that I was 
der, however, replied: ‘You’re a soldier now so you’ll just have to go.’ I answered: ‘I am only 
a temporary soldier. You need at least an education of six months to become a soldier and I 
have only received a training of three weeks.’ I didn’t flatly refuse to go but I tried to explain 
that I didn’t want to be deployed to Deh Rawod. He said: ‘You’ll get in trouble for this.’ I told 
him: ‘Listen, I left my country because of the Taliban. I came here voluntarily to support this 
country and the Dutch troops because I am Dutchman like you. If you tell me that I am getting 
in trouble I will withdraw myself from this job as of today to prevent any misunderstandings.’ 
He then said: ‘Alright, you can decide what you want to say for yourself.’ I told him that I was 
willing to go to Deh Rawod only not for a period of six months and if it was therefore possible 
for me to rotate with other interpreters. When I arrived at camp Hadrian they told me that 
I had to stay there permanently. As if they were playing with a child. I didn’t know anything 
about the equipment, I didn’t know what EW was about, I just had to learn everything. Then 
they ordered me to join thirty men up in the mountains at camp Hadrian to fight the Taliban. 
I told them that I wasn’t a real soldier. I have been through that before [prior to his migration 
to the Netherlands, the respondent was victim of a violent attack]. I have been wounded and 
have experienced six months of pure misery after that. I just have a real bad history with the 
Taliban. I told them that I really wanted to work inside the camp but that I couldn’t cope going 
out on patrol for so many days.”
Whereas soldiers from the very start of their career for example are drilled to look after their 
gear and to be on point, this responsibility is not taught to and therefore not internalized 
by interpreters. Yet, soldiers mistakenly presume this and other military knowledge to be 
present in others who have not, or only briefly during the pre-deployment training, received 
these instructions. Such presumptions could lead to above described situations in which 
the interpreter finds himself rather lost. The images of ‘the bushmaster driving away and 
leaving the interpreter without any protection’ and ‘the distressed interpreter wandering 
the camp all alone’ are metaphors for the interpreter who beliefs himself to be a member of 
the in-group while he in fact is, due to the actions of the soldiers (or more precisely the lack 
thereof ), left to his own devices. Unsurprisingly, such situations could potentially harm the 
value, meaning or enactment of the interpreter’s work identity on the interpersonal level. 
Although respondent NI 4 attempted to resolve this identity threat by mitigating the effects 
of the soldiers’ actions by stressing that the circumstances were demanding for everyone 
in the operational theatre, such incidents could, when they are experienced often, evoke 
antisocial behavior toward coworkers (Miscenko & Day, 2016, 223). Precisely because team 
cooperation relies on personal bonds, the individual’s identification with a work group 
is located at the relational level of work identity (Miscenko & Day, 2016, 226). The military 
organization should therefore be attentive to the vulnerable position of the interpreter and 
the importance of inclusiveness in the unit. 
The quotes of NI 4 and NI 7 point out another phenomenon that seems to be inherent 
of the relationship between the interpreter and soldiers. The interpreter, as ‘non-member’ 
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military and Afghan culture) at the time, however, was not registered and consequently not 
appreciated by the military officer. It was most probably this lack of acknowledgement that 
caused the argument to continue long after the incident had taken place. The respondent 
anticipated but not explicated (high context) the requirement of a respectful gesture of 
the soldier but when the other, not knowing what was expected of him, was anything but 
forthcoming (low context), the disagreement developed into a full-blown relational conflict 
in which both insisted on their positions and harsh accusations (low context) were made 
back and forth (Shaeffner et al., 2015, 475). 
When incidents such as described in this subparagraph, which are just a few of the many 
examples of misconception, misattribution, miscommunication, and misunderstanding 
in this study, are detrimental to the work identity on the collective level and therefore to 
the commitment of members and the goal achievement of the military organization, then 
the question rises how task and relation conflicts can be resolved. Morton Deutsch, one 
of the founding fathers and pioneers of the field of conflict resolution, in this matter has 
theorized that ‘the crux of the differences between cooperation and competition lies in the 
nature of the way in which goals of the participants in each of the situations are linked. In a 
cooperative situation the goals are so linked that everybody “sinks or swims” together, while 
in the competitive situation if one swims, the other must sink’ (Deutsch, 1973, 20).  
5.3 Moderators of Cooperation: Team Up or go Down.
Deutsch has summarized the differences between a cooperative and competitive process 
into four different aspects. First, is the aspect of communication which in a cooperative 
process is characterized by an open and honest sharing of communication and information. 
The competitive process, in contrast is characterized by either a lack of or misleading 
communication and information. Second, is the aspect of perception which in a cooperative 
process stimulates convergence and conformity of values and beliefs, whereas in a 
competitive process it stimulates the sense of complete oppositeness. Third, is the aspect of 
attitudes towards one another in which a cooperative process leads to trusting, friendly and 
helpful behavior, while a competitive process leads to suspicious, hostile and exploitative 
behavior. Finally, there is the aspect of task orientation which in a cooperative process 
stimulates the enhancement of mutual power and resources (by utilizing special talents), 
and in which conflicting interests are defined as a mutual problem to be solved by collective 
effort. A competitive process by contrast promotes the enhancement of one’s own power 
and the minimization of the interests of the other, it also expands the scope of conflict to 
a general principle that is no longer tied to a particular issue at a certain time and place 
(Deutsch, 1973, 30-31).    
How members of an organization view their goals to be related to other person’s goals, 
in other words has important implications for the dynamics and consequences of their 
the one who was at fault. I told him that I didn’t receive any assignment from him and that he 
was there as my guard. He was there to protect me. That was his job. Simple as that’.” 
Task conflicts such as illustrated by the quote are described as ‘disagreements among team 
members concerning the content of the tasks being performed, including differences in 
ideas, viewpoints and opinions’ (Schaeffner, Huettermann, Gebert, Boerner, Kearney & Song, 
2015, 468).  The argument between the interpreter and the military officer demonstrates that 
a disagreement between team members over the content of tasks may lead to a relationship 
conflict.  Relationship conflicts exist ‘when there are incompatibilities between team 
members on a personal rather than a task-related level, including tensions and annoyances 
(Schaeffner et al., 2015, 468).  Relationship conflicts can emerge either through a process 
of misattribution when objective criticism or divergent ideas about tasks are subjectively 
misinterpreted as personal attacks, or, as in this case, from harsh behaviors in the course 
of a task conflict. Theory on procedural justice has shown that the fairness of treatment that 
people experience has a powerful influence on their attitudes and behavior (Shaeffner et 
al., 2015, 471). Therefore, it is understandable that the interpreter reacted negatively to the 
disrespectful conduct of the captain and that their ongoing heated debate only fueled the 
fire of their animosity.
The incident between the interpreter and soldier becomes even more apparent when 
understood in light of the cultural context. The example illustrates ‘(…) what happens when 
high and low context systems meet in the same setting, when the unspoken, unformulated, 
inexplicit rules governing how information is handled and how people interact and relate 
are at opposite ends of the context scale’ (Hall, 1976, 97). The fact that the interpreter was 
reprimanded in the presence of the Afghan secretary of the provincial governor, shows that 
the military officer was not aware of the precarious nature of their disagreement. Their 
‘situation’ in other words was a clash of high and low context cultures (Hall, 1976, 98). The 
interpreter was tasked to find out the exact time of departure and therefore he resolved to a 
low communication style in a high context situation in order to clarify the answer given by 
the Afghan secretary. The soldier, in reaction to this approach, also communicated in a low 
context towards the interpreter by demonstrating his dissatisfaction. In no uncertain terms, 
the soldier made it clear what bothered him about the situation. The consequences of his 
dismissal, however, were more serious than the soldier at that moment might have foreseen. 
The interpreter, being familiar with the Afghan culture and the importance of the demeanor 
and standing of conversational partners, had to call upon the role of mediator to mitigate 
not only the negative effect of this low context information on his own status but that of the 
Afghan and Dutch soldier as well. By circumventing the conflict and reverting to the formal 
procedure of high context communication, the interpreter actually contained the situation 
and prevented the loss of face for all of the parties involved. This carefully performed 
balancing act of switching communicational and cultural codes (simultaneously engaging 
in high and low context communication while adhering to the cultural norms of both the 
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they are blaming that you should go with me for example. Or for example they are saying do 
this work in order if you don’t I will fire you and the place you are in I will give to some other 
interpreters. All of us in one unity go to the supervisor and after that our supervisor and we 
make an agreement with the base commander. So, if we’ll face some more difficulties with 
Dutch soldiers and they blame us and they didn’t respect some of the culture and they got 
some problem, maybe I will leave this job.”
The above-mentioned quote shows that local interpreters were sometimes reproached and 
even blackmailed by soldiers if they didn’t follow their orders. Consequently, the interpreters 
had developed their own mechanism to cope with task conflicts by forming a unified front. 
Respondent M 5 in this regard recalls of another and different kind of task conflict in which 
‘regrouping’ and cultural identity also seemed to be the denominator:
 
“Some local interpreters were completely unmanageable. There was a Dutch soldier of Ira-
nian descent in our team who was proficient in Farsi and other dialects and who in that capa-
city was able to monitor interpreters. At one time, he was checking on a local interpreter who 
repeatedly insulted our Afghan interlocutor in what must have been an attempt to get away 
from the situation. When he confronted the local interpreter with his actions the other re-
plied: ‘Whatever, he was only a stupid farmer anyway’. In this particular case, however, there 
was a national interpreter who felt sorry for the local interpreter and who therefore informed 
him about the possibility of Dutch law in this matter. The local interpreter took this advice to 
heart and filed a complaint about the way Dutch soldiers treated him and the other interpre-
ters. By doing so, the national interpreter incited the whole of the group of local interpreters. 
I had to confront the national interpreter with his behavior because he had jeopardized the 
order of the base. The national interpreter had positioned himself too much as an Afghan. 
Better to hand over your passport then, is what I think but eventually we transferred the na-
tional interpreter.” 
The approach of the interpreters confirms that people, due to a lack of acknowledgement, 
dissatisfaction or resentment will identify themselves with their subgroup rather than the 
whole of the team. A direction of movement which of course is completely opposite to what 
is desired by collective team identification. From a Western sociological perspective, such 
on working conditions inspired ‘acts of rebellion’ might be perceived as a (quasi) mutiny 
(Soeters, 2018, 144). According to the Pashtunwali, however, this fighting spirit can be 
understood as a just attempt to defend one’s honour and rights through a non-violent method 
of resolution (Rzehak, 2011, 11). This tendency to unite in the face of conflict, moreover, is 
universal and certainly in Afghanistan, with its tumultuous history, it has become a common 
trait of society. Afghans, after all, ‘(…) may quarrel happily among themselves, but they stand 
together and assert their pride in being Afghan when outsiders threaten’ (Zobrist Galád, 
2012, 10). Paradoxically, the coping strategy of the local interpreters, namely the convergence 
commitment and interaction on the collective level of work identity. Research in line 
of thought with Deutsch’ theory of conflict resolution has determined collective team 
identification and team member alignment as moderators that could prevent task conflicts 
from spilling over into relationship conflicts (Schaeffner et al, 468-470). Collective team 
identification can be described as the shared and intrinsic motivated feeling of attachment 
and belonging that members hold toward the whole (rather than the subgroup) of the team. 
Team member alignment, by contrast, describes team members’ extrinsic motivation for 
cooperation on grounds of the instrumental value that effective team collaboration has for 
gaining individual rewards (Schaeffner et al, 2015, 472-473). 
Collective team identification is high, when members do not primarily identify with 
subgroups in a team (for example based on functional background) but rather with the team 
as a whole (Schaeffner et al, 2015, 473). As a consequence, members will perceive a situation 
as cooperative rather than competitive because they believe that members are committed to 
common goals rather than the goals of their relative subgroups. Emotional attachment to 
the team and common goals in other words contribute to the development of a cooperative 
team spirit which will enable members to find constructive ways to resolve interpersonal 
animosities that emerge from task-related discussions (Shaeffner et al, 2015, 474).  
Respondent M 31 has come to understand this principle of collective team identification as 
follows: 
  
“I have learned how to deal with interpreters and how important it is to include them in the 
team. When interpreters become part of the group you’ll notice a positive increase in effort. 
He has to earn his position, though. I’ll always want to know first which way the wind blows. 
Only after I have experienced what the interpreter is capable of and how he handles his task 
and the group, I’ll put some more confidence in him.” 
While the data demonstrates that this concept of collective team identification is 
implemented by some of the soldiers and interpreters on the individual and interpersonal 
level through gestures of reciprocity and (growing) mutual understanding or as Deutsch 
would call it ‘helpful behavior’, this is not yet the case on the collective level of work identity. 
The following quotes illustrate the point of view of respectively respondent LI 6 and LI 8 on 
this matter:
 
“If I have some problems, especially with my mentor if he doesn’t respect me or he doesn’t 
have good behavior towards me I will tell him: ‘Sorry, but it’s not fair. We are human as you. 
We want to work together as a colleague and I accept that you are my boss but it is a better 
way to work with each other, to cooperate with each other’.” 
“There are some things I don’t like about the job. For example, when some Dutch advisors 
come blame us saying that some terp [short for interpreter] has worked with another advisor, 
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individual rewards as well as team-based rewards are given within the military organization 
as the following quotes of respectively respondents M 14 and M 53 make clear:
 
“The Afghan interpreter and more specifically the Afghan in particular loves a piece of paper. 
Money is than of less importance to them. We gave them a ‘Letter of Appreciation’ in which 
we expressed our satisfaction with the effort shown by the interpreter. We put a big signature 
underneath it and even included a passport photo of the interpreter in the certificate so that 
illiterate people could also see that it really was about that specific person. The interpreters 
were very pleased with that.  Even so that they almost begged for it. Some interpreters came 
to me asking: ‘When do I get to receive such a ‘Letter of Appreciation?’ only to get the door 
slammed in their face because I would always say: ‘If you deserve one, you’ll probably get one 
and if not then not.’”
“There were always some interpreters that were excellent at their job and then it’s a pity that 
you have to go home. Going home obviously is a good thing but it’s sad that you have to say 
goodbye after having spent such a short but very intense period of time together. Once we 
gave them a sheep as a present. It was Eid Al-Fitr and you could of course bet your life on 
it that we would all be invited for that very same night to come and help eat up the sheep. 
Let me tell you, they cut open its throat right on the spot but they were so grateful for it. We 
helped them to store what was left of the meat in the fridge so that they could come and get 
some of the sheep every week. And every time when they came by you were invited to come 
and join them. So, yes in that way you were very intensely involved with each other. With work 
but also in the evenings, with the calls, the meals and the small talk. Yes, it was pretty good.” 
Whereas the data of this case study demonstrates that there are rewards of various types and 
nature, there, however, was no such thing as an incorporated ‘reward-structure’ within the 
military. Handing out rewards in that respect depended too heavily on the personal views of 
the soldiers working with the interpreters. Despite the lack of institutionalization of such 
a reward structure, the positive effect of the rewards on all the levels of work identity was 
evident. It contributed to a climate of sharing and emotional attachment that enhanced the 
much-desired team work and effort within the military. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out 
that the moderator of team member alignment, just like collective team identification, was 
not very well grounded in the culture of the military organization.
of communal values and the effort to solve the problem collectively, therefore also 
demonstrates that ‘demands’ made by members of the organization towards other members 
of the organization strengthens the aspects of perception and task orientation of the 
cooperative process among the subgroup as well (Deutsch, 1973, 30-31). A kind of teamwork 
and self-organization in other words that, when not addressed carefully and correctly, could 
undermine the goals of the military organization as the following experience of respondent 
M 52 illustrates: 
 
“I place a lot of value on a man being as good as his word. Therefore, I hate the expression 
‘Inshallah’ because it’s no use to me when it comes to making clear commitments. You know, 
some of the interpreters just did whatever they wanted. They had an attitude like ‘I am the 
interpreter of the PRT. Who can touch me?’ But you know what? The PRT is not in charge. I 
am! So, if you treat me good I’ll be nice to you but if you don’t do what you’re paid for than 
I’ll have a serious word with you. (…) I ruled with an iron fist whether you were a soldier or an 
interpreter. That’s why I broke down the tribal culture of the interpreters. I need interpreters 
who can work together and who can fill in for each other. I don’t need jealousy and obstruc-
tion in the group. The interpreters should all be equal. Although I have to admit that the more 
experienced interpreters had an edge over the others.”   
This probably well-intended but nevertheless ill-conceived attempt to take control and banish 
feelings of jealousy and competition among the local interpreters by breaking down their 
tribal structures and replacing these with a strict set of rules, proved to be counterproductive 
for the cooperative process on the organizational level. This strategy of negative contingent 
reinforcement did not take the cultural identity of the local interpreters into account and 
therefore missed out on the opportunity to create support (Felfe, Tartler & Liepmann, 2004, 
266). Instead, the respondents’ treatment of the local interpreters created a shared sense 
of indignation that only stimulated the emotional attachment among members of the 
subgroup. The ramifications were unforeseen and unprecedented. The local interpreters 
filed an official complaint against the respondent which instigated an investigation into his 
position. 
The examples given by the respondents show that the moderator of collective team 
identification should be more firmly rooted in the military organization when it comes to the 
position of and interaction with interpreters. Now that the first moderator has been discussed 
we need to look more closely into the second moderator of team member alignment. This 
moderator is high, in turn, when there are short- and long-term goals at the team level and 
when members are rewarded on basis of team effort instead of individual performance. A 
combination of team goals and team-based reward structures has demonstrated to motivate 
a sense of team responsibility and team work among members because members want to 
avoid the risk of jeopardizing individual rewards that can only be achieved through joint 
efforts (Schaeffner et al, 2015, 474). The empirical evidence, however, demonstrates that 
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While regular leaders in low dynamic work environments should easily be able to give clear 
and appropriate responses to the team, highly dynamic work environments, however, have 
very few cues let alone a script for expected responses and specific actions. Uncertain and 
unstable circumstances cause members to search for directions to guide their behavior. 
Precisely in these turbulent contexts, transformational leaders are believed to flourish 
and to be highly capable of influencing members through their charisma and behavior 
(Gundersen, Hellesøy, Raeder, 2012, 48).  The mission theatre of Uruzgan fits the description 
of a highly dynamic work environment more than perfectly and therefore the phenomenon 
of transformational leadership was likely to manifest itself within the military organization 
(Vogelaar & Dalenberg, 2012, 99-101, 104). With regard to the cooperation between on-scene 
commanders and subordinated this indeed was the case. Sometimes, however, in relation 
to the cooperation with interpreters transformational leadership manifested itself in rather 
unexpected ways as the experiences of respectively respondents NI 2, NI 3 and M 21 illustrate: 
 
“I hang out with the local interpreters quite a lot. They come to me to have a talk. Whenever 
there are problems, they turn to me. They trust me although I don’t share any personal infor-
mation with them. That simply isn’t possible. They’re young and want to discuss matters with 
me. About things they experience with the soldiers. Sometimes the soldiers address them in 
a disrespectful way or abuse their religion or their tribal descent. I’ll then ask them who the 
soldiers involved are so that I can have a word with them. I’ll tell the guys that the local inter-
preters are here to work and that it would be nice if they could treat them properly. The sol-
diers appreciate that, they’re willing to listen to me. I find it important that things are solved 
immediately so that the problem doesn’t escalate. I didn’t expect the local interpreters to 
choose me but one time one of them came to me with a problem and I told him what I would 
do in such a given situation. Like the uniform. I told them they should look ‘sharp’ in it. I give 
them small advice. If there are serious problems, I’ll get someone else involved to handle the 
matter. Sometimes a local interpreter joins us on a mission. That’s pretty difficult for them be-
cause they don’t understand Dutch. That’s why they come and sit with me to have a talk and 
drink tea. You know, nobody is perfect and that goes for local interpreters as well. (…) I talked 
with the OMLT and asked them if I could teach the ANA interpreters for a couple of hours. The 
OMLT was very pleased with that and I organised the lesson for the boys.”
Respondent NI 2 exerted (idealized) influence by functioning as a role model for the local 
interpreters and soldiers. While the local interpreters confided their trust in him, the 
soldiers were willing to listen to him. In both situations the respondent demonstrated 
high performance and moral standards (Felfe, Tartler & Liepmann, 2004, 267). He followed 
through on his actions and decisions by teaching the group of local interpreters the essentials 
of interpretation and advising the soldiers on how to treat their fellow interpreters. It is 
precisely this kind of integrity and competence that earned the respondent NI 2 the respect 
and admiration of others. In a similar vein, the following quote demonstrates not so much 
5.4 Transformational Leadership: The Interpreter as Smooth Operator
Ideally, both collective team identification (shared team goals) and team member alignment 
(team-based rewards) are expected to be effective when the task conflicts are of a medium 
level (Schaeffner et al, 2015, 475). After all, in situations where there is hardly any dispute about 
tasks, conflicts are not likely to occur and therefore the moderators are not expected to have 
a significant effect. This is also the case in heated task-related conflicts because members 
will then attribute the cause of the dispute to the person involved instead of the nature of the 
task. Once the conflict has escalated, the moderators will also be of little effect because they 
will not be able to outweigh the negative impact of the task-related conflict. The theoretical 
implication of these assumptions seems rather obvious. Task conflicts should be contained 
to a medium level in order to prevent them from spilling over in relationship conflicts. 
Although the aforementioned examples show that there have been task conflicts between 
soldiers and interpreters that had already escalated well beyond that point, certain members 
of the military organization have nevertheless attempted to prevent the development of 
such sensitive problems through a strategic approach that closely resembles the concept 
of ‘transformational leadership’. This concept has been qualified by extant research as a 
most powerful and influential driver of collective team identification in organizations that 
experience high levels of task conflict (Schaeffner et al, 2015, 490).  
Transformational leadership has been a popular research topic for the past several 
decades. It was developed at the end of the 1970’s during a time in which the concept of 
charisma, which was originally introduced by Weber in 1922, was rediscovered in the field 
of leadership research. Although the concept of charisma initially centered on political 
leadership, the ideas were soon transported to an organizational context. The central idea 
of the theory is that ‘organizations and employees are overmanaged but underled’ (Felfe, 
Tartler & Liepmann, 2004, 263). Whereas ‘managers’ are functionally oriented and keen on 
maintaining the status quo, ‘leaders’ on the other hand ‘(…) offer value based and attractive 
visions of the future, communicate their aims and strategies in a convincing matter, offer 
trust and confidence, and consider the personal needs and values of their [personnel]’ (Felfe, 
Tartler & Liepmann, 2004, 263).     
Transformational leadership is characterized by four strategies. These consist first of 
‘idealized influence’, the ability to exert influence by serving as a role model; second of 
‘inspirational motivation’ which is the ability to develop and communicate a convincing an 
attractive future vision; third of  ‘intellectual stimulation’, referring to the ability to include 
and participate others; and finally, of ‘individualized consideration’ which is the ability to 
coach and mentor team members (Felfe, Tartler & Liepmann, 2004, 267). Through these 
strategies, transformational leaders are able to align the team members’ goals and values 
and encourage collective optimism and identification with the team (Gundersen, Hellesøy, 
Raeder, 2012, 47). Research has even suggested that these strategies of transformational 
leadership are more prevalent and effective in highly dynamic organizational contexts. 
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be asked or said which others didn’t dare, he would step forward. So, there were in fact three 
natural leaders of the group.” 
The quote makes clear that the strategies of transformational leadership are not represented 
by one and the same person but that different strategies are performed by different (but 
certain) members of the group depending on the different needs of the moment. The local 
interpreters in that light complemented each other’s traits and assets to the benefit of the 
whole of the group. Of course, the example also shows that local interpreters competed 
with each other for the top position in the informal hierarchy. A phenomenon that is not 
uncommon to the bureaucratic organization.  
Another observation which can be made from the data and to which the quotes already 
implicitly yet carefully point, is the notion that the role of transformational leader with regard 
to the interpreters most often was not taken up by soldiers. Although the quartermaster 
and G1 of course bear responsibility for the interpreters, these assignments are part of a 
formal position and are therefore of a different nature than the strategies employed by the 
transformational leader who acts independent and irrespective of position. An explanation 
for this might be that transformational leadership seems to require some kind of bond with 
the group one seeks to address and that soldiers, despite their comradery for interpreters, as 
a consequence of the behavioral codes of the hierarchy do not feel obliged nor comfortable 
to perform these strategies across different strata of the military organization. 
Whereas bureaucratic organizations are known for their rigidity, there nevertheless always 
seems to be some leeway to play with the rules. The skills that members of the organization 
use to carry out their tasks also enables them to circumvent the official channels. This can 
be clearly seen in the actions of for example local interpreter Harry whose mild manners 
were not only valuable for gaining the trust of local Afghans and soldiers but also for getting 
things done for the group. Such ingenuity oftentimes constitutes an informal hierarchy in 
which person-dependent relationships of dominance and subordination become persistent 
over time through repeated social processes (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011, 1517, 1521). Albeit 
that informal hierarchy can emerge within the superimposed strata of the bureaucratic 
organization, the vertical barriers between strata, however, are so strict that informal 
hierarchy cannot cross strata. Consequently, informal hierarchy manifests itself at the same 
formal level of hierarchy (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011, 1522). Persons of the same official 
status and position therefore tend to develop an unofficial ranking among their immediate 
work colleagues or peers based on the accustomed idea of bureaucratic superiority and 
subordination. In bureaucratic organizations like the military, in other words, the principle 
of formal hierarchical ordering is almost completely replicated in the informal realm.
While formal and informal relationships are bound to the delineated strata of 
the military organization, the data of this study demonstrates that the concept of 
transformational leadership, despite the earlier described observation about soldiers, is not 
necessarily confined to these perimeters. Some national interpreters were prepared to cross 
the admiration but rather the sense of revelation that overcame the local interpreters when 
respondent NI 3 shared his sobering message with them:
 
“I accidentally happened to be at the meeting that the colonel had organised for the local 
interpreters after their camp had been searched. The interpreters were very emotional and 
embittered about the way the quartermaster had treated them after the Lucky incident. I as-
ked the interpreters who the person in question was and if his behaviour represented that 
of the other soldiers. When it turned out that they only harboured resentment against their 
quartermaster, I asked them about the number of local interpreters that were present on the 
base. They answered that their group consisted of 70 to 80 interpreters in total. ‘Now, tell me’, 
I asked them, ‘do all of these men behave correctly towards Dutch female soldiers?’ The in-
terpreters were taken aback by my question and looked down in embarrassment. ‘Well then’, 
I explained, ‘there are clearly idiots among you guys as well but this doesn’t necessarily have 
to count for the rest of you now does it?’” 
In this example, respondent NI 3, had a heart-to-heart talk with the local interpreters about 
their critical assessment of others while turning a blind eye to their own misbehaviour. By 
being straightforward and drawing a parallel between the soldier(s) and themselves, the 
respondent encouraged the local interpreters to question their own assumptions and to 
perceive the delicate situation from a more reasonable perspective (Felfe, Tartler & Liepmann, 
2004, 267). There is more depth to this act of ‘levelling’ than the ability to associate with 
others alone, it is the capacity to connect and engage others that fosters responsibility for 
one’s individual behaviour as well as that of the (sub)group to which one belongs. Whereas 
respondent NI 3 was a relative outsider to the group, strategies of idealized influence and 
intellectual stimulation can also be discerned among the members within the subgroup as 
well as the following quote of respondent M 21 illustrates: 
 
“The internal hierarchy among the local interpreters was based on age, charisma and skills. 
We had a couple of charismatic interpreters. There was ‘Grandpa’ who actually was more 
about my age of 35 years old. A very mild-mannered man. He didn’t speak perfect English 
but he really, really knew how to convey the feeling behind things. He also knew how things 
worked and got people to trust us. He got along with everybody also on patrols. Then there 
was Aziz [fictional name]. A category one interpreter. Perfect English and medically very qua-
lified. Just a really, really smart guy. And with charisma. Of course, they had their own strife 
among each other about who was the leader of the pack. From the first till the last day they 
always asked me: ‘Who’s the leader?’ and I would answer: ‘I am not going to say that. There 
are a couple of things I want all of you to do but it’s up to you how to get it done.’ With some 
directions from me of course. But when the interpreters wanted something to discuss with 
me, the others always let Grandpa or Aziz do the talking. Or Hans for that matter. He was also 
a category one interpreter. Perfect English but very mischievous. Whenever things needed to 
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imply a loss of status, this approach, however, is not supported by the local interpreters. 
Instead of affiliating with the national interpreters, the local interpreters chose to refrain 
from interaction with them. This attitude in turn might be explained by the assumption that 
actors are influenced by how their peers have formed attachments (Sauder, Lynn & Podolny, 
2012, 275). Since most of the interviewed local interpreters did not interact with the national 
interpreters, others probably followed suit in order to comply with the norms of the informal 
hierarchy. 
In sum, these findings demonstrate the complicated nature of the position of the 
interpreter within the military organization as well as the adjoining intricate dynamics 
of interaction between interpreters (among each other) and soldiers. How this all relates 
to the tasks and performance of the interpreter will be addressed in the fourth aspect of 
intervention. 
6. Intervention:  The Interpreter as Primus or Minimus Inter Pares?
Now that we have come to an understanding of the intricacies concerning the position and 
cooperation of the soldier and interpreter in the military organization, we should explore 
how interpreters actually perform their tasks since the activity of interpreting is inherently 
influenced by the situation in which it occurs (Inghilleri, 2003). A more thorough insight 
into these actions, however, first requires a clarification of the exact mission of the military 
organization in the specific context of stability operations.   
Western military organizations are typically designed for conventional battle against 
similarly organized opponents representing opposing states. Stabilizing conflict-torn 
societies, however, is a completely different task that requires intervening armies to adapt 
to this specific mission (Kitzen, 2012). Instead of fighting another state’s army, soldiers have 
to deal with elusive enemies hiding among an often highly fragmented local population. It 
is almost impossible to defeat such opponents by direct use of force as it is very difficult to 
distinguish them from civilians. Consequently, conducting stability operations requires a 
more indirect approach in which the military organization minimizes the use of force and 
adopts a so-called population-centric approach in order to secure the cooperation of the 
population. This strategy ideally denies the opponent the ability to seek ‘refuge’ among the 
population and in the long run even might make him irrelevant. In practice this implies 
the embracement of a broad spectrum of socio-economic, political, and security-oriented 
measures in order to enhance stability in a fragile local society. Adopting such an approach 
implies not only a departure from the narrow classical interpretation of the military as a 
means to deliver force, it also requires an adaptation to the specifics of the societal dynamics 
that dictate the conflict environment. The mission of the military organization in the context 
of stability operations in other words encompasses both the adoption of a population-
centric approach, as well as the adjustment of this approach to local circumstances. What 
organizational ‘boundaries’ in order to be able to influence the local interpreters through 
their behavior and charisma. Others, however, distanced themselves from the locals as NI 1 
explains: 
 
“I don’t have any contact with the local interpreters. I have my reasons for that. I am here for 
business. I keep my private life to myself.” 
The national interpreters were not the only ones who had their reservations. While some of 
the local interpreters showed a careful interest, a significant part of them, however, kept a 
rather indifferent attitude towards the national interpreters as the viewpoints of respectively 
respondents LI 3, LI 2, LI 4, and LI 7 illustrate: 
 
“We talk to them, yes of course. We sit with them, we just say hello hi to everyone, you know. 
But from their side we don’t get that much of a warm welcome, you know. They just stay in 
their own groups, you know and I don’t know but yeah we like to talk to them. Of course, we 
like to know how their life is in Dutch, you know and everything else.” 
“We have no contact with national interpreters because we don’t need them. We are working. 
We can work here and they are working in their section and we work here. We don’t speak 
with them, yes normally like hi, hello something like that, nothing else. We don’t want to keep 
contact with other people. Just we like to work here, go to the dining hall and back. We don’t 
need the contact with them. If it is necessary, then we should make contact with them.” 
“We don’t have a relationship with them because they live and stay separately with us. Just 
when we are face to face we just say hello to one another and we don’t have any other relati-
onship with each other.”
“We don’t know them and also we didn’t talk with them. We didn’t meet. We didn’t know 
each other so how can we talk with each other? (as if he’s offended only by the thought of it)” 
This seemingly contradictory positioning of engagement and disengagement between the 
national and international interpreters might also be explained by the strata of bureaucratic 
organizations. From that point of view, it would be logical to assume that members of a 
different status (with the exception of transformational leaders) do not communicate much 
with each other. Another explanation for the lack of interaction, however, might consist of 
the theory that a person’s status is inherently tied to the status of his associates and that status 
as a consequence can leak through relations. ‘In the eyes of third parties, high status actors 
affiliating with low-status actors would experience a drop in status whereas the opposite 
would be true for low-status actors (Sauder, Lynn & Podolny, 2012, 274).’ While this might 
hold true in case of the national interpreters whose relations with lower status actors might 
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reconnoitering the environment, translating the ICOM chat, and supporting staff meetings. 
In all of these scenario’s the interpreters were required to interpret on the spot in both 
directions, cover different topics and texts while simultaneously switching between the 
role of cultural, political and diplomatic intermediary (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2019, 474). 
Respondent NI 2 in this regard describes the range of his interpreting skills and actions as 
follows:
 
“The job of interpreting varies depending on the situation and the mission. At the PRT it’s 
strictly translation but at the BG, when going outside on a mission, it’s something completely 
different. (…) We give advice and keep a watchful eye. When there’s a conversation going on 
and someone makes a phone call, we’ll have to register that as well. We observe those who 
look ill-natured or unhappy and try to detect those who only are in it for the money. We have 
made some signs among each other for that. We’ll select a certain word which we’ll use once 
we notice that an individual is useless and wasting our time. We’ll then end the conversation. 
Sometimes when we’re out on patrol I just take up the role of force protection and let the 
local or embedded interpreter handle the conversation. I’ll then step back and watch what 
happens: what are the movements and gestures, what are the signals, do people agree or 
not or do they just say yes when they mean something else completely. When the interpreter 
misses out on something, I’ll step in and tell him: ‘You forgot to ask about that part’. After a 
couple of minutes, I’ll then ask the question myself and hear something more. That’s how we 
coordinate and achieve our goals. We won’t leave until then. I can tell by somebody’s face or 
accent, the words he uses, the way he speaks or the signals he receives, the movements he 
makes and the way he glances around whether there is someone who is watching him. We’ll 
then say: ‘Ok, thanks, we know enough.’ If possible, we’ll ask the man if he could find the time 
to come by half an hour later. Usually, they’ll say yes or suggest another time. We’ll make an 
appointment so that we can talk more freely. (…) There are also situations in which the inter-
preter can act as a mediator. When something happens, I’ll try to mediate and remain impar-
tial. I’ll do my best to please both parties but what’s most important is to solve the problem 
with the best solution possible. They know exactly what I do. I am screened. I work with them 
under the same flag. I’ll do whatever is expected of me in such a situation but I will of course 
always tell them about my game plan. I’ll ask them if they will let me handle the situation and 
usually they give me permission to do so.  I’ll inform them later about how I solved the case.” 
The experience of respondent NI 2 immediately makes clear that a conventional definition 
of interpreting does not fit the complex task assignment of interpreters in conflict zones. 
Different documents and notes have been disseminated throughout the Dutch military 
organization containing guidelines about the employment of interpreters in conflict 
zones. These documents, however, are rather ambiguous in their description of military 
interpreting. Their understanding of interpreter activities in conflict zones not always 
coincides and sometimes even contradicts each other. Whereas a publication of the Army 
exactly demanded this twofold challenge of the intervening forces and more particularly the 
Dutch military who were deployed to Afghanistan? Before delving into this matter on the 
tactical level of the military organization, it is important, however, to first briefly describe 
the context of the Western intervention in Afghanistan. 
The war in Afghanistan started on 7 October 2001 when US forces reacted to the 9-11 
attacks. Backed up by a tremendous amount of air power, special forces set out to hunt for 
the terrorists responsible for these attacks and those that had facilitated them. Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), as the war on terror was labeled, therefore not only aimed at 
wiping out Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization, but also at toppling the Taliban regime. The 
former proved rather difficult because Al-Qaeda is, despite Osama Bin Laden’s death in 2011, 
still active today. Ousting the Taliban from power, however, turned out be a more concrete 
aim which was quickly realized by December 6 when the senior leadership of this extremist 
organization opted to flee (Jones, 2009, 93-94).   
In the wake of the resulting power vacuum, the international community installed an 
interim government in Kabul protected by ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force. 
While this improved the situation in the capital, the situation in Afghanistan as a whole 
remained fragile. The international intervention in 2003, therefore, adopted a wider agenda 
for stabilizing the country. Under command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
foreign presence rapidly expanded throughout the country while adopting a comprehensive 
approach in which defense, diplomatic, and development efforts were combined in order 
to build and bolster the new Afghan state (Suhrke, 2011, 10). By 2006 this expansion process 
had been completed, and intervening forces were active in all of Afghanistan. This increased 
presence of the coalition forces coincided with the re-emergence of the Taliban as an 
insurgency (Giustozzi, 2008, 1-6). Consequently, soldiers found themselves entangled in a 
complex stability operation in which they were required to simultaneously protect civilians, 
reconcile war-torn local communities, promote good governance, foster development, 
and target insurgent networks (Kilcullen, 2013, 142-143). The Dutch TFU mission was no 
exception to this (Kitzen, Rietjens, Osinga, 2013, 183-186). Daily business in Uruzgan province 
encompassed various tasks ranging from dealing with local leaders and providing assistance 
to grass roots communities to fighting the Taliban – and all of this could occur within a couple 
of hours during a single patrol. The operational background against which the cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters took place, therefore, was highly demanding as tasks were 
almost continuously shifting for all of the involved.  
6.1 The Letter or Spirit of Interpreting? The Identity Crises of Interpretation
The actions of the interpreter during the mission could take place in various situations 
ranging for example from establishing agreements with contractors in and outside of the 
base, assisting the Dutch military and ANA soldiers, accompanying patrols into the green, 
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of definition and training could easily result in too high an expectation on the side of the 
military and sometimes insecurity at the side of the interpreters. Respondent NI 7 explains 
the strain this put on the mutual cooperation as follows:
 
“You listen to the ICOM [radio/transceiver] but it is very difficult to hear everything they’re 
saying. I explained to them that I couldn’t follow all that was being said. I meant of course that 
I couldn’t hear everything but they subsequently interpreted my remark as if I couldn’t under-
stand the conversations on the ICOM. You have to write and listen at the same time. I wasn’t 
thinking about nice or important words.  I just wrote the words down. They told me that my 
level of writing skills was very poor but the Taliban aren’t stupid. They use simple words. They 
don’t say ‘put that IED over there’ or have elaborate conversations about their plans. They 
talk about ‘things’ so I’ll write down ‘things’. They said: ‘He only knows the word things’. I 
was really sad about that. That person hadn’t said anything to me and now he writes such an 
evaluation about me. I just write down what I hear. They might mean something else by that 
but I don’t interpret the information. I could get in trouble when I get it all wrong. Sometimes 
they use the word ‘camel’ while they actually mean bomb or something like that.”
The quote illustrates that the intervention of the national interpreter in this situation did 
not meet the standard of what his military colleagues expected of him when listening to the 
ICOM chat. While the respondent, out of fear for misinterpreting, chose to literally translate 
what he was hearing, the soldiers on the other hand expected the interpreter to convey the 
meaning of what was said on the intercom. The task-conflict that arose from this discrepancy 
was caused by the anxiety which the interpreter experienced when dealing with what might 
be sensitive and crucial information and the frustration the soldiers experienced for missing 
out on information that could possibly and potentially endanger the safety and success of 
the mission.  Both in other words were intent on a careful handling of information, but their 
expectations about how to secure this created a miscommunication which eventually also 
negatively affected their cooperation.       
     This specific task-conflict took place on the slippery slope between the technical and 
strategic level of intervention. The interpreter in this example restricted himself to the 
task of bringing ‘the terms and concepts in the source text abroad with a minimum loss’. 
He in other words tried to make the sense of the message clear, which is composed of an 
explicit written or spoken part and an implicit part which is unsaid but meant by the other 
and understood by the listener (Katan, 2011, 37). Unfortunately, the interpreter failed to do 
so because he could not grasp all of what was said on the ICOM. The soldiers, however, not 
only expected the interpreter to disclose the implicit part of the message, they also wanted 
him to interpret on a strategic level. The interpreter had to clarify sentences in the message 
in which information regarding the subject was missing. The difficulty with ill-formed 
sentence structures, however, is that these cannot be translated literally because that would 
result in incomplete interpretation or mis-interpretation (Katan, 2011, 37). Therefore, the 
Commander (Commandant-Landstrijdkrachten, C-LAS) for example acknowledged the 
interpreter as a valuable source for gathering intelligence, the Office of Interpreter Services 
(BTD) explicitly advised against such practices (C-LAS, 2012, 1; Bureau Tolkdiensten Defensie, 
2009, 7). Irrespective of the varying interpretations represented in these official documents, 
the reality on the ground was that soldiers and interpreters had to pull all the stops to face 
the military and civilian challenges of the stability operation. 
The notion that the activity of interpreting calls for a more unconventional approach 
seems to gain more support over the last two decades as scholars have begun ‘to question 
the traditional dogma of interpreting as a passive, impartial, ‘black box’ event’ (Katan, 
2011, 33). In this academic debate interpreters are described as ‘social’ and interpretation as 
‘mediation’, ‘interaction’ and ‘intervention’. The question, for scholars as well as interpreters, 
remains, however, what these labels mean and this in turn lies at the heart of the interpreter’s 
dilemma (Katan, 34). While the debate about what interpreters can and should account for is 
still ongoing, there is consensus about the fact that interpretation and translation inherently 
implies intervention (Baker, 2008, 16; Katan, 2011, 34). It is therefore not a matter of whether 
or not interpreters intervene but how and when they do so.   
Typically, interpreter behaviour is the result of a set of enacted strategies in a particular 
environment supported by accepted professional and social norms about what is right and 
appropriate and this again logically depends on the role, status and identity of the interpreter 
(Katan, 2011, 35). These aspects have already been addressed in the previous paragraph 
but their influence will be noticeable once more when we continue to further explore the 
cooperation of soldiers and interpreters in order to shed light on how interpreters actually 
intervene in the context of military missions. 
6.2 Interpreting: To the Heart of the Military Matter
The coverage of the war in Afghanistan in both conflict and translation studies and the media 
has not only contributed to the acknowledgement of the complexity of the population-
centric approach adopted by ISAF, it has also emphasized how crucial the presence of 
language mediation in such operations is. All of the respondents unanimously confirmed 
the importance of having an interpreter with the team. Both the military as well as the 
interpreters were straightforward in their understanding that the mission could not succeed 
without the intervention of interpreters. There was, however, less mutual agreement about 
what the tasks of the interpreter should comprise of. This is hardly any surprise, since a lack 
of definition has characterized the interpreter’s working environment throughout history 
(Gallai, 2019, 207). Whereas the national interpreters in this regard received some instruction 
in interpreting skills during their pre-deployment training, the local interpreters did not 
receive such instructions and had to learn how to approach their task assignment on the 
job (Fitchett, 2019, 195). Combined with the highly demanding operational theatre, this lack 
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pragmatic meaning and face (Katan, 2011, 39). This makes it sometimes difficult for the 
interpreter to comply with the (formal) instructions he has been given. The interpreter, 
after all, has to tie his intervention to the needs of the military, the interlocutor and the 
circumstances and these obviously are not always compatible with the professional norms 
of the job description. When it comes to military interpreting, being a professional, in other 
words means that the interpreter of all things needs to be a strategist himself who can deal 
with the uncertainties that inevitably seem part of the job. The interpreters who were able to 
pull this off, were highly appreciated and wanted by the soldiers as respondents M 5 illustrate:
 
“We don’t command the language and the local people don’t speak English, so it is crucial to 
have an interpreter when we go outside of the gate. We had this one local interpreter who 
was of incredible value to us. He was intelligent, spoke English fluently and had the uncanny 
capacity to sense the hidden agendas of our interlocutors. He was just a really good interpre-
ter who always joined us on patrol. He was also present during the many combat situations 
we encountered. We didn’t know at the time, though, that he was secretly planning his way 
out because he didn’t return from his leave. The impact of the TIC’s probably got the better 
of him.” 
Besides the importance of cultural and linguistic knowledge and experience that have been 
mentioned earlier, this last quote also demonstrates that it takes courage to interpret in 
the operational theatre. While most of the local interpreters according to a ‘private think 
piece’ of the 44 Battle Group (2007) were ‘young and enthusiastic and seemed to like ‘action’ just like 
the soldiers’, they were, however, not military trained. Typically, interpreters were ordinary 
citizens who had directly witnessed the atrocity of the conflict. Joining the troops, however, 
meant that interpreters emotionally had to cope with the constant threats of opponents who 
perceived them as traitors as well as the probability that they could be involved in combat 
situations. This exposure to violence consequently could cause interpreters to develop 
adverse experiences, psychological distress and post-traumatic reactions (Soeters, 2018, 157-
158; Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2019, 476). The anxiety which could built up in interpreters 
therefore should not be overlooked nor underestimated, because such experiences, when 
going unnoticed by the military, could give rise to negative emotions toward the out-
group such as fear and hatred. An example of how such feelings of resentment can affect 
the cooperation between the interpreter and soldiers, will be more closely examined in the 
paragraph about the final aspect of perception.   
All in all, one can conclude that interpreting in conflict zones means more than just 
a transmission of messages from one language to another (Gallai, 2019, 215). It calls for a 
deeper strategic understanding (Katan, 2011) The intervention of the military interpreter, 
after all, takes place at the heart of the operational theatre in which different parties each 
have a stake in the course of events. Precisely these dynamic working conditions designate 
soldiers needed the interpreter to fill in the gaps of the ill-formed word ‘things’ because 
they otherwise would not be able to meet the challenges of the ‘Who, what, where or how’ 
demands of the mission. Their focus on the strategic level, unfortunately made them rather 
insensitive to the difficulties this type of intervention implied for the interpreter. Respondent 
NI 4 describes the challenges of his task assignment as follows: 
 
“The task of the interpreter depends on the people. Some soldiers want to know everything 
immediately and others want a literal translation, word by word. And some only want to know 
what´s important. But some soldiers trust you and give you the time to talk to people. You can 
then tell them afterwards what the intention of the conversation was. It all depends on the 
soldier or officer. The PRT sometimes expects you to translate literally while others tell you 
only to convey the meaning of the conversation. Sometimes you just can´t make any sense out 
of the words and then I’ll have to explain to them what they mean. One time, I translated li-
terally but they couldn´t make anything of it. When you translate words for example, the mea- 
ning is completely different. They talk about one thing while they mean something different 
all the same. You have received instructions to translate in short sentences but sometimes 
someone tells you a whole story. You might think he´s forgotten all about what the conver-
sation was about but at the end he´ll eventually comes back to the original topic. Sometimes 
I tell them to give the other some space to talk because at that moment I don´t know what 
he´s saying myself but eventually I see where he’s getting at. He goes this way, but means that 
way. They turn and turn. That´s tough enough already but where I come from it´s even more 
difficult.” 
While the intervention of the respondent listening to the ICOM might apparently seem to 
resemble the transactional approach of conference interpreting, in which language signs have 
a transparent referential function, the task of the interpreter in this case was complicated by 
the concealed nature of the messages. Interpreting on a strategic level in electronic warfare 
therefore implies not only the capability of the interpreter to clarify any indistinctness in the 
communication, it also asks for a solid knowledge of the strategies and (code) language of 
the opponent. A task that preferably requires training into the matter or at least some insight 
gleaned from evidence-based experience. The example of the respondent working for the 
PRT illustrates yet another element which increases the difficulty of interpreting in stability 
operations and which has been recognized by most of the respondents. The interpreter had 
to be able to adapt his level of intervention to the personal approach of the military. Some of 
the soldiers were very directive (instrumental) in their orders while others moved along with 
the knowledge and skills of their interpreters on how to proceed with the conversation, the 
interlocutor or the situation.  
The population-centric approach of the stability operation already presupposes 
interactional communication with the local people. In contrast to transactional 
communication, this type of communication for example also involves connotation, 
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but an agent who ameliorates military strategies by smoothening the communication be-
tween interlocutors. I bring the cooperation between ISAF and the local village to a higher 
and more efficient level.”
The quote provides an example of an interpreter who tries to be as impartial as possible while 
his interventions inherently demonstrate the opposite. In doing so, the respondent displayed 
the over-romanticized role of the interpreter as a peace-giving enabler of communication 
who might have a blindspot for the nature and consequences of his interventions (Baker, 
2005, 11). Rather than trying to be invisible, interpreters should acknowledge that they 
intervene ‘at the heart of interaction and that these narratives shape their lives as well as the 
lives of those for whom and between whom they interpret’ (Baker, 2005, 12). While some of 
the interpreters had yet come to terms with their visibility and hence partiality, others, who 
were less weary of showing their colors, took their task of interpreting to the other side of 
the spectrum. Respondent NI 8 in this regard did not hesitate to actively intervene in the 
military approach: 
 
“Almost immediately after my arrival I intervened with the mission team. I told them how 
they should approach the local population. At a certain time, they trusted me and from that 
moment on they began to ask me for advice themselves. But in the beginning I just stepped 
in because I saw that things didn´t go well, that they made mistakes actually. Without being 
asked to, I intervened and told them what my opinion was. The influence of my position, 
however, has grown gradually over time. In the beginning my cultural, regional and tribal 
knowledge was limited but I have developed myself into becoming an expert with regard to 
knowledge, contacts and so on.”
The quote demonstrates that any newness to the job did not keep respondent NI 8 from 
criticizing and advising the soldiers. His influence, however, was only truly established 
when he managed to increase his expertise and connections over time. The quality of his 
reputation and ties, therefore, eventually earned him the trust of the soldiers and locals. The 
quote also demonstrates that ‘the interpreters’ relationship to war is up close and personal 
and in demand of ethical decisions at all stages of the conflict’ (Gallai, 2019, 217). Another 
example of such personally driven intervention, is given by respondent NI 2 who stepped 
forward to advocate and represent the Dutch troops in a situation in which local villagers 
we’re against their presence:
 
“The job of interpreting varies depending on the situation and the mission. At the PRT it’s 
strictly translation but at the BG, when going outside on a mission, it’s something completely 
different. I have joined many missions and have experienced successful operations. I had a lot 
of contact with the local population at the time and it happened that their behaviour could 
change within fifteen minutes of time. They really could change from angry people into happy 
the interpreter to become ‘the man in the middle’ who must bring into balance all of the 
responsibilities and expectations this unique position holds. 
6.3. Interpreting: A Case of Concealing or Showing True Colours?
Academia has long believed that interpreters should be invisible and neutral by placing 
themselves outside of the interaction of the interlocutors in order to prevent their personal 
views and attitudes from influencing the course of interaction (Jones & Askew, 2014, 172). 
Now scholars of translation and interpretation studies, however, have gradually come to 
acknowledge that this idea no longer is tenable because it does not take into account the 
complex nature of the communicative process in which each person subconsciously installs 
their own beliefs, knowledge, cultural conditioning and attitudes (Jones & Askew, 2014, 172-
173). The interpreter is no exception to that rule and his own style of language, influenced 
by his personal narrative, will therefore inevitably affect the way he communicates and 
translates. Even to his best intentions, the interpreter in other words cannot be neutral 
or invisible. On the contrary, as has been illustrated throughout this study, he is an active 
participant in a language-mediated encounter which takes place in a territory that is neutral 
neither (Jones & Askew, 2014, 173).  The military interpreter, after all, is a facilitator who must 
actively pursue his commander’s objective (Fitchett, 2019, 196). Therefore, the interpreter 
simply cannot place himself outside or in between narratives because the military requires 
him to be loyal towards the mission and this obviously makes it difficult for him to be 
considered impartial (Baker, 2005, 12; Fitchett, 2019, 197; Gallai, 2019, 217).    
Although his ‘allegiance’ to the military already renders the question of whether or not 
the interpreter is neutral as irrelevant, some of the respondents nevertheless tried to uphold 
the idea of invisibility in their interventions. Respondent NI 1 describes this as follows:
 
“I have to translate the questions that are asked. I try to do that to the best of my ability. I can’t 
tell anyone how they should answer because they need to do that themselves.  I only translate 
in that moment. I have to translate the answers as given to me by the commander. I can’t in-
fluence the commander nor the conversation because that affects the military operation and 
that precisely is the responsibility of the commander.”
The interpreter pursues neutrality by trying not to interfere with the business of the 
commander. Unaware of his own ambivalence towards the matter, however, respondent NI 
1 almost in the same breath demonstrates how futile such an attempt to remain invisible is: 
 
“An interpreter must be honest at all times and should not beat about the bush. He can im-
prove the communication by telling soldiers how certain questions should be rephrased for 
better effect. In that respect, the interpreter is not a mere parrot who repeats after the soldier 
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level of internal solidarity among sets of actors linked by the broker (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 
142). Both dimensions affect the process of brokerage. Bias on the one hand affects the 
process of brokerage because brokers who are tied more to one party than another may be 
less neutral than brokers who are truly in the middle (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 143). This of course 
is clearly the case with interpreters who are contracted by the military and who therefore are 
expected to act both on and in behalf of the troops. Cohesion on the other hand, emphasizes 
the relations, varying from highly to weakly connected, among the actors in a setting.  We 
have already ascertained that networks with strong ties have a strong sense of shared fate 
and solidarity. These feelings of cohesion, however, could also cause members of a strong 
community to belief that the broker, or more in particular the interpreter who acts as one, is 
not part of the group and that his motives therefore should be received with skepticism.  
The level of cohesion in a community might explain why brokers are so often perceived 
as corrupt (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 144). If members from a cohesive group suspect that the 
broker does not conform to their value system, either because he acts out of self-interest 
or because he seems to be part of another value system, they might doubt his allegiance to 
the community and therefore his morality. Brokers, therefore, may very well be viewed as 
untrustworthy because they are not really part of the moral community. Because of their 
position as outsiders, brokers might not feel themselves restricted by moral conventions 
and this could lead them to act idiosyncratically or in their own self-interest (Stovel & Shaw, 
2012, 144). Both the behavior of the broker as well as how his actions are perceived by others, 
therefore, are important in whether or not the broker is viewed as an outsider who does not 
belong to the group and who therefore cannot be trusted. This aspect of perception will be 
further analyzed in the next paragraph. 
In anthropological and political science, cultural brokers are described as 
persons who can bridge the gap between traditional or local communities and 
regional or national governments. The capacity of the cultural broker to connect 
disparate parties stems from his joint acceptance by the stakeholders (Stovel & Shaw, 
2012, 150). Whereas the spiritual leader most probably accepted the interpreter’s 
brokerage as a result of their shared language, kinship and cultural background, the 
commander accepted his intervention most probably on grounds of his knowledge 
of the military mission. In a masterly and emphatic way, the interpreter was able to 
make a deal by ‘bringing persons with different interests together and showing them 
how, in some setting or context, their interests coincide’ (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 149). 
In accordance with Simmel’s analysis, the interpreter, therefore, mediated as a true 
‘tertius iungens’ (‘the third who joins’) (Soeters, 2018, 97). He aligned the military 
need for a mission post with the villagers’ need for safety and facilities and as such 
he realized a shared ground that both parties otherwise could not have established 
for and/or by themselves. Having indirectly contributed to the basic living conditions 
of the villagers, the interpreter’s reputation was now one of admiration instead of 
suspicion. In that light, both the examples of respondents NI 8 and NI 2 illustrate 
people who were pleased with the soldiers. In Deh Rawod, for example, lives a spiritual leader 
who was afraid of the OMF. Just one or two weeks before, they had hanged a person on a tree 
nearby. The people were afraid and against the placement of a Dutch mission within their vil-
lage. I asked if I could have a talk with that man. I knew prayer time was over and that it there-
fore couldn’t be used as an excuse to deny the request because there was plenty of time until 
next prayer. At the beginning the villagers were reserved and unwilling. The mission comman-
der asked me if the people were angry and what else he could ask them. I said to him: ‘Give me 
five minutes. I will translate everything afterwards, but let me handle the conversation.’ So, I 
talked to the spiritual leader and broke the ice by sharing small talk and by making formal and 
light-hearted jokes. I then said to him: ‘Listen, we know you are afraid of the OMF’. You have 
to realize that I was talking to a spiritual leader and that I had to address him on his own level. 
I said to the man: ‘OK, you are a very spiritual man and people come to see you from Kandahar 
and other places far and away. Muslims are never afraid, except for the wrath of God. So, why 
then be afraid of the Taliban?’ The man answered and said: ‘You are right.’ I then said to him: 
‘We are not here to occupy your country. We are here temporarily for just a couple of years. We 
are here for safety and reconstruction, nothing else. If you want to go to mosque for prayer 
ten or twenty times, feel free. That’s your own business, we don’t mind. We only want to make 
the area safer and help people out who are very poor and have no drinking water. We see 
children with no shoes on their feet and women who need help.’ I then started talking about 
my own women and said: ‘If anything happened to my mother or sister I would bring them to 
a doctor or a hospital to prevent things from getting worse. It is not forbidden to see a doctor, 
so what would you think of the idea of having such facilities present here in the region?’ The 
man answered by saying: ‘Yes, you’re right. It would be a good thing.’ ‘Well’, I said, ‘That’s our 
intention. That’s why we are here. The only thing we ask from you is to send someone to in-
form us when the Taliban is around in this region. Don’t go yourself but let a child come to us. 
We’ll know what to do then. You can leave the rest up to us. Don’t worry about that.’ And so, 
within fifteen minutes of time the people were ever so happy. They started to smile and make 
jokes. The commander asked me what I had said to the people and I explained to the villagers 
that I had to translate our conversation to him. He was pleased, very pleased indeed. Right 
away, after two weeks we started building our mission and that mission has been there ever 
since. When other colleagues visit that man, he will still ask: ‘How is he doing? When does he 
come round here again? Please, invite him to come for tea when you see him’.” 
This example clearly demonstrates that the interpreter intervened as a broker by spanning 
the gap between the Dutch soldiers and the villagers. As described earlier in this chapter 
brokerage can be understood as ‘the process of connecting actors in systems of social, 
economic, or political relations in order to facilitate access to valued resources’ (Stovel & 
Shaw, 2012, 141). Situations in which brokerage occur can be characterized by the dimensions 
of bias and cohesion.  Bias in this regard refers to the extent to which the broker is relationally, 
socially or informationally closer to one party than the other, while cohesion refers to the 
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could be perceived as a potential and valuable source of situational awareness. This concept 
is of great importance for the military organization because soldiers need to be able to 
comprehend what is going on in their surrounding environment in relation to the task they 
need to accomplish (Rietjens, 2019, 4).  
In accordance with the three levels of Endsley’s situational awareness theory, interpreters 
could be of value when it comes respectively to the perception of the elements in the 
environment, comprehension of the  situation, and projection of future status (Rietjens, 
2019, 8-13). The interpreter can assist the military in perceiving the characteristics and 
dynamics of the environment. Especially in situations in which the troops need to operate 
in unfamiliar territory, interpreters could, because of their broad palate of knowledge, 
assist supervisors in obtaining relevant information. Secondly, the interpreter can help 
comprehend this environmental information by assessing its value and integrating this 
into the mission strategy. The interpreter can provide a unique perspective on the conflict 
because he is able to interpret the situation from both a Western as well as a local perspective. 
As such, the interpreter can make sense of a situation that otherwise could have caused for 
misunderstanding as the following example of NI 4 illustrates: 
 
“I went outside on patrol and there was an imam and some people. I had to talk with them 
and the imam grabbed my sunglasses. My military colleague said to me: ‘I think you just lost 
your glasses’. I told him that I knew what was going on and that it was alright that the imam 
had took them from me. I would tell him all about it later. The imam thoroughly inspected 
the sunglasses and I said to him: ‘Look what a nice pair of glasses this is to protect your eyes 
from the sun.’ The imam peered through the glasses and said in agreement: ‘Well, yes these 
are nice indeed.’ My colleague asked me what just had happened and I explained to him that 
rumour got around that you could see people naked with these kinds of glasses. By trying 
them on, the imam for himself could experience that it was just a pair of ordinary sunglasses. 
So, we solved the matter rather easily. I think that the people had heard about it and rumours 
tend to spread fast. That’s why I let the local people experiment with the sunglasses so that 
they know they’re harmless.”
The above-mentioned situation might seem innocent, but it could have had far-reaching 
consequences if the interpreter had not intervened. One could easily imagine that the 
locals would keep the Dutch troops at a distance if they believed the rumors to be true. 
The presence of the troops in that instance might have been experienced by the locals as 
a face threatening act which logically would have damaged the reputation of the Dutch 
military forces in the region. Who, after all, wants to do business with or be protected by 
foreign soldiers who have seen your private parts? Through his empathetic assessment, the 
interpreter, however, helped to defuse the potentially harmful situation. This brings us to the 
third level of situational awareness in which the outcome of the knowledge of the first two 
levels and learned experience lead to a certain type of action (Rietjens, 2019, 13). By taking 
another result of successful brokerage. Brokers often become powerful as a result 
of their ability to facilitate resources and opportunities or by gaining access to an 
increasing number of valuable people or information (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 146; 149). 
Although clearly not the case in the given examples, the broker, however, might also 
become the ‘tertius gaudens’ (‘the ‘laughing third one’) who profits from both sides 
and is able to manipulate them (Soeters, 2018, 97).  This type of self-indulged and 
malicious brokerage, of course only fuels the suspicion and mistrust that others 
already might have towards brokers and more specific interpreters.
Whereas the benefits for brokers could exist for example of status, gratitude, access to 
opportunities and resources or even bribes, there is also a potential downside to brokerage. 
When attempts to brokerage fail, the reputation and the status of the intermediary suffers 
great damage (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 148). The risk of how easily brokerage can break down, 
might therefore explain why people feel reluctant to act as a broker.  While brokers in those 
situations bear most of the brunt, stakeholders are also negatively affected because failed 
brokerage results in fewer opportunities and resources (Stovel & Shaw, 2012, 153).  Despite the 
caution which needed to be taken into consideration, most interpreters and soldiers were 
nevertheless prepared to take the risk that was involved in this type of intervention. After 
all, in complex conflict operations such like ISAF, knowledge of the local language, customs, 
people and mission environment is pivotal and the insight and expertise of the interpreter 
for that matter indispensable. The linguistic and cultural knowledge of interpreters did not 
only allow them to take up the role of a broker, it also enabled them to act as an informant. 
It is precisely this aspect of their job which made the phrase ‘We are the eyes and ears of ISAF’ 
popular among interpreters. Respondent M 32 in this instance gives an example of the 
alertness of his interpreter:      
 
“My [local] interpreters were active on the job. If they noticed something strange in the con-
versation they would always tell me that. Just like they would always inform me when some-
thing had caught their eye. During a negotiation, my interpreter once whispered that I should 
watch a particular person in the company more closely. He suspected that the guy wasn’t an 
Afghan but a Pakistani and that I should pay attention to him when he was asked a question 
because he probably would not be able to answer it. It turned out that my interpreter was 
right about that.” 
The example demonstrates that the interpreter was a sharp and careful observer. He used 
his knowledge to assess the situation and then discreetly passed that information on to the 
commander. Without this piece of intel, the military probably would not have been aware of 
the existence of the Pakistani let alone thought about what his presence in that particular 
situation could have meant. By sharing his information, the interpreter, not only contributed 
to a more complete comprehension of the environment but also to the military’s decision-
making process how to adequately respond towards such a situation. Interpreters therefore 
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different kind of advice. There’s also like ICOM, there’s enemy talking. I should explain to him 
this, that and that because there’s real danger but if there’s two bottles of water and he wants 
to get one bottle and one to leave there. No, I don’t want to ask for him why he not also wants 
to get the other bottle. This is not my job. But there’s also advice, if there’s anything and I 
suspect for the guy when we are on a mission I also tell him: ‘Sir, can you accept my question?’  
and he says yes, I say: ‘I am suspectful of that guy, we should search him’. There is many kind 
of advice. If we are suspectful, we should do it then.” 
“I didn’t advice anyone. No one asked me about it, so how can I advise them? No one asked 
me about this. I would like to give advice. You people, you are here to cooperate with Afghan 
people and the most important is for you to know about the Afghan culture. The Afghan cul-
ture that’s the most important for you. If you want to speak with anyone, you must know how 
can you speak with Afghan people. For example, someone, the Dutch army for example, they 
will move formation and they want to search the house. The area where they are, they have 
to knock the door, then someone will answer it and they are allowed to go the inside of the 
house. It’s also respect, honour you can call it. And if you do it this way, it is the better way and 
you will win in Afghanistan. But it’s not our task to give advice. Our task is only translation. If 
someone asks us ‘How can we do this?’ we will advise him otherwise we want to keep to our 
task.”
Although there are plenty of examples of interpreter interventions that would justify a 
more profound involvement of interpreters in the decision-making process, soldiers tend 
to follow the conventions of the military organization. These regulations, however, most 
often don’t correspond with the wide variety of task assignments that interpreters actually 
fulfill during the mission. Two proposals for a new and specific code for interpreters 
have attempted to address this issue, respectively the Conflict Zone Field Guide for Civilian 
Translators/Interpreters and Users of Their Services developed by Red T (a non-profit organization 
that advocates the protection of translators and interpreters in high-risk settings), the 
International Federation of Translators (FIT) and the International Association of Conference 
Interpreters, and an ethical code developed by Moreno Bello (Fitchett, 2019, 196; Gallai, 2019, 
215-217). Both documents are intended as guidelines for the basic rights, responsibilities 
and linguistic challenges of interpreters and their users. The main point of criticism about 
these publications, however, is that they emphasize the neutrality and impartiality of the 
interpreter.  Thereby these codes fail to acknowledge the complexities of interpreting in the 
daily reality of conflict zones. Considering the absence of any real(istic) guidelines and the 
fact that interpreters are agents by the nature of their very profession, interpreters typically 
have to rely on self-legislation in order to decide what is the right course of action (Gallai, 
2019, 218). These conditions of course are far from ideal and confront interpreters as well 
as soldiers with ethical challenges. Interpreters, after all, have to ‘calibrate’ their actions 
according to their own moral compass, whereas soldiers have to decide whether or how and 
action soldiers gain an increased understanding of their operational environment which 
consequently enables them to adapt more efficiently to situations. This approach, however, 
requires a constant reflection on actions undertaken rather than accepting the environment 
as a static given (Rietjens, 2019, 13). In the following example, respondent M 49 explains why 
he reserves time to reflect with his interpreter on the interaction with the local population: 
 
“Interpreters are of value when it comes to understanding culture. You can ask them about 
the meaning of the headgear of our interlocutors, etiquette and appropriate behavior. After 
meetings, I always talk to my interpreter. We reflect on the conversation and the interlocutor. 
The interpreter explains how I should interpret non-verbal communication like for instance 
facial expression. Some interpreters, however, take their initiative too far by wanting to point 
out which individuals are Taliban. I have my reservations about that because I want to remain 
objective. I want to make my own judgement irrespective of what the interpreter thinks. I 
have to keep an open mind and need to figure out for myself what the interlocutor wants. I 
want to gather my own information even if necessary by ‘the hang yourself’ method.”
The example, however, demonstrates a certain ambiguity in the respondent’s appreciation 
of the skills of the interpreter. The commander acknowledges the interpreter as a valuable 
source when it comes to cultural and communicational awareness. This is probably the 
reason why he includes the advice of the interpreter into the reflective process. Reflection 
is viewed as a method that helps professionals to develop a better understanding of practice 
through questioning and investigating ones’ actions and their consequences. Reflection on 
practice has furthermore been recognized to be important for sustaining one’s professional 
health and competence and more specifically the ability to exercise professional judgment 
(Loughran, 2002, 34). With regard to the latter, however, it is interesting to notice that when 
it comes to ‘targeting’ the opponent, the respondent relies on his own judgement rather 
than that of the interpreter. The example of course is quite extreme but it nevertheless 
demonstrates that the interpreter’s opinion or expertise on situational awareness is not 
always taken into consideration by soldiers. Explanations for such a display of ‘reluctance’ 
towards the interpreter’s influence might be found in (a combination of ) factors such as 
strategy, procedures and organizational, cultural and personal norms. Whereas this kind of 
dismissal doesn’t stop some of the interpreters from forging ahead, it brings others, who are 
less assertive, to a mere standstill. This perhaps is even more true for local interpreters who 
as a consequence of their cultural background are not expected to give unsolicited advice as 
is illustrated by respectively respondents LI 1 and LI 8:  
 
“I would like to give advice about my culture. I want to import to him to explain to him our rule, 
our culture, our religion. If he want ask for me, if he do not want to ask for me. For example, 
the teacher did not ask for me the question. You gave answer to that question? No, you should 
not give the answer. If the teacher asks the question, you should answer to him. But there’s 
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normal according to the military culture (Wong & Gerras, 2019, 22). The consequences of 
such negative attributions for the interaction and more specifically the cooperation between 
the involved parties will be addressed throughout this paragraph.
Goffman, moreover, explains that ‘persons often do not know what game they are in or 
whom they are playing for until they have already played. Even when they know about their 
own position, they may be unclear as to whom, if anybody, they are playing against, and, if 
anyone, what his game is, let alone his framework of possible moves’ (Goffman, 1969, 119). 
Logically, these difficulties will be even more poignant in conflict zones like Afghanistan 
where nothing is as it seems. For instance, local villagers who support the troops might 
only do so because they are compelled by the opponent as not to arouse suspicion. Another 
example of uncertainty that can be experienced during the mission is one that affects the 
interaction between soldiers and interpreters. The previous sections have already showed 
that military troops depend on the intervention of the interpreter. This dependency, 
however, is often perceived with ambivalence because the qualities of the interpreter might 
also be considered a threat itself (Bogers, Van Dijk en Heeren-Bogers, 2010, 162). Who, 
after all, knows whether the interpreter is a fair player or that the gathered information is 
complete or safe with him? It is under these critical and uncertain conditions that soldiers, 
interpreters and local civilians have to interact with each other. Respondent M 16 in this 
respect points out a number of fundamental issues that complicate the cooperation between 
soldiers and the interpreters: 
 
“The interpreter will always in some way remain an outsider because of his descent. Just like 
we will always be outsiders in their country. He belongs more to the country than we do. 
And that of course puts a certain strain to what extent the interpreter is part of the unit. I do 
think we should involve the interpreter more in what we do but as long as there is no efficient 
research on OPSEC, the position of interpreters therein, and apparent leaks of information or 
circulation of intelligence – we will always fall back on it and will always look at interpreters 
suspiciously. If we don’t know where we are with interpreters it will always hum around.  It’s a 
sort of conventional wisdom on which we fall back. And sometimes I think that we are letting 
ourselves getting a bit too carried away about security. See, that’s the problem with trust. Like 
I said, the soldiers’ trust is compartmentalized but real trust is unconditional. You either trust 
someone or you don’t. And as long as there’s no absolute trust, interpreters will not be a part 
of the military unit and remain outsiders. Our soldiers of course do not receive all of the in-
formation as well because our security policy holds that we share our information with as few 
people as possible. It’s not that we don’t trust our soldiers to keep the information to them-
selves but we just know that soldiers unintentionally do mention information in telephone 
calls, letters, weblogs and so on. It’s this knowledge that keeps us from sharing information 
with our soldiers. But it’s different when it comes to interpreters. We don’t trust them or we 
do not trust them enough because we think that they will leak information. I think you need to 
have a big heart to trust someone unconditionally. Let me refer to the Americans once more. A 
to what extent following the interpreter’s compass is sensible and feasible with regard to the 
military mission and organization. 
This tension between freedom and responsibility ultimately revolves around control. 
Individuals, according to Goffman’s analysis, tend to manage interactions by trying to 
control the responses made by others. All participants in interaction, therefore, play their 
own game and all players have their own particular interests (Soeters, 2018, 95). In pursuit 
of their interests, people and in this case more in particular soldiers and interpreters (as 
well locals), have to deal with individuals and parties who appear to either help or hinder. 
These dealings in turn compel people to assess and calculate the capacities and intentions of 
others (Goffman, 1969, 3). How these assumptions come about and how they influence the 
interaction during the mission will be further discussed in the following paragraph about 
perception. 
7. Perception
Stability operations in foreign countries like ISAF are exemplary for the soldier’s dependency 
on the linguistic, cultural, social and environmental knowledge of interpreters who for their 
part most often are not familiar with the skills and drills of the military. This paragraph 
seeks to understand how soldiers and interpreters perceived their collaboration and how 
this experience influenced their interaction. Goffman in this regard describes interactions 
as an ‘information game’ in which participants try to control the perceived significance of 
their own actions as well as attempt to uncover the real meanings behind the actions of other 
participants. Participants, for that matter, do not just act in interactions, that is managing 
the impressions that are given and given off, they also observe and interrogate. During this 
process, participants are aware of the fact that others are doing the same and therefore all 
of the involved will wonder whether the other is providing an accurate image of themselves 
(McCoy, 2017, 261).    
Although Goffman often applies the game metaphor in his analyses of social interaction, 
he nevertheless points out that it is a very strong simplification of reality which doesn’t take 
into consideration salient issues like for instance the existence of norms (Swedberg, 2001, 
312). Especially, in complicated intercultural interactions such as the cooperation between 
soldiers and interpreters, different values influence how one perceives the behavior and 
intentions of others. A local interpreter who prefers saving face to giving a direct ‘no’ for 
an answer, for example, might be seen as sly or evasive by soldiers who are not familiar 
with the Afghan culture while in fact the interpreter was demonstrating perfectly normal 
behavior according to his cultural frame of reference. The same goes for the commander 
who for example out of habit approaches the interpreter in the same blunt and unforgiving 
way as his soldiers. Whereas from a foreign perspective, the commanders’ behavior might 
likely be perceived as disrespectful and rude, his assertiveness would be accepted as perfectly 
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a fair balance in given and received resources, complementarity will not only add value to 
the relationship, it will also trigger partners to contribute to the cooperation. One simple 
example of such complementarity of resources between soldiers and interpreters can be 
found in the protective measures that soldiers take in order to accommodate the tasks of 
the interpreter, or vice versa the knowledge and flexibility interpreters bring into play to 
benefit the efficiency of the mission. The social component of trust refers to the quality of 
the relationship and the impact this has on the nature and value of the exchange within it. 
For example, the interpreter who pushes his reserves to take the extra shift because of his 
social bond with his platoon leader; or the soldier who shares his gear out of solidarity with 
his interpreter with whom he has been through hell and back. 
While the structural component of trust is essential for the creation of the relationship, 
the social component is necessary for its continuation. The relationship, after all, can only 
be stable if both parties benefit from it and when temporary periods of inequity can be 
overcome. Trust building, therefore, requires a long-term investment in the equity of the 
relationship. The reciprocal obligations that result from that intent, will ultimately ‘create a 
stock of goodwill from which an actor can draw when the need arises’ (Madhok, 2006, 32). 
In light of respondent’s M 16 observation and the corresponding views of other respondents, 
the question, however, arises whether this two-component superglue also works in the 
specific context of the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters in the mission theater.
The first ‘obstacle’ that could prevent the development of trust in the collaboration is 
the perceived social identity of partners. Respondent M 16 mentioned that local interpreters 
will always remain outsiders to the military organization because of their descent, just like 
soldiers will always be perceived as foreigners by the Afghan population. In a similar vein 
respondent LI 2 formulates the impact of perception and the subsequent behavior on the 
Afghan people and more specifically the local interpreters as follows:
 
“When we have respect for the Dutch people, they should have respect for us also because 
when we do respect to you, you should respect to me. It can be done but not from the one 
side. When you do something wrong he [the Afghan citizen] will be angry because he’ll always 
be thinking ‘You enter in my country and you always push us. It is our country. It is our right 
to live here, not for you. When you cannot help us, it is just not allowed for you to push us. (…) 
I told you before that I didn’t go on patrol. Never, never on mission but I hear from my col-
leagues that the behavior of the Dutch people is not good. Sometimes with the interpreters 
also. Sometimes they react not as a human with interpreters. They are thinking that Afghan 
people are not humans, that’s a problem. Some of the people are like that. Some of the Dutch 
people, not all. But Dutch people are good people. My colleagues did a lot of jobs with the 
Americans also and with the British, but they like the Dutch people. Yeah, but some of the 
people are bad people, really. Their behavior is not good and that is a problem. Even with the 
interpreters. Just they are thinking the Afghan people are not human.” 
U.S. officer spoke about one of his Afghan colleagues, not an interpreter but a commander of 
the Afghan security guards, and he said: ‘If I had to walk from Deh Rawod to another camp and 
I had to carry him on my back than I would have done that.’ He said this to express his feelings 
of solidarity but he also said that he could not share everything with him. So, as a person he 
would have gone every length for his Afghan colleague, they even had fought together, but at 
the same time he felt that he had to keep his distance. And that will always leave a mark on the 
relationship. You can ask yourselves whether it is truly possible to build a trusting relationship 
in a period of four months. I do not think that you can hand over your trust to another soldier 
with regard to a certain person. So, that will always be a problem and that’s why interpreters 
will never be a part of the unit. Even when it is necessary for an efficient cooperation.” 
In the above-mentioned quote respondent M 16 brings several factors and conditions such 
as the in- and out-group, emotions, operational security, and duration of deployment to the 
attention which in his opinion influence and hamper the cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters. Similar aspects have been mentioned by other respondents as well and all, in 
one way or another, seem to involve the issue of trust. This conclusion seems logical given 
the assumption that the greater the degree of interdependence between parties or partners, 
the greater the need for trust will be (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006, 23).
7.1 Trust as the ‘Super Glue’ of Cooperation: Better Stick to It?
Trust is key in military organizations and it has gained even more importance with the 
increasing amount of international military operations in which both internal and 
external partners are dependent of each other (Bogers, Van Dijk, Heeren-Bogers, 2010, 162). 
Although military organizations acknowledge the need for these kinds of missions, such 
multinational alliances have proved to be difficult to manage (Rietjens, 2019, 14). Different 
perceptions on the ownership, contribution and sharing of resources oftentimes result 
in a strained relationship between partners and give rise to a high potential for conflict 
(Madhok, 2006, 30-31). A way to overcome these difficulties is to focus more closely on the 
social dimension within which the relationship is embedded. This trust-centered approach, 
which brings the moderators of collective team identification and team member alignment 
back to mind, revolves primarily on the notion that trust creates opportunities that, when 
met with reciprocity, commitment and mutual tolerance, result in cooperation (Madhok, 
2006, 31; Carlin & Love, 2011, 44).  Trust is defined as people’s positive expectations in the 
face of vulnerability and uncertainty towards other people’s intentions (Möllering & Sydow, 
2019, 142; Carlin & Love, 2011, 44). Trust in other words is the perceived likelihood that the 
other will not behave in a self-interested manner (Madhok, 2006, 32). Trust consists of a 
structural and social component that reinforce each other. The structural component refers 
to the complementarity of the resources that are contributed by both partners. If there is 
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belong to the out-group (Baker, 2010, 210-211). Notwithstanding the fact that there might be a 
correlation between ethnicity and trust, evidence from the field in Uruzgan demonstrates that 
the ethnicity of the interpreter also can be used as a strategic instrument to (paradoxically) 
soften the boundaries between parties who perceive each other as outsiders. In this light, the 
earlier described acts of brokerage and mediation can be perceived as examples in which the 
ethnicity of the interpreter cleverly but carefully is framed to serve the goals of the military 
organization.   
Another reason why soldier’s perceive interpreters as outsiders can be found in the 
pervasive opinion among respondents in which interpreters are described and dismissed 
as untrained military professionals who have not learned the niceties of soldierly life. The 
Afghan population, on the other hand, most probably perceived the military troops as outsider 
because of their different identity. Collectivist societies, such as in Afghanistan, moreover, 
are believed to exhibit a bias against out-groups, resulting in low levels of trust of outsiders 
(Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006, 24). Remarkably enough, however, military organizations also have 
characteristics in common with collectivist societies. Ingroup collectivism for example 
refers to the level of loyalty and solidarity that members express in their organization. In the 
military this is often manifested as unit cohesion, esprit, or pride (Wong & Gerras, 2019, 23-
24). This phenomenon might also explain why soldiers might be wary of ‘outsiders’ or even 
start a conflict with them.
7.2 Identity and Conflict: A Matter of Interpretation 
There are two theories that each have a different outlook on the effect of heightened ingroup 
identity on conflict. Social identity theory claims that a stronger identity with the ingroup 
leads to a more negative evaluation of the out-group and as such to more conflict. Another 
theory on identity, predominantly the work on identity by Erik Erikson, on the other hand, 
suggests that a strong sense of social identity is necessary and healthy for the development 
of secure individuals (Schafer, 1999, 830-831). If this is true, then conflict and instability 
may correlate not with a strong sense of social identity but with a poorly developed sense 
of social identity. If one feels better about ones’ own identification with the ingroup and 
the position of ones’ ingroup, then intergroup conflict should not be necessary. Both 
seemingly competing theories shed an interesting light on the following conflict situation 
as experienced by respondent NI 4:
 
“I didn’t have any problems up until now. [The respondent was put under investigation and 
taken off duty at the time of the field research.] Last year there was a problem with the ranks. 
They refused some of the interpreters because they thought they were local interpreters. 
They have their own showers. In Deh Rawod the local interpreters were not allowed to eat 
with the Dutch soldiers. They had to eat separately and they didn’t get the same thing to eat as 
How people perceive themselves, and consequently others, is often determined by the groups 
to which they belong (Schafer, 1999, 830).  Social identity can be described as a person’s sense of 
self derived from perceived membership in social groups. According to social identity theory, 
social identity consists of three components respectively categorization, identification, and 
comparison (Chen & Xin Li, 2009, 431-432). The first component of categorization refers to 
the process of putting people into categories. Labelling someone as for example a soldier or 
an interpreter, is a way to define people. Secondly, the component of identification refers to 
the process by which people associate themselves with certain groups on grounds of a shared 
sense of sameness (Schafer, 1999, 832). The ingroups are the social groups people identify 
with. The out-groups, conversely, are the social groups people don’t identify with. Because 
people tend to gravitate towards those similar to themselves, they also tend to become more 
cohesive with people they interact with more often (Wong & Gerras, 2019, 18). For example, 
while all coalition and Afghan troops are military, soldiers first and foremost will identify 
themselves as members of their respective national contingent, and more specifically their 
unit such as PRT, ISTAR, BG or Kandak (ANA battalion). The third component of comparison 
refers to the process by which people compare (the nature of ) their groups with other groups, 
and the bias they develop in favor of the group to which they belong. The existence of in- 
and out-groups therefore is based on the idea that ‘we’ possess certain qualities that ‘others’ 
lack. Whereas members tend to show loyalty and respect towards the ingroup, members 
of the out-group are often met with competition and resistance (Macionis, Peper, Van der 
Leun, 2010, 143). Negative intergroup attitudes may be based on a combination of factors 
such as race, ethnicity, religion, political ideology, level of development (Schafer, 1999, 831). 
The coalition forces, for example position themselves against the OMF and legitimize their 
presence with the belief that they, armed with a set of democratic values and the intention 
to secure and develop the region, fight a good cause. Another example can be found in the 
‘classic’ comparison between the Pashtun and Hazara people, in which the former perceive 
themselves to be of higher standing than the other. This of course is but an oversimplified 
representation of the influence of tribal heritage within the Afghan population which in 
reality is far more diversified and complex.
Assumptions or stereotypes connected to membership of a certain social category, 
influence how much trust is placed in a partner who is a member of that category. National 
categories in this regard are particularly strong categorizations in the context of international 
cooperation (Ertug, Cuypers, Noorderhaven & Bensaou, 2013, 266). The fact that soldiers as 
well as interpreters describe each other as outsiders, therefore illustrates the impact that 
social categorization can have on the perceived trustworthiness of partners. Studies on 
military operations in former Yugoslavia in this regard explain that interpreters, and more 
specifically local interpreters who ethnically belong to the ‘enemy’ group, generally are 
not seen by the military as trustworthy and reliable interlocutors. From a soldier’s point of 
view, the issue of trust, therefore predominantly depends on ethnicity and this is one of the 
mayor reasons why interpreters, according to this particular interpretation, are perceived to 
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In line with the above mentioned, the ‘bottle of water incident’, moreover, seems to 
support the idea that ingroup members are less likely to be punished for misbehavior than 
members of the out-group (Chen & Xin Li, 2009, 452), Rather than reflecting on their own 
part in the conflict, the military was quick to respond with sanctions that consequently 
resulted in the dishonorable dismissal of the local interpreter. There is yet another view that 
suggests precisely the opposite about inappropriate behavior of ingroup members and out-
group members and which could be interesting with regard to international cooperation. 
This view claims that members of the ingroup are punished harder for deviant behavior than 
members of the out-group (Cooper, Doucet & Pratt, 2007, 309-310). The explanation for these 
different reactions to inappropriateness is based on the idea that while good behavior of an 
ingroup member might reflect well on the entire group and reinforce the group’s collective 
sense of identity, this is not the case with individuals who are perceived to belong to the 
out-group. Their behavior is not seen as reflective of the collective identity of the ingroup 
and therefore their influence on the functioning of the collective is perceived to be less than 
that of ingroup members. Whereas inappropriate behavior of ingroup members in this line 
of thought can damage the positive identity of the ingroup, inappropriate behavior of out-
group members, simply by implication of their ‘otherness’, cannot pose such a threat. On 
the contrary, misconduct by outsiders could even bolster the positive identity of the ingroup 
as it serves to further support their superiority and hence the individual self-enhancement 
motive. Apart from the effect of ingroup bias on the self enhancement of social identity, this 
theory, however, could only work with regard to this case study when interpreters are not 
perceived as outsiders and/or if their qualities (which could be perceived a threat) did not 
have the capacity to also seriously harm the mission. This, however, precisely is the matter. 
Much of the data brings to light that most of the military respondents were careful and even 
hesitant in their consideration to accept interpreters as members of the ingroup even though 
they acknowledged their own vulnerability due to their reliance upon them. 
With the exception of one situation, which has been addressed in the paragraph about 
position and that involved the conflict between respondent M 52 and the group of local 
interpreters, there are only few examples within the collected data that moreover seem 
to mention the punishment of misconduct by soldiers.  For instance, the situations in 
which soldiers refused national interpreters to enter the bathing facilities or the incident 
in which soldiers vandalized Koran books. The inappropriate behavior of the soldiers in 
these instances, however, did not lead the organization to condemn and/or reject them as 
a way to reinforce the normative system of the ingroup (Cooper, Doucet & Pratt, 2007, 310). 
Yet, there are plenty of examples, of which some have been explored in this chapter, that 
show a completely different picture when it comes to the perceived ‘inappropriateness’ of 
interpreters. The first sentence of respondent NI 4 in which the interpreter alludes to the fact 
that he finds himself in trouble already bears testimony to that. 
the soldiers. We got all sorts of fruit and the like and they didn’t get anything. I have discussed 
my concern about that. If local interpreters don’t get to eat well, they are not able to deliver 
good work either. The local interpreters are as important as we are. They usually have to go 
out on patrol with the soldiers. Last year in Chora I noticed that a local interpreter was having 
a problem with a soldier. The interpreter had asked for water. It was really hot. He didn’t get 
any. The local interpreter told me himself that he, in a fit of anger, had said to the Dutch sol-
diers: ‘Too bad I haven’t got a weapon otherwise I would have killed you all. Why would I have 
to work with you, if you don’t even give me some water to drink?’ With these words they came 
to the district building. I happened to be there at the moment. The boy told me that he was 
infuriated because he didn’t get any water. He also told me what he had said to the soldiers. 
Later, I heard that he was dismissed and sent home. He was said to have had contact with the 
Taliban. They had searched his belongings and had found a camera.  I have tried to explain 
that the local interpreter was denied water. That was what had caused the conflict. I didn’t 
know if he had contact with the Taliban but the problem was about water. The Afghans don’t 
think with their mind when they’re angry, they just rant. They say more than is good for them. 
That’s a problem.”
The quote shows that different rules and rations were applied to the local interpreters. This 
makes it reasonable to assume that the interpreter did not really belong to the ingroup and 
was perceived as an outsider. Whether the derogatory treatment of the local interpreter was 
done by the soldiers knowingly or not, the impact of this devaluation was unmistakably 
self-evident. Deeply hurt by the injustice of the situation, the local interpreter crossed all 
borders of appropriate behavior by threatening to kill the soldiers if he had been given 
the opportunity. This violation of conduct on the side of the local interpreter was used 
by the military as evidence to doubt his loyalty and to suspect him of having connections 
with the Taliban. Without exactly knowing what preceded the interpreters’ outburst over 
this fundamental basic need, the conflict indeed exacerbated intergroup tensions as social 
identity theory would have predicted.  
Another reason which could explain why the military perceived the interpreter as a 
traitor or even the enemy, might be found in the self-image threat that the conflict most 
presumably posed for the involved soldiers. Conditions of uncertainty generally tend to 
trigger members of the ingroup to activate negative stereotypes and judgements about 
members of the out-group because these mechanisms restore feelings of self-worth (Fein, 
Von Hippel & Spencer, 1999, 50). The fight in this regard could be seen as symptomatic for 
the anxiety soldiers might experience when they are not familiar with the local language and 
customs of their mission environment and the debilitating impact this could have on their 
military performance. A group’s conflictual behavior, therefore, could also, according to the 
theory of self-identity, be indicated by the level of internal insecurity (Schafer, 1999, 839). 
Both explanations, therefore, show that the two theories are not so much competing with 
but rather complementary to each other.
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the local interpreter lashed out in anger by threating to kill the soldiers who, in that 
instance, had most likely become the proverbial enemy. Although perhaps understandable 
from the local interpreters’ point of view, such uncontrolled behavior could not be tolerated 
by the military. The violation of the internal safety of the organisation in fact caused the 
military to accuse the local interpreter of betrayal and to condemn him as such. Respondent 
NI 4 concludes his narration of the incident with an afterthought in which he gives a short 
character description of the emotional nature of Afghan people by explaining that they tend 
to go overboard when emotions run high. And although this might very well be considered 
a stereotype itself, this generalization effectively addresses the problem of such ‘cultural 
emotional behaviour’ in the professional setting of the military organization in which most 
emotions are managed and even scripted. 
According to Hochschild’s understanding, the task of soldiers can be described as 
‘emotional work’ in the sense that ‘it relates the worker’s personal feelings and their 
expression to the impact this is intended to have on the other(s)’ (Soeters, 2018, 158). The 
focal point of the violence-related emotional work of the military organization is to keep the 
action away from direct experience by keeping it quick and clean (Soeters, 2018, 160). One 
of the most important ways to contain the negative impact of violence, is to prepare, train 
and guide soldiers in their ability to keep a balance between justified and controlled use of 
violence on the one hand and violence getting out of control on the other (Soeters, 2018, 
162). To that effect, soldiers, have been thoroughly disciplined to internalize and comply 
with the rules, procedures, skills and drills of the organization in order to act according 
to the intentions of the military in an emotionally controlled manner (Soeters, 2018, 107). 
Being untrained military professionals, interpreters of course have not been the subject of 
such form of ‘dressage’. Although interpreters cannot be blamed for this ‘lack of discipline’, 
this nevertheless could have caused frustration among some of the soldiers who as a 
consequence might have felt the need to show interpreters the ropes. Whereas the military 
manages to increasingly control the implications of violence during their operations, the 
organization should also be attentive to control the subtler acts of violence that could, as 
have been illustrated, be present in the interaction between soldiers and interpreters. The 
development of a trusting relationship, the fundamental precondition for international 
cooperation, after all depends on shared expectations (and thus perceptions) that are shaped 
by the institutional environment in which the partners are embedded (Zaheer & Zaheer, 
2006, 230). 
Another emotion that is prevalent within the military organization and which is closely 
related to trust pertains to the feeling of suspicion. Respondent M 16 already mentioned the 
soldiers’ fear that interpreters will leak information. Respondent M 13 delves more deeply 
into this delicate and complicated matter by saying the following: 
 
“As a person I trusted the interpreters. I really had a good and close relationship with those 
people. As a person I trusted them, all of them, even Farukh, everybody. I just could get along 
7.3 Cooperation and Conflict: An Emotional Affair
The quote of respondent NI 4 alludes to another important aspect that is closely related to (the 
development of ) trust in multinational cooperation and this consists of how emotions are 
perceived and managed in organizations. Emotion has been of interest to scholars for centuries 
because emotions significantly influence the attitudes, motivations and behaviors of people 
across cultures, situations and all domains of life (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015, 119). Emotions 
can be described as ‘flexible response sequences that are called forth whenever an individual 
evaluates a situation as offering important challenges or opportunities’ (Halperin & Pliskin, 
2015, 121). Emotions, therefore, have the power to produce a certain type of behavior as a 
response to a particular situation or circumstance. This of course is exactly what happened in the 
‘bottle of water incident’ in which the injustice of the soldier’s refusal to share water infuriated 
the interpreter to such an extent that he lashed out at the soldiers.     
     The implication of emotional experience does not only manifest itself in the intra- 
and interpersonal context, but in social contexts as well. As such, emotions themselves 
influence the nature of intra- and intergroup relations. In line with the concept of social 
identity, group-based emotions refer to emotions that are felt by individuals as a result of 
their membership to a certain group or society. Individuals, therefore, might experience 
emotions not only in response to personally relevant situations, but also in response 
to situations that affect members of their ingroup. One such example of a powerful and 
prevalent group-based emotion is anger. The emotion that was so strongly expressed by 
the local interpreter. Anger is expressed when the actions of the out-group are perceived 
as unjust and deviating from acceptable norms. People who experience anger, therefore, 
belief that they immediately need to undertake action in order to correct the wrongdoing. 
The emotion is accompanied by the belief that the ingroup is capable of carrying out such 
corrective action through confrontation or violence (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015, 123). In order 
to understand what triggered the anger of the local interpreter, we have to look more closely 
at something which respondent LI 2 mentioned earlier about the negative behavior of some 
of the Dutch soldiers towards the Afghan people and local interpreters. The notion that they 
were not always and by everyone perceived as humans, even though they were putting their 
lives and limbs on the line every time they went out on patrol with the troops, most probably 
roused the emotions in their own group and set off negative perceptions about soldiers in 
return as well. When people feel socially excluded and rejected by others, they in general 
also feel bad and tend to engage in socially destructive and self-destructive behaviors (Fiske, 
2004, 22). Research in this regard, moreover, has indicated that the perceived inequity in the 
social and economic exchange could indeed significantly affect people’s perception of the 
value of their relationship (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998, 556). This makes it very reasonable 
to assume that the soldier’s refusal to give him water reinforced the local interpreter’s 
opinion about the soldiers and that particular reevaluation of their relationship might have 
consequently pushed him over the edge. In order to end the injustice and the humiliation, 
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single individual can compromise information that must be kept secret. This is the reason 
why military intelligence relies on formal, mechanical, and procedural controls to ensure no 
one knows too much. This need-to-know mentality stems from the organizational practice 
of information and secrecy compartmentalization. This process involves the separation 
and parting of secrets into pieces in order to prevent individuals from putting the secrets 
together and seeing the ‘bigger picture’ (Dufresne & Offstein, 2008, 103). Respondent M 13, 
however, has no illusions about the latter. On the contrary, he gives a rather sober analysis 
of the issue. First, he acknowledges that most interpreters already seem to be privy of 
information that is perceived to be of high value. This notion is commonly accepted among 
other respondents and matches the description of the interpreter as ‘the institutional 
memory of the organization’ which soldiers use to describe the interpreters’ knowledge of 
the organization and mission. Respondent M 49 in this regard explains as follows:
 
“Interpreters are like cultural advisors for us at the PRT. They also fulfill a memory function. 
Although we stayed at the PRT for 6 months, there always came a time when you had to hand-
over your task to someone else. Your interpreter then basically provided for continuity. My 
interpreter for example informed me that the PRT already had spoken with a person before 
or that a person came from a certain place. So, those were also things we let our interpre-
ters do. There was for example this situation at the gate in which an Afghan told me that my 
predecessor had promised him certain things. My interpreter informed me that he had been 
present at that particular conversation and that nothing of the sort had been discussed at the 
time. We consulted our reports on the matter and it turned out that our interpreter was right. 
They simply have been present for a longer period of time and I think that’s just a good thing.” 
While soldiers recognized that such inside-knowledge increased the human capital of the 
interpreter, they also fully understood that this particular asset made them vulnerable to 
blackmail. At the extreme, compartmentalization therefore not only is devised to benefit 
the secrecy-holding capabilities of the organization but also to protect the individual secret 
holder. The rationale is that if one does not have the full picture, one should become a less 
desirable target for those who want to know the full picture (Dufresne & Offstein, 2008, 104). 
How dangerous the task of the interpreter exactly is, and how deeply aware they are of their 
vulnerability, illustrates the following quote of respondent LI 5:  
 
“It’s a dangerous job. Only my father knows. Not my cousin, not my relatives, nobody in gene-
ral because I have a tribe in my village that distributes a lot of nightletters in the mosque near 
to my home. ‘Your son works as a spy for the Americans’ but exactly they don’t know who 
distributes this nightletter. And exactly the people also know where you work. My father right 
now is away from home. Right now, he lives in the city and also my brother has leave home. 
He’s leaving for city right now. But it is a big problem when they find out if he’s interpreter. 
with them very well. I knew that they at least knew as much about Deh Rawod as we did. So, 
on the one hand I thought something like: ‘Well guys, let’s not pull each other’s leg. They al-
ready know a lot.’ And they do know a lot. Okay, it was a rule, and even though I didn’t agree 
with it, I knew that we could be very cautious about certain pieces of information. But they al-
ready knew almost all of it.  So, we didn’t exactly need to be panicky about it either. I complied 
with the rule anyhow by telling them as little as possible. Only the things they really needed to 
know. On the other hand, however, I realized that their primary loyalty is never towards ISAF. 
Even if they are here with the best intentions of the world. If a person for example comes from 
Kandahar and his parents are being extorted, well that person will tell them everything they 
want to know. Easy. And I would probably do the same. I would put the interest of my family 
above that of ISAF too. Simple as that. You can extort everyone like that. So, I have always 
assumed that everything the interpreter knows will indeed eventually end up known outside 
of the gate.  Even though I trusted them but those are really two different things. And in some 
cases, it was more obvious and direct than others, like with Farukh. And at the same time, I 
thought: ‘Well, interpreters who come from Kabul might perhaps not be very interested in 
everything that happens in Deh Rawod and what the connections are over there. But then 
again, the ties in Afghanistan oftentimes unexpectedly run across a lot of areas. So…’ Some-
times it is very clear how the information is channeled over there. See, as with Farukh. That’s 
how it is. If he hears something interesting that might be of interest to the Popalzai warlords, 
then he will hop on his motorbike the very same day to tell ‘em that. But there are also inter-
preters who came from Kabul and who didn’t have such a direct relationship with all kinds of 
warlords in our area. And then I thought to myself: ‘Yes, but in Afghanistan there might be 
connections between Kabul and Deh Rawod as well which you might not have expected.’ So, 
the information will end up there anyhow.”
Alongside the increasing awareness that trust is central to the development and constitution 
of cooperation, there is also a growing concern among researchers about distrust and 
the violation of trust in organizations. They belief that the greatest danger to modern 
organizations does not longer come from the outside but rather from the inside. It is the 
betrayal of ‘ambitious, selfish, deceitful people who care more for their own advancement 
than the mission of the organization’ (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998, 547). This observation is 
based on the notion that the very conditions that necessitate the development of trust, that 
is the inability to completely monitor and evaluate the performance of the trusted party, also 
offers opportunities to violate that trust.  Betrayal in other words seems to go side by side 
with trust and loyalty.
Betrayal can be defined as ‘a voluntarily violation of mutually known pivotal expectations 
of the trustor by the trustee, which has the potential to threaten the well-being of the 
trustor [and hence the organization the trustor represents]’ (Elangovan &    Shapiro, 1998, 
548). As no other, military organizations realize, and this is the suspicion or in their own 
words ‘the conventional wisdom’ to which respondents M 16 and M 13 seem to refer, that a 
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Lying is defined as “intentionally trying to mislead someone” (Argo, J. & Shiv, B., 2012, 
1094). Lies can be categorized into self-benefiting deception in which people lie to protect 
their public or private self; and other-benefiting deception wherein people lie among other 
things to ensure that social interaction runs smoothly. White lies are a specific type of other-
benefiting deception that are told to prevent harm to others that would otherwise have 
occurred if the deceiver would have told the truth. Strictly taken the interpreters’ lies about 
their profession can be perceived as both self-benefiting as other-benefiting deception. 
Interpreters lie in order to protect themselves as well as their relatives from harm. Their 
intention to mislead, therefore, does not stem from immoral behavior. On the contrary, it 
arises out of fear for the opponent and concern for others. Interpreters are forced to tell 
white lies in the hope to find refuge in subterfuge. Interpreters, like soldiers, in other words 
also try to prevent their relatives from ‘seeing the bigger picture’ because in their situation 
knowing too much could be just as dangerous as well. 
Apart from the soldiers’ concern that interpreters could disclose information under 
threat of having themselves or their relatives killed, respondent M 13 voices the soldiers’ 
suspicion that interpreters might voluntarily leak information out of motives of self-interest. 
Respondents M 30 and M 7 respectively say the following about this matter:
 
“An interpreter is aware of what he’s allowed to know and what not. So, he knows very well 
not to ask about operational information. He shouldn’t ask too many questions because 
that’s none of his importance. The only thing he has to do is translate. After all, he is a local.  
You don’t really know if you can trust him or not but a little common sense can go a long way 
for that matter.” 
“Well, if you are going to try and build a certain intelligence image of a region and more par-
ticularly an image of your opponents in that region, I have considered it desirable, without 
commenting on whether or not this truly is desirable, to use as much as possible the same 
interpreter because it takes a lot of conversations before you receive valuable intel from the 
involved parties. The fact is that the interpreter is your vital link. Not only because you could 
not understand each other otherwise but also because he has the conversations in his head. 
Okay, chances are that the interpreter then might know a lot. That’s the downside but then 
again that’s also what enables you to follow up on what you have discussed previously. It 
would even be better if we could appoint a special interpreter for that task but that was simply 
impossible at the time because of the shortage of interpreters.  Anyhow, it is absolutely true 
to say that interpreters function as the memory of the organization. And that, by the way, is 
as I have said before, not necessarily desirable because it could also be dangerous. The upside, 
however, is that the guy who comes after me can work with the same interpreter. If we’re tal-
king about building up a relationship with our conversational partners then the interpreter is 
very fundamental to that. After all, he’s the one who already knows about the conversations 
but like I said before that’s also the downside of it because he has all the information in his 
When everybody is indicating he’s interpreter they must kill him because insurgents don’t like 
interpreters.”
The earlier mentioned description that the interpreters’ relationship to war is ‘up close and 
personal’ (Gallai, 2019, 217) takes on a whole new meaning when one considers that the 
exposure to physical threat seems to be inextricably related to the fate of interpreters. These 
acts of violence are not restricted to the person of the interpreter alone but are aimed at their 
close relatives as well. Intimidation in the form of ‘nightletters’ or the notion that (relatives 
of ) others in similar situations have been killed simply because they were interpreters, 
prompted interpreters to withhold information about their job or even to lie about it. 
Respondents NI 3 and LI 4 in this respect explain:  
 
“Although I feel relatively safe, being an interpreter in Afghanistan is dangerous. Not only for 
myself but for my family as well. Interpreters are the bridge between the civilians and ISAF. 
Without this bridge communication would be impossible. In that sense you could state that 
the interpreters are the ears of ISAF. So, when the Taliban gets hold of us, we’re doomed. 
Whereas commanders or captains of the military are valuable for ransom, interpreters are 
seen as traitors who must be tortured and killed in the most horrific way. My family, therefore, 
doesn’t know that I am an interpreter. They think that I am here as an agronomist for some 
NGO. The risks attached to the job are also reason that I am escorted everywhere I need to go. 
I also make sure that I hide my military uniform under robes and scarfs and only when I have 
reached my destination I am prepared to let go of my disguise. (…) The military organization 
continuously tries to improve its policy to guarantee the safety of interpreters and others but I 
take my own precautions nevertheless. I am alert even on the compound itself. I will never eat 
at the same table in the mess hall. In that way I make sure that my food cannot be poisoned. 
Then again, that’s my approach. Everybody has a different view on safety and therefore deals 
with it differently.” 
“Interpreting is dangerous because it’s a dangerous area. The Taliban wants to get an ambush 
and the soldiers they want to make security and therefore they make rampage in the same 
area and yes that’s dangerous for us and also for the Dutch soldiers too. They protect me 
because I am working for them and they want to protect us as soon as they can but it’s a dan-
gerous job. It’s dangerous for me and my family and I never want to tell about it to others, the 
neighbours and villagers, that I am working as an interpreter. If they know that I am working 
as an interpreter here, they want to kill me. And yes, it is more dangerous for me and my fa-
mily. Just as they are asking me where I am working, I am telling them that I am working for a 
foreign project and I never want to know them or tell them about my job that I am working as 
an interpreter. If they get information about me, they want to kill me and they want to trouble 
my family and therefore I never want to tell them. It is dangerous for me and my family.”
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make the cooperation work. A notion that has already been acknowledged by a predominant 
part of the respondents but which is difficult to put to practice. Not in the first place because of 
the above-mentioned obstacles but also because of impediments raised by various practical 
factors of which the relative short duration of the rotation probably is the most poignant. 
The fact that soldiers do not have the luxury to invest in long-term relationships with 
interpreters during their rotations, however, does not imply that the military organization 
should not pursue such trusting relationships as a cumulative and cyclical process over the 
course of multiple rotations. Although trust, as respondent M 16 has rightly stated before, 
cannot be transferred from one person to another, it should nevertheless be ‘harvested’ 
and perceived as an organizational resource across rotations. While counter-intuitive to the 
idea of operational security, interpreters should get the benefit of the doubt. Organizational 
trust in the interpreter, in other words should serve as the axiom for developing and 
maintaining an effective cooperative relationship. Trust, in that sense, is a form of ‘social 
intelligence’ as it facilitates group cohesion by being both rewarding and efficient. After all, 
if people, and in this case more in particular soldiers and interpreters, can basically trust 
each other then group life works better (Fiske, 2004, 24). This will positively influence the 
mutual perception of the involved parties and as such enhance the willingness to contribute 
to a communal effort which ultimately plays a decisive role in the success of military 
operations in foreign mission areas.               
       Implementing this concept, however, demands flexibility and adaptability of the military 
as a learning organization and that’s where another difficulty lies. Various studies have 
indicated that lessons learned on the tactical level are often not acknowledged by senior 
leadership and therefore not institutionalized within the organization (Noll & Rietjens, 
2016, 235, 237; Hasselbladh & Ydèn, 2019, 3, 12, 14-15; Kitzen, 2019, 52). The cooperation with 
interpreters in this regard is no exception as the same challenges not only remain existent 
in Afghanistan but also continue to appear during new stability operations in the Middle 
East and the wider Sahel region (Righton, 2015; Broere, 2015). If organizational experience 
can be understood as retrospective sensemaking (Hasselbladh & Ydèn, 2019, 6), then it 
would only be right for the military to incorporate the knowledge which can be derived 
from the vast collection of the respondents’ experiences, insights and beliefs about the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters. These ‘lessons’, after all, will only and truly 
be understood and acted upon when they have been authorized by the organization itself. A 
first and very basic step into this learning process might be discerned in the decision of most 
Western nations to grant asylum to Afghan interpreters whose lives are threatened because 
they have worked for the coalition forces (Read, 2019). As a consequence of pressure from, 
among others, military unions who acknowledged the vital support interpreters provided, 
the Dutch government eventually was one of the last Western countries to adopt this policy 
(Koenis, 2019). Hopefully, this act of reciprocity will be used as the steppingstone to further 
the perception of interpreters as full partners in military cooperation. 
head. Should it ever come that way that the interpreter has been given the choice to work for 
the opponent for whatever reason, then that of course would be a very serious situation. That 
risk, however, would be more present among local interpreters than national interpreters. 
Then again, the same could happen to national interpreters. Especially, an interpreter who 
for example has decided to give up interpreting after three missions and who has been off the 
radar since.” 
In cases like the above mentioned, betrayal can either be understood as the result of a lack 
of motivation of the trustee to conform to the expectations of the trustor, or the motivation 
to violate these expectations (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998, 550). Incidents of such treachery in 
the history of military organizations are the reason why military intelligence models today 
still apply a closed system in the management of their secrets. This means that access into 
the information chain at any level is guarded and not pluralistic (Dufresne & Offstein, 2008, 
105). The coded entry to some parts of the compound, prohibition of cell phones in certain 
facilities and the need-to-know policy are examples of ways in which the military try to 
guard their information. Despite these attempts, however, no amount of energy, controls, 
procedures, or regulations can prevent information from leaking (Dufresne & Offstein, 
2008, 105). If not for the rise in technology which makes information not only more readily 
available but also more at risk, then for the labyrinth of connections between the local 
communities in the mission area.  
Whereas normally information sharing would lead to the development of a trusting 
relationship between members of inter-organizational cooperation, the military has 
learned by trial and error that trust is not always desirable. Too much trust could lead to 
carelessness, complacency or inefficiency (Möllering & Sydow, 2019, 144). In order to build 
and maintain trust in organizational and institutional contexts, the institutionalization of 
distrust and doubt (by control) has been widely acknowledged as a remedy for too much 
trust. Although this mechanism seems reasonable, it might not always create the intended 
effect because distrust and doubt could ultimately drive out trust altogether (Möllering & 
Sydow, 2019, 153). The military organization, therefore, must steer a clear course between 
trust and distrust. Something, which is easier said than done because extensive research has 
proven that trust, and more specifically experience based trust, has the ability to mitigate the 
hampering effect of social categorization on trustworthiness (Ertug, Cuypers, Noorderhaven 
& Bensaou, 2013, 266-268). This type of trust which is based on the specific experiences with 
the trustee, however, can only grow stronger when parties get to know each other better 
over time. Whereas trust based on social categorization results from cognitive shortcuts that 
involve stereotypes such as nationality, experience will allow parties to directly observe each 
other’s contributions and to draw inferences from that information with regard to one’s 
trustworthiness. 
When applied to international military intervention, this would mean that it is imperative 
for soldiers and interpreters to trust one another and to invest in the relationship in order to 
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more difficult to manage, relational conflicts. These hampering effects on the cooperation 
could be mitigated by implementing the moderators of collective team identification and 
team member alignment. While soldiers actively acknowledged the fundamental value of 
a sense of belonging and shared communal goals for effective cooperation, the military 
organization did not recognize the importance of addressing this matter in a more structural 
way. Moreover, some interpreters proved to be capable to critically assess the needs of both 
the individual and the group. These ‘transformational leaders’ were able to transcend 
organizational boundaries and the nature of this particular trait could explain why such 
leadership was mostly (but not exclusively) exerted by interpreters, who, contrary to soldiers, 
were less confined by military hierarchy. In the absence of clarity, the position of the 
interpreter eventually seemed to be more a matter of personal insight than organizational 
prowess. 
Fourth, the aspect of intervention by interpreters was determined by the situation in 
which it occurred. In case of the mission in Uruzgan this implied on the spot interpreting in 
both directions, covering different topics and texts while simultaneously switching between 
the role of cultural, political and diplomatic intermediary. The reality on the ground, 
therefore, required interpreters to adopt an unconventional approach that went beyond 
the traditional notion of interpreting as a rather passive and impartial ‘black box’ event. 
Furthermore, the data demonstrated that military interpreting called for interpreters who 
themselves could act strategically and deal with the job’s inevitable uncertainties. This kind 
of dexterity allowed interpreters to also act as informants and assume the much-needed 
role of broker through which they could enhance the military’s ability to gather sufficient 
situational awareness and influence the local environment. Deep-seated organizational, 
cultural or personal norms within the military, however, meant that soldiers oftentimes 
preferred the conventional approach and therefore did not always take the advice of 
interpreters to heart. This conduct was further exacerbated by the lack of realistic guidelines 
that acknowledged the full complexity of interpreting in war zones. As a result, daily 
operations were dominated by personal dilemmas as interpreters had to decide upon the 
right course of action by themselves, while soldiers needed to decide whether following the 
interpreter was sensible and feasible. Once again, these conditions demonstrated that the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters was surrounded by uncertainty and therefore 
often depended on individual character and zeal.  
Fifth, the final aspect of perception described how soldiers and interpreters perceived 
their cooperation. Trust, in this regard, is key in military organizations, but it has become 
even more important with the increasing amount of international stability operations in 
which internal and external partners are highly dependent of each other. Whereas researchers 
in organization studies, almost invariably have proclaimed a trust-based approach as a 
successful and efficient way to enhance the cooperation between international partners, 
this concept, however, is difficult to reconcile with the military organization which usually 
has incorporated a significant amount of distrust to level out too much trust in others. In 
8. Conclusion 
Military stability operations in foreign societies cannot be conducted without the assistance 
of interpreters. The interdependency of this cooperation, however, confronts the involved 
parties with all sorts of challenges. This chapter examined the international cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters during the Dutch stability operation in the Afghan province 
of Uruzgan in order to provide a more detailed insight into this particular interaction. For 
that purpose, a case study was conducted following the analytical framework of respectively 
the aspects of allocation, motivation, position, intervention and perception. The analysis 
contributed to the understanding of the dynamics of each aspect and how respondents dealt 
with the intricacies of their cooperation. In order to draw a conclusion, it is necessary to 
briefly touch upon the key findings of every aspect. 
First, the aspect of allocation described how interpreters became involved in the 
Dutch military mission and how they were allocated within the military organization. The 
strong ties of Afghan communities turned out to be a powerful resource that provided in 
the need for a sustainable livelihood for the interpreters as well the military’s need for 
linguistic personnel. Whereas social capital was the determinant factor for recruitment, 
the human capital of the interpreters determined their assignment to specific units. Skilled 
and experienced interpreters were often soon promoted to higher positions, which meant 
that soldiers at the ‘lower’ levels, to their regret, were drained of much-needed expertise. 
Ultimately, the aspect of allocation was defined by scarcity and interpreters therefore 
remained in great demand throughout the mission. 
Second, the aspect of motivation described the reasons why soldiers cooperated with 
interpreters and vice versa. While all three different categories of respondents displayed 
various motives to join the military and to participate in the mission, two main characteristics 
could be observed. First, soldiers typically approached the cooperation with interpreters 
rather instrumentally as they considered linguistical and cultural assistance essential for 
engaging the local population. In other words, working with interpreters was crucial to 
their mission. Next, both local and national interpreters emphasized that reciprocity was 
among their main reasons for joining the mission. Most respondents indicated a strong 
desire to contribute to the international effort, and more specific the Dutch mission, while 
simultaneously doing something for their country (of origin). It was concluded, therefore, 
that whereas soldiers interact with interpreters for predominantly instrumental reasons, 
interpreters seemingly are more ideologically motivated.  The concept of reciprocity, 
moreover, was acknowledged by some members of the organization as a crucial incentive to 
motivate effective cooperation among each other.   
Third, the aspect of position described how interpreters as untrained (military and 
linguistic) professionals tried to make sense of their working experience within the 
military organization. This proved to be problematic as the lack of a clear description of 
their position could easily lead to task-conflicts which in turn could spill over, into even 
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addition, the case study demonstrated that a combination of factors such as in- and out-
group effects, operational security and the relatively short duration of deployments also 
hampered the development of a trusting relationship. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the 
only way to bridge a trust-gap paradoxically is to invest in long-term trusting relationships 
as experience will allow partners the opportunity to observe each other’s trustworthiness. 
Therefore, experience-based trust should be accepted as an axiom for developing and 
maintaining effective cooperation. This requires the military organization to initiate a 
learning process capable of harvesting individual experiences and institutionalizing them as 
a cumulative body of knowledge. In this regard, initiatives resulting from recent experiences 
in stability operations might offer a stepping stone for initiating this learning process in 
which interpreters are accepted as full partners in military operations.
To conclude, what can be derived from these key findings on the interaction between 
soldiers and interpreters during the daily conduct of the stability operation in Uruzgan? To 
begin, the exploration of the five aspects of allocation, motivation, position, intervention and 
perception has once again demonstrated that this specific collaboration is highly dynamic, 
complicated and challenging. Whereas this case study has shed a light on the way mutual 
differences could create obstacles in the development of proper working relationships (and, 
thus, effective cooperation), it has also explained that this heavily depends on how the involved 
parties deal with the challenges at hand. Although some soldiers and interpreters behaved 
in such a way that this could potentially undermine the communal goals, others showed 
the daring and dexterity to act in the interest of the mission even when this implied having 
a different outlook and approach towards ‘procedures and protocols’. This enabled them 
to build relationships to effectively operate in Uruzgan’s highly demanding environment. 
The next and final insight of this case study, therefore, consequently concerns the need for 
the military organization to empower and stimulate such cooperative behavior. For that 
purpose, the lessons observed at the tactical level should be captured and institutionalized 
at the organizational level. In doing so, soldiers and interpreters in future missions will be 
better able to overcome the many challenges with regard to allocation, motivation, position, 
intervention, and perception, and build effective cooperative relationships from the very start 
of their deployment. If there ever was a metaphor to describe this kind of vital cooperation, 
it should be that of a ‘diamant’. A resource that took years in the making, is made of the 
hardest of materials, multi-facetted and razor-sharp, but above all, when appreciated, the 
most valuable of gifts to behold.
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Introduction
Modern military operations are highly internationalized efforts that require cooperation 
between coalition partners as well as local parties. Inherently, such endeavors confront 
stakeholders with the different linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the various 
involved parties. The military organization tries to overcome the language barrier within 
international coalitions by implementing English as the military lingua franca. This measure, 
however, is not sufficient when troops have to communicate with people in non-Western 
areas of operations. In those circumstances the military depends on the intervention of 
interpreters. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, have extensively illustrated 
how soldiers needed to cooperate with these agents in order to conduct their daily tasks. 
Aiming to enhance the understanding of the influence of linguistic matters on international 
military cooperation, this dissertation addressed the following central question: How do 
language issues affect military operations, and how in particular do soldiers and interpreters 
cooperate in mission areas to overcome such issues? 
This explorative study applied mixed methods research in order to investigate the impact 
of language on military cooperation in the mission environment. More specifically, data 
was collected by conducting in-depth interviews with Dutch servicemen as well as national 
and local interpreters and through a survey among deployed soldiers. These interviews were 
complemented with participant observation during an international military exercise in 
Germany and the ISAF mission in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. This concluding chapter briefly 
summarizes the main findings and furthermore describes reflections, avenues for further 
research, and recommendations.    
Main findings
The research problem was approached from an organizational, macro/meso-sociological 
as well as an interpersonal, micro-sociological perspective. In order to answer the central 
question, the following six research questions were formulated:
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work as a force multiplier. In comparison and contrast to less skilled servicemen, proficient 
officers were able to increase their leverage on communicational and managerial processes. 
Whereas proficiency in the language(s) of coalition partners thus enabled individuals to 
cope with socio-linguistic challenges within the organization, this capability, however, 
was not sufficient to conduct negotiations with local parties in foreign mission areas. In 
these circumstances, the military organization depended on the assistance of interpreters. 
This dependency has become even more prominent as linguistic knowledge and cultural 
understanding today are perceived to be essential for the management of modern military 
operations. After all, besides their language skills, interpreters are also well-equipped to see 
through the intricacies of the local operational environment and to provide the military with 
the much-needed situational awareness. Precisely because interpreters are able to bridge 
the linguistic and cultural gap between parties, they can also be described as the tightrope 
walkers of war. A metaphor that aptly captures the precarious and perilous nature of their 
intermediary position.  
Chapter 2 ‘Tough Talk: Clear and Cluttered Communication during Peace Operations’ demonstrates 
that the corrosive effect of the language barrier in multinational corporations affects both 
native and non-native speakers. Studies on communication dynamics in multinational 
corporations show that the language problems of non-native speakers consist of 
miscommunication, attribution, loss of rhetorical skills and code-switching. Native 
speakers, or those who are proficient in the primary corporate language, often wrongly 
assume that (other) non-native speakers can communicate fluently as well. Of course, 
these biased-expectations fall flat as soon as the linguistic incompetence of the non-native 
speaker becomes evident. This ‘disclosure’ disrupts the communication and could even lead 
to feelings of distrust in the cooperation. During negotiations, for instance, non-native 
speakers tend to discuss matters in their own language. This switching of codes, however, 
most often is perceived by others as conspiring behaviour and as a consequence is met with 
acts of exclusion and hostility. 
Moreover, negative experiences with language problems can produce individual and even 
institutionalized prejudices against non-native speakers. The effects of this stereotype threat 
weigh heavily on non-native speakers because a lack of linguistic proficiency often is equated 
with professional ineptitude. In order to avoid these by-effects of the language barrier, less 
proficient professionals often resort to face-saving strategies that result in a distancing from 
the communication network and an avoidance of communication in general. Mechanisms, 
that ultimately will only further undermine the position of non-native speakers. These 
findings have been confirmed by the job performance of key players within the international 
military organization as well. Participant observation and interviews conducted during a 
multinational military exercise in this regard demonstrated that the respondents also 
experienced the loss of face as one of most significant and feared effects of linguistic 
incompetence. The field study furthermore shows that language incompetence could reduce 
or even silence one’s voice in the decision-making process. Although the opposite is also true 
Research Questions
Central Question: How do language issues affect military operations, and how in 
particular do soldiers and interpreters cooperate in mission areas to overcome 
such issues? 
Q1: How do language problems manifest themselves during military operations?
Q2: What are the implications of language (in)competence on communication 
between soldiers in multinational military organizations?
Q3: How does the language barrier between soldiers and local population 
influence the complexity of modern peace operations?
Q4: How do soldiers perceive the interpersonal dynamics of working with local 
interpreters as linguistic and cultural mediators in mission areas?
Q5: How can the role and position of interpreters in military contexts be described 
by use of interpreters’ working experiences in war-infested environments?
Q6: What are the dynamics of cooperation between soldiers and interpreters in 
























These research questions define the focus of this study and were each addressed in different 
chapters of this dissertation. 
Military Organization and Language
Chapter 1 ‘Language Matters in the Military’ points out that the language barrier is a commonly 
encountered obstacle in international cooperation. Two historical examples, the language 
conflict in the Belgian Army during World War I and the multilingual composition of the 
Dutch Colonial Army, show that a poorly chosen or non-existent language policy severely 
complicated the execution of instructions and commands. In these military environments, 
miscommunication often led to grave situations and unnecessary casualties. Furthermore, 
the case of the colonial army also stressed the need to establish contact with the population. 
Although the Dutch army recruited local interpreters for this purpose, they considered these 
agents to be untrustworthy and therefore encouraged soldiers to familiarize themselves 
with the local vernaculars. 
The influence of language (in)competence on organizational processes has predominantly 
been investigated by socio-linguistic and organizational studies who unanimously have 
pinpointed language as the culprit of organizational misunderstanding. This critical 
observation was confirmed by the findings of several cases in the context of the military 
organization. Close observations of military personnel at Kabul International Airport 
for instance have indicated that language is an ambivalent tool that, depending on how 
adequately the subject is addressed, can either undermine the efficacy of professionals or 
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foreign language themselves, reality showed that this ideal was not feasible.  Nevertheless, 
most servicemen managed to command some basic words of the local vernacular but this 
was not enough to overcome the language barrier and therefore the military had to recruit 
interpreters in order to connect with parties in the area of operations. These historical cases 
showed that interpreters are more than just linguistic agents as they proved crucial for the 
gathering of intelligence and canvassing the surroundings. Despite their important role, 
the intermediary position cast a shadow upon their motives and servicemen therefore often 
treated interpreters with suspicion.
In order to understand how today’s soldiers perceive the cooperation with local 
interpreters, a mixed methods study was applied to investigate the experiences of Dutch 
soldiers of the BG and PRT units. Although (serious) problems in the interaction between 
soldiers and local interpreters did occur, the analysis showed that servicemen in general 
appreciated their assistance in a positive and professional way. With regard to the BG 
respondents, the cross-cultural competence of openness (a person’s open-mindedness 
towards out-group members and his or her susceptibility to cultural norms and values 
of others) proved to be determinant for the appreciation of the cooperation. The PRT 
respondents, on the other hand, emphasized that a professional attitude, which more 
specifically includes the intercultural competencies of respect and empathy, was important 
to establish a trusting relationship with local interpreters. Differences in the experiences 
between the BG and PRT can be explained by the different working situations (core-military 
tasks versus reconstruction tasks), readiness to invest in a trusting relationship, the level of 
intercultural competence, and pre-deployment training in working with interpreters. The 
more aware soldiers are of how these factors influence their cooperation, the better they 
will be able to perceive local interpreters as resourceful agents capable of addressing the 
linguistic and cultural needs of both the military organization and the local population.
Chapter 5 ‘Small Sociology of Interpreters: The Role and Position of Interpreters in Conflict Situations’ 
applied a literature study as well as an autoethnographic analysis to explore the experiences 
of interpreters in war-infested environments in order to gain an understanding of their 
role and position in military operations. Since ancient times the interpreter’s reputation 
has been one of duplicity. Since ancient times the interpreter’s reputation has been one 
of extremes. The interpreter was either the paragon of invisibility or duplicity. Whereas 
they seldom received acknowledgement for their skills and therefore often were left 
unmentioned in historical reports, interpreters were easy targets of suspicion who could be 
blamed for scheming and plotting against their employers. This pattern has been observed 
throughout history and therefore this chapter investigated whether this ambiguous image 
of the interpreter still persists. More specifically, this study explored the experiences of 
interpreters through their own account of events. This approach has brought forth five 
seperate but interdependent aspects that can be used to describe the role and position of the 
interpreter within the military field. 
for linguistic proficiency, it cannot necessarily be assumed, however, that native speakers 
and more specifically British servicemen always profit from this situation. Their fluency, as 
was discovered by this study, also happened to be their flaw as non-native speakers found it 
difficult to comprehend their language use.      
Finally, this chapter demonstrates that the military takes a rather ambivalent stance 
towards the influence of language on communication and cooperation. Whereas the English 
language is considered an expected quality of the personnel, this study has concluded that 
proficiency in today’s military lingua is not self-evident. To neglect this realization is to 
trivialize the detrimental effects of the language barrier on the communicational process 
in military operations. The military organization, therefore, needs to consider how to 
adequately implement its corporate language and how to actively support those who have 
not yet been able to fully command and embrace it.
Chapter 3 ‘Language and Communication during Peace Support Operations in Timor-Leste’ has 
provided an insight into how language and cultural sensitivities can contribute to the 
complexity of peace operations. The case study of UNTAET demonstrates that it is important 
for troops to have an understanding of the socio-political and linguistic (post)colonial) 
landscape of the mission environment. Precisely, because the Australian peacekeepers 
omitted to integrate adequate cultural and linguistic knowledge into their strategic approach, 
the troops unintentionally alienated themselves from the population. The language barrier, 
in this regard, caused the Australian contingent to suffer from a bad reputation which they 
attempted to repair with the assistance of locally recruited interpreters that enabled them to 
communicate with local parties. Once again, however, the Australians experienced that this 
required caution as the various communities could only be approached by interpreters who 
were one of their own. Although these interpreters considerably strengthened the hand of 
the Australian soldiers, it was too little too late to get a firm hold of the situation. The lack 
of linguistic and cultural awareness in the earlier stages of the intervention had spoiled the 
peacekeepers’ ability to truly reach out and gain the support of the population. In retrospect, 
it therefore can be concluded that the self-proclaimed success of the mission in fact was a 
remarkable piece of self-deception as UNTAET failed to fulfil a substantial role in the state-
building process in Timor-Leste.
 
Military Operations and Interpreters
Chapter 4 ‘Smooth Translation? Cooperation between Dutch Servicemen and Local Interpreters in Military 
Operations in Afghanistan’ explored the interpersonal dynamics between soldiers and local 
interpreters through a discussion of historical examples and a mixed methods research of 
this cooperation during the Dutch ISAF mission. The cases of the Dutch Colonial Army and 
the Kit Carson Scouts in Vietnam demonstrated once again that it was essential to incorporate 
local guides and interpreters into the ranks. Although soldiers were advised to learn the 
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difficulty of meeting the high demand for interpreters throughout the mission. Second, 
the aspect of motivation demonstrated that whereas soldiers approached the cooperation 
with interpreters rather instrumentally, the interpreters themselves had more ideological 
reasons for joining the military. The concept of reciprocity (prosocial behavior that inclines 
persons to return a given service), moreover, positively reinforced the process of cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters. Third, the aspect of position demonstrated that despite 
the formal classification of interpreters into different categories, the position of interpreters 
was predominantly determined by the rigidity of both the hierarchical structure and social 
relations within the military organization. Although this problematized the cooperation 
considerably, these negative effects could be mitigated through the moderators of collective 
team identification and team member alignment. The military organization, however, did 
not recognize the importance of implementing these concepts in an effective way. Instead, 
individual soldiers and interpreters acted as ‘transformational leaders’ who were able to 
create a sense of belonging and communal goals. All in all, the position of the interpreter 
seemed more a matter of personal insight than organizational zeal. Fourth, the aspect of 
intervention in practice consisted of on the spot interpreting and cultural, political, and 
diplomatic mediation. These tasks go far beyond the traditional idea of the interpreter as a 
neutral ‘black box’. Moreover, it was found that interpreters who showed initiative and could 
act strategically were better suited to face the uncertainties that are inherent to interpreting 
in a military environment. Therefore, interpreters were as much linguistic advisors as they 
were brokers who enabled the military to interact with the local population. The military 
organization, that is the system as well as the individual soldiers, however, often failed to 
recognize the potential of the utility and deployability of the interpreter. This explains the lack 
of vision and absence of realistic guidelines with regard to the cooperation between soldiers 
and interpreters. Intervention in everyday operations, therefore, often became a dilemma for 
both soldiers and interpreters who had to decide for themselves how to proceed in a specific 
situation. Once again, individual characters determined the outcome of the uncertainty 
surrounding this cooperation. The fifth and final aspect of perception demonstrated that 
while trust is key in international cooperation, this is difficult (but not impossible) to 
establish in the military organization. Operational security, in- and out-group effects and 
short deployments were all experienced as obstacles that hampered the development of 
mutual trust between soldiers and interpreters. All together this demonstrated that the 
interaction between soldiers and interpreters during the Dutch mission in Uruzgan was a 
highly dynamic, intricate, and challenging matter (of the heart) which heavily relied upon 
how the involved individuals dealt with the situation at hand. These personal experiences at 
the tactical level, therefore, constitute the basis upon which the military can strengthen the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters in future missions.
First, the aspect of allocation often proved to be a matter of chance. The role of interpreter 
was given to those individuals who could speak (a few words of ) the relevant language and/
or who could rise to the occasion. While their assignment therefore was mostly arbitrary, 
the impact of their job was transformative as their linguistic and mediation skills not only 
enabled communication, but also created opportunities for the involved parties. Second, 
the aspect of motivation centres on the core motivation of belonging. The interpreter 
devoted his cultural and linguistic capacities to ameliorate his own fate as well of that of 
others in the hope to contribute to the formation and consolidation of close relationships, 
support and groups. Third, the aspect of position described how interpreters were literally 
positioned between groups. As a go-between they were confronted with different conflicting 
group norms and interests. While this often was experienced as a burden, the interpreters 
nevertheless used their position, even at their own peril, to safeguard and preserve the 
communicational process between the parties. Fourth, the interpreters’ interventions 
proved crucial for all involved parties as their actions enabled them to approach difficult 
to access territories, persons, and information. Although rarely credited for such services, 
interpreters used their cultural knowledge to influence the outcome of interactions, even if 
this involved subtle manipulation or misrepresentation that could only further complicate 
their reputation. Finally, the aspect of perception was found to be heavily influenced by the 
in-between position and the sometimes ‘ambiguous’ interventions of interpreters. Due 
to this duality, the loyalty of individual interpreters often was perceived with suspicion. 
Interpreters, therefore, often remained outsiders to all of the involved parties. Despite these 
allegations, interpreters used their own independent view to cope with this stigma and 
to engage in others and bridge differences. Together these five aspects enable an accurate 
description of the role and position of interpreters in a conflict environment and thereby 
they constitute a theoretical framework that can be applied to further investigate and 
understand this matter in the context of military missions.       
Chapter 6 ‘Communicating Vessels: The Trade and Traits of Soldiers and Interpreters during Stability 
Operations in the Province of Uruzgan’ provided an insight into the dynamics of cooperation 
between interpreters and soldiers in modern military operations. For this purpose, 
experiences from soldiers and both national and local interpreters who participated in the 
Dutch stabilization mission in Uruzgan province were scrutinized by use of the framework 
presented in chapter five. In addition to understanding how the respondents dealt with the 
intricacies of their interdependency, the analysis also contributed to the comprehension of 
the (mutual) dynamics of each aspect of the framework.     
     First, the social ties of Afghan communities proved instrumental in the allocation of 
interpreters. Social capital, therefore, was an important source of recruitment. Human 
capital such as personal skills, on the other hand, determined the assignment of interpreters 
to specific units. Competent individuals often received promotion to higher positions, 
which meant that soldiers at lower levels were deprived from the necessary knowledge 
and expertise. Since interpreters were a scare resource, this paucity further added to the 
234 Talk Up Front  Conclusions, Reflections and Recommendations 235
organizational and individual dimensions of language problems in the military context. 
This is even more important since the topic remains relatively unexplored within the field 
of military studies. The insights and limitations of this dissertation, in this regard, offer a 
starting point for future studies. Whereas this study has demonstrated the effects of the 
language barrier on modern military operations and provided a profound insight in the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters, it has been limited in its approach. Inherent 
to the nature of a doctoral dissertation, only a select number of examples of international 
military cooperation have been analysed. In-depth case studies were limited to experiences 
in an operational NATO headquarters, the UNTAET mission in Timor-Leste, and the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, the analysis of the interaction between servicemen 
and interpreters in the latter mission focussed exclusively on the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. 
Consequently, a broader approach is necessary to incorporate a wider range of data from 
different missions and different nations that can be used to further the understanding of the 
language barrier in military operations and the role and position of interpreters within the 
organization of the armed forces. Therefore, this study identifies two specific avenues for 
future research that address some of the most prominent issues at hand.
First, the effectiveness of language on modern military (stability) operations needs to 
be understood more closely. This not only pertains to communication within coalitions 
of international military cooperation, but also to communication with local parties either 
through interpreters or specially trained soldiers. The insights from this dissertation urge 
for an international comparative study that aims to disclose the full extent of how soldiers 
are confronted with linguistic and (related) cultural gaps and how they subsequently address 
these challenges. The military domain is rich in evidence, which should be harvested by use 
of, among others, field studies, before-and-after-designs with comparison groups who either 
have or have not participated in a language program, long-term evaluation of linguistic 
interventions by interpreters, and cross-national comparison of communication strategies 
of military operations. While ambitious, the increased dialogue between (international) 
academics and practitioners provides fertile soil for such research (Jones & Askew, 2014, 
6). Exploring this area, therefore, will not only further enhance the understanding of the 
effectiveness of language on military operations, but also identify successful and less 
successful practices and point at ways to uncover and use linguistic potential within the 
military organization. 
Second, this study found that interpreters are very vulnerable due to their in-between role 
and position. More research is necessary to explore the full consequences of the interpreter’s 
precarious intermediary position and to identify methods that equip the military organization 
to better accommodate and protect these agents. This can be achieved by investigating how 
servicemen of other national militaries and interpreters experience the cooperation in 
conflict areas. Moreover, in addition to research into international missions, recent Dutch 
deployments in among others Mali, Iraq, and (again) Afghanistan offer new opportunities 
for case studies as well. These new venues might benefit from the theoretical framework 
To conclude
How do language issues affect military operations, and how in particular do soldiers and 
interpreters cooperate in mission areas to overcome such issues? This study has extensively 
demonstrated that language highly influences both the communication and cooperation 
between international military personnel as well as local parties. With regard to the latter, 
interpreters proved to be vital in obtaining the mission’s goals as their linguistic and cultural 
skills enabled the troops to interact and engage with the local population. Establishing 
constructive and trusting cooperation between soldiers and interpreters, and for that matter 
local actors, however, was not self-evident. Efficient working relationships were often more 
the merit of individual traits than standard procedure. The success of the mission, after all, 
greatly depends on a mutually reinforcing and inversely related set of requirements that is 
tiered along the lines of the deployment of the interpreter, a jointly supported cooperation 
and an investment in a trusting relationship. Language management, in the broadest sense, 
therefore, requires a steady top down and bottom up approach of which the learning process 
should result in a body of knowledge that is based upon the accumulated experiences and 
insights of both soldiers and interpreters. 
Reflection and Future Research 
The outcome of this explorative study first and foremost provides an insight in the far-
reaching consequences of language matters in international military operations. As a result 
of the practical nature of this scope, the research predominantly relies upon historical and 
empirical evidence in order to present an extensive oversight of challenges and problems 
with regard to linguistic issues in the military context. More specifically, it adopts a 
predominantly sociological perspective to investigate how language matters influence the 
military organization and stakeholders in conflict-infested mission areas. This approach 
also includes theoretical ideas and propositions from, among others, the fields of sociology, 
organization studies as well as cultural and language studies that have been used to analyse 
the data and answer the research questions. As such, the study contributes to the emerging 
body of interdisciplinary research that combines insights from the humanities and social 
sciences in order to obtain a better understanding of issues of language and conflict (Kelly, 
Footitt & Salama-Carr, 2019, 6). In this regard, the merit of the research lies in both its practical 
scope and predominantly sociological perspective since the effects of language issues on 
international military cooperation in modern missions have been relatively understudied. 
The most important contribution of this study therefore consists of its unique insight into 
previously less explored consequences of the language barrier in conflict areas.       
Further research should expand on the results of this study to gain much-needed 
additional insights that allow for the development of a broader perspective on the 
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operations. Doing so will smoothen the cooperation between various parties, including 
those less linguistically competent.
Second, this study has demonstrated that smooth cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters often involved individuals who through their (transformational) behavior 
facilitated effective working relationships. Such initiatives proved crucial in overcoming the 
deep-seated culture, norms, and standards of the military organization that (unwittingly) 
causes obstacles in the cooperation with interpreters. Therefore, military personnel, and 
more specifically commanders, should stimulate and empower individuals capable of forging 
cooperative bonds. Setting shared goals and creating a sense of belonging might produce 
the conditions in which all of the involved acknowledge their mutual interdependency and 
thereby seek to realize the full potential of their cooperation. This of course should also 
encompass the notion that an interpreter is as much a linguistic as a cultural adviser. The 
recognition that interpreting is more than just translation enables the military to optimally 
deploy these agents in their effort to connect with the local society. Since these insights have 
been derived from personal experiences in mission areas, the organization should strive to 
gather more of this kind of knowledge through systematic reflection on the cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters. Such reflective learning will contribute to the development 
of normative professional skills that will equip servicemen and interpreters to make better 
use of their discretionary powers. This in turn will positively affect the cooperation as this 
approach creates leeway to implement the expertise of the involved individuals. 
Third, this dissertation has more than once demonstrated that the military organization 
did not fully recognize and acknowledge the importance to address language matters in 
a more structural way. In the fog of war language implications of deployments are often 
addressed in an implicit or unstructured manner (Kujamäki & Footitt, 2019, 129). Therefore, 
organizational policy should be formulated in order to mitigate the various detrimental 
effects of the language barrier. In this regard, it is crucial to implement a policy for 
developing, maintaining, and augmenting linguistic skills among military personnel. Due 
to the complexity of military operations, these measures should focus on both linguistic 
competence and cultural sensitivity. This will boost soldiers’ confidence and their ability to 
communicate through and with others in the mission area. 
A fourth recommendation pertains to interpreters specifically. As a consequence of their 
intermediary role and position in the mission environment, interpreters are particularly 
vulnerable. Therefore, the organization should develop a comprehensive human resources 
policy that provides directions with regard to their recruitment, deployment, and aftercare. 
Questions about the intricacies of (local) acquisition, the accommodation and assignment 
of interpreters to specific units within the organization, as well the responsibilities of the 
military towards interpreters after the end of their service, need to be addressed at the 
organizational level. This should include matters like, for instance, insurance, medical care 
and protective visas (Fitchett, 2019, 199-200). Furthermore, since interpreters proved to be a 
scarce resource for which coalition partners were even willing to compete (in terms of salary), 
that was introduced in Chapter 5 and applied to the analysis of Chapter 6, since it offers a 
tool to further comprehend this intricate relationship of interdependency. Additionally, 
this also enables the optimization of this framework as it will provide an enhanced insight 
into the various aspects and how they (inter)relate to each other.  Furthermore, it must be 
emphasized that future research on the precarious role and position of interpreters should 
adopt a comprehensive approach towards this particular aspect of military operations. In 
order to fully understand the dynamics at hand the scope must be broadened beyond the 
actual operation itself. Instead, the full range of experiences should be studied, including, 
among others, recruitment and pre-deployment training, security and staffing conditions 
during the operation, as well as the interpreters’ safety and well-being after the international 
military mission has ended. This is even more important as the insights obtained from 
such a holistic approach will also enable the military organization to adjust both its policy 
and practice. In doing so, future research can contribute to improve the guidelines and 
training for both servicemen and interpreters (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2019, 486). These 
reflections and suggestions for future research illustrate once more that there remains much 
to be learned to effectively employ interpreters and to actively anticipate language issues in 
modern military operations.
Recommendations for Military Policy and Practice
International military cooperation simply is impossible without adequate communication. 
Since this study has investigated how language issues affect military operations, its insights 
not only contribute to the understanding of this matter, they also provide a basis to smoothen 
the communication and cooperation within this specific context. Therefore, this section 
discusses recommendations for both the practice and policy of the military organization.     
First, awareness is key. Military personnel should realize the detrimental effects of 
language problems and not take linguistic proficiency for granted. While seemingly obvious, 
reality shows that not all soldiers within a coalition might possess sufficient knowledge of the 
official language. Moreover, competent non-native speakers might struggle to understand 
native speakers, especially when they speak with an accent. Even NATO, with its highly 
standardized use of English has been structurally confronted with such problems (Jones & 
Askew, 2014, 36-38). Logically, this language problem becomes even more complicated in 
situations in which other actors do not speak the military lingua franca at all (such as for 
instance the local population) are involved. The first step, therefore, is to acknowledge that 
‘the relative absence of language awareness is an indicator of shortcomings in current policy’ 
(Kelly, 2019, 106). Whereas this certainly also needs to be addressed at an organizational 
level, individuals at the grass roots level should be trained to realize that language issues 
might exist and that they subsequently should take this into account during the conduct of 
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it is recommended that the organization secures additional international agreements. This 
might be realized at an ad hoc basis among coalition partners participating in a specific 
mission, but should also be addressed in a more permanent manner as part of international 
military cooperation under the flag of NATO and UN. 
A fifth and last recommendation concerns organizational learning. While militaries 
traditionally emphasize the importance of so-called lessons learned, they have a poor track 
record in actually learning and implementing lessons, especially in case of peace support or 
stabilization operations. Most Western militaries, for instance, have learned substantially 
in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they nevertheless failed to institutionalize the 
insights resulting from these experiences (Kitzen, 2020, 18). This also seems to be the case 
with respect to the military’s ability to mitigate the effects of the language barrier. Despite 
an abundance of experiences, there was a lack of broadly supported vision, leadership 
and realistic guidelines to efficiently manage language matters and more specifically the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters. Military organizations, therefore, should 
start to learn how language has affected their operations. While such a learning policy 
might be an integral part of the afore recommended language and interpreter policies, 
institutional learning is of such vital importance that it should be mentioned separately. 
Talking up front and learning to learn from hard-gained experiences are the crucial first 
steps towards a more efficient policy and practice in dealing with the language barrier in 
military operations. Finally, this dissertation should conclude by paying tribute to all of the 
soldiers and interpreters who have tried to bridge the language gap despite facing violent 
conflict and organizational restraints. They have shown the way forward. 




AIIC   International Association of Conference Interpreters
ASG   Afghan Security Guard
BG   Battle Group
CAVR   Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation
CIMIC   Civil-Military Cooperation
DR   Deh Rawod
DTF   Deployment Task Force
EW   Electronic Warfare
FAVON Federatie van Afghaanse Vluchtelingen Organisaties Nederland 
FIT   International Federation of Translators
G1   Staff Personnel Officer 
HOTO   Hand-Over-Take-Over
IED   Improvised Explosive Device
IMS   International Management Services
INTERFRET  International Force in East-Timor
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force
KAF   Kandahar Airfield 
MFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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MT   (PRT) Mission Team
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO   Non-Commissioned Officer
OMF   Opposing Military Forces
OMLT   Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
POW   Prisoner of War
PRT   Provincial Reconstruction Team
QRF   Quick Reaction Force
RPG   Rocket Propelled Grenade
SFIR   Stabilisation Force Iraq
TFU   Task Force Uruzgan
TK   Tarin Kowt
UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL   United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL   United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNTAC   United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET   United Nations Transitional Administration in East-Timor 
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Appendix I
Oversight of Interviewed Local Interpreters
Allocation Motivation Position Intervention Perception
LI 1 Network 
(friend who 




(in search of employment, 
making money for his 
family and girlfriend)
Ideological 
(future of country, support 
foreign army, expelling 
terrorists from country)




Self: positive (‘Without the inter-
preter the foreign army could not 
support the country’)










(in search of employment, 
earning salary to support 
family)
Likes to work with the 
military




Self: positive (soldiers can’t  suc-
ceed without the interpreter) 
Military: both positive (The Dutch 
are good people) and negative 
(treatment: ‘Some soldiers think 
Afghan people and interpreters 
are not human’)
NI: no contact
Local: ‘When you pay respect, the 
Afghan people will give their soul 
for you’







(moral responsibility for 








Military: predominantly positive 
(‘Doing their job perfectly but we 
don’t get that much of a warm 
welcome’)
NI: not mentioned.
Local: negative (‘People believe 
that the interpreter is no better 
than the Dutch army or coalition 
forces)
LI 4 Chance (en-




(in search of employment, 
earning money)
Ideological
(wants to support and be 
part of ISAF in rebuilding 
the country and creating a 
safe environment, wants 
to solve the problem 
between the ANA soldiers 
and Dutch soldiers)  







(‘The interpreter is a solace for 
the country’)
Military: positive (They have 
good behavior and treat the 
interpreters well)
NI: not mentioned
Local: depends on behavior (‘The 
local people are uneducated so 
we must behave good (according 
to Islam) for them to behave good 
as well because if we behave bad 
they’ll hate us’)
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LI 8 Network (his 
cousin LI 2 in-
troduced him 
to the job)
Not mentioned OMLT staff Translation Self: positive (‘The interpreter 
is the most important guy in the 
group because he’s the guide for 
all the unit.’)  
Military: positive 
(‘They have respect for us. I am 
really happy with them. We work 
together as a colleague. They 
don’t think you are an interpreter, 














(the importance of the 
job for the reconstruction 
and development of the 
country)




Self: positive (‘Being an interpre-
ter is the hardest job in Afghani-
stan. I think that the interpreter’s 
job is the I in ISAF because 
without us ISAF can’t do anything 
because they don’t know about 
the languages in Afghanistan.’)
Military: positive (‘They respect 
us and we respect them. We don’t 
have any problems right now. The 
Dutch soldiers have good beha-









(wants to work for his 
country and contribute 










our village and 
things. That’s 





they know who 
he is.’
Self: positive (‘Our job is the best 
job and the most difficult job than 
other soldiers.’)
Military: both positive (‘When 
they are going on a mission 
they’re doing their job. They’re 
doing their job carefully.’) and 
negative (Advisors and supervisor 
who blame interpreters and thre-
aten to fire them if they don’t fol-
low their orders. ‘We face some 
difficulties with Dutch soldiers 
and they blame us and they didn’t 
respect some of the culture and 
they got some problem, maybe I 
will leave this job.’)
NI: not mentioned
Local: not mentioned
LI 7 Network 
(friend who 




(earn some money)  
‘I fight for my country not 
for work. Before coming 
here I said I will make 
money but in here when I 
came here so I see the ANA 
guys who have a salary 
about 150$ not more than 
that. So, I said they are 
fighting for their own 
country just for 150$ so I 
can also fight by 600$. So, 
I am fighting. I am not only 
the terp also I feel I am a 
soldier. Not for the ANA’s, 
not for the Dutch but for 













(‘I feel appreciated. … They say 
‘Know that you are a part of our 
team. We need you for this case 
just stay behind me.’)
Military: positive 
(I feel respected and that’s more 
important to me than my salary.’ 
‘The Dutch army respect the local 
people very much.’)) 
NI: (‘We don’t know them.’)
Local: (‘The Taliban can point 
out with their teeth that he’s the 
terp.’)  
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Appendix II
Oversight of Interviewed National Interpreters
Allocation Motivation Position Intervention Perception





Category 1 PRT Interpretation
Cultural education 
Mediation






















Mediation LI and military
Self: positive (interpreter is 
eyes and ears of ISAF)
Military: positive (coo-
peration) and negative 
(treatment)
LI: positive (mediation and 
social interaction)
Local: predominantly 
negative (traitor) and so-
metimes positive (support)
NI 3 Application 
MFA
Ideological 
(support ISAF and 
native country)








Mediation LI and military
Self: positive (interpreter 
is the bridge between ISAF 
and civilians, ears of ISAF)
Military: positive (briefing) 
and negative (treatment LI)


















Self: positive (interpreter is 
bridge builder)
Military: mostly dependent 
of commander; both 
positive (cooperation 
higher ranks) and negative 
(treatment lower ranks, 
incident)
LI: positive (social talk)
Local: predominantly nega-
tive (traitor; lack of or bad 
image troops) and some-
times positive (support)
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Self: positive (interpreter 
is the bridge between sol-
diers and population; part 
of the group who’ll fight 
to the last bullet, image 
builder Dutch troops)
Military: positive (coope-
ration commander) and 




NI 6 Network 
(friend who 
works as an 
interpreter for 
the Dep. of 
Justice)












Self: positive (without the 
interpreter there would be 
no mission; interpreter is 
the only lifeline between 
military and population)
Military: positive 
















Military: both negative 
(incident, treatment, lack 





NI 8 Break from uni-
versity, opportu-
nity to return to 
Afghanistan











Local: positive (being 
respectful is enough; needs 
to keep a careful balance, 
however, to avoid tension 
between parties)






Interpreters ‘borrowed’ from 
US and Canadian coalition 
forces
LI recruited by two NIs and 
through allies (minimal 
screening, personal screen-
ing focused on relationships 
with local parties)















Lack of screening led to 
caution with regard to shar-




NIs held more privileges 
and relationships were of a 
different nature (compared 
with LIs) 
Interpreter is never part 
of the team (‘and that is 
a pity’)
Interpretation, trans-





material through the 
local market




Scarcity, in DR 1 LI ‘bor-
rowed’ from US coalition 
forces, in TK NIs and addi-
tionally some LIs ‘borrowed’ 
from US forces 
Preference for the same 


















No restricted information 
involved, information was 
freely shared with inter-
preters
No physical restrictions 
at base
Mixed interest potential 
risk  
The interpreter is part of 
the team
Interpretation includ-
ing context, Literal 
translation of process-
es and procedures
Self: positive (LIs 
were good at their job 
and could be trusted 
when relationship 
developed; locally 
hired sometimes less 
skilled, but willing to 
learn)
Negative (LIs that 
were spoilt by work-
ing for coalition 
forces)
Appendix III
Oversight of Interviewed Military Personnel
 1  The respondents are listed in order of rotation. Since the different units of the TFU had different rotation schemes, the rotation  
of the TFU staff has been used here. The listed rotation concurs with the TFU staff with which the respective unit has shared most 
time in Uruzgan.  




Initially 3 LI, then 4 and at 
the end of rotation 6 as the 
Dutch mission was picking 
up momentum; incidentally 
a NI 
Difference in contracts (one 
LI had arranged that he 
would only work at the base)
Due to shortage hiring of 
locals as interpreters: Bari 
Gul (who previously worked 










The interpreters had their 
own formal leader who was 
well respected within the 
unit; more respect, howev-
er, for informal leader (Bari 
Gul), who was effectively 
running the LIs and estab-
lished their position with 
the company
Position of hired locals 
ultimately undermined due 
to local disputes which saw 
Bari Gul leaving to work 
with US troops and Taza 
Gul harassed and ultimately 
fired (role US, dispute 
NLD-US)
NI undermined authority 
of the military by instigat-
ing LIs 
Platoon leaders established 
good contacts with indi-
vidual LIs (which also led to 
a preference from the side 
of the LIs) 
‘The more normal you treat 
your interpreter, the more 
effective the cooperation. 
Moreover, you’re respon-
sible for his security.’
‘Treat your interpreter the 









tions well when he 
translates and inter-




and possesses the 
right personality’







NI, lack of military 
attitude and language 
skills of LIs)
NI: negative (more 
connected to Afghans 











Scarcity, initially 2 NIs, later 3 
for staff PRT
Only 4 LIs for BG, MTs and 
other units
Local interlocutors dem-
















Only NIs due to restricted 
nature of work
Informal hierarchy based 
on preference from military
NIs treated like other 
military personnel when 
sharing information (need-
to-know/nice-to-know)
NIs not always perceived 
as benevolent by locals, 
sometimes threatened as 
traitors
Some offices out-of-
bounds for NIs; NIs were 
allowed to bear arms and a 
cell phone 
Despite military training 
and rank, NIs were not 
considered true soldiers
Interpretation, in-




Self: positive (fully 
trusted 2 NIs, good 
relationship and 
respect)
Negative (1 NI fired 
because of corrup-
tion; intensity of job 
and scarcity exhaust-
ed NIs; when working 
with LIs no sensitive 





Initially 2-3 LIs ‘inherited’ 
from US forces, ultimately 
3-8 LIs when IMS succeeded 
in stepping up recruitment 
(young adults)
Additional screening by 
Dutch staff
Later also 1 NI 
Instru-
mental
LIs who did not function 
appropriately were sent 
back to IMS
Need-to-know policy
LIs cannot be fully trusted
Restricted freedom of 
movement at base, and 
except locally recruited 
Bari Gul no weapons were 
allowed
Problems with position 
of interpreters caused by 
insufficient language skills, 
lack of dedication, young 
age
Better language skills 
needed on patrol, than 




LIs: negative (‘don’t 
we have a right for 
better conditions?’, 
conditions at the 
camp were very 
rudimentary during 
the first rotation)  




Scarcity, initially 1 LI via IMS, 
later supplemented to 4/5
Half of the period 1 NI 
Allocation of specific mis-
sion by base commander 
dependent on location and 
interlocutor
Additional screening for LIs 
in DR












Position of the interpreter 
ideal for spying (Pakistan) 
LIs are always at risk
Good LI: sufficient English 




mined by period deployed 
as LI
NI stayed with LIs and acted 
as informal leader in order 
to control LIs
Information sharing de-
liberately on short notice/
need-to-know policy
Impossible to fully trust LIs, 
trust is a matter of experi-
ence with an individual LI
Restricted access to some 
base areas and facilities
Some problems due to Ra-
madan, scarcity of rooms, 
intensity of roster
Listening in on elec-
tronic devices (NI)





and gives cultural 
explanation 
Self: positive (dur-
ing the mission 
cooperation with LIs 
smoothened, yet a 









In pioneering phase no 
interpreters, LIs (amongst 
whom Bari Gul) acquired and 
rudimentary screened by 
US; later formalized through 
IMS; scarcity lowered quality 
standards 
9 LIs at max, but enormous 
rate of replacement and 
mostly 6 available (demand 
for 13)
Incidentally two NIs 
Platoon commanders were 
looking for  persistence and 
no-whining mentality in LIs
Instru-
mental 
(LIs as a 
‘tool’)
When in DR NIs were 
accommodated with LIs 
in order to detect security 
issues and other problems
LIs were allowed to take 
part in Ramadan celebra-
tions   
LIs were not part of the 
military organization, but 
a ‘tool’ for accomplishing 
the mission and trusted on 
need-to-know basis
Informal interpreter com-
munity hierarchy: NIs, LIs 
from Kandahar, ‘local’ LIs. 
Bari Gul exception because 
he had been in the area for 
a long time and was well-
connected
Within the group LIs from 
Kandahar senior members 
tried to claim privileges 
(countered by interviewee)
Restricted access to base 
facilities for LIs who were 
also not allowed to bear 
arms (except Bari Gul)
During firefights LIs are a 
liability
NIs as cultural advi-
sors when possible 
and when military 
staff was open to such 
advice
Interpreting during 
talks and translation of 
written documents
NIs dedicated for 
intelligence work, but 
when unavailable LIs 
were also allowed to 
overhear ICOM chatter
LIs joined patrols, 
stood at the gate of 
the base, were active 
with the base security 
details, etc.  
Self: positive (daily 
informal contact and 
regular meals to-
gether with LIs; good 
working relationship 
and easy to manage 
difficulties when you 
adapt to their culture; 
‘father figure’ to 
younger LIs)  
Negative (you can 
never fully trust LIs 
because you don’t 
have insight in all 
different agendas; 
poor training of LIs 
for task as interpreter 
and military environ-
ment) 
NIs: positive (opted 
to step up as cultural 
advisors and act as 
intermediators and 
check towards LIs)
LIs: positive (NIs 
as representative 
and balance against 
military staff)
Negative (mainly 
security related, one 
LI experienced too 
many enemy fire dur-
ing patrols and did 
not return from leave; 
sometimes platoon 
commanders were 
perceived too direct) 





Scarcity, at worst 2 interpret-
ers for the whole base
Later 5-6 LIs (through KAF as 
well as locally hired)
1 NI available when an elec-
tronic warfare detachment 
was deployed
Preference for locally hired LI
Not only soldier have their 
preference, also local inter-
locutors
Experiences during duties 
were used for additional 










During TFU I interpreters 
were the only Afghans with 
whom we were working 
directly (no Afghan army 
presence)
Interpreter is intermedia-
tor in conversations; good 
interpreter is pro-active 
and lies the right emphasis 
in the conversation
For the local interlocutor 
the interpreter is not a sol-
dier, but a fellow Afghan
Some LIs disguise them-
selves by wearing sun 
glasses or bandana’s
Position of locally hired LIs 
vulnerable
Informal hierarchy among 
LIs
Information position de-
pends on personal relation-
ship with LI, but generally 
as little and late as pos-
sible (need-t-know policy, 
operational security)
Restricted freedom of 
movement at base, only 
locally hired LI Bari Gul 
was allowed to bear arms 
(because of his background 
as security guard)
Interpreter is not only 
a resource, but also an 
individual




Self: negative (did not 
trust all LIs due to ei-
ther poor quality, lack 




ing relationship with 
preferred LI, person-
ality is pivotal (and 





Pioneering phase in which 
locals (Bari Gul, Taza Gul) 
were hired as interpreters, 
often through US mediation; 
gradual influx of LI (IMS); 
one NI; at peak 7 interpret-
ers (shortage)  
Also competition between 
US and NLD for interpreters 
‘Local interpreters are all but 
an elegant solution, in times 
of scarcity, however, one has 




Locals and LI caught be-
tween society, Taliban and 
work (Taza Gul requested 
weapon to protect his fam-
ily; LI Waffa disappeared for 
some time), and therefore 
might be coerced or per-
suaded to switch sides.
Since LIs have to think 
about the security of them-
selves and their families 
you cannot trust them 
completely.
Interpreters within unit 
treated with respect and 
according with Maslow 
(example of air condition-
ing which was allocated to 
LIs as soon as available) 
Hierarchy of interpreters; 
formal
chief interpreter (Waffa) 
who earned 1200$, this 
caused envy with other 
LIs (600$), also informal 
hierarchy
HOTO of ISAF units might 
trigger different behavior 
oof LIs as they are treated 
differently by newcomers
LIs gave Dutch soldiers 
farewell presents, but 
they did not receive gifts 
in return. The soldiers 
deemed the relationship of 
a transactional nature; LIs 
had already been rewarded 
for their work.  
Interpretation
Translation
Intelligence (EW, ICOM 
chatter)
Cultural advice 
‘An interpreter has to 
be able to interpret 
the intention (verbal 
as well as non-verbal) 
of a message’
Self: undetermined 
(in the pioneering 
phase one has to 
work by trial and 
error which caused 
positive and nega-
tive experiences; a 
good interpreters is 
trustworthy, language 
skills and the ability 
to learn on the job
LI: positive (it’s all 
about the money)
NI: negative (about 
Dutc, felt connected 
with LIs and even 
decided to relocate 
himself to their 
quarters) 




2 NIs allocated to PRT com-
mander/staff
Scarcity
In allocation for specific 
jobs, the preferences of local 















The interpreter moves be-
tween two worlds, but his 
loyalty has to be with ISAF
A PRT interpreter is a spar-
ring partner for the soldiers, 
therefor the interpreter 
needs to be intelligent 
and skilled and the soldier 
should provide him with 
information about the 
context of conversations
Triangular interposition 
of interpreter, soldier, and 
interlocutor
Very intensive job which 
is not always appreciated 
appropriately
Within the PRT NIs were 
well-respected, fully trusted 
and informed
No weapons during meet-











Self: positive (capable 
NIs, good advice and 
interpretation, deep 
respect for interpret-
ers and good rela-
tionship)
Negative (1 NI ac-
cepted money from 
the local population, 
despite the lack of 
bad intentions this 




NI, around 5 LIs
Preference for allocation 
of LIs for a specific mission 
based on language skills and 
knowledge of the area, posi-
tive personality and good 
advices














Interpreter as extension of 
the soldier
LI Bari Gul, member of pla-
toon (also carried weapon)
Interpreters who spoke 
Dutch were higher in hier-
archy, NI informal leader 
of LIs
Interpreter is a source of 
information with whom a 
trust relationship should be 
developed, yet at the same 
time one should keep a 
certain distance
Trust is complicated as 
there are so many different 
agenda’s and interests at 
stake, and therefore LIs can 
never be fully trusted 
An interpreter is not a 
soldier
Information shared on 
short notice
Restricted access to some 
camp areas
Cultural differences be-
tween LIs with an urban 
origin and local population
Effectiveness of interpreter 








ence with LI embed-
ded in platoon, much 
learned from LIs and 
I found a personal 
way to deal with 
interpreters, yet it all 
remains a matter of 
personalities)
Negative (NI as well 
as LIs developed an 
attitude, complain-
ing LIs, bad language 
skills, cultural differ-
ences) 




12/13 LIs (shortage, 15 need-
ed) randomly appointed 
from TK (IMS), 1 NI
Shortage: ‘100,000s of euros 
are spent just to be here and 
then it fails because of a lack 
of interpreters’ 











Interpreter and respondent 
formed the nucleus of each 
patrol 
As mission endured LIs 
became very close to 
respondent, they were no 
longer outsiders ‘he was 
my walking encyclopedia, 
I cooperated closely with 
him and he was always in 
my physical proximity’
Working relation with 
other ISAF soldiers could be 
troublesome
No official hierarchy, 
informal hierarchy (age, 
language skills etc.)
Position of interpreter is 
seriously hampered when 
originating from area of 
operations
LIs felt threatened by 
Taliban; did not inform 
family about their work and 







database of local 
information)
Self: positive (trust, 
good working ex-
periences, ‘some LIs 
smarter than aver-
age Dutch soldiers’, 




tents and intention 
of a discussion and 
are representative; 
LIs possessed more 
knowledge than we 
did, no need to treat 
them with suspicion)
Negative (bad inter-
preters make it dif-
ficult to get the point 
of a meeting; exam-
ple Sharif, language 
skills insufficient, 
‘half of our intel is 
lost in translation’)
LI: positive (felt part 
of PRT, loyalty)
Negative (mistreat-
ment and disrespect 
as a consequence of 





The first rotation suffered 
from a huge shortage of 
interpreters; when no in-
terpreters were available, 
Afghan security guards were 
employed as interpreters
Available LIs were divided 
between US and Dutch 
No NI in DR
Development of LI pool; 
one DTF engineers, 2 KAF, 1 
Afghan security guard (Bari 













Enemy-centric focus of US 
soldiers contrasted with 
population-centric focus of 
Dutch, this gave LIs working 
for US better position and 
determined the informal 
hierarchy
Informal hierarchy also 
influenced by income which 
triggered some LIs to extort 
local contractors
LIs (especially with ties to 
the region) were always 
treated with suspicion 
out of fear of treason as a 




dent on quality of inter-
preter (intellect, diligence 
with regard to the mission, 
and language skills); good 
relationship also led to 
informal contact
LIs were strictly limited to 
their own quarters within 
the camp and thus were re-
stricted in their movement 
and physically separated 
from Dutch soldiers
Most LIs were not allowed 
to bear arms and have 
cell phones (except two 
persons from local origin/




LI asked and were al-
lowed to take over the 
initiative in order to 
straighten the discus-
sion)
Base duties, contact 
person for local con-
tractors
Translation of written 
texts including Taliban 
night letters
Patrol duties, main-
taining contact with 
local population
The ‘personal hori-
zon’ of an interpreter 
determines the abil-
ity to act as a cultural 
advisor 
Self: positive (al-
located LI was a 
member of our team, 
good formal as well 
as informal relation-
ship; most other LIs 
were young easily 
approachable, open 
and interested in 
working together; LIs 
prepared a meal for 
interviewee)
Negative (LIs some-
times susceptible to 
blackmail, opportu-
nistic, poor quality, 
sloppy)
LI: negative (some-
times felt  unaccepted 
by military staff; 
threat of enemy fire)





On a daily basis 2 inter-
preters on the camp, 2 on 
forward post, 2 on patrol, 
and 2 rest 
Young LIs, c. 20 years
Permission to recruit LIs 
in DR as a consequence of 
scarcity and poor quality 
of interpreters; candidates 
screened for tribal back-
ground, English skills, 
general attitude, position 




Young age and origin of LI 
influence attitude towards 
local population
Informal hierarchy: lo-
cally hired LI Bari Gul ‘more 
equal than others’ and 
enjoyed privileges which 
triggered envy of others, 
informal hierarchy also 
based on age 
Need-to-know policy, brief-
ing on extrem short notice 
(‘during walk towards 
vehicle’)
Physical movement re-
strictions on base (which 
LIs typically try to ignore 
during HOTO period)
On forward post no physi-
cal separation between LIs 
and Dutch military person-
nel, which triggered friction
Interpreters insiders as well 
as outsiders of which the 
latter determines the fact 





locutors say, including 
non-verbal commu-
nication, context, and 
nuances
NI was tasked for 
intelligence gathering 





with regard to local 
affairs over the span of 
multiple rotations
Self: positive (in 
general the military 
is too negative, LIs 
wrongfully perceived 
as threat; by dealing 
pragmatically with 
operational security 
demands and LIs you 
can achieve a lot and 
enhance the role and 
effectivity of the LIs)
Negative (compart-
mental trust for rea-
sons of self-defence, 
based on previous 
experiences in Bos-
nia, negative attitude 
and poor quality of 
some LIs)
LI: negative (physical 





3-10 LIs randomly appointed 
from TK (structural short-
age);
in early days locally recruited 
interpreters when the sole LI 
was killed




sible for position of inter-
preters within unit (Maslow, 
sorting out command-
ers who treat LIs badly, 
$600monthly salary for LI) 
‘Certificate of appreciation’ 
gives status
Tasks with differ-
ent units: BG, PRT, 
PSYOPS, Base Com-
mand; shortage of 
interpreters mainly felt 
at the base, because 
‘without interpreters 
you cannot go outside 
the gate’  
Self: positive (gen-
erally respondent 
seems to have good 
experiences manag-
ing the interpreters)
Negative (‘I don’t 
trust interpreters’; 
NIs lack of language 
skills and lack of 
adaptation to military 
culture 
NI: undetermined
LI: Feel mistreated by 
IMS and seemingly 





LIs from Kandahar or else-
where
‘Unlimited’ availability 
through interpreter office 
at KAF (also screening), the 
nature of the operation dic-
tated the number of inter-
preters (2-3 on average)
One permanent LIs, prefer-













During operation LI is 




no emotions and no 
own contribution





LI, LIs with military 
background)
Negative (old LI 
who held a power-
ful status, but did 
not perform on a 









5/6 LIs at best, including 











Age seniority (junior LIs less 
status)
Openness (more open LIs 
lower in status)
‘Certificate of appreciation’ 
gives status for LIs them-
selves
Hired locals were suscep-
tible to local influences, one 
local reportedly switched 






N.B.: Due to shortage 
of interpreters respon-
dent’s PRT MT spent 
weeks confined to 
the base
Self: positive ( dur-
ing pre-deployment 
training ‘the 
interpreter is no 
interlocutor’, but in 
Afghanistan inter-
preters proved highly 
valued interlocutors 
who completed 
statements, took the 
initiative and asked 
the right questions)
Negative (locals 
susceptible to local 
influences ‘we call 
this distrustful, yet 
for them it’s a matter 





5 LIs at best (scarcity), 











Informal hierarchy amongst 
LIs. Senior interpreter Sharif 
and Bari Gul  ‘Tolk of the 
town’ leading
Bari Gul returned home 
to his village whenever 
possible; local population 
approached him for cutting 
deals with ISAF (broker)
Gender issue: as a female 
officer respondent kept 
distance from LIs and 
emphasizes professional 









positive about her ex-
perience respondent 
stresses complicated 
nature of working 
with LIs in an alien 
cultural environment)




Shortage of interpreters 
(between 6 and 12, while 15 
needed); relative small camp 
at DR no priority for NIs; 
LIs allocated through IMS 
Kandahar; 2 locally hired LIs 
(among who Bari Gul, who 
carried a weapon)
Some LIs indicated they 
were recruited ‘from the 
street’ and only checked in 
TK; in general screening was 
insufficient
Shortage of interpreters 
mainly due to IMS (‘the nail 
to my coffin’, not delivering 
upon promises, bad pay-
ments, obliging LIs to work 
during entitled leave, black-
mail, etc.); as a result LIs 
would not return from leave  
Jobs with units would be 
allocated on the evening 






























The position of bunks in the 
sleeping room changed as 
relationships between LIs 
developed
One of the NIs was an 
acquaintance of the in-
terviewee as this NI used 
to work as a bouncer at a 
night club 
One LI used informal group 
hierarchy to claim a posi-
tion as ‘base interpreter’ 
Non-functioning LIs were 
lowest in informal hierarchy
Group unified when they 
encountered problems at 
base (fitness times, etc.) 
LIs responsible for their 
own quarters and mess  
Bari Gul’s status and allow-
ance to carry a gun were 
the results of his position in 
earlier rotations
Tasks with differ-






Sometimes LIs would 
use physical violence 
to correct interlocuters 
(example beating)
LIs would indicate how 
negotiations could be 
conducted safely and 
effectively 
Self: negative (dis-
trust of LIs: duplic-
ity, ‘you never know 
what the interpreter’s 
exact intentions are; 
‘they are all buddies, 
also sexually, the Kite 
Runner hits the mark 
pretty close (‘Boys 
Night’)’; not all held 
sufficient language 
skills; cultural differ-
ences; I did not pos-
sess adequate means 
for controlling the LIs; 
much more difficult 
than similar experi-
ence when managing 
interpreters in Bos-
nia; yet on a personal 







10 LIs (shortage, 12 needed) 
randomly appointed from 
TK (IMS), 1 locally hired 
interpreter (carried his own 
weapon), 1 NI
Locals regularly offered their 
services as interpreters at 







LI tribal background, mo-
tives for working with ISAF
LIs remain outsiders, 
among other, trust on need 
to know basis and culture 
(example LIs suspected 
of stealing explosives, LIs 
almost started a strike; 
never tell an LI that you 
don’t trust him)
Reference to LI accommo-
dation on the camp: ‘Out-
side at the interpreters’’ 
Threat for LI families




‘Interpreter has only 
one job: to translate’
Activities in which 
interpreters partici-
pated: patrols, guard 
duty, base, medical 
care for locals, night 
shifts, PRT, training of 
local police 
Self: undetermined 
(trust on need to 
know basis; treat LIs 
respectful; much the 
same as earlier de-
ployments in Bosnia 
and Afghanistan, 
trust based on need 
to know basis, secu-
rity first, and control 
the interpreter)
Negative: Interpret-
ers trying to instigate 
other interpreters
LI: negative (distrust, 
preparedness to 
strike and discontent)




Interviewee was responsible 
for the allocation of LIs and 
NIs within the PRT
Varying number of 8-13 LIs
General allocation:
Police training 1, MTs 3, 
leave, PRT home duties >1
Formally for security reasons 
only NI within PRT com-
pound, yet due to scarcity 
also LI; on patrols mostly LIs
NIs allocated to jobs con-
cerning provincial matters, 
LIs district matters
US often bought away LIs 
Letters to C-TFU asking for 
more interpreters: never 
answered
IMS recruited LIs; inter-
viewee regularly reported 
back on LIs 











NIs better educated and 
language skills; LIs not 
always adequate English 
level.
Informal hierarchy NIs; 
opinion of most educated/
knowledgeable NI pre-
vailed; this often contrasted 
formal ranks, yet higher 
rank meant more payment 
and thus more esteem   
LIs deliberately not in-
formed on all details in 
order not to bring them in 
a position vulnerable to 
extortion
NIs were trusted and fully 
accepted and performed 
duties a high level; yet there 
was a lack of information 
on their position/pres-
ence to military personnel 
which sometimes triggered 
distrust, discrimination, and 
cultural clashes; this im-
proved after a rapport was 
filed on this problem and 
measures were taken as it 
was feared that the already 
scarce NIs would further 
decline in number.  
Manning the phone 
24h/day as first re-
sponder for locals in 




especially NIs proved 
essential for dealing 
with cultural differ-
ences  
Self: positive (I have 
always trusted my 
interpreters and 
they have never 
disappointed me; 
even F. who I have 
confronted with his 
emotional involve-
ment has never raised 
any suspicion; while 
interpreters could 
be aggressive, they 
always were open 
and candid)
Negative: (in compar-
ison with interpreters 
in Bosnia and Iraq, 
Afghan interpreters 
were fiery and quickly 
angry citing unjust 
security concerns) 
NIs: negative (dis-
crimination, often felt 
second-rank person-
nel and mistreated 
by military staff as a 
consequence of lack 





LIs (max 11, allocated 
through IMS) appointed on a 
daily basis to different units 
by respondent, preferences 
and traits of both soldiers 
and LIs were taken in con-
sideration
1 hired local (Bari Gul)




Respondent noted that Bari 
Gul could move freely when 
on leave, which caused 
suspicion and ultimately 
triggered his discharge (see 
interview)
Formal categories 1,2,3 on 
basis of experience and age
Informal hierarchy age, 
charisma, experience 
(examples)
QM responsible for manag-
ing the interpreters on a 
daily basis
Undetermined Self: positive (LIs 
could be trusted and 
were respected for 
their work, good 
working relationship, 
received farewell 
gifts; more positive 
image of working 
with interpreters than 
before mission) 
LIs: positive (status, 
money, felt treated 
well and respected by 
respondent; in tears 
when respondent 
redeployed)
Negative (initial lack 
of respect from sol-







LIs randomly appointed, 
personal preference to work 










The position of the LI dur-
ing patrols is literally ‘close 
to me and therefore the 
boys keep him secure’. The 
LI he has regularly worked 





of how LI takes initia-




cially with regard to 
LI he has regularly 
worked with; mutual 
trust, good language 
skills)
LI: positive (security 
and LI he has regu-
larly worked with felt 




LIs randomly appointed, 
personal preference to work 
with a more senior LI
Also mentions that some 
LIs have been working in 
the area for as much as 2 











Never part of team, yet LI 
should be treated respect-
fully and feel at ease (most 
close when based at out-
post) at the same time ‘you 
should be clear that you’re 
not allowed to trust LIs for 
sake of security’
Physical position LI mostly 
close to platoon leader, but 
not always in order not to 




ing atmospherics; ‘I 
always watch how my 
LI drinks his tea during 
a meeting’) 
‘I have always consid-
ered myself a guest of 
the local population… 
and the interpreter has 
helped me with this’




- outpost duties  
Self: negative (pre-
vailing perception 
despite some good 
working experiences; 
‘it’s impossible to 
speak of a trustful tie 
with an interpreter’; 
‘the moment I trust 
my interpreter I am 
endangering my 




with junior LIs who 
are trying to show off 
and are not obeying 
orders)
Positive: senior LI 
how fully behaves 





(clearly aware of  situ-
ation and emphasiz-
ing mutual relation-
ship; ‘if you’re good 
to me, I’ll be good to 
you all’) 
Negative: complain-





Only 6 to 8 of 15 allocated 
interpreters; NIs, LIs from 
Kandahar and Kabul (prefer-
ence for ethnic groups not 
present in DR), LI Bari Gul
IMS is to blame for scarcity; 
Dutch military contractors 
(‘buying interpreters as 
products from the shelf’) 
have not concluded solid 
deals with this company and 
therefore contracts allow the 
LIs to be redeployed with 
other ISAF contingents
2 LIs were fired as they could 
not cope with increased ten-
sion in the area
Screened for language skills 
and background (problemat-
ic due to lack of registration); 
within the military nobody is 
aware of the exact amount 
of screening an interpreter 
has been subjected to
Preference in allocation 
based on an interpreter’s 
personal ability to help a 
military commander to have 
a nuanced conversation
 
Interpreters allocated to 
tasks according to the 
criteria: predictability of 
moves, power and memory 
(increase with experience, 
beware of personal inter-
est; Bari Gul for instance 
is not appointed to talks 
with local power-holders), 
interchangeability (develop-
ing skills in order to become 
more broader employable 
and preventing monopoly 
position with certain inter-
locutors) 
US pays more, therefore ‘the 
best interpreters will ulti-










sate the military’s lack of 
an institutional memory in 
the area of operations; this, 
however, provided both 
an advantage as well as a 
danger. 
Interpreter as colleague: 
‘The last thing you want to 
have is a personal relation-
ship with an interpreter, 
the relationship should be 
strictly professional’; this 
prevents prejudice and 
deals with possible security 
risks caused by interpreters; 
accepted by interpret-
ers when communicated 
clearly
Hampered screening 
fosters distrust and urges 
for regular checks to assess 
consistency of interpreter’s 
behavior
Interpreters allow to ‘put 
an Afghan face to every-
thing’ as well as to ‘put a 
Dutch face to everything’; 
yet, ‘interpreters should 
never be placed in the inter-
mediator position’
Informal hierarchy based 
on intellect, salary, duration 
of stay in DR, origin
Interpreters informed on 
‘need to know’ basis, which 
expands as trust increases
For infantry platoons LI Bari 
Gul’s local origin made him 
an excellent interpreter, the 
PRT mission team, how-
ever, considered him too 
meddlesome   
First: interpretation& 
translation
Second: assistance & 
cultural advice in deal-
ing with locals (exam-
ple ‘how to deal with 
approaching kids’) 
Self: positive (When 
treated correctly 
interpreters are an 
asset, when treated 
badly they are of no 
value or even a li-
ability, this is difficult 
for young soldiers. 
Use of interpreters 
to introduce Afghan 
background to mili-
tary staff. After nega-
tive experiences with 
interpreters during a 
previous deployment 
to Iraq, this was a 
first return to positive 
experiences; LIs are 




(‘Interpreters are your 
most important secu-
rity risk’; you should 









LIs randomly appointed, 
personal preference to work 
with a single LI who holds 
sufficient command of 











During a mission (patrol) 
the interpreter is part of the 
team as he needs protec-
tion and as a consequence 
of social interaction but 
when we are on location 
they have a certain ‘cor-
ner’ and ten they’re not 
included. 
The better an interpreter, 
the better his position as a 





LIs repeatedly ask for 
a weapon in order to 
fight along the ISAF 
soldiers (requests 
denied)
Self: positive (highly 




security risk, not all 
interpreters have suf-
ficient language skills)
LI: positive (feel part 




15-20 predominantly LIs 
randomly appointed within 
the BG 
Respondent has worked 










LI is accepted by team, yet 
remains outsider due to 
















LIs randomly appointed to 
DR by IMS.
LIs appointed by base 
command, each week/day 
respondent submitted a 
request for the required 
number (7/8 on average, 
at peak 15 LIs available) of 
interpreters 
Hired locals (Bari Gul)















LIs from urban background 
considered the local popu-
lation primitive
‘You’ll never be able to trust 
an interpreter completely, 
yet you have to be able to 
work with him’; importance 
of work relationships; 
rotating the LIs throughout 
the unit in order to estab-
lish an image of each one 
of them
Hierarchy of interpreters 
determined by local origine, 
command of English, expe-
rience, and contact with US 
Taliban labels LIs traitors 
and has put a $10,000 





Self: positive (LIs 
always prepared to 
assist – even when off 
duty – when respon-




ers’; interpreter as 
force multiplier, ‘If 
you are able to have 
a good conversation 
with your interlocu-







Additional screening of LIs 




Appointment of LIs within 
BG is arranged by interpreter 
manager (former inter-
preter, chosen by LIs). LIs are 




BG is starting position 
for LIs.
Good LIs are promoted 






Self: positive (based 
on feedback of 
platoon commanders 




er, some individuals 
might violate trust)
LI: undetermined 
(although some LIs 
complain a lot) 
Local: undetermined




Shortage of interpreters, 
initially only 1/patrol, later 2
Preference for working with 
IMS LIs as NIs often demon-
strate an arrogant attitude 
towards the local population 
(‘Uruzgan is a backward 
province’)
Also preference to work with 
LI Bari Gul, yet aware of the 
risk that his personal inter-
est might cause a lose of 
neutrality
LIs from Kabul and Kan-
dahar hold best language 
skills, this also influenced 
preference 














Interpreter receives regular 
‘personnel care’ in the 
form of an evaluation once 
a week 
Own initiative of interpreter 
is stimulated to deal with 
cultural sensitive situations
Informal hierarchy of inter-
preters based on age and 
skills; loyal to each other
‘Interpreters occupy a spe-
cial position within the unit, 
they are not in for the full 
100% as they are not part 
of the original group. This 
might change when a single 
LI is appointed to a unit’
Informal bonding with LIs 
by watching Bollywood 
movies and discussing their 
personal interests and mo-










able source of infor-
mation; perception of 
interpreters changed 
positively in Afghani-
stan; LIs proved easy 
going and capable 
of improvising and 
adapting to military 
conditions; it’s im-
portant to keep an 
open mind toward 
the interpreter and 
treat him fair and in 
accordance with the 
situation)
neutral: ‘trust the 
interpreter in all that 
relates to the con-
versation, in all other 
matters I didn’t trust 
the interpreter’
NI: undetermined
LI: positive (learning 
on the job from sol-




LIs randomly appointed, 
personal preference to work 










Good LIs are quickly pro-
moted to PRT or TFU staff, 






Self: negative, lack of 
trust (due to random 
allocation no pos-
sibility to forge a 
tie, also example in 
which a LI possibly 
betrayed the position 






LIs randomly appointed for 
operations, personal prefer-
ence to work with a single LI 










LI is ‘one of the boys’.
BG is starting position for 
LIs (all junior and unexperi-
enced interpreters)
Good LIs are quickly pro-






Cultural advice (LI 





tion and interaction 
with population, as 
well as the gathering 
of intelligence; LIs 
can be trusted with 
regard to their task of 
translation
Negative: 
LI can’t be trusted 
with operational 
information and what 




diers, unprepared for 
unexpected situa-
tions (dependent on 
personal traits)
LI: positive (part 
of the team, feel 




that there is some 
cultural distance 
between LIs and the 
locals)




Small group of selected NIs 
who are screened by MIVD 
for sensitive intelligence 
work
Additionally, in consultation 
with the interpreter man-
ager selected LIs might be 
screened for less sensitive 
intelligence work (only when 















NIs: rank attributed on 
basis of language skills 
and knowledge (mostly 
captains)
NIs use rank to confront 
junior officers or question 
their task at hand 
When given orders by supe-
riors some NIs turn anger 
LIs: in general humble 
attitude towards intelli-
gence operators, only small 
selection of high quality LIs 
that is allowed to work with 
ISTAR. 
Emphasis on transla-




preters can hear from 
which area a voice 
stems  
Self: positive (Mutual 
trust and respect as 





for NIs because of 
screening and military 
training. However, LIs 
are closer connected 
to local society and 
therefore bring addi-
tional understanding
Negative (some NIs 
don’t behave profes-
sionally and only 
point at their military 
status when it’s in 
their interest There-
fore some ISTAR 
personnel prefers LIs)
NI: positive (money, 
rank, status, and 
trust)
negative (when or-
ders collide with their 
ideologic views) 
LI: positive (status, 




NI and LI randomly appoint-
ed for duty with role 1, when 
no interpreter available the 













tion, all interpreters might 




(bridging gap between 
local patients and 
Western medical 
practice)
Strictly clear that 
interpreters are not 
entitled to participate 
in medical treatment
Self: positive (Both 
NIs and LIs are crucial 
in medical treat-
ment). Yet, wants 





situations as a con-
sequence of cultural 






LIs randomly appointed, 
personal preference to work 










BG is starting position for 
LIs (all junior and unexperi-
enced interpreters).
Good LIs are quickly pro-
moted to PRT, which in-
creases their status among 
peers (respondent received 
gifts from a LI who was pro-
moted to the PRT thanks to 
his recommendations)
Interpreter is part of the 












population, as well as 
the gathering of intel-
ligence; LIs can be 
trusted with regard 





pared for unexpected 
situations (dependent 
on personal traits)
LI: positive (part 
of the team, feel 
protected by ISAF 
soldiers)
Local: undetermined, 
yet there seems to 





Small group of selected NIs 
who are screened for sensi-














Rank attributed on basis 
of language skills and 
knowledge
‘NI is a colleague’.
‘Supporting humint 
talks encompasses 
more than mere trans-
lation’ Interpretation
Translation
Cultural advice (yet 
sometimes deliberate-
ly ignored to provoke 
informers)
Self: positive (Trust 
is absolute basis of 
working relationship, 
still good relationship 




situation due to 
nature of intelligence 
work)
Local: undetermined 




LI randomly appointed via 













Embedded in ANA unit (one 
of the soldiers)
Good LI might be ‘promot-
ed’ to PRT and TFU staff
Interpretation
Translation (opera-
tional orders for ANA)
Social interaction
Cultural advice
Leading role LI to-
wards ISAF soldiers 
when dealing with 
ANA casualties   
Self: positive (‘I keep 
my interpreter close 
to me’, trust as much 
as possible/‘need to 
know’ basis, gives his 




LI: positive (mutual 
trust, support from 
ISAF soldiers)   
Local: undetermined 
(positive reaction 
expected, but yet to 
be seen)
M  41 
OMLT/
TFU 3
LI randomly appointed via 
interpreter pool (respondent 
suspects that allocation is 
partly based on personal 
traits, origin, and possession 
of arms) during multiple-day 
operations the same LI), 











No formal hierarchical dif-
ferentiation,
embedded in ANA unit.
Good LI might be ‘promot-
ed’ to PRT and TFU staff.
LI from Hazara background 





tional orders for ANA)
Cultural awareness 
(‘probe’, sensor and 
anticipator of atmo-
sphere, impartial third 
party during social 
patrol) 
LI takes over leading 
role when ANA com-





vated and with good 
intentions)
Negative (young age 
and lack of military 
and language skills, 
undesired interven-
tions, lack of screen-
ing, and lack of trust. 
LI: negative (lack of 
trust and security, 
discussion about use 





PRT operations officer (S3) 
and interpreter allocate 
interpreters to Mission 
Teams depending the task 
their up to
Both NIs and LIs are de-
ployed (12 in total?), but 











While trust grows as a 
consequence of good coop-
eration, interpreters remain 
relative outsiders Intense 
mutual experiences like a 
TIC, however, might forge a 
special tie that establishes 





Self: positive (good 
interpreters)
Negative (interpret-







36 LI for OMLT (80 for TFU 
in total) hired though IMS 
in Kandahar and randomly 
embedded within ANA units, 
personal preference to deal 
with LI of the specific unit he 
is working with or the HQ LI 












Knowledge and expertise 
leading in position of LI, 
more skilled interpreters at 
HQ level (example LI who 
used to live in New York)
Interpretation
Translation (opera-
tional orders and staff 
documents for ANA)
Self: positive (skilled 
LI at ANA HQ level, 





Negative (High risk 
of breaching opsec, 
‘Lucky’ incident, 
distrust (‘Weapons 
are strictly forbidden 
for LIs!’.  
LI: positive (course to 
enhance interpreter 
skills)
Negative (Lack of mu-
tual trust, enhanced 





LI randomly appointed, 























Embedded in ANA unit  
Interpretation 
Translation (opera-
tional orders for ANA)
Cultural advice 
Self: positive (‘mu-
tual trust is essential’; 
trust depends on 
personality and 
openness LI)
LI:  undetermined 
Local: undetermined




4-6 NIs including locally 
hired (Bari Gul)
Screening though IMS and 
DR quartermaster
Most ‘popular’ LIs were 




Locally hired NI risk factor 
due to position in local 
society
Locally hired Bari Gul domi-
nated and bullied other LIs
Informal hierarchy also 
influenced by Dutch sol-
diers; the more often a LI 
went on patrol, the more 
status he got
LIs that were often picked 
for patrol duties by Dutch 
soldiers were considered 
members of their team
Need-to-know policy
Physical separation within 
the camp
Distrust as a consequence 
of insecurity about how to 
deal with LIs among many 
Dutch soldiers
Dealing with locals at 
base gate








cultural and local 
context
Self: negative (never 
trusted LIs, which 
led to clashes with 
colleagues; admits 
that he was not 
good in dealing with 
interpreters and kept 
relationships strictly 
professional; ‘if I was 
the opponent I would 
infiltrate an agent as 
close as possible: the 
position of the inter-
preter’)
LI: negative (one 
incident of wrongful 
accusation of treason 




6-15 LIs; planned for mis-
sions by S3 (with some 
influence from the LIs 
themselves); daily briefing at 
18:00 with details about next 
day’s assignments 
0-4 NIs; tasked to maintain 
relationships with local lead-
ers by phone
The best available interpret-
ers from the TFU pool were 
assigned to the PRT as a 
consequence of the nature 
of its work; in order to test 
LIs they were first assigned 
to the BG for a week
The PRTs interpreter man-
ager personally went to 
Kandahar to select the best 
LIs from the IMS pool
Scarcity a consequence of 
limited popularity of job 
among young Afghans and 
the lack of English language 
skills
‘Begging’ US contingent for 
LIs mostly successful (police 
courses)
Due to scarcity jobs for NIs 
were later appointed to LIs 
who had proven themselves 
thrustworthy and skillful






























Local interpreters were 
informed on a need to 
know basis, yet as complete 
as possible because they 
were part of the mission 
(but lacked appropriate 
screening)
NIs were trusted with 
sensitive information (ap-
propriate screened in The 
Netherlands) 
Interviewee observed much 
distrust with regard to LIs 
among PRT personnel – a 
consequence of operational 
security culture
Interpreters make no dis-
tinction between personal 
relationships and organiza-
tional hierarchy 
The PRT organized a TFU 
meeting in order to stress 
the importance of the posi-
tion of the interpreter and 
his cultural knowledge
LIs would receive an official 
certificate as a recognition 
for good performance
Personnel care in the form 
of a weekly LI briefing and 
individual after action de-
briefings in order to discuss 
successful or bad practices
Interpreters would always 
try to enhance their posi-
tion
NIs part of the unit, LIs 
depending of individual
LIs were physically sepa-
rated from quarters and 
PRT offices, but welcome in 
mess hall and bar
Informal hierarchy of 






Patrols with MTs (main 
effort)
Manning the PRT 
house
Intervention by tele-
phone (went wrong 
when a police post 
was attacked and TFU 
reacted by inciden-
tally striking civilian 
vehicles)





LI: positive (for secu-
rity reasons LIs prefer 
to work for the PRT, 
money, appreciated 
good treatment by 
PRT staff)
neutral (initially 
difficulties with need 
to know policy, direct 
feedback)




Mix of NIs and LIs; mostly 



















terpreter is a human 
translation machine, 
he’s the interface 
between me and the 
local population’, 
easier to work with 
Western orientated 
LI’s but the LI who 
are traditional are 
probably better in 
appropriating the 
conversation and  in-
terpreting (they don’t 
give their own spin to 
the conversation)
 lack of trust in LIs 
and NIs, NI’s only 




Local: Not the in-
terpreters but the 
interlocutors are  rats. 
They pretend to know 
nothing and stall the 
conversation so they 




Most skilled LIs from BG 
transferred to PRT.  At 
staff level NI interpreters 
(preferred for the unit as 













NIs part of Dutch army 
structure.
LIs working with PRT are 
promoted from BG and 
therefore enjoy higher 
status (which sometimes 





Self: positive (while 
the pre-deployment 
training led to an 
paranoid attitude 
towards interpreters, 
the practice is that 
there are good work-
ing ties)
Negative (sometimes 





sional, highly skilled, 
part of the military 
organization) 
LI: positive (status)
negative (no own 









8-10 LIs from Kandahar, 
Kabul, and Jalalabad
Preference for LIs due to bad 
attitude of NIs, their tenden-
cy to take over the initiative, 
English as mission language, 
good experiences with LIs
Quartermaster allocated 
taskings on a daily basis, 
best LIs tasked with most 
complicated missions
Locally recruited LI Bari Gul 
was fired in this period, 
apparently because he held 
too much interest in much 
of the PRT affairs (family ties 
with key leaders, etc.), he 
























know policy, briefings on 
short notice, typically the 
team would discuss the 
information further with 
the LI in patrol vehicle 
when on road 
‘No control without trust’ 
Actively fostering a good 
relationship between mili-
tary staff and LIs, the small 
pool of LIs made it possible 
to learn more about each 
specific individual
Informal hierarchy among 
LIs based on age, length 
of period one has been 
working as a LI, command 
of English
An NI tried to claim author-
ity over all LIs, which led to 
his demise
Not all military personnel 
was sufficiently aware of 
the value and workload of 
the interpreters
Restrictions on freedom 
of movement within camp 
and not allowed to bear 
arms
Relationship with and 
position of LIs was part of 
HOTO with predecessors as 
well succesors
‘I want to make my as-
sessment independent 
of the opinion of the 
interpreter’
‘clear instruction with 
regard to interpreting/
translating: correct 
the interpreter when 
necessary, and let him 
translate when asked 
and if necessary’ 
Political meetings 
required 3 LIs (1 for the 
commander, 1 for the 
development proj-
ects, 1 for the security 
detail) 
‘The interpreter is 
more than a transla-
tion machine, espe-
cially when he has 
been in the area for a 
longer period’
Cultural advisor, 
informer (yet deal with 
care with this informa-
tion as it might be 
biased) 
Patrols, gate duties, 




the LIs transfer knowl-
edge from previous 
rotations
Depending on the 
interlocutor, LIs would 
disguise themselves 
Self: positive (almost 
no problems with 
LIs, ‘you can always 
count on them’, good 
experiences contrary 
to pre-deployment 
training in which 
interviewee was 
warned to ‘take 
care what you do 
with interpreters, 
they are translation 
machines’, respect 
for LIs)
LI: positive (respect 








5 interpreters and 1 supervi-
sor allocated to KAF base 
command
9 additional interpreters for 
dealing with weekly bazar
Interpreters divided in two 

























The rivalry between com-
peting factions sometimes 
necessitated to validate/




Self: negative (local 
competition rendered 
local interpreters un-
reliable when dealing 
with local staff and 
bazar salesmen)  




PRT commander and staff 
were allocated 2/3 NIs, ad-
ditionally the Dutch Ministry 














NIs part of the team (proper 
screening, military rank, 
received same aftercare as 
military personnel)
NIs informal intermediators 
with LIs (information flow, 
social control); interviewee 
considered this tie a crucial 
investment for cohesion 
among PRT interpreters
LIs respected team mem-
bers (received letters of 
recommendations)
 
LIs were no sparring 
partners with regard to 
content of the mission and 
therefore were informed 
on a need-to-know basis 
(and they agreed with their 
position as there was no 
interest in taking over the 
position of the interlocutor, 
respect for authority)
LIs trusted, yet considered 
vulnerable to local influ-
ences
Informal LI hierarchy based 
on age seniority
Trust relationship influ-
enced by daily relation-
ship, experiences of 
predecessors, the number 
of occasions in which an 
interpreter prevents you 
from making a mistake, 
screening. 
NIs allowed within PRT staff 
offices and also allowed to 
bear arms, LIs not
Conveying the mes-
sage, including 





Providing feedback on 




Self: positive (‘as 
commander of the 
PRT I was continu-
ously accompanied 
by an interpreter’; 
received good advice, 
good relationship 
with interpreters)
Negative (some LIs 
held insufficient 
command of English 
and were sometimes 
corrected by local 
interlocutors)  
LIs: positive (letters 
of recommendation, 
rapprochement on 




quent strike of BG LIs 
caused by overreac-




25 LIs allocated to BG
Preference for LI who was 
prepared to take initiative, 
held sufficient language 
skills and who had a good 
character
LIs who received good 
evaluations were promoted 
to PRT/staff TFU
BG allocated least experi-
enced LIs
Additional informal screen-
ing by platoon leaders
Instru-
mental
During patrols the inter-
preter was always posi-
tioned close to the (sub-)
commander at the front
LIs were on short notice 
briefed about the com-
mander’s intent and pur-
pose of the mission in order 
to enable them to operate 
as independent as possible
During pre-deployment 
training it was urged to 
inform LIs as little as pos-
sible
When trusted, LIs are will-
ing to take the initiative
An allocated LI was trusted 
until he demonstrated that 
he did not deserve to be 
trusted
LIs were treated in the 
same strict way as soldiers 
when they made a mistake 
during patrols
The platoon as whole is 
responsible for the LIs 
safety, LIs were perceived 
as members of the unit
Restrictions: no arms, no 
access to restricted staff 
areas at base
Conveying the com-
mander’s message to 
local interlocuters 
Cultural advice 
Self: positive (good 
experience working 
with LI of prefer-
ence who he trusted 
despite awareness 
that LIs might have 
multiple interests at 
stake, the negative 
image presented dur-
ing pre-deployment 
training did not 
reflect the practice of 
working with LIs in 
Uruzgan)
Negative (problems 
due to insufficient 
English language 
skills or questionable 
loyalty) 
LIs: negative (threat 
during patrols)




15 LIs (young adults from 
Kandahar/Kabul) hired via 
IMS for $1,200/month; after 
arrival at DR the QM ac-
commodates and manages 
LIs, including daily appoint-
ments
Incidentally 2 NIs 
Instru-
mental
QM entitled to send back 
LIs (to IMS) when not func-
tioning or security risk
Importance of independent 
LIs without local ties
LIs would sometimes 
disguise themselves when 
interacting with locals
QM demonstrates ‘fatherly 
involvement which pays 
back’
Informal hierarchy based 
on seniority of age and 
employment
Operational security and 
limited information to-
wards LIs
In general LIs were trusted, 
when doubts about trust-
worthiness an investigation 
would be conducted
LIs were allowed 20 min-
utes of satellite phone/
week
Restriction with regard 
to freedom of movement 
on base and ban on arms 
for LIs 
When a group of soldiers 
excluded their LI, which 
triggered intervention of 
QM; in general Dutch sol-
diers demonstrated too less 
interest in their allocated LI
LIs were presented a 
sheep for end of Ramadan 
celebrations, which led to 
invitations for Dutch staff 
LIs perform duty as 




Ad hoc duties, includ-




Self: positive (‘they 
are my boys, I treat 
them just like I 
treated my Dutch sol-
diers’, initially some 
problems with lan-
guage skills etc., but 
soon improvements 
as LIs and Dutch 
soldiers got used to 
work together; ‘a 
pity you have to say 
goodbye’)
Negative: (NIs should 
not be given a mili-
tary rank, cause they 
behaved like they 
were commanders 
of LIs)






bility over all 88 interpreters 
of the Dutch contingent (71 
TK, 13 DR, 4 KAF); this job 
encompassed planning and 
allocation (‘the right inter-
preter in the right place’) as 
well as dealing with prob-
lems and leave.
Ad hoc: more wounded, 
more interpreters allocated 
to field hospital  
NIs: scarcest 
OMLT only LIs 
LIs recruited and hired 
through IMS in Kandahar, 
which was run as a ‘criminal 
organization’ by American 
Afghans who intimidate 
LIs; this management was 
replaced twice due to secu-
rity concerns; screening was 
rudimentary only therefore 
additional screening by 
Afghan intelligence in TK
Instru-
mental
Hierarchy: one LI acting as 
local manager overseeing 
LIs for IMS, later abolished 
because this manager had 
developed an attitude 
towards other LIs, this also 
meant there was no longer 
any buffer for smoothening 
conflicts between inter-
viewee and LIs 
Interviewee enforced his 
position as ‘supreme boss’ 
over all interpreters in order 
to control positions and 
attitudes 
‘Custom law’ among LIs: 
newcomers start with the 
OMLT, highest positions are 
with PRT
‘Tribal culture’ among LIs
Discrimination, LIs were no 
longer allowed in cantina 
(Echo’s) because of their 
smell
Culture clash between 
Dutch soldiers and inter-
preters
Daily work for various 
elements of the TFU 
(BG, OMLT, PRT, etc.)
24h reachability for 
intake of detainees
Self: negative (most 
of my job consisted 
of solving problems 
either among inter-
preters self or as a 
result of interaction 
with military ‘users’, 
therefore ‘I ruled 
with an iron fist’ 
towards both inter-
preters (‘the Afghan 
understands the 
language of the stick 
best’) and colleagues, 
‘interpereters were 
only allocated 
through me’; ‘every 
good-for-nothing 
who could say yes/
no was accepted 
as an ISAF LI’; poor 
standard of LIs urged 
me to enforce strict 
behaviour (‘a man a 
man, a word a word’) 
and to English learn-
ing; ‘Breaking down 
tribal culture among 
LIs’ because position 
should be based on 
skills; ‘Never trust 
Afghans’, for instance 
LI manager, Lucky 
incident, LIs briefed 
as late as possible 
to prevent security 
risks; interpreters will 
only improve through 
tight control)
LI: negative (reac-
tions after Lucky 
incident concerning 
the attitude and 
management styles 
of interviewee; fear of 
threats from IMS and 
Taliban)    











Uprising of LIs as a conse-
quence of rumors about 
disgrace of a Koran during a 
house search
Reporting incident on 
behalf of Afghan soldier
LIs form front against Dutch 
and threaten to strike
Detaining LIs considered 
undesirable (only when 
relation with Taliban is 
proved)
Investigating incidents 
in which LIs were 
involved
Self: negative (1 LI 
ushered dead threats 
against a Dutch sol-
dier and subsequently 
he himself or another 
LI instigated an upris-
ing among LIs and 
threaten to report 
this to the press, all 
based on rumors of 
an incident)
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Appendix IV
Oversight of Respondents Quoted in Chapter 6
                          Category
Aspect 
Local  Interpreters National Interpreters Military Personnel
Allocation LI 1, LI 5, LI 8 NI 1, NI 4, NI 6,      NI 8 M 1, M 12, M 17,   M 29, 
M 41
Motivation LI 1, LI 3, LI 4, LI 7 NI 2, NI 5, NI 7 M 10, M 11, M 40
Position LI 2, LI 3, LI 4, LI 6, LI 7, LI 8 NI 1, NI 2, NI 3, NI 4, NI 5, NI 6, NI 
7, NI 8
M 5, M 14, M 21,  M 26, 
M 31, M 36, M 52, M 53
Intervention LI 1, LI 8 NI 1, NI 2, NI 4, NI 7, NI 8 M 5, M 32, M 49
Perception LI 2, LI 4, LI 5 NI 4 M 7, M 13, M 16,  M 30, 
M 49
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Appendix V
Topic Lists Used for Interviews with 
Local Interpreters (I), National Interpreters (II) and Military Personnel (III)
I. Topic List Local Interpreters:
Function
1. Have you worked as an interpreter before?
2. How did you get this job? 
3. Why do you want to work as an interpreter for ISAF?
4. What is your native language? What languages do you speak? What language(s) do you 
use here?
5. Have you been screened? 
6. Do you have a rank? Why (not)?
7. What do you do as an interpreter? Can you give examples of your daily job?
8. Where and with whom do you stay on the base?
9. Are there any restrictions for local interpreters on the base?
10. What do you think of your job? What do(n’t) you like about it? 
11. Do you consider your work as an interpreter to be dangerous? In what respect?
12. How would you describe your cooperation with the Dutch soldiers? Are there any prob-
lems?
Religion
14. Are you religious? How important is that to you?
Social contacts
15. Do you hang out with Dutch soldiers? Can you give examples?
16. How is your relation with the national interpreters?
17. If you experience problems, would you then talk about it? With whom?
18. Do you keep in touch with your family? How?
Communication and culture 
19. Do you think there are differences between your style of communicating and the way 
Dutch soldiers communicate? Can you give examples?
20. Are you familiar with the “hearts and minds” approach? What, do you think, is the best 
way to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people?
21. What is typical for the Afghan culture? Can you give examples?
22. Could you tell me something about the position of women and children? How to ap-
proach women? 
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het idee dat u op een andere manier behandeld wordt? Waarom denkt u dat? Kunt u een 
voorbeeld geven? 
17. Hoe denkt u dat de Afghaanse bevolking uw rol als tolk binnen het NL leger ervaart? 
Waarom denkt u dat?  Kunt u voorbeelden geven waaruit dat blijkt? 
18. Hoe zou u de rol van de tolk omschrijven? 
19. Ervaart u als tolk bepaalde voorrechten en/of beperkingen t.a.v. het uitoefenen van uw 
werkzaamheden? Licht toe.
20. Zijn er veiligheidsvoorschriften die specifiek voor tolken gelden?
Communicatie en cultuur
21. Hoe zou u de Afghaanse manier van communiceren willen omschrijven? 
22. Welke verschillen zijn er tussen de westerse en Afghaanse manier van communiceren? 
Kunt u daar wat over vertellen? Hoe gaat u daar mee om?
23. Zijn er wel eens situaties voorgevallen waarin u hebt geweigerd om iets te vertalen om-
dat het cultureel gezien niet gepast was? Zoja, wat?
24. Zijn er situaties waarin u het idee heeft dat u de situatie moet uitleggen omdat de NL 
militairen de Afghaanse cultuur niet begrijpen? Hoe handelt u in een dergelijke situ-
atie? Hoeveel vrijheid heeft u daartoe? 
25. Wordt er in de Afghaanse cultuur gebruik gemaakt van invloedrijke (tussen)personen 
om bepaalde belangen te realiseren? Wanneer?
26. Wie zijn deze personen en hoe worden zij benaderd? Speelt uw kennis daar een rol in?
27. Heeft u zelf wel eens opgetreden als bemiddelaar? Kunt u daar iets over vertellen?
28. Hoe denkt u de hearts and minds van de lokale bevolking te kunnen winnen? Kunt u daar 
voorbeelden van geven?
29. Is er wel eens sprake van non-verbale uitingen door NL  militairen die door Afghanen als 
beledigend of zelfs kwetsend worden ervaren? Hoe handelt u vervolgens als u dat ziet?
30. Welke onderwerpen zijn absoluut niet bespreekbaar?
31. Geeft u als tolk wel eens uitleg over situaties, gebieden, historie, religie, gebruiken, wi-
jze van communiceren? Zo ja, kunt u daar een voorbeeld van geven? In hoeverre denkt u 
dat het geven van cultureel advies deel uitmaakt van de taken van de tolk? Zou u willen 
dat er meer gebruik van uw kennis wordt gemaakt? 
32. Welke sociale factoren spelen een rol bij de communicatie? (leeftijd, sekse, respect, 
rijkdom/klasse, tribale afkomst)
Ontspanning/vrije tijd
33. Wat doet u in uw vrije tijd op de basis? Met wie?
34. Op welke manier en hoe vaak houdt u contact met familie in Nederland? En wat betreft 
uw familie in Afghanistan? 
Values
23. How important is honour to you in your professional and personal life? Can you give 
examples?
Extra 
24. If there was something that you could change about your job, what would that be?
 
II. Topic List National Interpreters 
Functie
1. Welke ervaring heeft u als tolk? (Is dit uw eerste optreden of heeft u al meer ervaring?) 
Zoja, i.g.v. Defensie, aan welke missies en/of rotaties heeft u deelgenomen?
2. U werkt nu als tolk voor Defensie, hoe bent u op deze positie terechtgekomen? (af-
komst, taal, cultuurkennis, contacten).
3. Waarom wilde u voor Defensie tolken?
4. Bent u gescreend? Welke screening heeft u ondergaan (B/A)? Hoe heeft u dat ervaren? 
5. Heeft u enige voorbereiding genoten om als tolk te kunnen functioneren? Waaruit be-
stond die training? Waar vond de training plaats?
6. Op welke termijn heeft u die voorbereiding genoten? (kort voor vertrek of ruim vooraf-
gaand aan de uitzending)
7. Heeft u een rang toegekend gekregen? Zoja, welke? Wat vindt u daarvan?/Hoe heeft u 
dat ervaren? 
8. Heeft u een duidelijk overzicht van de militaire organisatie op de basis? Indeling van 
eenheden, Small Units of Action? Is het duidelijk waar de functie van tolk onder geplaatst 
is?  Behoort u tot een bepaalde eenheid? Welke? Zoniet, hoe functioneert u dan?
9. Waaruit bestaan uw taken als tolk? Word u ingezet voor specifieke taken en situaties?
10. Hoe ervaart u persoonlijk uw rol? Ervaart u een verschil met wat u tijdens de opleiding 
heeft geleerd en wat u in de praktijk doet? 
11. Is er een rotatiesysteem voor de tolken? (Hoeveel maanden werkt u, werktijden per dag, 
hoeveel vrije tijd heeft u ter beschikking? Draait u wisseldiensten en welke?) 
12. Had u (voorafgaand) een bepaalde verwachting van de missie en uw optreden/
werkzaamheden daarin? Licht toe. Komt de praktijk overeen met uw verwachting? Licht 
toe.
13. Hoe ervaart u de samenwerking tussen u en de militairen? Kunt u een voorbeeld geven? 
14. Ervaart u verschil in de manier waarop u benaderd wordt door militairen met een hoge 
rang en militairen met een lagere rang? Heeft u een idee waar dat verschil in gedrag uit 
voort zou kunnen komen?
15. Op welke wijze wordt u geïnformeerd over de situatie waarin u als tolk gaat optreden? 
(Neemt u deel aan briefings en debriefings? Wordt u apart op de hoogte gesteld?)
16. Hoe denkt u dat anderen (NL militairen) uw positie als tolk ervaren? Heeft u wel eens 
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9. Is er sprake van een bepaalde categorie en/of rangorde t.a.v. tolken wat betreft hun 
werkzaamheden?
10. Hoe vindt de informatieoverdracht met tolken plaats? In welke mate worden zij be-
trokken bij briefings en debriefings? 
11. In welke mate speelt vertrouwen een rol in de informatieoverdracht met tolken? Ver-
trouwt u de tolken met wie u samenwerkt? Licht toe.
12. Gelden er bepaalde veiligheidsrestricties ten aanzien van tolken? Zijn er bepaalde 
handelingen en/of (deel-)gebieden binnen het kamp voor hen verboden? Waarom?
13. Hoe ervaart u de omgang met tolken? Zijn er problemen waar u tegenaan loopt?
14. Is uw beeldvorming van de lokale tolk en uw samenwerking met hen gedurende uw 
uitzendperiode veranderd? Op welke wijze? Kunt u een voorbeeld geven?
15. Als u terugblikt, welke situatie waarin u hebt samenwerkt met een tolk staat u dan het 
meest helder voor de geest? En welke situatie heeft u het meest aangegrepen?
Afsluitend
16. Hoe zou volgens u de samenwerking tussen tolken en militair binnen uw eenheid ver-
beterd kunnen worden?
Religieuze beleving
35. Hoe belangrijk is geloof in uw leven en wat betekent het geloof voor u persoonlijk? Is er 
op de basis gelegenheid om uw geloof te beoefenen? Hoe ervaart u dat? Hoe wordt daar 
vanuit de militaire omgeving op gereageerd? 
Waarden
36. Welke persoonlijke en professionele waarden zijn voor u belangrijk? Heeft u het idee 
dat deze waarden door uw omgeving worden gerespecteerd? Waaruit blijkt dat? (re-
spect, eer)
37. Kunt u uw ervaring, problemen, etc. bespreekbaar maken? Zoja, met wie? (een 
maatschappelijk werker, aalmoezenier, commandant,  collega’s of helemaal niet).
Communicatie en religie
38. In hoeverre speelt religie een rol in het dagelijkse leven van de gemiddelde Afghaan?
39. Zijn er wel eens situaties waarin u het idee heeft dat u vragen niet kunt stellen omdat de 
vraag in religieus opzicht niet gepast is? Wat doet u dan?
Communicatie en gender 
40. Kunt u onderscheid maken tussen man-vrouw verhoudingen in de Afghaanse commu-
nicatie/ cultuur? 
Afrondingsvragen
41. Hoe ervaart u uw optreden als tolk tot nu toe? 
42. Op welke manier denkt u dat de positie van de tolk binnen de organisatie geoptimali-
seerd kan worden?
III. Topic List Military Personnel 
Functie
1. Kunt u omschrijven waaruit de taak van uw eenheid binnen de TFU bestaat?
2. Wat is uw functie binnen de eenheid? Waaruit bestaan uw werkzaamheden?
3. Op welke manier hebt u in uw werk met tolken te maken?
4. Met welke lokale en/of nationale tolk(en) werkt u het meest samen? Waarom? 
5. Met welk type tolk werkt de eenheid (voornamelijk) samen?
6. Hoeveel tolken heeft de eenheid in dienst op dit moment en hoe worden zij geworven?
7. Op welke wijze worden de tolken gescreend? Vindt u deze screening toereikend? Uit 
welke aspecten zou de screening volgens u idealiter moeten bestaan?
8. Waaruit bestaan de werkzaamheden van de lokale tolken binnen uw eenheid? In welke 




How do language issues affect military operations, and how in particular do soldiers and 
interpreters cooperate in mission areas to overcome such issues? By answering this central 
question, this explorative study aims to enhance the understanding of the effects of the 
language barrier on international military cooperation. For that purpose, a predominantly 
sociological approach is adopted to investigate the dynamics at both the macro/meso-, and 
the micro-level of this specific form of interaction. The first three research questions apply 
a macro/meso perspective. Respectively these questions explore how language problems 
manifest themselves during military operations; what the implications are of language (in)
competence on communication between soldiers in multinational military organizations; 
and how the language barrier between soldiers and the local population influences the 
complexity of modern military operations. The next three research questions apply a 
micro-level perspective to investigate the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters. 
These questions address how soldiers perceive the interpersonal dynamics of working 
with local interpreters as linguistic and cultural mediators in mission areas; how the role 
and position of interpreters in military contexts can be described by use of interpreters’ 
working experiences in war-infested environments; ad what the dynamics of cooperation 
are between soldiers and interpreters in military operations and how involved parties deal 
with the intricacies of this cooperation.
The findings demonstrate that language highly matters in the military organization. 
Throughout history linguistic issues have complicated operations as they either hampered 
the cooperation between soldiers or impeded the interaction between the military and 
the local population. As today’s operations typically are international endeavors in foreign 
societies, armed forces simultaneously encounter both of these issues. Whereas the former 
is addressed by proclaiming English as an international military lingua franca, the latter is 
dealt with by recruiting interpreters who command the vernacular(s) of the mission area. 
These agents are well suited to meet the socio-linguistic challenges that are inherent to the 
interaction with local partners as interpreters possess linguistic skills as well as cultural 
knowledge that are necessary to respond situations in the conflict zone. 
Despite these measures, linguistic issues continue to have a detrimental effect on 
international military operations. First, command of the official military language among all 
members of an international coalition is not self-evident as is illustrated by, among others, 
participant observation during an exercise of (1) GE-NL Corps. A lack of linguistic proficiency 
as well as the negative by-effects of the language barrier can divide soldiers. This is harmful 
because servicemen need to work together in order to obtain the goals of the mission. 
Moreover, in the stressful and demanding military environment, even the most skilled 
non-native speakers might not live up to the linguistic expectations of the organization. It 
is therefore essential to take language matters seriously during the planning and conduct 
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structural way. The position of the interpreter, therefore, strongly depends on the personal 
insights of the involved individuals. Fourth, the aspect of intervention clarifies that the role of 
the interpreter involves more than just interpreting. Precisely because of the unpredictability 
of the military environment, the interpreter also acts as a cultural and political advisor 
as well as a diplomatic intermediary. Individuals who are able to act strategically are well 
suited to take up such roles. Yet again, however, the military organization fails to sufficiently 
recognize this as it does not provide realistic guidelines that adhere to the multi-faceted 
nature of the interpreters’ interventions. Fifth, the aspect of perception demonstrates that 
trust is difficult to establish within the military setting. Operational security as well as other 
factors such as in- and out-group effects and short deployments all hinder the development 
of trust between the involved parties. In sum, the case of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan 
shows that cooperation between soldiers and interpreters is a highly dynamic, complicated, 
and even challenging matter that heavily depends on how the involved persons deal with the 
situation. Successful individual experiences, therefore, should form the basis for learning 
and institutionalizing lessons.   
To conclude, this study extensively demonstrates that language issues influence 
cooperation between international military personnel as well as collaboration with the local 
population. With regard to the latter, the linguistic and cultural skills of interpreters are 
crucial as they enable these agents to act as intermediaries between soldiers and local actors. 
Despite their vital role and position, smooth cooperation between soldiers and interpreters 
is not a matter of course. Efficient cooperative relationships typically do not emerge as a 
consequence of the military organization’s standard procedures, but have shown to strongly 
depend on individual traits. Particularly those soldiers and interpreters who can bridge the 
language gap and establish a constructive cooperation are instrumental to achieve mission 
success. It is time for military organizations to acknowledge these insights and start learning 
for future operations.
of operations. Second, the availability of interpreters alone does not guarantee success in 
engaging local partners as demonstrated by a case study on the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East-Timor (UNTAET). Military organizations should not only appoint 
interpreters, but also employ them to develop sufficient linguistic and cultural awareness 
and mediate between the different parties. Effective cooperation between soldiers and 
interpreters therefore is essential for mission success.  
In order to investigate the interpersonal dynamics between interpreters and soldiers, this 
study analyzes experiences from both sides. First, a survey among Dutch soldiers deployed 
to the Afghan province of Uruzgan, shows that, among others, the nature of the work and 
individual cross-cultural competencies are key determinants for efficient cooperation. 
Openness, cultural empathy and respect for the interpreter are crucial for accessing foreign 
societies. Furthermore, comfortability with the translation process, the general behaviour 
of interpreters and support for their in-between position create appropriate conditions 
for interaction with the local population. Due to the relatively understudied nature of the 
cooperation between soldiers and interpreters, this study subsequently focuses on the 
experiences of interpreters to introduce a theoretical framework that describes the role and 
position of these agents in conflict situations. An autoethnographic analysis of narratives 
from individuals who served as interpreters in circumstances of violent contention reveals 
that their experiences are defined by the aspects of allocation, motivation, position, 
intervention, and perception. 
Next, the framework is implemented to gather insight into the dynamics of cooperation 
between soldiers and interpreters in modern military missions. For this purpose, an 
extensive qualitative case study is applied which includes semi-structured interviews with 
national and local interpreters as well as Dutch soldiers deployed to Uruzgan province in 
Afghanistan. In addition to enhancing the understanding of how individuals respond 
to the complicated nature of this specific working relationship, the analysis also furthers 
the insight into the dynamics of each particular aspect of the theoretical framework. First, 
with regard to the aspect of allocation, social capital is instrumental in the recruitment 
of interpreters. Human capital, on the other hand, determines their allocation within the 
organization. The promotion of these agents to other units, paradoxically, often results in 
a shortage of competent interpreters at the lower level that executes the bulk of operations. 
Second, the aspect of motivation is approached rather instrumentally from the military side, 
while interpreters might join the military for more ideological reasons. Third, the aspect of 
the position makes clear that, despite the presence of protocols and guidelines, the position 
of the interpreter within the military organization remains ill-defined. In order to more 
strongly embed their position, the moderators of collective team identification and team 
member alignment should be structurally implemented by the organization. Individual 
soldiers and interpreters could act as transformational leaders in this process as they can 
cross bureaucratic strata and boundaries to the communal benefit of all stakeholders. 
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